austlii:cth/FedCFamC2G/2026/358
General information, not legal advice.
FedCFamC2G
2026-03-11
Original judgment source is linked above.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
(a) he was employed by the respondent, Sydney Luxury Smash Repairs Pty Ltd (SLSR);
(b) his employment was covered by the Vehicle Repair, Services and Retail Award 2020 (Award);
(c) on 24 October 2024 SLSR terminated his employment without notice;
(d) at the time SLSR terminated Mr Borlandelli's employment, SLSR:
(i) was obliged, but failed, to give him two weeks' notice or payment of $5,441.64 in lieu (notice amount); and
(ii) he was entitled to be paid $5,937.10 for accrued but untaken annual leave (annual leave amount); and
(e) SLSR failed to pay Mr Borlandelli these amounts.
(a) the "current Proceedings" (that is, the FWC proceeding) are "misconceived, to the extent they claim alleged unpaid wages and/or entitlements";
(b) to commence a fresh set of proceedings "without regularising the formal and substantive defects" with the FWC proceeding "would constitute an abuse of process";
(c) Mr Borlandelli was in default of orders the FWC had made; and
(d) he was "astounded" Mr Garan would commence a proceeding in this Court, not only in light of the above, but because he must be aware that the Fair Work Ombudsman "offers an investigative and enforcement service for unpaid wages and entitlements free of charge, without the need for Court intervention".
(a) Ms Zahra had "read the statements provided by the staff of [SLSR] to the investigator appointed by the insurer for the two workers' compensation claims that [Mr Borlandelli] has on foot";
(b) Ms Zahra then interviewed "several of our staff, who made the statements", and "held discussions with them and Mr Pierce ", who appears to be the controller of SLSR; and
(c) the "outcome of this investigation was a list of the dates when [Mr Borlandelli's] absence was unexplained, or unapproved, and when he exceeded his entitlements"; and Ms Zahra lists those dates.
(a) under cl 29.4(c) of the Award annual leave does not accrue on overtime; for that reason he needs to go back through SLSR's financial records and deduct all of the credited annual leave for the overtime Mr Borlandelli worked;
(b) Ms Zahra informed Mr Katralis that Mr Borlandelli was "doing overtime to a substantial degree, or at least claiming it, but she was not distinguishing between ordinary hours and overtime"; and
(c) Mr Katralis was shown a "number of statements in the" FWC proceeding, and "formed the view that the payslips issued to [Mr Borlandelli] and the single-touch payroll data submitted to the Australian Taxation Office regarding him were wrong", and that Mr Katralis needs to revise his calculations accordingly.
Pursuant to r 17.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (Rules), within 28 days of the date of this order, the Respondent pay:
(a) the Applicant:
(i) $5,937.10 on account of annual leave payable on termination of the Applicant's employment (70.57 hours at $84.13 per hour);
(ii) $5,441.64 on account of notice (2 weeks' pay in lieu of notice, at $2720.82 per week);
(iii) $470 on account of filing fees;
(iv) $4,381.27 on account of costs (see Schedule 2 of the Rules: $3,354.70 for initiating an application up to the completion of the first court date; and two daily hearings (at $342.19 per hearing) plus a 50% loading);
(v) $592.67 on account of interest on the amounts referred to in (a)(i)- (ii) and (b)(i) (assuming that these amounts were payable upon the termination of the Applicant's employment on 24 October 2024);
(b) into the Applicant's superannuation account:
(i) $625.79 on account of superannuation (payable on the payment in lieu of notice referred to in paragraph (a)(ii) and calculated at 11.5%).
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
The Respondent did not appear at the case management hearing on 27 May 2025.
The Court was satisfied that the Respondent was aware of the hearing on 27 May 2025 as the Respondent was in attendance at the last court date on 29 April 2025 at which the matter was listed for a case management hearing on 27 May 2025.
The Court was satisfied that the Respondent was in default by its non-attendance at the case management hearing (rule 13.04(2)(iii) of the Rules).
The Court was satisfied costs could be awarded on the basis that the Applicant had offered to settle the annual leave underpayment claim for a lesser amount in January 2025 and failure to settle the proceedings prior to the commencement of these proceedings constituted an unreasonable act or omission under section 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).
Pursuant to r 17.05(2)(a) of the Rules, the Court may vary or set aside a judgement or order made in the absence of a party.
The amount payable in respect of unpaid wages/ employment entitlements may be subject to applicable taxation in the hands of the applicant.
Information regarding the enforcement of court orders is available on the court's website (see www.fcfcoa.gov.au/gfl/enforcement ).
With respect and without criticism to the Court, it seems the Court may not have been given the full picture of what had transpired between the Parties and related matters, including the fact that, in the FWC Proceedings, the Applicant was awarded the exact same relief as what it sought in these Proceedings in terms of notice pay and superannuation, the Applicant had been entirely indemnified by workers' compensation payments since his termination, and he had also been historically overpaid annual leave and superannuation (see the affidavits of Zahra and Katralis, filed on 7 and 13 May 2025, respectively). The Respondent's position is that there is a huge raft of disentitling conduct on the part of the Applicant in the context of a costs order, which we are sure the Court was not made aware of.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
- On 26 May 2025, the Fair Work Commission issued a decision (Borlandelli v Sydney Luxury Smash Repairs Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1428 (Decision)) awarding the Applicant compensation in the sum of two weeks' notice plus superannuation on that notice (paragraph [66] of that decision).
- In light of this Decision, it is unnecessary for the Court to also make an award for notice and superannuation on that notice.
- While the Decision was referred to in the hearing of this matter on 27 May 2025, the Court had not had an opportunity to read the Decision in full in the hearing on 27 May 2025.
