Bousara & Skali [2025] FedCFamC2F 1293 (11 September 2025)

1. The Mother and the Father shall do all things and sign all documents as shall be necessary to renew the child's Australian Passport upon expiration, with the Mother to prepare any application in the first instance and the Father to return such application within 2 weeks of receipt from the Mother, with the parties to share equally the costs of obtaining the same.
2. The Mother shall hold the child's Passport when he is not travelling with the Father.
3. Subject to Order 2 above, the Mother shall provide the child's passport to the Father via the child not less than 7 days prior to the child's international travel with the Father and the Father shall return the child's passport to the Mother via the child within 48 hours of the child's return to Australia following international travel with the Father.
4. Within 7 days from the date of these orders, the Mother provide a copy of the bio-data page of the child's passport to the Father; and upon the child receiving a new or renewed Australian Passport, the Mother is to provide a copy of the bio-data page to the Father within 7 days of receipt of the new or renewed Australian Passport.

1. Pursuant to s 102QAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the application for other orders by the mother is dismissed.

1. There is an existing ADVO in place and to the extent of the communication required by these orders, these orders are to prevail over the ADVO.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are parenting proceedings that were commenced on 10 September 2024 and there was substantial agreement achieved with consent orders being made on 9 April 2025. Relevantly, those consent orders provided for shared parental responsibility. For some reason not apparent to this Court, the two remaining very narrow issues of overseas travel and passport were fixed for a further hearing with the discharge of the ICL.
2. The child in the present case is now 14 years old and has no serious mental or physical issues to be taken into account. The Court has read the child impact report, the affidavits, the case outlines and the written submissions. The parties at the commencement of the hearing today provided consent orders appropriately resolving, the travel disputes between them, in respect of which the Court indicated, subject to two corrections, it proposed to make the orders 1 to 6 in the form that were provided together with a notation.
3. What was then sought to be pressed was an application relating to a security bond for the respondent father ("the father") in respect of overseas travel and adult supervision for the child whilst there was overseas travel by the father. Whilst the Court greatly appreciates the assistance of the written submissions of Dr McConaghy on behalf of the applicant mother ("the mother"), this is an application that should not have been pursued. It is patent that there is no apparent real risk of the father not returning to Australia where he has lived for the last 24 years and where he has a residence that he owns. The application for a security bond appears to be one that cannot reasonably have been advanced as child focused but rather because of a substantial mistrust by the mother.
4. The Court understands that there has been family violence and is aware that there is an ADVO in place and appreciates the lack of trust that violation of an ADVO would engender. However, the father's evidence was that the child would not be able to travel overseas if he had to provide a bond. Identifying that the father has other assets he could sell does not assist the Court. A child of the age of 14 ordinarily would be able to spend time with either parent in accordance with his wishes. That is a matter that materially impacts on the issue of breach identified by the mother. Fourteen is not an age where the Court is likely to force the child to try and do something contrary to his wishes because it would be a form of potential child abuse, where the child has no other serious physical or mental issues.
5. The Court appreciates that the mother's concerns are no doubt heightened by the father's disregard of the existing parenting orders that were so recently entered into. The father should understand that he is exposed to contravention applications if he does not comply with the existing consent parenting orders. What makes this case even more surprising is that in few months' time, the child will spend such time as he wishes with either parent, and this issue is one that would have gone away entirely, and it is not apparent to the Court that there is any current proposed arrangement for overseas travel.
6. The Court adds that overseas travel for this child, given the need to take into account the cultural benefits of travelling to the parents' homeland, are obviously significant. To impose an impediment in the nature of a bond in this case is in no way child focused. Cooperative parenting requires a child focused approach by both parents. A child focused approach would recognise the cultural benefits of overseas travel by the child at this age with either parent. Introducing an impediment to that overseas travel where there is no real unacceptable risk reflects a failure to focus on the child of a similar kind that was identified in paragraph 65 of the child impact assessment. It is very important that both parents maintain a child focused approach in future parenting and avoid conflicts because that adversely impacts on the developmental, emotional, and psychological wellbeing of their child.
7. The Court is of the view under s 102QAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") that there is no reasonably arguable case to sustain the proposition that there should be a bond in the present case. The Court finds that the requirement of a bond is not in the best interests of the child and has taken into account the mandatory considerations under s 60CC of the Act applicable to this narrow issue.
8. The other remaining issue is one of desire for an order whilst overseas, which it was suggested should be reciprocal, that there should be constant adult supervision of the child. When the child is spending time with either parent, the parent with whom the child is with has parental responsibility for the child. That means that one expects that parent to exercise a child focused approach to their parenting. Micromanaging the parenting is not something that the Court should engage in. A child at the age of 14 is well able to travel overseas with a parent without a prescriptive order of the kind being sought by the mother in the present case.
9. Again, the Court understands the apprehension and fear in terms of trust and past family violence that have impacted on the mother in that regard, and the Court has taken into account the incidents that were referred to, including departure of the parenting orders to date on which the Court has already commented and reminded the father of the importance of complying with the same. However, in terms of overseas travel, it is not appropriate to impose such a prescriptive sanction in circumstances where the child is of the age of 14 in all the circumstances of this case.
10. The Court is of the view under s 102QAB of the Act that there is no reasonably arguable case to support the prescriptive order sought in respect of adult supervision during overseas travel advanced by the mother. The Court is not satisfied that such a prescriptive order is in the best interests of the child and has taken into account the mandatory considerations under s 60CC of the Act.
11. It is for these reasons the Court makes the above orders.

I certify that the preceding eleven (11) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of Judge Street.