Issued under s 7.13 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017

In accordance with Division 7.4 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017, my determination of the merit review matter is:

1. In accordance with s 7.13(3)(d) of the Act, I remit the question of the cost of transport services to the claimant's children for reconsideration by the insurer in accordance with the attached reasons, and
2. The claimant is not permitted to recover the legal and other costs of this dispute.

A statement setting out my reasons for the determination is included with this certificate.

1. Gisele Bonsu was involved in a motor accident on 4 February 2025. The accident occurred on the Great Western Highway near the Hawksbury Road intersection. The claimant says she experienced headache and neck pain immediately after the accident and then 24 hours later developed lower back pain and left knee pain[1]. It is agreed that the claimant has also developed psychological or psychiatric symptoms following the accident.
2. On or about 7 February 2025, Ms Bonsu made a claim for statutory benefits under the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (the MAI Act). The claim was made against NRMA the third-party insurer of the motor vehicle Ms Bonsu believes caused the accident.
3. NRMA accepted the claim, and as the relevant insurer within the meaning of s 3.2 of the MAI Act, commenced paying the claimant her statutory entitlements.
4. A dispute has arisen between the claimant and NRMA about payment for certain expenses namely "transport assistance for her children to and from school and extra-curricular activities."
5. The claimant sought an internal review of NRMA's decision in accordance with Division 7.3 of the MAI Act. Because the insurer affirmed its original decision and the claimant does not agree with that decision, the claimant has referred the dispute about the care to the Personal Injury Commission (the Commission) for merit review in accordance with Division 7.4 of the MAI Act.
6. The claimant's legal representative completed an application for merit review ticking the box "gratuitous services" as the matter in dispute. The proceedings have been allocated to me.

1. The MAI Act establishes a scheme for the payment of statutory benefits under Part 3 and the awarding of damages under Part 4 to persons injured in motor accidents in New South Wales. Two separate claims can be made in accordance with s 6.12 of the MAI Act. The claim that is before me is Ms Bonsu's claim for statutory benefits.
2. Statutory benefits include weekly income replacement type benefits pursuant to Division 3.3 of the MAI Act and treatment and care benefits pursuant to Division 3.4. The current dispute between Ms Bonsu and NRMA concerns Ms Bonsu's entitlement to a particular form of treatment and care benefits, that is expenses for transport services.

1. Section 3.24(1) provides the entitlement to treatment and care benefits and establishes that the claimant is entitled to "(a) the reasonable cost of treatment and care."
2. The definition of "treatment and care" clearly covers health and allied health services including attendant care services (which would in turn include transport services) provided to the claimant for her needs, but the services in dispute are transport services provided and to be provided to the claimant's children being transport services that before the accident the claimant provided to her children on a gratuitous basis.
3. Section 3.26(1) provides as follows:

"An injured person is entitled to statutory benefits under this Division for the reasonable expenses incurred after the motor accident in employing a person to provide domestic services to the claimant's dependants."

1. Statutory benefits are payable under s 3.26(1) so long as four pre-conditions are met:

(a) the claimant provided the services to the dependants before the accident;

(b) the dependants were not capable of performing the services themselves;

(c) there is a reasonable expectation that the services would have been provided for at least 6 hours per week for at least 6 consecutive months, and

(d) there will be a need for the services for that period of time and that need is reasonable in all the circumstances.

1. Section 3.26(5) provides a definition of dependents which includes children and a definition of gratuitous domestic services which means "services of a domestic nature which were provided without payment".

1. In a statutory benefits claim, disputes can be resolved by merit reviewers, Medical Assessors and Members of the Commission. Schedule 2 to the MAI Act declares certain types of matters to be merit review matters, others to be medical assessment matters and other to be claims assessment matters.
2. In the context of this dispute, Schedule 2(1)(j) permits a merit reviewer to determine "whether statutory benefits are payable under section 3.26 ... and the amount of statutory benefits so payable". In other words the merit reviewer determines both the entitlement to the benefits and the quantum of those benefits.

1. On 20 May 2025, Ms Romeo from Expert Rehab completed an "attendant care request" (ACR) form. This request notes:

(a) the claimant was independent with transport before the accident but is now "medically unfit to drive due to increased anxiety associated with her diagnosis of PTSD";

(b) the claimant has anxiety and panic attacks when attempting to drive;

(c) despite engaging in therapy, the claimant continues to experience anxiety;

(d) Ms Romeo recommended "transport assistance from her own driver to achieve the best outcomes ... and avoid additional stress", and

(e) services of a consistent driver are required.

