• The Tribunal finds that the applicants have not provided supporting expert evidence to justify their submitted valuation, or establish the presence of contamination or structural issues;
• The Tribunal finds that the applicants have implicitly accepted the valuation given by the respondent;
• The Tribunal finds that the correct methodology of valuation to be applied is the comparative market approach which was used by the respondent in determining its valuations;
• The Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent's valuer considered all the relevant factors inclusive of defects of the properties, as evidenced by their recognition and analysis in the valuation report;
• The Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent's valuer came to the correct and preferable valuation for the properties having selected appropriate comparator properties and having made appropriate comparisons between them and the subject properties.

Administrative Review - Valuation of Land Act 1971 - Decision by Valuer-General upon an objection - General valuation of land within the State

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ss 34, 37

Valuation of Land Act 1971 ss 5, 11, 12, 24, 25, 25B, 25C

Ardoch Pty Ltd v VG (No 2) [2006] SASC 217

Bargwanna Pty Ltd & Anor v Valuer-General for the State of South Australia [2011] SASC 67

Bosnakis & Anor v Valuer-General of South Australia [2017] SASC 158

Bosnakis & Ors v Valuer-General [2024] SACAT 46

Bosnakis v Valuer-General [2023] SACAT 30

This is an edited version of the Tribunal's decision pursuant to s 60 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013. These changes do not affect the Tribunal's decision or its reasons for decision.

Made under the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 s 37(1)(a)

1. This is the determination of three applications made by Christopher and Helen Bosnakis (applicants) for review of decisions made by the Valuer-General (respondent). The decisions were made in relation to the site and capital values for the financial year 2023-2024 for three properties owned by Mr and Ms Bosnakis. The applications are made pursuant to s 25C of the Valuation of Land Act 1971 (VL Act).
2. The decisions for review relate to three properties: the First Burnside property and the Second Burnside property (2023/SA003832 and 2023/SA003833, respectively); and the Valley View property (2023/SA003836).
3. Each application raises similar issues in respect of the review of the valuation of each of the properties, with the same parties, so the three applications are being dealt with together by the Tribunal.
4. The Valuer-General determined the site value and capital value of each of the properties as at 1 January 2023 as follows:

Valley View property: site value $550,000 (notional value), and capital value $900,000 (notional value)

First Burnside property: site value $960,000, and capital value $960,000

Second Burnside property: site value $990,000, and capital value $990,000

The Valuer-General relied upon expert reports from an independent expert valuer, Ms Rachel Elliott.

1. The applicants lodged applications for objection against these valuations, and following consideration of these objections, the notional site and capital values for the Valley View property were reduced, to $470,000 and $850,000 respectively; while the site and capital values for the First Burnside property and the Second Burnside property remained unchanged.
2. The applicants submit that the valuations of the properties should be determined as follows:

Valley View property: site value $100,000 (notional value), and capital value $100,000 (notional value)

First Burnside property: site value $700,000, and capital value $700,000

Second Burnside property: site value $650,000, and capital value $650,000

1. There have been numerous hearings concerning these applications, and the parties have provided detailed written submissions. At the directions hearing of 22 September 2025 the parties agreed to provide final written submissions, and for the matters to then be determined on the basis of the written submissions and evidence before me.
2. The applicants provided a written submission in respect of each application on 18 August 2025, including a number of exhibits (detailed in the Directions of 22 September 2025) in support of their applications. The applicants provided a further written submission served on the respondent on 15 October 2025. Mr Bosnakis also filed an affidavit dated 23 July 2025. A report dated 31 October 2024 by Mr Peter Ghion, an expert valuer, was filed by the applicants, with a valuation estimate of $900,000 - $950,000 in respect of the two properties at Burnside. However the applicants subsequently advised that they do not rely on this report.
3. The respondent filed a written submission on 16 September 2025, including three Schedules: Land Valuation Principles; submissions on Bosnakis v Valuer-General [2017] SASC 158 (2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis); and documents provided to Ms Elliott (the valuer who conducted the valuations in issue). The respondent provided a further Supplementary Written Submission in response to the applicants' final submission, dated 21 October 2025.
4. I take all this material into account in this determination, and note that the applicants did not rely on the report from Mr Ghion.

1. The applicants have agreed that the grounds for review in these matters are as follows:

Valley View property: the respondent failed to properly consider a number of issues relevant to the site and capital valuations of the property. These were contaminants on the property, including bitumen; uncontrolled fill up to 3 meters; water problems; structural issues concerning the building; cost factors for rectification; retaining walls; trees; white ants; issues with pavers; and issues with roadworks.

First Burnside property: the respondent failed to properly consider a number of relevant issues: these were the quality of the soil and the content of soil reports; a crater of 6 meters; engineering reports concerning the condition of the building; the slope of the land; retaining walls; the period of rental and its impact on the property; contaminants including asbestos; fencing; the proximity of the road and its impact.

Second Burnside property: the same issues as for the First Burnside property.

1. The applicants' principal submission is that the valuation approach adopted by the respondent, namely the comparative market approach, is inadequate and "extremely incorrect", as it does not take into account costs and liabilities associated with the properties in determining their values. The applicants submit that the properties should be valued taking into account their condition, and liabilities and costs associated with each property. They submit this approach as the appropriate methodology for valuation, is supported by in the views expressed by another valuer (Mr Colin Ettridge), and in a decision by Parker J in the Supreme Court of SA in 2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis.

