Bosley v Queensland Police Service [2026] QDC 45

[4] His argument at trial is conveniently articulated in his submission sent to police prosecutions on 13 April 2025 and tendered in this appeal. It relevantly states:

• Once the officer went on his way, his first question about distraction, caused me to question how I had missed the change in speed limit. Therefore, I went back over the route and noted that the speed warning and signage after the variable speed limit gantry seemed very closely spaced. I have measured the distance between the signs on google maps, they are as follows:

o A first variable speed limit gantry approximately 800 metres from the first two of four 60km/hr signs, on each side of the road. This has been set at 80km/hour when I have inspected it.

o The second variable speed limit gantry approximately 300 metres from the 60km/hour sign, which was set at 80km/hour on the night of the alleged offense.

o A 60km/hr warning sign approximately 30 meters past the second gantry.

o A red slow down sign approximately 100 metres past the second gantry; and

o An "End of motorway" sign, just before the roundabout.

The approximate locations of the key signs can be seen on the following map:

• The signage on this stretch of road is in breach of the Queensland Road Safety Technical User Volumes - Guide to Speed Management (2023), which sets minimum lengths for speed zones. Section 3.4 of this document states: "Except where specified elsewhere in this document, the minimum length of a speed zone is defined by the speed limit, as specified in Table 3.4. Unless specifically detailed elsewhere in this document, speed zones are to be as long as possible and should not be less than the 'minimum lengths' in Table 3.4."

The minimum length for an 80km/hr speed zone in Table 3.4 is 1.2 kilometres, when in this instance the 80km/hr zone is approximately 800 metres. I have gone back over the route and note that the speed limit at the gantry before the first 80km/hr gantry, has been 90km/hr when I have been through the location, so the first gantry represents the start of the speed zone.

The exceptions in the document which allow shorter length speed zones than Table 3.4 relate to area speed zones, a shared zone, a footpath, a 110km/hr speed zone, poor pavement conditions, service roads, on and off ramps, and bridges and flood ways due to structural deficits. None of these conditions are relevant on this stretch of road.

• I contend that the second 80km/hr variable speed limit sign was a particular distraction, as it was far too close to the warning and speed limit sights. As such it served no purpose being left on at this time of the night, but created the expectation that I was entering a much longer 80km/hr speed zone and misleading me.

• The 2017 paper titled "Safety implications of co-locating road signs: a driving simulator investigation" by staff from the Queensland University of Technology Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety and the Australian Road Research Board" discusses how signage can become a distractor which increases the risk of crashes, by causing drivers to glance offroad.

• I contend that this academic work highlights the risks posed by unnecessarily glancing at signage offroad. It further highlights why the signage breaching the Queensland Government's own guidance in establishing signage in this location, had the effect of misleading me into speeding.

• In conclusion, I was driving with appropriate care by keeping my eyes on the road, having just seen the 80km/hr variable speed limit. It was reasonable for me not to expect a change in the speed limit as soon as it happened. Therefore I will be submitting that I should be found not guilty, due to this being a mistake of fact.

[5] Mr Bosley advanced submissions in broadly those terms when giving evidence and in address. In re-examination, the learned Magistrate questioned Mr Bosley so he could clarify Mr Bosley's evidence in support of his arguments as follows:[1]

"as far as 60-kilometre-an-hour signs that you went past, how many do you say is your - what's your position as to how many there were after you've left the 80 zone?---Ah, there was one saying, um, slow - um, slow - um, there was one immediately saying that there's a 60 k - - -

Sixty ahead. Yes?---Now, that was about 30 metres past the gantry, um, which is in clear conflict with the gantry, which is an enormous, um, illuminated, um light - um, speed limit sign which you have to look up at, um - - -

And then - - -?---Then there was a "slow down" sign, and then, um, further on, there were four, um - four 60-kilometre-an-hour signs.

