Unless the terms of the Act and regulations require some other meaning be applied, the words "good character" should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, namely, a reference to the enduring moral qualities of a person, and not to the good standing, fame or repute of that person in the community. The former is an objective assessment apt to be proved as a fact whilst the latter is a review of subjective public opinion. ... A person who has been convicted of a serious crime and thereafter held in contempt in the community, nonetheless may show that he or she has reformed and is of good character. ... Conversely, a person of good repute may be shown by objective assessment to be a person of bad character.

4. The Federal Court of Australia has also considered the state of satisfaction that is required in determining whether a person is of good character. In BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574, O'Bryan J observed at [54]-[55] (citations omitted):

Section 21(2)(h) requires the Minister to form a judgment as to whether he or she is satisfied that the applicant for citizenship is of good character. The word "satisfied" in that context is not amenable to the application of an evidentiary burden of proof, such as balance of probabilities. That is for at least two reasons. First, the decision is an administrative decision to which the rules of evidence are inapplicable and the evidentiary burden of proof inapposite. Second, the matter of which the Minister must be satisfied, the applicant's good character, is not a fact to be proved but an opinion requiring an evaluative judgment. A standard of proof, such as balance of probabilities, is incapable of application to such an opinion. ... > > The absence of an evidentiary burden of proof does not mean that there is an absence of a legal standard of satisfaction. In the context of s 21(2)(h) of the Act, satisfaction requires that the decision-maker reach an affirmative belief that the applicant is a person of good character. It is not sufficient for the decision-maker to believe that there is a chance that the applicant is a person of good character; equally it is not necessary for the decision-maker to have a high degree of confidence that the applicant is a person of good character. ...

5. The respondent has published policy guidance in the form of Citizenship Procedural Instructions. The Citizenship Procedural Instruction No. 15 (CPI-15) provides some guidance as to the assessment of whether a person is of good character.
6. I am not bound by this policy, however I recognise that governmental policy should generally be applied unless it is inconsistent with the Act or there are cogent reasons to depart from it.[3] I do not consider CPI-15 is inconsistent with the Act nor do I consider there are cogent reasons to depart from it. Rather, I consider that the proper application of lawful policy promotes consistency in decision-making and is a cogent reason to apply the policy rather than depart from it.
7. CPI-15 guides decision makers to assess good character holistically.[4] That approach is consistent with the evaluative nature of the assessment required discussed in BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574.
8. Whilst I have considered CPI-15 in its entirety, it is useful to observe that, among other things and relevantly, the CPI-15 guides decision-makers:

(a) as to the qualities that a person of good character would be expected to have, including respecting and abiding by the law in Australia;[5] > > (b) that the citizenship character assessment is informed by the applicant's conduct prior to applying for a visa and during their time in Australia, requiring an assessment of all available information, including any information provided during the visa application process, while the applicant has been a visa holder in Australia, and during the processing of the citizenship application; [6] > > (c) that a person of good character would not practise deception in their dealings with the Australian Government, such as intentionally providing false personal information or engaging in other forms of material deception during visa and citizenship applications;[7] and > > (d) that where an applicant has provided incorrect information, it will only be of concern if it was provided knowingly.[8]

1. Before the Tribunal are the documents provided by the Respondent under s 23 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth). In addition, the parties provided a joint hearing bundle which was marked as Exhibit J1 (EX J1) and, in addition to the T-documents[9] and supplementary T-documents,[10] contained the respondent's statement of facts, issues and contentions,[11] a bundle of documents relating to the applicant's protection visa application,[12] and an English translation of the applicant's Taskera.[13]

1. In his evidence-in-chief, the applicant relied on his written statement provided to the Department.[14]
2. The applicant agreed during cross examination that he had been a Pakistani citizen 'his whole life'. In relation to the Taskera, the applicant explained that it was possible to obtain such documents in Pakistan by paying a fee. He otherwise indicated that, however, if the authenticity of the document were to be checked he did not think it would be accepted.
3. During cross examination, the applicant appeared to suggest that the Department ought to have realised he held Pakistani citizenship based on the documents he had produced in relation to his education in Pakistan. He further asserted that, had the Department expressly asked if he was a Pakistani citizen he would have disclosed it. He claimed that his failure to include this information earlier was because he had a lack of documents verifying his citizenship at that time.
4. The applicant also accepted that his previous statement to the Department, that he was residing in Pakistan illegally, was false. He acknowledged that there was a distinction between being a citizen of the country and holding evidence of that citizenship.
5. The applicant otherwise confirmed that he applied for his Pakistani passport in or around December 2016 and had last visited Pakistan in 2019. When asked about his failure to disclose his Pakistani citizenship in his application for a resident return visa in 2020, the applicant characterised the admission as a 'mistake' but was unable to provide an adequate explanation for why the information was withheld.