1. In respect of this property the applicants submit that the report of the respondent's valuer, Ms Elliott, failed to take into account or did not appreciate all the problems, losses and liabilities of the property, and overlooked a number of features of the property.
2. In particular, they submit Ms Elliott misrepresented or misunderstood the "serious catastrophic landslide" which had occurred at the property, referring to it as "erosion or slippage"; she stated that the 30% of the property was not suitable for development, whereas the applicants submitted the whole property was unsuitable because of the unstable soil at the property; and she considered there was no contamination at the property, whereas the applicants submitted there is bitumen, runoff from the road due to flooding, and weedicide and pesticide residue, all representing contaminants.
3. The applicants also state that the property is subject to water damage from a neighbouring property, and that there are major structural issues and defects in the house situated on the property, and that remediation of those defects would be very expensive, and affect the value of the property.
4. In an affidavit dated 23 July 2025, Mr Bosnakis states that the evidence shows that only a small part of the property is stable, and that the soil is contaminated by large amounts of bitumen; that very extensive and expensive remediation of the site is necessary; that an "enormous amount of repairs " are necessary to rectify the building at the property, with a quote for $1,204,500 for repairs at the property. Mr Bosnakis states that this evidence was not available to the Tribunal when earlier applications relating to valuation of the property for earlier years were considered by the Tribunal.
5. The soil report dated 6 October 2022 refers to soil analysis taken from three bore holes. It identifies "soil colour", "texture, structure and consistency", and "soil description". The latter includes reference to "fill", and to "possible pavement profilings" at the top level, and "demolition fragments" elsewhere. Other than Mr Bosnakis' comments in his affidavit, there is no analysis or explanation of the soil report.
6. A "Remediation soil works - tender submission" dated 19 June 2023 addresses "the demolition, and remediation soil works at the property, to include removal and disposal of contaminated soil ... up to 24,000 tonnes", and clearing and levelling the site.
7. A property report relating to the premises, dated 30 July 2024 (in the form of a pre-purchase property report) was also provided. This report refers to "evidence of serious safety hazards" ("unsuitably levelled" areas outside, lack of lift off hinges to the toilet door, and insufficient clearance above the door); major defects (including possible water damage to ceilings, walls, floors and cabinetry throughout; some cracking; damage to tiles, sealants and taps in wet areas; some cracking in external walls; and some possible pest damage and wood rot externally). Some "minor defects" were also identified. An engineering inspection of the boundary retaining wall was also provided, suggesting "the wall appeared to be structurally sound and the main issue was the migration of water from the Client's property to the neighbour's property".
8. A quote from a builder, dated 25 September 2024 estimated a total of $1,204,500 for "major property renovations" including "serious earthworks including ground water drainage and run off water, structural repairs, major electrical works, swimming pools, 3x bathrooms, laundry, flooring, 2x balcony's, [sic] balustrade's, [sic] tiling, salt damp, eaves and gutters, pergola, glass windows/door in pool room, gyprock, tiling". Communication from another builder (dated 8 August 2024) declines to undertake building or repair work at the premises, as the builder specialises in new home construction and large additions. The builder comments that "you have extensive issues with your home that are related to the design of your existing home", and quotes $2,500 - $2,800 per square meter for the construction of a two-storey home, in addition to design and landscaping costs. A further quote for the preparation of concept plans for a new build was provided from another organisation, quoting $23,980.
9. Mr Bosnakis also provided photographs of the site.
10. The applicants also provided an opinion on the value of a different property, dated February 2021, by Mr Colin Ettridge of Land Services SA. Mr Bosnakis submits that the approach taken by Mr Ettridge in that valuation is the appropriate approach to take with the valuation of his property, in particular in that he makes adjustments to the value ascribed by deducting the costs for demolition of existing structures and the cost of remediation of the site.

1. Most of the submissions are common to both these adjoining premises.
2. The applicants submitted that Ms Elliott's valuation was incorrect in her assessment that the road on which the property was situated "carried moderate traffic volumes"; and that she was incorrect in her assessment that there is a "moderate fall" of land on the property, as they assert that there is a fall of approximately four meters, and the house is in a "4 meter hole". The applicants also disagreed with Ms Elliott's assessment that there was no contamination or potential contamination of the properties, as they state there is asbestos in the buildings. They state Ms Elliott failed to take the soil report into account.
3. The applicants submit that the houses on both properties were uninhabitable and would require demolition. In addition, they state there was no stormwater infrastructure at the premises. They submitted a quote for a "demolition package" in respect of both properties, quoting a total of $195,613 for all work associated with demolition.
4. A Site Inspection Engineer's Report, dated 12 August 2024, refers to "extensive defects" at the two properties, "including asbestos cladding and fibres, rising damp, mould caused by lack of weatherproofing and no moisture barriers". The Report states that both properties "are presently uninhabitable and beyond economic repair", and that the site "falls away ... overall 7 metres approx. diagonally across the two lots". The Report notes that "the topography allows for unrestricted stormwater flow from Greenhill Road across both lots", and "there was no observed stormwater infrastructure". The Report concludes that any future development of the site would require further comprehensive soil testing to detect any soil contaminants for remediation; removal of contaminated and unsuitable foundation materials, and replacement with suitable materials; the installation of a compliant stormwater system, and engineering design of appropriate footings for new buildings. Quotes for the installation of stormwater fitouts at both properties were provided: the quotes for the two properties total $82,380.00.
5. A quote for the demolition of the buildings on both sites is provided, including removal of asbestos and all clearing and removals, including of 200mm topsoil: this totals $325,015.00.
6. The applicants also submitted a conditional email offer for the purchase of both properties in September 2015 for a total price of $860,000.00. This sale did not proceed, but they submitted this showed that the properties were worth far less to a potential purchaser than reflected in the valuations.

1. The applicants acknowledge there have been earlier decisions made by the Tribunal in which their argument concerning the appropriate approach to land valuation has been rejected by the Tribunal. They submit that the views and conclusions in those cases should be disregarded because Mr Bosnakis had been unable to effectively present his case at the hearings of those earlier matters as he had not been legally represented, was dyslexic, and had been suffering the effects of medication he was taking. In addition, they state there is new evidence and information for the Tribunal to take into account. They submit the Tribunal should adopt the approach set out by Parker J in 2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis.
2. The applicants disputed the valuations reached in Ms Elliott's report concerning the Valley View property. They submit that Ms Elliott failed to take into account the extent of the erosion on the property, and the risk of another "landslide", as a result of water accumulating under the road and seepage into the ground; that she is incorrect in her assumption that 30% of the property is unsuitable for development, when all is unsuitable because of unstable soil; and she is incorrect that there is no potential contamination at the property, as they say there is "uncontrolled fill" and bitumen at the property, as well as other contaminants brought in by the constant flooding of the property.
3. The applicants also challenge the basis of the valuation. They submit that the cost of remediating defects and other issues at the property should be deducted from the proposed value, as these costs detract from the value of the property and would be taken into account by a purchaser in determining how much to pay. Accordingly, the documents provided by the applicants, setting out the costs of various remediations, are relevant to establishing a proper value of the property, as these costs and liabilities should be deducted from the proposed valuation. They state that the documents provided establish clearly that there are major issues with the property, such as would significantly reduce its value, as a purchaser would have to address the issues. The material provided demonstrated the cost of doing so, and they submitted these costs effectively should reduce the valuation that could be ascribed to the property.
4. They submit that all the documents provided represent "expert reports and quotations", and so should be taken into account by the Tribunal. They submit that this material is based on expertise, and "cannot be compared with the sales comparisons of Ms Elliott". They submit that Ms Elliott "does not have experience in the building industry", and accordingly she was unable to make an assessment of the condition of the properties.
5. The applicants submit that the other properties identified by Ms Elliott do not have the same issues as does their property, which is in a very poor condition.
6. The applicants submit that the approach to valuation they propose is adopted and applied by other valuers. They refer to the valuation provided of other premises by Mr Ettridge, and also assert other valuers representing the respondentshould have adopted this approach. They submit the decision of Parker J in 2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis supports this approach to valuation, and it should be applied in respect of their properties.
7. In relation to the Valley View property, the applicants assert that taking all liabilities and costs associated with the property into account, the property had a "negative value" of $1,548,725: they arrive at this figure by taking the valuation determined by the respondent ($850,000), and deducting from it the costs of remediation as set out in in the various documents provided to the Tribunal. The applicants submit that, taking into account that valuations are required for rating and taxing purposes and that a "negative rating" cannot apply, a "fair valuation", taking into account all the matters they have referred to, would be $100,000 for both the notional site and capital value in relation to the Valley View property.
8. In relation to the properties at Burnside, the applicants submit that the costs and liabilities relevant to those properties should also be taken into account in assessing the value of the properties. They refer to the quotes and reports relating to the condition of the properties, which demonstrate that the houses on the properties are uninhabitable, and the costs of remediation of the defects of the properties. They submit that Ms Elliott failed to take this information into account in making her valuation.
9. The applicants state that they have proved that there are contaminants in both properties, and this was ignored by Ms Elliott; and they state that they have presented evidence that in 2015, when the properties were in much better condition, occupied and generating income, a prospective purchaser was only prepared to offer $850,000 for both properties.
10. Applying the same approach to these properties, the applicants submit that the First Burnside property should be valued at $700,000 for both site and capital value; and the Second Burnside property should be valued at $650,000 for both site and capital value.