And when you say four, are you saying - and as I said, I have to go back and look at it - but there's obviously the solid signs on the side of the road that have the 60, that the officer pointed to when he was driving along?---Mmm-hmm.

And then how many sets of 60 are there of the - I'll call them the illuminated signs?---There's no sets of, um, illuminated signs. The illuminated signs are only 80 kilometres an hour.

Right?---So it goes 80 kilometre an hour for the illu - ah, this is having passed the first illuminated sign, which I think was about 800 kilom - ah, 800 kilometres - eight - - -

So you're saying, when you were in the 60 zone, the only indication of the 60 zone is the signs on the side of the road that's the - - -?---Correct. The - the non-illuminated signs.

Non-illuminated signs. There's no 60 signs - no illuminated signs?---No."

[6] The learned Magistrate dealt with Mr Bosley's submissions as follows in his reasons:[2]

Mr Bosley's defence to the charge is based on the confusion caused to him by those who manage the road in question, and in particular the speed signage, and a failure to adhere to the Department of Transport and Main Roads guidelines as to the length of speed zones.

As I understand Mr Bosley's evidence and submission, and this is a summary only of the very detailed submissions he made, he submits that he operated his vehicle at the time of the alleged offence in a way where he was operating under a mistake of fact brought on by the way in which the signage was positioned and visibly appeared to him.

The drive-through conducted by Larue shows that the section of the road where an 80-kilometre zone is in effect is controlled by large illuminated 80 kilometre an hour zone gantries crossing the road. After the final such gantry in the 80 zone, there is a sign which indicates a 60 kilometre zone ahead. Mr Bosley, I think in his evidence, said it was about 30 metres on, that is probably around about correct on my view of the footage. Then there are two sets of 60 kilometre an hour zones indicated, one on each side of the road. I do note that there is also, prior to the first of the 60 kilometre an hour zones, a large red sign which, from recollection, says, "Reduce speed now."

The prosecution says it has proved each element of the charge, that the guidelines in relation to the length of speed zones is directory and not mandatory, and that Mr Bosley has effectively operated under a mistake of law and not one of a reasonable and - honest reasonable mistake of fact. I do not accept the submission of the defendant that this is a case where there is a mistake, and that the mistake of fact made - there was mistake of fact by him. In my view, the signage was clear and unhindered.

I note in his interactions with the officer, he conceded - and these are the initial interactions, and whilst much of what was said was perhaps difficult to detect because of other traffic noise, he conceded that he did not see the 60 kilometre an hour zones in question. If there was a mistake by Mr Bosley, it was one of law and not fact, and I endorse the comments and adopt the comment made by Judge Smith in the matter of Philp v Commissioner of Police with respect to the importance and primacy of the road rules in this regard, so therefore I find Mr Bosley guilty of the charge. Yes.

[7] Mr Bosley's notice of appeal raises two grounds which he submitted alone or together (I assume) establish that the conviction at trial involved a miscarriage of justice.

[8] First, he submitted that the prosecutor failed to call a material witness. He articulated his ground in this way:

The Prosecutor refused to produce a witness when I asked, who could answer questions about the number of similar offences at the intersection and whether any investigation of whether the signage contributed had been undertaken.

[9] He added an additional argument: that the prosecutor had not told him that she had decided to only call the arresting officer, not a witness who could talk about the functioning of the signage. He suggested that this was a change in the prosecutor's position from an earlier willingness to call a 'signage' witness.

[10] Second, he submitted that the prosecutor failed to provide him in advance with a copy of Philp v The Commissioner of Police.[3] This ground can be dealt with here. There is no absolute obligation on a prosecutor to provide relevant authorities in advance, though it might be a good practice to do so, especially where self-represented parties are involved. However, in this case the learned Magistrate stood the matter down so Mr Bosley could consider the case and Mr Bosley made submissions afterwards without seeking further time to do so.[4] He makes similar submissions on this appeal. The second ground fails.