1. The applicant relies on statutory declarations provided by Mr G and Mr A. At the hearing, he indicated that it was unlikely that they would have anything further to add if they were to give oral evidence. Mr Roosendaal, for the respondent, indicated that he did not seek to cross examine Mr G and Mr A. In those circumstances, it was not necessary to take oral evidence from Mr G or Mr A.

1. The applicant accepts that he did not disclose his Pakistani citizenship to the Department intentionally. He concedes that this information was withheld throughout his dealings with the Department until he responded to the invitation to comment on the adverse information. Against this, the applicant's position was that if he was asked to provide the information he would have done so.
2. The applicant submits that this non-disclosure was motivated by fear for his safety rather than an intent to defraud for personal gain. He states that he was seeking refuge in Australia due to threats to his safety in Pakistan and had disclosed those threats to the Department.
3. In relation to his conduct and decision to withhold information, the applicant contends that he was advised by other Hazaras that he would be returned to Pakistan if he disclosed his citizenship. He claims this fear persisted despite his status as an Afghan and a Hazara Shia, which he contends would cause him to face a high risk of harm in Pakistan. He submits that he became afraid and consequently chose not to disclose the citizenship to avoid removal.
4. In support of his application and his character, the applicant has now provided a statutory declaration and copies of his Pakistani passport and National Identity Card. Additionally, he relies upon written references from Mr G and Mr A.

1. The respondent submits that the Tribunal cannot be satisfied the applicant is a person of good character as required by s 21(2)(h) of the Act because the applicant knowingly provided misleading and inaccurate information to the Department regarding his citizenship of Pakistan over an extended period.
2. The respondent relies upon specific instances of conduct spanning 15 years to demonstrate a sustained course of deception. These instances include:

(a) failing to disclose Pakistani citizenship during an initial interview and in a Form 80 personal particulars assessment in 2010; > > (b) insisting during the Independent Merits Review process in 2011 that he held no Pakistani citizenship and possessed no right to reside in that country; > > (c) stating in his 2011 Protection visa application that he resided in Pakistan illegally and had departed on a fraudulent passport; > > (d) answering in the negative when asked if he held other citizenship in his 2015 application for Australian citizenship by conferral; and > > (e) failing to disclose this citizenship in subsequent documents between 2017 and 2020, including a declaration of service, a further Form 80, a partner sponsorship application, and an application for a Resident Return visa.

3. The respondent argues this deception was material to the 2011 Independent Merits Review decision which found the applicant met the definition of a refugee. That finding was premised on the applicant having no right of residence in Pakistan, which was a conclusion derived directly from the false information provided by the applicant. The respondent contends that obtaining a migration benefit through dishonesty weighs significantly against a finding of good character.
4. The respondent also raises concerns about the applicant's truthfulness concerning identity documents. In 2011 and 2015, the applicant stated his Taskera was in Afghanistan or that he possessed no such document. Yet, he subsequently produced a copy of a Taskera issued in June 2010. The respondent notes that no explanation has been provided as to how this document was obtained while the applicant was in Australia.
5. The respondent submits that 'good character' refers to a person's enduring moral qualities. It is emphasised that the applicant signed six declarations verifying information he knew to be false. The respondent contends that observance of the truth is an absolute requirement in dealing with migration officials and that citizenship is a privilege requiring adherence to moral values, fundamentally honesty in dealings with the Government.
6. While the respondent acknowledges the two written references provided by the applicant, it submits they should be afforded limited weight as they do not address the specific conduct in question.

1. The issue I must determine is whether the applicant meets s 21(2)(h) of the Act, which requires that I be satisfied that he is of good character at the time of this decision. In doing so, I must consider all the evidence before me in a holistic way to form an evaluative judgment.[15] Paragraph 3.3 of CPI 15 also provides:

A decision-maker can be satisfied that an applicant is of good character if the applicant has demonstrated good enduring/lasting moral qualities that are evident before their visa application and throughout the time the applicant held a visa, and during the time their citizenship application was lodged and processed.

2. I am prepared to accept, as the applicant claims and the respondent does not resist, that were the applicant's conduct in relation to his migration matters put to one side, the applicant would otherwise be of good character. He is supporting his family, working, and pays his tax. Both of the applicant's character references also, subjectively, regard him as being a person of good character. Mr G describes the applicant has being 'hardworking, ethical and a good person'.[16] Among other things, Mr A describes the applicant as 'an honest, respectful, and helpful friend'.
3. However, as I will explain, I am not satisfied that the applicant is a person of good character for the purposes of s 21(2)(h) of the Act. I have reached this conclusion principally because of what I find to be the applicant's sustained course of deception regarding his Pakistani citizenship. This conduct strikes at the heart of the integrity of the Australian migration and citizenship framework.
4. The applicant accepts that he holds Pakistani citizenship. This is evidenced by a Pakistani passport issued in 2016 and a National Identity Card issued in 2022. I find that he does hold Pakistani citizenship. The applicant further accepts that he knowingly failed to disclose this citizenship until he responded to an invitation to comment on adverse information in January 2025. Indeed, the applicant said in his statutory declaration dated 2 January 2025 that:

I would like to sincerely apologise for failing to declare this upon my arrival and hope the department can understand my circumstances and reasons for not declaring this upon my arrival.