1. The respondent submitted the Tribunal should vary the notional site value and notional capital value assigned by the Valuer-General for the 2023-2024 financial year to the Valley View property, such that the notional site value is $470,000, and the notional capital value is $850,000; in respect of the First Burnside property, affirm the decision of the Valuer-General that the site and capital value for the 2023-2024 financial year are $960,000; and in respect of the Second Burnside property, affirm the decision of the Valuer-General that the site and capital value for the 2023-2024 financial year are $990,000.
2. The respondent noted in its written submission that the only expert evidence before the Tribunal is the expert reports of Ms Elliott, the independent valuer engaged by the respondent. The respondent submitted Ms Elliott should be regarded as providing expert evidence in this matter, and noted that although the applicants had filed a report by a valuer Mr Ghion (in relation to the Second Burnside property), they expressly stated they do not wish to rely on this report.
3. The respondent rejected the applicants' assertions that Ms Elliott has misunderstood or disregarded features of the property at Valley View. It is noted that she considered "the extremely steep" topography, referring to aerial photography which showed "some erosion or slippage in the past", and acknowledging that "significant supporting earthworks" would be required for future development in part of the property. The respondent notes that Ms Elliott analysed market conditions at the date of valuation, taking into account strong value growth in 2022.
4. In relation to the properties at Burnside, Ms Elliott considered the site attributes including the poor condition of the buildings on the properties, and that it was likely that "the cost to restore the improvements to an acceptable market standard would be unviable".
5. In considering the market conditions at the date of valuation, Ms Elliott referred to the strong growth in value in 2022, including the strong demand for land and redevelopment opportunities in Burnside, the larger site proportions, and the underlying zoning which would permit redevelopment, as well as the busy major road frontage. Ms Elliott commented that no allowance for demolition was made in the value assessment, as she considered that the costs of demolition are not an impediment in markets where vacant land is scarce, "particularly in prestige markets", such as this location.
6. Mr Bullock for the respondent noted that the applicants had not put forward any expert report in support of their contended values, and on that basis, had not met the onus on them to establish that the values they proposed were correct or preferable. The respondent submitted that it was open to the Tribunal to dismiss the application due to lack of evidence.
7. The respondent submits that the arguments presented by the applicants are similar to the issues put to Ms Elliott in previous proceedings they had brought before the Tribunal (matters 2022/SA003741; 2022/SA003748; and 2022/SA003756, the previous proceedings). Ms Elliott had been the expert valuer for the respondent in the previous proceedings, and the approach submitted by the applicants was rejected by President Hughes in her determination in 2024 of the previous proceedings (Bosnakis & Ors v Valuer-General [2024] SACAT 46 (2024 Bosnakis)). The previous proceedings also related to the same properties, and concerned the valuations of those properties at an earlier date.
8. Mr Bullock submitted that the view taken by President Hughes in rejecting the approach to valuation submitted by the applicants should be adopted and applied in the present matters. President Hughes rejected the applicants' arguments in the previous proceedings, and accepted the approach to valuation, and the specific conclusions she had reached, presented by Ms Elliott. In particular, in relation to the First Burnside property, her Honour accepted Ms Elliott's view that "demolition costs are not a special category of defect that depress the price of properties that are being valued as a residential development site", and that "the quality of the comparator pool, and the unremarkable characteristics ... permitted the comparable transactions method to provide a valuation without recourse to adjustment".
9. In relation to the Valley View property, her Honour did not accept that any defects at the property were of such consequence as to affect the value "beyond the ordinary contribution that the defects made to the comparison process". She considered the defects had been taken into account in determining value, and, further, that Mr Bosnakis had not established that he was obliged to take any steps by way of remediation in order to be able to sell the property if he wished to do so.
10. Finally, the respondent submitted that it appeared that the applicants had implicitly accepted the values ascribed by the Valuer-General, as they had taken these valuations as the base value from which they then deducted the costs and liabilities they asserted should be taken into account.
11. In respect of specific matters raised and material provided by the applicants, the respondent provided the following responses:
    • No expert evidence of structural issues at the Valley View property has been submitted by the applicants.
    • Ms Elliott considered the quote from Royal Park salvage (the applicants' Exhibit B) for soil works remediation in the sum of $1,080,000, and noted that there was no requirement to undertake this work; and further, that this is an assessment of notional value which "assumes the existing title configuration and potential for division (and as such development to the individual titles) does not exist".
    • Ms Elliott considered the building inspection report (Exhibit C) which identified an "enormous amount of repairs required to rectify the property", and noted that these observations were consistent with her observations of the property condition.
    • The quote from Levalex Builders (Exhibit E) was not provided to Ms Elliott, but does not include any expert engineering evidence concerning structural issues, but is a quote to carry out a "complete renovation" of the property. The respondent submitted that the quote, while referring to potential structural repairs being undertaken, does not amount to engineering evidence of engineering or structural defects with the property. The quote from Precision Homes (Exhibit G) is a quote for the design for a new house, not addressing the need to rectify the issue; and the email from Rowett Construction (Exhibit F) addresses whether the builder was prepared to carry out work, not an assessment of structural issues.
12. In relation to the properties at Burnside, the respondent submitted that the applicants' submissions identify that they disagree with the methodology adopted by Ms Elliott, and her conclusions as to value.
13. In particular however, the respondent notes that its valuation of these properties has ascribed no value to the buildings on the properties: the site and capital values of the properties are the same. In those circumstances there is no point in seeking to deduct from the valuations any asserted costs to repair the buildings, as the valuations are, effectively, of the land value only, and Ms Elliott noted the buildings on both properties were uninhabitable. She also expressed the view that it was not necessary to make any allowance for the cost of demolition of the structures: the respondent notes that the applicants have not provided any valuation evidence that demolition costs would be deducted from the market value of the land.
14. The respondent also notes that quotes relating to costs of fencing, and stormwater infrastructure, are inappropriate to take into account. Mr Bullock notes that the stormwater infrastructure does not presently exist, and there is no evidence it is required in order to sell the property. With respect to the fencing quotes, the respondent notes that such costs are usually shared with neighbouring owners, and these and costs such as for retaining walls and filling costs would generally, once incurred, increase the value of the property.
15. The respondent also rejects the applicants' assertions relating to contamination of the properties, rejected by Ms Elliott. It is submitted the presence of asbestos and surface debris, especially in respect of the buildings of the age of those on the properties, are not generally matters that materially impact on value. The respondent notes there has been no contamination assessment carried out on the properties, and the issue had been appropriately considered by Ms Elliott.
16. In relation to the applicants' underlying valuation methodology, that is, taking Ms Elliott's valuation and then deducting costs from it, the respondent submits that this does not accord with valuation practice. This approach was also rejected by President Hughes in her decision relating to the previous proceedings.
17. In addition, the respondent submits that once the works the applicants assert are necessary, the costs for which would be deducted from the valuation of the properties, it is likely the properties would have a significantly greater value.
18. The respondent submits that there is no basis for the approach proposed by the applicants, and the methodology adopted by Ms Elliott accords with general valuation practice, and the approach taken by President Hughes in the 2024 Bosnakis decision concerning the previous proceedings.
19. The respondent provided separate submissions on the general principles governing land valuation, and on the decision of Parker J in 2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis.