[11] Although Mr Bosley's notice of appeal was limited to those two procedural grounds, it is evident from his submissions that he contends that the conviction is also affected by substantive legal error (the section 24 ground).

[12] Mr Bosley submitted on the appeal that Philp could be distinguished on the basis that in that case, the speed camera was positioned too close to a speed limit sign by reference to the requirements of the relevant Police Manual, while Mr Bosley's case is that the 80km/hr sign actually misled him into believing the speed limit was 80km/hr. He also submitted that there was no scientific evidence led before his Honour in Philp about the safety risk of glancing too often at speed limit signs. He also submitted that the failure to observe the 60km/hr speed sign led to his mistaken belief that the speed limit remained 80km/hr and that that mistake was a mistake of fact not a mistake of law. He submitted the learned Magistrate erred in reaching the contrary conclusion. He then submitted that his mistake was otherwise a mistake under s 24 of the Code.

[13] This ground of appeal arises out of Mr Bosley's submissions below that failure to comply with the certain guidelines in placing of speed signage was relevant to whether the offence was proved beyond reasonable doubt. He submitted that the Queensland Road Safety Technical User Volumes (QRSTUV): Guide to Speed Management (the Guide), taken with an academic paper to which he referred, supported the conclusion that it was distracting to glance off the road too much and that accordingly (I assume) his failure to observe the 60km/hr signs was a reasonable mistake as well as an honest one.

[14] His first ground of appeal argues that the prosecutor erred in failing to call a material witness so that he could advance that argument. However, if that argument has no prospect of success as a matter of substantive law, then the prosecutor's decision not to call the witness he wanted called will be irrelevant. It is therefore convenient to begin with his substantive argument about the effect of the Guide and the availability of s 24 of the Code as a defence.

[15] Mr Bosley relies on the Guide. The Guide is an approved notice under s 166(2) Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) (TORUM Act).

(1) The chief executive may approve the design of, and a method, standard or procedure about, an official traffic sign.

(2) The approved design, method, standard or procedure must be contained in the MUTCD or an approved notice.

(3) The MUTCD or approval notice must be available for purchase or inspection by the public at the department's head office or the other offices of the department that the chief executive directs.

[17] Mr Bosley relies on s 3.4 of the Guide which[5] provides:

Except where specified elsewhere in this document, the minimum length of a speed zone is defined by the speed limit, as specified in Table 3.4. Unless specifically detailed elsewhere in this document, speed zones are to be as long as possible and should not be less than the 'minimum lengths' in Table 3.4.

There is no minimum length when an area speed zone is applied.

Where development density varies along a homogenous road section, it is desirable to keep the frequency of speed limit changes to a minimum. A speed zone should, therefore, bridge any length of road for which a higher limit would otherwise be indicated, but where the length is shorter than indicated in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4 - Minimum lengths of speed zones Speed Limit (km/h)

[19] Mr Bosley submitted at trial that the speed limit signs on the length of road involved in the offence did not comply with s 3.4 of the Guide. In particular, he submitted that the 80km/hr speed zone was less than the minimum length identified in table 3.4. The evidence at trial did not appear to support that contention. The DVD of the drive through by the officer who gave evidence shows that the 80km/hr speed zone leading up to the 60km/hr zone was longer than 1.2km. So much is plain because he rode for well over a minute at or about the speed limit in the 80km/hr speed zone. He passed under three variable speed sign gantries in that time.

[20] In any event, Mr Bosley's contention that there was non-compliance with the Guide assumes that there must be a minimum of 1.2km after each speed limit sign. That construction is wrong. Nothing in the words of s 3.4 or table 3.4 support that construction. They describe a recommended minimum length of the speed zone, not the minimum length of the zone after a speed limit sign.

[21] There is another problem for Mr Bosley's argument. The evidence also discloses that the 60km/hr zone did not begin until after two signs: one warning of a 60km/hr zone ahead and the other stating "Reduce Speed Now". Apart from the relevance of those signs to the reasonableness of Mr Bosley's state of mistaken belief, they also comprise a distance along the length of road in which the speed zone remained 80km/hr, a distance Mr Bosley does not consider in his analysis, and which must be added to the distance identified in paragraph [19] above.