1. A plan for 12 weeks of transport assistance was set out by Ms Romeo at a cost of about $2,000 per week and $24,580.32 in total was claimed.
2. It was stated that:

(a) the claimant's psychologist and GP supported using a consistent driver, familiar with her needs and that she had already used the services of "Ash" and "Eric" and perceives "him" to be a safe driver thereby avoiding "triggers" for the claimant and her mental health declining;

(b) if the care was not provided, the claimant was at risk of increased anxiety and panic attacks, social isolation and impaired recovery;

(c) public transport was considered, but was said to be inappropriate as the children "were always taken care of especially during the colder seasons" and it is not time efficient, direct or reasonable for her or her children to use public transport;

(d) not attending to her children's needs increases her anxiety levels, and

(e) a support worker would require a two hour call out fee to accompany Ms Bonsu which is not cost effective.

1. A box was ticked saying this is "the most cost-effective option" as the driver is familiar with the claimant's needs and can minimise the possibility of triggering her symptoms.
2. On 29 May 2025 the insurer wrote to the claimant (and her solicitors)[2] denying the claim for transport assistance in the sum of $24,580.32 "because the treatment request is not considered reasonable and necessary".
3. In this letter NRMA:

(a) acknowledged the statutory basis of the request (s 3.26) but says statutory benefits are not payable "if domestic services provided after the motor accident are provided gratuitously";

(b) accepted liability to pay for the claimant's travel expenses to medical appointments and physiotherapy (presumably under s 3.24(1));

(c) declined to pay for expenses associated with the claimant attending church or grocery shopping "as these relate to yourself and not your children" but agreed to pay the reasonable costs of a grocery delivery service;

(d) denied liability to pay for taking the children to school and activities as this "comes in under 6 hours", and

(e) offered to pay for the claimant to attend a return to driving programme.

1. On 29 May 2025 the claimant's solicitor emailed NRMA, seeking an internal review[3] and pointing out the breakdown of the claim made for transport services as follows:

(a) the children's travel to school - five hours a week;

(b) the children's travel from school to extracurricular activities (soccer, futsal, swimming) - five hours a week, and

(c) the children's travel to church - 1 hour and 10 minutes per week.

1. The total claimed was 11 hours and 10 minutes per week.
2. Attached to the letter was an invoice from "Watch Investments Pty Limited" in the sum of $831.23 for five school trips, two trips to after school swimming and two trips to church.
3. On 12 June 2025 NRMA advised the claimant of the outcome of the request for the internal review of the claimed transport assistance[4]. NRMA:

(a) refers to a 6 June 2025 email advising that NRMA would support four weeks of transport assistance in the sum of $25 per journey for school, futsal and soccer training once per week, soccer game once a week and swimming once a week;

(b) an initial needs assessment that says the claimant's children were taking public transport to school;

(c) the insurer has been supporting the claimant with Opal payments and taxi assistance to get to treatment, and

(d) the current medical evidence does not give an end date for the assistance.

1. On 13 October 2025, the insurer denied liability to pay any ongoing statutory benefits to the claimant beyond the first 52 weeks after the accident[5]. While the insurer says the claimant was not wholly or mostly at fault, the insurer says the claimant has sustained threshold injuries only.
2. An internal review of that decision was undertaken on 3 November 2025[6]. Amongst other things, the insurer alleges that the claimant does not meet the criteria for a

post-traumatic stress disorder as the severity of the accident was not significant enough to meet criterion A as set out in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual 5 third revision (DSM-5). The insurer refers to two previous car accidents. 3. The dispute about threshold injury has now been referred to the Commission for medical assessment but not yet determined.

SUBMISSIONS AND PROCEDURAL STEPS IN THE PROCEEDINGS

1. The submissions lodged by the claimant with the application[7]:

(a) do not refer to the insurer's partial payments or partial approvals;

(b) explain how s 3.26(1) and (5) are complied with - which does not now appear to be in issue;

(c) argue that the claimant is unable to drive herself - which is also not apparently in issue;

(d) rely on the statement from the claimant's pastor about the claimant's non-attendance at church but that her children do attend;

(e) state that the children are, because of their age, incapable of getting themselves to and from school, extracurricular activities or church and previous attempts to use public transport were unsuccessful;

(f) but for the accident the claimant would provide at least 11 hours and 10 minutes of transport services to her children per week, and

(g) the claimant is a single mother and has no family who can provide assistance.