1. The office of the Valuer-General is established under the VL Act with the function of making valuations of land, determining the annual value, the capital value, the site value and the unimproved value of land, where those values are required for the assessment of rates, taxes and other charges (see s 11 of the VL Act). Pursuant to ss 11 and 12 of the VL Act, the Valuer-General conducts general valuations with respect to land in the State on an annual basis, and a value is assigned as at a date determined by the Valuer-General.
2. The capital value of land is defined in the s 5(1) of the VL Act as

... the capital amount that an unencumbered estate of fee simple in the land might reasonably be expected to realise upon sale, but if the value of the land has been enhanced by trees planted on the land (other than commercial plantations) or trees preserved on the land for the purpose of shelter or ornament, the capital value must be determined as of the value of the land had not been so enhanced

3. The site value of the land is defined in s 5(1) of the VL Act as

...the capital amount that an unencumbered estate in fee simple in the land might reasonably be expected to realise upon sale assuming that any improvements on the land, the benefit of which is unexhausted at the time of valuation, had not been made; for the purposes of this definition - > > (a) improvements means -

(i) buildings and structures (but not including structures in the nature of site works); and

(ii) wells, dams and reservoirs;

(iii) and the planting of trees for commercial purposes

1. A person who is dissatisfied with a valuation may object to it under s 24 of the VL Act. The respondent must consider the objection, and may allow or disallow the objection (s 25(1) of the VL Act). If the person remains dissatisfied, they may seek a review by a valuer under s 25B of the VL Act, and if the person is still dissatisfied following that review, then they may seek review by this Tribunal under s 25C of the VL Act.
2. An application pursuant to s 25C of the VL Act invokes the Tribunal's review jurisdiction under s 34 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SACAT Act).
3. The operation of s 34 of the SACAT Act is modified by the terms of s 25C of the VL Act. Section 25C(3)(b) of the VL Act provides that

a review under this section will be taken to come within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction but, in the exercise of this jurisdiction, SACAT will consider the matter de novo (adopting such processes and procedures, and considering and receiving such evidence or material, as it thinks fit for the purposes of the proceedings)

4. A review of the respondent's decision requires the Tribunal to determine the correct or preferable decision. The Tribunal may affirm the decision under review; vary the decision; set aside the decision and substitute its own decision; or send it back to the decision maker for reconsideration. Section 25C of the VL Act expressly provides the Tribunal with the discretion to vary the determination by increasing or decreasing the valuation.

1. Section 25C(3)(b) of the VL Act makes it clear that the Tribunal is to exercise its jurisdiction under s 34 of the SACAT Act by considering the matter afresh.
2. It is not necessary for the applicants to demonstrate error in the way in which the decisions subject to review were made, but in 2024 Bosnakis (the decision determining the previous proceedings) President Hughes stated that (at [113])

In a challenge to a valuation under section 25C of the Act, the onus is on the applicant to establish that the valuations he contends are correct, should have been made by the respondent.

3. President Hughes referred to a statement of Kourakis J (as he then was) in Bargwanna Pty Ltd & Anor v Valuer-General for the State of South Australia [2011] SASC 67 at [6], where he stated that although it is not necessary to show error, an applicant appealing pursuant to s 25C has an onus:

The appellant must satisfy this Court that a different valuation should have been made. That onus is discharged by leading evidence of the value of the property.

4. In Bosnakis 2024, President Hughes accepted that valuation is a matter of expertise (at [188]). She proceeded to adopt the view expressed by Debelle J in Ardoch Pty Ltd v VG (No 2) [2006] SASC 217 at [33] as follows:

[T]he court will not interfere with a valuation unless the appellant demonstrates that the valuer whose assessment is subject to appeal has made some error of law; has acted on a wrong principle of valuation, had misapprehended, misused or excluded relevant material, in other words, has failed to have had regard to relevant factors or has had regard to irrelevant factors; had misapplied principle or has in some other way erred in discharging the task of a valuer. The court will also interfere where the valuation is manifestly excessive or manifestly low.

5. President Hughes also noted that the Supreme Court, which exercised this jurisdiction before it was transferred to the Tribunal, had taken the view that it was not appropriate for the Court to select elements of one valuation and elements of another to reach a third valuation. President Hughes acknowledged that the role of the Tribunal is different to the role of the Court, and the Tribunal, as an administrative body, is expressly authorised to substitute its own decision. However, she noted that in these matters "the decision is one wholly comprised of an opinion that is the subject of expertise", and concluded (at [191])

... it is appropriate to maintain the approach that the outcome arrived at will be one that either adopts a particular valuation that has been contended for by a party, or remits the question for reconsideration.