5. Insofar that the applicant claimed that his decision not to include information about his Pakistani citizenship in his 2020 resident return visa application[17] was a 'mistake', I find that he subjectively regards it as being a mistake because it has, among other things, resulted in his citizenship application being refused. In the context of the repeated failure of the applicant to disclose his Pakistani citizenship, I am satisfied that the decision not to disclose it in his 2020 resident return visa application was a conscious decision, and as such I am satisfied the non-disclosure occurred knowingly.
6. The concept of 'good character' requires an assessment of a person's enduring moral qualities. Central to this assessment in the present case is the requirement for candour and truthfulness in dealings with government officials.[18] I find the applicant has failed to meet this standard. The dishonesty in this case was not an isolated lapse in judgment; it was deliberate, repetitive, and calculated over a period of approximately 15 years. At the hearing before the Tribunal, the applicant referred to the nondisclosure of his Pakistani citizenship as costing him 15 years of his life. The applicant, however, conceded that the responsibility for that rested somewhere between '90%' and '100%' percent with him. Whilst this evidence gives some hope that the applicant has obtained some level of insight and remorse into his conduct, it is difficult to reconcile with his assertions or attempts to place any of the responsibility on the Department allegedly failing to ask him about his Pakistani citizenship.
7. The applicant's deception is critical to the resolution of whether I am affirmatively satisfied that he is a person of good character. In saying that, I make clear that I am not punishing the applicant for his past misdeeds. However, the applicant's deception has been material to his visa status in Australia. The evidence demonstrates that the applicant secured a Protection visa in 2011, in part, because the decision-maker accepted his claim that he had no right of residence in Pakistan. I am satisfied that the applicant knowingly allowed that decision-maker to proceed on a false factual basis. By concealing his Pakistani citizenship, the applicant engineered a migration outcome to which he may, or may not, have otherwise been entitled. The conduct in potentially securing a benefit through what I find was a material non-disclosure is conduct inconsistent with the moral qualities expected of a person of good character.
8. I also place significant weight on the persistence and duration of the dishonesty. Long after the initial grant of protection, the applicant continued to provide false information in statutory declarations, visa applications, a citizenship application, and a sponsorship application. I place considerable weight on the fact that the applicant signed no fewer than six declarations verifying the accuracy and correctness of information which should have, but did not, disclose his Pakistani citizenship. I find this demonstrates a continuing disregard for the law and the obligations of accurate disclosure.
9. In making that finding, I have considered the applicant's explanation that he feared being returned to Pakistan if he disclosed his citizenship. However, this does not mitigate the gravity of the conduct in the context of a citizenship application. While subjective fear may explain the initial non-disclosure, I do not accept that it justifies or adequately explains what I find is a decade-long, repeated, pattern of deceit in relation to the provision of information and failure to provide relevant information related to migration outcomes. Furthermore, I also place weight on the fact that the applicant only corrected the record in January 2025, around 12 months after being invited to comment on whether he had Pakistani citizenship or not. The applicant did not proactively self-disclose. This suggests to me that the disclosure was a matter of necessity rather than representing a genuine expression of remorse or a return to honest dealing at that time
10. I am also concerned about the applicant's conduct regarding his identity documents. I find the applicant's belated production of a Taskera, issued in 2010 against a context of previously claiming such a document was unavailable or in Afghanistan, provides additional support for a conclusion that the applicant has been selectively truthful when it has appeared to suit his immediate interests.
11. Candour and honesty in dealing with migration officials are of fundamental importance. The proper administration of the migration and citizenship framework relies heavily on the candour of applicants who are often required to provide information that is exclusively within their own knowledge. To knowingly engage in deception subverts the proper administration of those frameworks. Such conduct is the antithesis of the enduring moral qualifies required for the purposes of s 21(2)(h) of the Act. Honesty in a citizenship application is an absolute requirement and is the strict personal responsibility of a person who seeks the privileges, and obligations, that are attended to the conferral of Australian citizenship.
12. For the above reasons, I am not satisfied that the applicant is a person of good character at the time of this decision. I find the applicant's history of repeated deception of the Australian authorities in relation to his migration matters weighs very heavily and indeed determinatively against a finding that the applicant is of good character. I do not accept that the applicant's character, as it relates to his migration dealings, has been remediated by the effluxion of time and the counterbalancing of an extended period of honesty and candour in his migration affairs.

I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of General Member F Robertson

............[SGD]............................................................

[1] Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422; [1996] FCA 663.

[2] Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422; [1996] FCA 663, 431-432.

[3] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, 640.

[4] Citizenship Procedural Instruction No.15 - Assessing character under the Citizenship Act (CPI-15), [3.3]