[22] There is therefore no basis to conclude that the speed limit signs as placed on the length of road in question in this case did not comply with s 3.4. Nor to infer that s 3.4 provides some basis for concluding that a driver keeping a proper look out might be expected not to see a speed limit sign which appears less than 1.2km from another speed limit sign, or that expecting a driver to do so requires risky glancing away from the road.

[23] Mr Bosley did not identify any other relevance for s 3.4. Accordingly, it was irrelevant to the issues at the trial.

[24] The irrelevance of the Guide does not end Mr Bosley's s 24 argument.

(1) A person who does or omits to do an act under an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief in the existence of any state of things is not criminally responsible for the act or omission to any greater extent than if the real state of things had been such as the person believed to exist.

(2) The operation of this rule may be excluded by the express or implied provisions of the law relating to the subject.

[26] On the honest but mistaken belief element, it remains open to him to contend that the 80km/hr variable speed limit sign on the gantry was located so close to the subsequent signs indicating a 60km/hr zone that they misled him into believing that the 80km/hr zone would continue for some distance.

[27] On the reasonable but mistaken belief element, it remains open to him to contend that glancing away from the road can be risky behaviour for a driver, even if the Guide does not support that argument on its proper construction.

[28] It might be accepted that that the prosecution did not exclude beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Bosley honestly believed that the speed limit remained 80km/hr. His honesty was not challenged at trial.

[29] However, the evidence excluded beyond reasonable doubt that he reasonably but mistakenly believed that to be the state of things. The drive through by the police officer shows the following:

(a) First, after the last 80km/hr gantry is a sign communicating that there is a 60km/hr zone ahead. The sign is able to be seen in the ordinary field of vision of a driver. It would not require any looking away from the road. While it is reasonably close to the gantry, there is nothing about it to suggest it would be hard to see;

(b) Second, some seconds of ordinary driving later is a large red sign with white print stating "Reduce Speed Now". It can also be seen in the ordinary field of vision of a driver;

(c) Third, some seconds of ordinary driving later are two standard example 60km/hr speed signs which can be seen in the ordinary field of vision of a driver; and

(d) Fourth, some seconds of ordinary driving later are two further standard example 60km/hr speed signs which can be seen in the ordinary field of vision of a driver.

[30] While Mr Bosley might not have seen any of these four signs and continued to believe that he was driving in an 80km/hr zone, no driver could reasonably hold that mistaken belief in the above circumstances. It is difficult to think what more could have been done to disclose to a driver keeping an ordinary look out that the speed limit was about to change and had changed. The suggestion to the contrary is, with respect, nonsense.

[31] This conclusion makes it strictly unnecessary to determine if a mistaken belief that the speed limit on a length of road is more than the applicable speed limit because of failure to observe signs altering the existing limit is a mistake of fact or a mistake of law.

[32] However, in my view, the mistake would be a mistake of fact. The distinction can be difficult to draw. Mr Bosley's mistake was not a misunderstanding as to the effect of a traffic sign, which is clearly a mistake of law.[6] It might also be argued that his state of belief should be characterised as being ignorant of the speed limit on the length of road in question. If so characterised, his state of belief comprised mere ignorance of the law which s 22(1) of the Code expressly states is not a defence to any offence.

[33] However, on balance I do not think that would be a correct characterisation of his evidence. Rather, Mr Bosley's evidence revealed a mistaken belief as to what the speed limit was on the relevant length of road because of his positive but mistaken belief[7] that the speed limit remained 80km/hr as signed prior to the length of road marked as 60km/hr. To my mind that was more likely a mistake as to the state of things, not a mistake as to the legal consequence of the state of things, nor mere ignorance of the law. That conclusion does not assist him though, as I have found beyond reasonable doubt that his belief was not a reasonable one on the evidence. And it is difficult to see how any driver would be likely to succeed on such an argument if a speed zone was signed in the normal manner and the driver simply did not notice it. A driver is required to keep a proper lookout, including for speed limit signs.