Previous Tribunal decisions relating to the same properties

1. The applicants have made previous applications to the Tribunal for review of decisions made by the the respondent in respect of the same properties, where the valuations applied to previous years. Tribunal Member Bean considered the valuation of the three properties for the 2021-2022 financial year in Bosnakis v Valuer-General [2023] SACAT 30, and President Hughes reviewed the valuations for the properties in her decision related to the previous proceedings in the decision referred to above, dated 28 May 2024 (2024 Bosnakis).
2. In both these matters the Tribunal affirmed the decisions of the Valuer-General.
3. The Tribunal is not bound by earlier decisions made in the Tribunal, but I should carefully consider these decisions and take them into account. These decisions were concerned with the same parties, the same properties, and similar decisions concerning the valuation of the properties. The applicants presented similar submissions and evidence at the hearings in those matters, although they presented some additional evidence in the present matters before the Tribunal. In both the previous matters the Tribunal presented carefully considered and detailed reasons for its decisions. The applicants did not submit I should disregard these earlier decisions, but directed me to the additional evidence they were presenting, as well as another decision relating to different properties, namely 2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis, decided by the Supreme Court, which they considered supported their case.
4. In both the earlier matters before the Tribunal the applicants presented a similar argument as they presented in this matter presently before the Tribunal. The underlying fundamental submission made by the applicants was that the decisions in those matters were not correct or preferable because the approach to the valuation of the properties was flawed. In each of those previous applications the valuations determined by the respondent was based on the expert valuation of Ms Elliott. In both cases the Tribunal accepted the valuation approach and methodology adopted by Ms Elliott over the approach submitted as appropriate by the applicants.
5. In the previous proceedings Ms Elliott gave evidence before the Tribunal, as did the applicants' expert valuer, Ms Loftes. President Hughes accepted Ms Elliott's expert opinion and methodology over that of Ms Loftes.
6. The applicants did not appeal to the Supreme Court in respect of either of these earlier decisions of the Tribunal.
7. The application presently before the Tribunal relates to different decisions made by the the respondent. Although the decisions relate to the same properties, they are valuations for a different period (2023-2024 financial year). The applicants have made a similar submission in the present matter to that made in the earlier matters before the Tribunal: that is, that the valuation methodology adopted by the respondent in this matter, as in the previous decisions, is not a correct methodology for valuation.
8. The valuation methodology proposed by the applicants is that adjustments should be applied by way of deductions from the value reached through the standard comparable transactions method of valuation (formerly known as the "direct comparison" method). The comparable transactions method is a "market approach" to valuation, where sales of comparable properties are compared with the subject property, with adjustments for differences such as allotment size, zoning, location, and improvements, to arrive at a market value (see the account of Ms Elliott's description of this approach by President Hughes at [87] in 2024 Bosnakis).
9. The applicants submitted that once this valuation is established, then costs and liabilities relating to the property should be deducted from the valuation figure reached in order to account for the particular defects in the property, on the basis that these defects would be taken into account by a potential purchaser. Accordingly, they submitted evidence of defects at the three properties, and the cost of remedying those defects, and submitted these costs should be deducted from the value arrived at by the comparable transactions method.
10. In the previous matters decided by the Tribunal in relation to the values of these properties, the applicants made the same submissions concerning methodology, and in both those matters, this approach to valuation was rejected by the Tribunal as an appropriate or relevant methodology.
11. In 2024 Bosnakis, President Hughes carefully considered the evidence of Ms Elliott on the relevance of making further deductions. Her evidence had been that generally such further deduction after reaching a value would be unnecessary, because the comparable transactions method would usually take into account any value reducing characteristics of the subject property, as the comparable transactions method assumes there will be differences between properties. In that matter Ms Elliott had given evidence of how she took into account the various characteristics of the properties, as well as how she considered the evidence presented by the applicants concerning various aspects of costs of remediation.
12. In considering whether to adopt the submission of the applicants with respect to deductions of costs and liabilities from the established value, President Hughes considered 2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis, relied on by the applicants.
13. In that case Parker J considered the nature of "improvements" in respect of the property. The principal concern about "improvement" was surface debris on the property, and whether this, or other factors, amounted to "contamination" of the property. President Hughes concluded that it was apparent in that case, and in the matter before her, that the relevance of contamination, in whatever form, to the valuation of property, depends on the purpose to which the property may be put by potential purchasers. This in turn depends on a variety of other factors. President Hughes concluded that in the 2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis decision, the evidence was that the highest and best use of that property was as a storage site or wrecking yard, rather than as an industrial or commercial tenancy. It was this "narrow use to which the land could be put in the light of the risk that there was sub-surface hazardous contamination ... that depressed the value of the land and made it appropriate to apply a discount" (see [240] 2024 Bosnakis, referring to [112] of 2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis).
14. President Hughes distinguished 2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis from the proceedings before her on the basis that it was agreed in that case that the highest and best use of the Valley View property was its current use, namely as a residential dwelling situated on three allotments. Accordingly, the pool of purchasers was not reduced as it had been in the 2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis (which related to a different property). In addition, it was agreed that the subject property in that matter was significantly inferior to all the comparator properties because of the defects including contaminants and rubbish at the property, but President Hughes found that this was not established by the evidence before her in the matter she was determining. Finally, President Hughes found that in the matter before her, to the extent to which there were defects in the site and improvements at Valley View property, these had been taken into account in the determination of the value of the property, and that the applicant in the matter before her had not established that he was obliged to take any steps by way of remediation in order to sell the property if he wished to do so.
15. President Hughes concluded (at [246]):

... the 2017 Proceedings [2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis] do not establish that, in relation to [the Valley View property], there was an obligation on the valuers to discount the valuation further than had already been done, to take account of the negative attributes of the property. Further, when the circumstances of the cases are compared, it is evident that the basis on which the discount was applied in the 2017 Proceedings does not apply to the valuation task that was required for [the Valley View property].

16. I am not strictly bound by the decisions or reasons expressed in the earlier decisions of the Tribunal, as the role of the Tribunal as a body of administrative review is to review the matter before it on its merits, and, in the case of applications under the VL Act, on a de novo basis. However, I should not disregard earlier Tribunal decisions in the same area, and should consider the reasoning and application of principle in those earlier cases, as consistency is a relevant concern for the Tribunal, although of course not more relevant or significant than the circumstances and issues of the particular matter.
17. Taking into account the close connection between the matters considered in both those decisions, and the parties and properties of the matters presently before the Tribunal, it is not possible for me to disregard these decisions even if I considered it proper to do so. However, considering those connections, and the similarities in the submissions and evidence presented in the present matter by the applicants, and the very detailed consideration of those same submissions, issues and evidence by President Hughes in 2024 Bosnakis, I consider 2024 Bosnakis in particular to be a decision I should consider with care and respect.
18. In addition, I note that a new application cannot be taken as providing an opportunity for applicants to review past decisions of the Tribunal. The SACAT Act provides means by which parties who disagree with decisions of the Tribunal may appeal to the Supreme Court of South Australia: I note in relation to both of the previous decisions of the Tribunal concerning the valuation of these properties the applicants did not avail themselves of that right. Making a new application in respect of the new decisions concerning the valuation of those properties does not provide an alternative means by which those decisions can be reviewed.