- The above amendments are made pursuant to Rule 17.05(2)(a) and Rule 17.05(2)(e) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021.
- Information regarding the enforcement of court orders is available on the court's website (see www.fcfcoa.gov.au/gfl/enforcement ).
[17] The case advanced by SLSR during the hearing was that the reason for Mr Borlandelli's dismissal was a series of unauthorised absences from work and ongoing poor performance from Mr Borlandelli.
[18] Mr Pierce's witness statement identified a series of dates where Mr Borlandelli allegedly took annual leave and sick leave.7 Mr Pierce explained during cross-examination that his wife, Bianca, prepared the list and that he did not review SLSR's business records to verify that Mr Borlandelli was absent on the relevant dates. Bianca Pierce was not called to give evidence by SLSR. Mr Borlandelli provided Google Maps extracts which purport to show that he travelled to and from work on several of the dates where Mr Pierce claims he was absent.
[19] I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr Borlandelli took unauthorised absences during his employment with SLSR. It is not clear from the evidence that Mr Borlandelli was absent from work on the dates identified by Mr Pierce. Mr Pierce admitted during cross-examination that several of the dates were not correct. The evidence also does not establish that any of Mr Borlandelli's absences were not authorised. SLSR clearly operates in a relatively informal manner and that makes it very difficult to retrospectively assess whether any absence was authorised or not. That is particularly the case when Mrs Pierce is the person responsible for maintaining leave records and she was not called to give evidence.
[20] The vague hearsay evidence led by Mr Pierce is not sufficient to establish that Mr Borlandelli took unauthorised absences during his employment with SLSR. The taking of [sic]
unauthorised absences did not provide a valid reason for Mr Borlandelli's dismissal.
(a) to his having written to Mr Garan on 28 April 2025 identifying what he submitted was the clear duplication between the issues raised in this proceeding and the FWC proceeding;
(b) to Mr Garan having issued the 459E notice;
(c) Mr Borlandelli's being a net financial position equal to or better than that when he was working as from 15 November 2024 when Mr Borlandelli lodged a workers' compensation claim;
(d) Mr Borlandelli's being double compensated;
(e) Mr Borlandelli's failing to produce documents in the FWC proceeding;
(f) to his having a clear recollection that when the Registrar made directions on 28 April 2025 that the clear intent of the Court was to wait until the FWC made its decision, "and thereafter to allow the Parties to engage in settlement negotiations and/or marshal, file and serve further evidence in respect of their respective cases so that this matter could be heard"; and
(g) to Mr Borlandelli's having allegedly misled iCare.
(a) Mr Borlandelli's commencement of this proceeding was unnecessary, particularly as SLSR "had consistently indicated a willingness to meet all amounts properly owed", having suggested that the parties could involve the services provided by the Fair Work Ombudsman;
(b) this proceeding was commenced prematurely;
(c) Mr Borlandelli persisted to move this Court in circumstances where relief had already been granted by the FWC;
(d) Mr Borlandelli failed to bring to the Court's attention the FWC's decision on 27 May 2025 when he obtained default judgment;
(e) Mr Borlandelli took unnecessary further steps, such as the issuing of the 459E notice;
(f) the costs Mr Borlandelli incurred have been self-imposed; and
(g) Mr Borlandelli moved for default judgment "knowing that exculpatory evidence had been served on" Mr Garan "rendering entirely the commencement and maintenance of these Proceedings an abuse of process, while concealing that from the Court".
The way the discretionary power to set aside a default judgment is to be exercised was considered by the House of Lords in Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473. There the Law Lords said that, while there are no hard and fast rules, it was usual for the defendant to (a) give some satisfactory explanation for his failure to take the step that led to judgment being entered; (b) bring his application to set aside the judgment without undue delay; and (c) show that he has some serious (or prime facie) defence to the action: see Lord Wright at 489, Lord Atkin at 479-480 and Lord Russell at 481-482.
What these authorities show is that the judge must decide what is just or fair in all the circumstances. This involves weighing up the extent to which the defendant is prejudiced by allowing the order to stand and the prejudice to the plaintiff in setting the order aside: Kostokanellis v Allen [1974] VicRp 71; [1974] VR 596 at 605. It also involves the defendant showing some defence on the merits, for it is only if he has some defence that he will be seriously prejudiced if refused a trial. But, in the end, the judge's discretion is not to be exercised on any hard or fast rule. How the discretion is to be exercised will depend upon all the circumstances of each particular case.
(a) SLSR switched to a new bookkeeping system on 1 August 2024;
(b) the new system contained default setting which accrued leave on the earning of overtime; and
(c) the new system in fact accrued leave on overtime Mr Borlandelli worked.
a) The interlocutory application filed on 5 August 2025 be dismissed. > > b) SLSR pay Mr Borlandelli's costs of the interlocutory application set in the amount of $3,640.09.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Manousaridis.
[1] Now r 24.04(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
[2] Jorge Borlandelli v Sydney Luxury Smash Repairs Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1428, at [17]-[20].
[3] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Annesley Plant Hire Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 755, at [7].
[4] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Annesley Plant Hire Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 755, at [10].
[5] As for the rule against double recovery, see my discussion in Tzovaras v Jeandin [2014] FCCA 2039, at [52]-[57].
[6] Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534, at page 538 (Kirby P). The quote was made in the context of actions to set aside judgments for fraud, but it was prefaced by the words: "As in all actions based on fraud".
[7] Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission ( 2012) 247 CLR 486; [2012] HCA 39 at [26].
Borlandelli
Sydney Luxury Smash Repairs Pty Ltd [2026] FedCFamC2G 358
(1986) 6 NSWLR 534