[34] Mr Bosley's first ground of appeal was that the learned prosecutor had communicated that a witness on signage would be called and then unfairly changed their position at trial. I have reviewed the correspondence leading up to the trial, including correspondence admitted on the appeal. The correspondence does not show that the prosecutor ever communicated that a witness on misleading signage would be called. The prosecutor made clear that his foreshadowed arguments were out of scope. The prosecutor's language could have been a little clearer as to what was meant by out of scope but its meaning was plain enough: the matter Mr Bosley wanted to agitate was not relevant to the trial in the prosecutor's opinion.

[35] The issue is whether the prosecution failed to call a material witness. Whether a witness is called is a matter for a prosecutor. Only in exceptional circumstances should a trial Judge call a witness the prosecutor does not call.[8] The question is whether the trial was unfair because of the failure to call the witness.

[36] When I asked Mr Bosley to identify the witness Mr Bosley said should have been called, he said that the prosecutor should have called a traffic engineer with expertise in traffic signage. He said the engineer would provide evidence that incorrectly placed signage generated a risk of crashes contrary to the policy of the TORUM Act.

[37] He put it a little differently in his written submissions. He submitted that a witness should be called who could give evidence as to whether there had been previous incidents of driver's exceeding the speed limit in that area which might tend to prove that the signage was inducing errors in others.

[38] Neither witness would be a material witness nor necessary for the prosecution to call.

[39] As to the former, there is no basis in the evidence that the signage was misleading. And in any event, no traffic engineer could give evidence it misled Mr Bosley in particular.

[40] As to the latter, no witness could admissibly give the evidence Mr Bosley sought because no one could speak to the subjective conditions leading to such offences. But more compellingly, such evidence would only go to showing that others had committed the same offence that he had prima facie committed.

[42] As already observed, Mr Bosley had an opportunity to make submissions on the case relied upon by the prosecutor and was willing to proceed when called upon by the learned Magistrate, so there was no unfairness in that respect. In any event, Philp is not essential to his conviction. His argument is that the defence of s 24 was not excluded, and on the facts before the learned Magistrate it was.

[43] However, it seems in any event correct to me that the provisions of the Guide are irrelevant to the elements of the offence with which Mr Bosley was charged.

[44] The offence is set out in Regulation 20 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management - Road Rules) Regulation 2009 (Qld) (TORUM Regulations) which states:

A driver must not drive at a speed over the speed limit applying to the driver for the length of the road where the driver is driving.

[45] The circumstances defining when that offence is committed where a speed limit sign applies are set out in Regulation 21 including examples as follows:

[46] Section 14D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) provides in relation to examples:

If an Act includes an example of the operation of a provision -

(b) the example the example does not limit, but may extend, the meaning of the provision; and

(c) the example and the provision are to be read in the context of each other and the other provisions of the Act, but, if the example and the provision so read are inconsistent, the provision prevails.

[47] It is evident from that provision that an example articulates Parliament's intention as to what is included within the words of a particular statute, albeit it does not limit what is included. That is important here because the 60km/hr signs showed in the police officer's audio-visual evidence are the same as in the statutory example.

[48] What is plain from these matters is that for the purposes of the offence created by Regulation 20, signage in the form of that used in this case defines as a matter of law the speed limit in the area to which it applies.

[3] [2024] QDC 218 (Philp).

[5] Which appears to be unchanged between the 2023 and July 2025 versions of the Guide.

[6] See West v Palmer; Ex Parte West [1960] Qd R 375, 382-3.

[7] Or at least the prosecution's failure to exclude that belief beyond reasonable doubt.

[8] R v Apostilides [1984] HCA 38; (1984) 154 CLR 563.