1. Before specifically considering the submissions concerning the valuation of the three individual properties, I set out the general principles which I will take into account in determining these matters. Some have already been addressed above in these reasons.
2. The onus is on the applicants to establish that the decisions of the respondent being reviewed pursuant to their applications are not correct or not preferable. To do so, while the applicants do not necessarily have to establish error by the respondent, they must establish that a wrong valuation has been made, for example through the application of a wrong principle of valuation, or misunderstanding or disregarding relevant material or factors. This is clear from President Hughes in 2024 Bosnakis, referring to considerations by Kourakis J in Bargwanna Pty Ltd & Anor v Valuer-General for the State of South Australia [2011] SASC 67, and Debelle J in Ardoch Pty Ltd v VG (No 2) [2006] SASC 217.
3. A valuation of property for the purposes of the VL Act requires an exercise of expertise, and evidence of that exercise must be before the Tribunal for it to determine that a correct or preferable decision has been made. The Tribunal only has the opinion of one expert valuer before it: that is the report of the respondent's expert valuer, Ms Elliott, with respect to all three of the properties relevant to these matters. The applicants did not rely on an alternative valuation by another valuer: although they did file a valuation report in respect of one of the properties, they advised they did not rely on it and I have not taken it into account.
4. I am satisfied Ms Elliott is appropriately to be regarded as an expert in these areas. I note she was accepted as an expert witness in the 2024 Bosnakis, and I adopt that finding. In this respect I note that she has appropriate academic and professional qualifications, and is a Certified Practicing Valuer. She has worked as a property valuer since 1990, and has worked with a number of professional property organisations. From July 2022 - April 2025 Ms Elliott was Chief Valuer of Land Services SA, and since May 2025 she has been a Director at McGees Property Adelaide. This information is included in the respondent's written submissions, and was not challenged by the applicants.
5. The applicants in their submissions did challenge Ms Elliott's expertise as a structural engineer and builder. I accept that Ms Elliott is not and does not present as an expert in these areas. However, the applicants did not present any evidence from any persons who could be regarded as experts for the purposes of the VL Act. While they asserted the documentary evidence they presented was "expert" (from engineers, builders and others), the relevant expertise that is required for the establishment of a valuation for the purposes of the VL Act is expertise as a valuer.
6. The applicants did not essentially challenge the underlying methodology of valuation adopted by the respondent in this matter. They did not suggest that any of the comparator properties used in the reports adopted by the respondent were inappropriate, other than to suggest that the other properties identified by Ms Elliott did not have the same issues as their property does, which is in a very poor condition. They adopted as a base line the valuations determined by the respondent. What the applicants submitted was that costs of remediation and liabilities associated with the properties should be deducted from the base valuation, in order to give an accurate valuation of the properties: that is, what a willing but not anxious buyer would pay a willing but not anxious vendor for the property. They submitted that a potential purchaser would be influenced by the costs, particularly of remediation, with respect to the price willing to be paid for each of the properties. Accordingly, they provided the Tribunal with evidence of costs which would be associated with various remediations of the properties, including demolition of the improvements on the property, rebuilding of the house at the Valley View property, and removal of soil and levelling of the properties, and argued these costs should be deducted from the valuations already established.
7. The applicants submitted that the error in all of the valuations before the Tribunal was a failure of Ms Elliott to take into account, or a misunderstanding by Ms Elliott of the significance of, various aspects of the evidence they presented, which led her to disregard the evidence in making her assessment of the valuation of the properties.
8. The applicants put their submissions on this matter in terms of directly deducting the various costs from the established valuations. This approach to valuation of property is not an accepted valuation methodology, as is clear from the extensive discussion of the evidence given concerning the matter in 2024 Bosnakis.
9. In that matter similar submissions were made. The two valuers (Ms Elliott and Ms Loftes) explained to the Tribunal how they approached the exercise. They both agreed defects in a property were to be taken into account in determining a valuation and in comparing properties. The existence of defects (matters to be remediated) is relevant to the decision, in making comparisons, as to whether the subject property is inferior to a comparator property, and thus the existence of defects (and perhaps the cost of remediating the defect) affects the valuation of the property. However, it must be established that the defects are such that they "affect the value of the property beyond the ordinary contribution that the defects make to the comparison process" (2024 Bosnakis at [243]). That the defects should be taken into account in arriving at a valuation was agreed by both valuers. The disagreement was the impact doing so had on the concluded valuation.
10. I accept the applicants' submissions may be better understood as proposing that Ms Elliott had not appropriately taken the defects into account in arriving at her valuation, and they expressed this perhaps too crudely as requiring direct deductions from her concluded valuation, rather than as a more integrated consideration of arriving at the concluded valuation.

1. The applicants live in the house at this property. The property consists of three allotments, but has been valued as a single property, with a notional site value of $550,000 and a notional capital value of $900,000. On consideration of the applicants' objections, the valuation was reduced to $470,000 and $850,000 respectively.
2. The applicants submit the valuation should be $100,000 for the notional site value, with the notional capital value also $100,000 (they state the value is actually "negative", taking into account all the costs of remediating the defects at the property).
3. In her report Ms Elliott refers to the "extremely steep" topography of the site, and notes that it is clear there has been "some erosion or slippage in the past". She concluded that about 30% of the property would not be suitable for redevelopment, and "significant" earthworks would be required. She considered whether there was contamination at the site and reported she had not observed any contamination. She concluded that the highest and best use of the property was the use to which it was presently put, that is, use as a single residential property holding, with no potential for division. On that basis she did not look at opportunities or the costs for subdivision or development.
4. In making her assessment of valuation, Ms Elliott noted that both the site value and the capital value she arrived at is at "the lower end of the value range" taking into account the nature of the property (with very steep slopes), and the "below average condition and presentation" of the building, and "the reduced amenity of the gardens and grounds".
5. The applicants submitted that Ms Elliott had failed to take into account the defects of the property, including contamination of the soil, the nature of the property in terms of topography, and structural issues relating to the house.
6. I accept the applicants' submission that the property has a number of inherent defects, including its very steep topography, where there has been considerable soil or land instability in the past, and that the house itself is in poor condition. I accept remedying these matters would be expensive.
7. However, I do not accept the submission that these matters were not taken into account by Ms Elliott in her report and valuation. Both matters are specifically referred to and discussed in the report. Ms Elliott accepts that 30% of the property would not be suitable for development because of the steepness of the site: the applicants state this assessment should apply to the whole of the site, but I note that Ms Elliott's view is that the site should be valued as a whole, and that its "highest and best use" is as a single residential site, as presently disposed, not as a site for development. It is on this basis that it has been valued, not as a site which could be subject to development. The submission made by the applicants in this respect misunderstands the nature of the valuation applied. The applicants and Ms Elliott are making the same assessment as to the development potential of the site.
8. The applicants also submit that Ms Elliott is wrong in her assessment that there is no contamination of the site. They assert there is contamination, and the cost of remediating this will be necessarily incurred by a purchaser and so should be taken into account and would reduce the value of the property.
9. The applicants assert that there is bitumen and "uncontrolled fill" on the site, and the soil is also contaminated from runoff from the road, including weedicide and pesticide residue. They submitted a soil analysis for the property: the report refers to "fill", and "demolition fragments", but it does not include any interpretative text or provide any views as to soil quality or the nature or extent of any contamination, and accordingly it is impossible to derive any conclusion from the report alone which supports the assertions of the applicants. Ms Elliott did inspect the property on 1 August 2022 and did not observe any signs of significant or relevant contamination. I note there has been no contamination assessment (on any of the three properties) carried out by the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), and there are not formal reports establishing that there is any contamination at the property.
10. The issue of contamination was also discussed in 2024 Bosnakis, and had been the subject of evidence in that matter. In that matter, Ms Elliott had given evidence that in her view the nature of the property was "not outside the range of surfaces encountered on suburban house blocks" (at [74]), and she had noted in her report before the Tribunal in that matter "that there did not appear to be any contaminants on the property that would meet the EPA definition of a 'potentially contaminating activity' in a domestic situation", which would trigger any obligation on the property owner to disclose contamination to potential purchasers. As at that time (and as it is now in the present case before the Tribunal), there was no intention to change the use of the land, so there was no requirement for valuation purposes for a site contamination assessment by the applicant. Ms Elliott stated that she had taken the condition of the property, including any adverse issues of contamination, into account in reaching her valuation, and so to further reduce the valuation by deducting any costs to address those adverse aspects (including any contamination), would be to double count the adverse condition, first as a general factor in determining (a lesser) valuation, and then further, to include the cost of addressing the defect which has already been taken into account in the process of comparison.
11. In 2024 Bosnakis, President Hughes rejected the submission (and the approach of the other expert valuer, Ms Loftes) to deduct a further amount from the valuation to address the cost of remedying any contamination on the basis that this would entail a mix of valuation methods, as any contamination of the soil is an attribute of the property which had already been taken into account in the comparison process, and to deduct the cost of remediation would be to double count the impact of the defect.
12. I am not satisfied the applicants have established that there is any relevant significant contamination at the premises. While they have provided and relied upon a soil report, this report is without any explanatory or interpretative basis, and without that cannot usefully demonstrate anything about the nature of the soil relevant to valuation. I accept Ms Elliott's assessment that there was no apparent contamination, and note there has been no Environmental Protection Assessment or other environmental assessment. I accept that her assessment and consideration of this issue was appropriate, and note that this was accepted by President Hughes in 2024 Bosnakis. There has been no further evidence presented on this matter, just reassertion by the applicants. The material provided by the applicants which they say addresses the cost of rectification of the contamination does not either establish that there is any relevant contamination, or demonstrate how this is the only appropriate or effective way to do so. The cost quoted, from Royal Park Salvage, was for soil works remediation in the sum of $1,080,000, apparently for the purpose of both the removal of contaminated soil and for the levelling of the property. This was specifically considered by Ms Elliott in the previous proceedings, and she concluded it was not relevant as there was no requirement to undertake the work, and her valuation was based on the maintenance of the property for a single dwelling residence, rather than for development.
13. I am satisfied this amount, or any proportion of it, should not be deducted from the valuation of the property: I am satisfied that both the nature and topography of the property, and the issue of any contamination of the soil, has been taken into account in arriving at the valuation, and to take any part of this quote into account would be to double count the impact of the defects on the valuation of the property. In addition, the quote itself is not sufficiently specifically tied to remedying the alleged defects, as opposed to achieving a general overall improvement in the property, to be useful in the context of arriving at a valuation.
14. Ms Elliott also accepted that the house at the property was in poor condition. This is reflected in both her discussion and her conclusion, placing the capital value at the lower end of the comparative values she considered. Ms Elliott considered the inspection report provided by the applicants, which identified a number of defects, described as serious and otherwise, at the property. She observed that the report was consistent with her own observations of the condition of the property. The applicants also provided a quote for the "complete renovation" of the property, not provided to Ms Elliott.
15. It is clear from all the material before the Tribunal that the property is not in good condition and has numerous defects inside and out. However, in my view the applicants face two significant difficulties in making their case.
16. In the first place, the material they provide confirms the view of the condition of the premises taken by Ms Elliott. She has reached a similar conclusion, that the property is in poor condition and requires remediation. She states she has taken this state of affairs into account in reaching her valuation of the property, and this is demonstrated by setting the valuation at the lower end of the comparative values she uses. The applicants state that they disagree with the comparator properties selected by Ms Elliott because they are of properties in better condition: however, that is the point of Ms Elliott's report. She has recognised this is the case and set a lower valuation of the subject property compared with the comparator properties because of the relatively poor condition of the property.
17. Further however, the material provided by the applicants (quotes relating to designing and rebuilding the house at the property) is not expert engineering evidence that identifies structural issues at the property, or necessarily supports a lower valuation of the property. It is evidence of what it might cost to design and build a "complete renovation" at the property. These quotes do not assist with the valuation of the property.
18. I do not accept that Ms Elliott failed to take into account, or misunderstood, the issues relating to the condition of the property as asserted by the applicants. I am satisfied she did take the various issues raised by them into consideration in making her assessment of value of the property. In the circumstances where she did not have the specific quotes or other material provided by the applicants, I am nevertheless satisfied that she did consider the particular issues appropriately in a valuation of property context, and the material later provided by the applicants would not have assisted her further.
19. I also accept that Ms Elliott is an expert valuer, appropriately experienced and qualified to provide a valuation of the property for the Valuer-General, and expert evidence to the Tribunal. Insofar as the applicants asserted that Ms Elliott was not an expert in engineering, building and soil assessment, while this may be the case, it demonstrates a failure by them to understand the nature of the relevant expertise required in this matter: the expertise required for the purposes of the VL Act is in valuation, not building or engineering. Expert evidence from engineers or builders may well be relevant to a valuation and taken into account by valuers, notwithstanding, engineers and builders are not valuers for the requirements of the VL Act.
20. I also note that the material provided by the applicants is, in any event, not "expert evidence" from engineers or builders: the material is by way of various quotes and an inspection report. The soil report may well be by an expert but this has not been subject to any interpretation for the Tribunal.
21. I am satisfied that the various defects in the property have been considered and taken into account by Ms Elliott in reaching her assessment of the valuation of the Valley View property.