1. The insurer says at [1] that the dispute is a "merit review regarding gratuitous services." This is not quite correct as it is a dispute about the employment of someone to replace the gratuitous services provided by the claimant to her children before the accident.
2. The insurer submits at [5] that on 6 June 2025 the insurer agreed to pay the claimant's travel costs for four weeks at the rate of $25 per journey for a variety of the children's school and extracurricular activities.
3. The insurer says at [7] that on 1 July 2025 the insurer received a request for transport services in the sum of $10,139 which the insurer paid in part. The insurer says at [9] that on internal review, private hire car costs were considered not reasonable and that Uber rates would form the basis of any ongoing reimbursement.
4. The insurer conceded s 3.26(1) was satisfied and that as the insurer was funding travel NRMA asked that the proceedings be dismissed.

1. At the first preliminary conference it was noted there were three types of transport services mentioned in Ms Romeo's initial request:

(a) services provided to the claimant to get treatment (doctor and physiotherapy appointments). This is a request for transport services pursuant to the entitlement established in s 3.24(1)(b). If the treatment that is the subject of the travel claim, is related and reasonable and necessary, the insurer must pay the reasonable cost of the travel to obtain it;

(b) services provided directly to the claimant to go shopping, visit relatives, go to church herself. This is likely to be a request for transport services under s 3.24(1)(a). That is the transport services are a form of treatment provided to the claimant herself within the meaning of the definition in s 1.4 as possibly part of her rehabilitation, to benefit her mental health and so on. Alternatively, it could be a form of economic loss payable in her damages claim under s 4.5(b) for "costs relating to ... travel", and

(c) services provided to the claimant's children to attend school and after school sport and activities. This is, under s 3.26 a claim for the replacement of transport services that the claimant used to provide gratuitously but cannot now provide.

1. The parties confirmed it was only the third category of transport services that are in dispute. The claimant said the insurer had only agreed to pay for four weeks of services and at a rate below that which had been incurred. The insurer said that all transport services expenses incurred and verified by invoices had been paid but there was no jurisdiction to determine a dispute about expenses not yet incurred.
2. It was discussed and noted in the report at [15]:

"NRMA has not disputed that the claimant is, because of her accident-related injuries, unable to drive herself to medical appointments, drive herself to the shops or visit relatives and drive her children to school and after school activities. There is therefore no medical dispute in the matter about the need for the transport services."

1. It was also noted at [19] that there would appear to be two mechanisms for the payment of treatment and care expenses in the MAI scheme:

(a) the claimant pays the expense and seeks reimbursement of them from the insurer, or

(b) the claimant seeks pre-approval for the treatment or care, and the insurer approves it and possibly pays the treatment provider directly.

1. I expressed the preliminary view that the claimant does not actually have to have paid for the transport services and that if the insurer agrees they are related and reasonable and necessary, the insurer will have a liability to pay them subject to the reasonableness of the cost.
2. I also expressed the preliminary view that the jurisdiction of a merit reviewer covers the whole of s 3.26 which includes the entitlement to the care for the dependents and the cost of that care.
3. I requested additional documents and submissions including a statement from the claimant and a spreadsheet of expenses.

1. The claimant's further submissions dated 19 December 2025 deal with issues of jurisdiction and at [8] take issue with the insurer's "liability notice" dated 12 June 2025 and that the insurer now concedes s 3.26(1) has been satisfied but has not issued a "liability notice" to reflect this and therefore there is a current dispute.
2. The claimant says at [9] - [12] that the dispute is not a medical assessment matter but a merit review matter about the "reasonableness of the costs" and whether the Uber rate should be adopted. The claimant submits at [13] that the Commission has power to determine the entitlement to services under s 3.26 and the cost of those services.
3. The claimant says at [14] - [19] in answer to the insurer's submission that the Commission has no jurisdiction to determine a dispute about expenses not yet incurred citing Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance v Mayer[8] and AAI Limited t/as Moon[9] in respect to the meaning of the word "incurred". The claimant submits at [18] and [20] that the claimant is now liable for the transport costs of her children and that she has incurred a liability for expenses in accordance with the spreadsheet and invoices issued to her.
4. The claimant submits at [21] - [22] that during school holidays she would have provided at least seven hours of week of transport services to her children.

1. In the insurer further submissions filed on 8 January 2026, the insurer says:

(a) the expenses outlined by the claimant have been incurred within the meaning of s 3.24 and the insurer accepts the transport services are payable;

(b) the insurer has not approved the services the subject of invoice 0129;

(c) services the subject of invoices 0133, 0135, 0154 and 0157 have been paid in part at the rate of $25 per journey, and

(d) further payments will be made for invoices 133, 135 and 157.