1. It is convenient to deal with these two properties together.
2. These properties are adjoining. The houses on each of the properties are dilapidated and not occupied. Both the applicants, and Ms Elliott in her report, state that the houses are uninhabitable.
3. The respondent has valued the First Burnside property at $960,000 for both the site and capital value; and the Second Burnside property at $690,000 for both site and capital value. These values were unchanged by the respondent after consideration of the objections made against the valuation by the applicants. Effectively, the valuation for both properties is for land value only, ascribing no value to the houses on the properties.
4. The applicants submit the valuation for the First Burnside property should be $700,000 for both the site and capital value; and $650,000 for the site and capital value of the Second Burnside property. They supported their claim for a much lower valuation of these properties by reference to the run down condition of the houses on the properties, and the submission of an email from September 2015 in which a person made a conditional offer to both properties for a combined price of $860,000: this offer was not proceeded with, but the applicants' submission was that it indicated that this potential purchaser considered the properties to be not worth as much as initially proposed.
5. The applicants submit that Ms Elliott is incorrect in her assessment of the situation of the properties on a road which "carried moderate traffic volumes"; that she has underestimated the fall of the land, which they state is seven metres across both lots; that she is wrong in stating there is no contamination at the properties; and that she failed to take the soil report into account. They also submit that the houses are uninhabitable and will require demolition, and so this cost (for which they provided a quote of $195,613 for the demolition of both houses) should be deducted from the valuations. They also provided another quote for demolition of both houses and clearing of the topsoil, for $325,015. They also state that there is no stormwater infrastructure at the properties, and provide a quote for installation for $82,380.
6. I am satisfied Ms Elliott properly considered the slope of the properties in her report. I note Ms Elliott refers to the slope of each property in her report, rather than a diagonal measurement across both sites.
7. Ms Elliott also expressed the view that demolition costs need not be taken into account as she believed that demolition costs were generally not significant in the context of redevelopment, which, given the dilapidated state of the buildings on the properties, was likely the highest and best use for the properties. The applicants also agreed the buildings on the properties would need to be demolished, and I note that the buildings were accorded no value in the valuation of the properties: the site and capital values were given the same value. Ms Elliott's view was that the cost of demolition need not be factored into the valuation of properties where the land value is relatively high and the property is most likely to be acquired for development, as her view was that in this context the cost impact of demolition was relatively insignificant.
8. In addition, I am satisfied that any structural issues in the buildings on these properties, asserted by the applicants, are not additionally relevant, as the valuation and Ms Elliott's report show that the buildings did not contribute to the valuation of the properties, as the site and capital valuations are the same, and the poor condition of the buildings contributed to this conclusion.
9. Ms Elliott also considered the issue of contamination on the properties. She noted the presence of some asbestos and surface debris, but considered this not unusual in the context of housing of the age and condition on the properties, and considered this would not impact on value. The respondent in its submissions noted that the cost of removing any asbestos, even in the applicants' quotes, was a relatively small amount and unlikely to represent a material cost in any redevelopment.
10. I am satisfied that Ms Elliott's consideration of the factors relevant to the valuation of the properties was appropriate and thorough. I do not accept that she misunderstood any relevant factors. Clearly there are a number of factors impacting on the value of the properties: both factors that increase value, such as the location of the properties and desirable location, and their potential for development with supportive zoning classification, as well as changes in market conditions. There are other factors which may not increase the value of the properties, including the uninhabitable nature of the buildings and the topography. However I am satisfied Ms Elliott took into account relevant factors and did not overlook any matters of significance: in my view the disagreement of the applicants with her report in respect of these properties is merely disagreement with no significant evidence in support of their disagreement, such as in relation to the issue of contamination; and misunderstanding of the issue, such as the emphasis the applicants have placed on the dilapidated condition of the buildings, when this has not impacted on the valuation of the properties.
11. I accept the assessments of the valuation to be ascribed to these properties as made by Ms Elliott.
12. With respect to the withdrawn (or not proceeded with) proposal to purchase the properties in September 2025, I am satisfied this cannot be regarded as having any relevance to the present valuation of the properties. The applicants presented this email as indicating that the properties together were worth less than $860,000 in 2015, and could not be sold even at that price at that time. However, any relevance of that conditional proposal to the value of the properties is very limited, as it is clearly quite old, but more importantly, there are no details or other information associated with the email provided by the applicants. It cannot be speculated as to why the offer was made, or not proceeded with, or what the circumstances or interests of the possible purchaser may have been, and the Tribunal cannot draw any implications from it relevant to the valuation of the properties.

1. The applicants submitted that the valuation reports relied on by the respondent for the valuations of the three properties in these matters were unreliable and inaccurate, as they failed to take some relevant matters into account and misunderstood others. I have rejected the various submissions made in respect of that approach, and I am satisfied that Ms Elliott's reports reflect an appropriate and accurate consideration of the relevant considerations related to the valuation of the properties.
2. However, in addition, the applicants submitted that a different approach to valuation should be taken, different to that adopted by Ms Elliott. The applicants submitted that various costs which they say represent the cost of remedying defects at the properties, should be deducted from the values established by Ms Elliott. Alternatively, I have considered that their submission was that the various costs of remediation submitted by them by way of the various quotes placed before the Tribunal, should have been factored into the valuations arrived at by Ms Elliott so that the valuations were lower.
3. I have considered above in these reasons the approaches taken by President Hughes in the previous applications to the Tribunal concerning these properties, in 2024 Bosnakis. I accept, and with respect, adopt, the view taken by President Hughes in that matter: that is, that where it is accepted that the highest and best use of the subject property is not being changed, that is, that its current use will broadly continue, it is not appropriate to deduct the cost of any likely necessary or possible remediation from what would otherwise be the valuation of the property. It was on this basis that President Hughes distinguished the decision of 2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis (which concerned a different property to that before the Tribunal in 2024 Bosnakis, and in the present matters). With respect, I also agree with President Hughes' analysis and distinguishing of that decision.
4. In the matters presently before the Tribunal, it is similarly accepted that the highest and best use of all three properties is as residential sites, albeit possibly subject to redevelopment.
5. I am satisfied that the appropriate valuation methodology applicable to the valuation of these three properties is that adopted by Ms Elliott in her report, and by the respondent in her valuation, namely the comparable transactions method of valuation (formerly known as the "direct comparison" method). This is a "market approach" to valuation, where sales of comparable properties are compared with the subject property, with adjustments for differences such as allotment size, zoning, location, and improvements, to arrive at a market value. This is the approach to valuation which was adopted in 2024 Bosnakis (and in the previous consideration of the valuation of these properties by the Tribunal), and I am satisfied it continues to be the appropriate approach to the valuation of these properties.
6. I am satisfied that the applicants have not provided any submissions or evidence which can establish that any different approach is appropriate in these matters.
7. The applicants submitted that the approach taken in 2017 Supreme Court Bosnakis should be adopted by the Tribunal in this matter. I have already explained why in my view this would not be appropriate: I am satisfied the approach adopted by Parker J in that matter is restricted in its relevance to the valuation of property where the highest and best use of the property is different from its current use, thus significantly (in that case) reducing the pool of potential purchasers. This is not the case in relation to these three properties.
8. The applicants also submitted a valuation report by another valuer, Mr Ettridge (relating to a different property), and relied significantly on the approach taken by Mr Ettridge, which they submitted was the correct approach to take, and reflected the method they proposed, namely, to take into account the cost of remediation of defects in arriving at a value for the properties.
9. However, I do not accept this submission in itself as persuasive. That a different valuer has taken a different approach to the valuation of a different property is not evidence that the approach to the valuation of the properties in these matters is incorrect. The Tribunal has no evidence before it from Mr Ettridge as to why this approach was appropriate in respect of the particular property he valued, and how or why that approach might be applicable to the subject properties before the Tribunal in this matter. For the purposes of this review, the applicants must establish that the approach taken to the valuation of these properties was inappropriate and did not lead to the correct or preferable decision concerning their valuation.

1. The direct deduction of various costs of remediations from an established valuation, as submitted by the applicants, is not an accepted valuation methodology, as is clear from the extensive discussion on this issue in 2024 Bosnakis. As submitted by the respondent, it implies, also, that the applicants accept the "base level" valuation made by Ms Elliott, and then reduced the valuation of the properties by deducting these various costs from those valuations. It is clear from Ms Elliott's report that she did take into account the various defects also identified by the applicants: it appears that the applicants' real objection is that she did not discount the impact of these defects sufficiently in her determination of the valuations.
2. I am satisfied that Ms Elliott did take the relevant defects into account in reaching her valuation of the properties. I am satisfied that the applicants have not established any additional defects that were not taken into account (such as contamination), or that she misunderstood or underestimated the extent of the defects she did take into account.
3. I am satisfied that the appropriate approach to the valuation of these three properties was the approach taken by Ms Elliott in her report to the Valuer-General, and on which the valuation of the properties has been based, namely the comparable transactions method of valuation. I am satisfied that in reaching her assessment of the valuation applicable to these three properties, Ms Elliott has properly considered all the relevant factors, both advantages and defects, applicable to the properties for the purpose of reaching an appropriate valuation of the properties.
4. I am satisfied that Ms Elliott selected appropriate comparator properties (this was not seriously challenged by the applicants), and then made appropriate comparisons between them and the subject properties, taking into account the various defects in the subject properties, concluding that the valuations of the properties should be set at less than the values of the comparator properties as a result of the consideration of these defects.
5. I am satisfied that the valuation of the properties at Burnside, as notified by the respondent for the 2023-2024 financial year, are the correct and preferable valuations for those properties; and that the correct and preferable valuation of the property at Valley View for the 2023-2024 financial year is as varied following the applicants' objection, with the notional site value of $470,000, and the notional capital value of $850,000.
6. Accordingly I will make orders affirming the decisions of the respondent concerning the properties at Burnside; and varying the decision in relation to the property at Valley View.

1. The decisions under review (as varied following the objections made by the applicants) are affirmed.
2. The valuation of the property at Valley View for the 2023 - 2024 financial year is varied such that the notional site value is $470,000, and the notional capital value is $850,000.
3. The decision of the respondent that the site value and the capital value for the 2023 - 2024 financial year for the first property at Burnside are each $960,000, is affirmed.
4. The decision of the respondent that the site value and the capital value for the 2023 - 2024 financial year for the second property at Burnside are each $990,000, is affirmed.