1. The insurer analyses the cost of travel by car, uber, taxi, chauffeur and public transport and acknowledges there is no dispute about the claimant's incapacity to drive.
2. The insurer suggests that the claimant could travel with her children by public transport and that the weekly cost of her public transport in doing that would be similar to the cost of her driving them. The insurer submits that the cost of Uber, taxi or chauffer is three times the cost of public transport of vehicle transport and is not reasonable.
3. The insurer submits that a trip from school to Futsal has been paid at the rate of $25 but that there is no evidence of a trip to school on that particular day.
4. The insurer concedes the trip to swimming by public transport is not reasonable and seems to be submitting that the insurer should be paying only the difference between the cost of the claimant's pre-accident car travel and the cost of an Uber journey. Similarly, the insurer argues the claimant should be compensated on the basis of the difference between the car travel expenses which would have been incurred anyway and the cost of the Uber.
5. The travel to church said to be the subject of invoice 0129 has not been paid because the invoice has not been provided to the insurer and the insurer says there is no jurisdiction therefore to determine an invoice not requested, not refused and not the subject of internal review.
6. The travel to a funeral in invoice 0157 has not been particularised and the insurer argues it should pay the difference between car related travel and Uber as the claimant would have incurred those costs regardless of the accident. Invoice 0157 also included costs in attending a birthday celebration in Bankstown and the insurer again says there are no particulars of this and again says it should only have to pay the difference between the claimant taking her own car (which she would have done but for the accident) and the Uber costs.

1. On 12 January 2026 a second preliminary conference was held. While both the insurer's representative and the claimant's legal representatives attended, they did not attend at the same time and therefore a third conference was scheduled.
2. I referred to the claimant's two previous accidents and claims from August 2018 and May 2023.
3. There appeared to be an issue as to what had been paid and at what rate. There was also an issue about whether the claimant's children, at the ages of 11 and 13 should be able to get themselves to school and whether there needed to be expert evidence about their ability or lack of ability.
4. I issued further directions for an agreed list of outstanding expenses.

1. Both parties attended promptly at the teleconference on 22 January 2026.
2. The parties agreed there was no dispute that the claimant had physical and psychological injuries caused by the accident and psychological injuries that have led to the need for transport services.
3. The claimant's original request was for pre-approval of anticipated transport services expenses in the sum of $25,000. This was rejected for several reasons some of which the insurer no longer pursues. The insurer did not reject entirely the claim for services, and the claimant has been submitting invoices and receipts to the insurer some of which have been paid by the claimant and reimbursed by the insurer, others appear to have been paid directly by the insurer.
4. It appeared to be agreed that the sum unpaid was about $4,000 and the insurer took no issue with the verification of the expenses claimed.
5. The insurer did take issue with an invoice 0129 totalling $1,139 which it had not been asked to pay and an invoice 0157 which referred to transport of the claimant only and not her children. There were other invoices which were not at all clear.
6. The insurer conceded there was no dispute about the entitlement to statutory benefits under s 3.26 but that the only dispute was about the reasonableness of the cost of the expenses claimed as benefits under the section.
7. I identified the arguments raised by the parties and referred them to information from the NSW education department website. I requested additional documents including a statement from the claimant.
8. If the claimant sought costs, I advised I would, subject to any provisions in the regulation assess costs at the regulated rate. I asked that the parties' final submissions address the issue of costs.

1. The claimant submits that the sum of $1,968.04 is outstanding and provides an updated spreadsheet of the past treatment expenses claimed.
2. The claimant submits is it unreasonable for the claimant's children to take public or private buses to attend school and extracurricular activities "as they are unfamiliar with bus travel" and that on "an attempt "in early 2025" when they did so, they got off at the wrong stop. The claimant could not recall the details of that trip, but she was required to travel to them to help them return them home.
3. The claimant submits that she has relied on paid transport, friends and family and public transport when "absolutely necessary".
4. The claimant submits there are only limited special buses that go to and from school and there is significant walking involved which is not feasible.
5. The claimant submits her children have complained about private and public buses, feeling unsafe and have difficulty carrying heavy backpacks and sporting equipment and the three block walk to the bus stop requires her daughter to walk past dogs and she is afraid of dogs.
6. The claimant submits at [11] - [12] the insurer should reimburse her for the full fee of a private driver without deductions at the rate of $41.25 per trip (including GST) taking her children to school.
7. The claimant submits her children cannot catch an Uber on their own and she has had experiences of poor driving when she has caught Ubers. The claimant says engaging a consistent and familiar driver through a private service has reduced her levels of stress and anxiety.
8. The claimant submits at [16] the reimbursement rate of $25 does not adequately cover her for the expenses she has incurred and that the deduction of pre-accident care related expenses is not appropriate. She also submits at [17] that Uber permits surge pricing and a flat $25 fee is incorrect.
9. The claimant submits at [18] - [19] that she should be reimbursed for the full fee of a private driver without deductions at $124.30 per trip to church.
10. The claimant submits at [20] - [21] that the claimant should be reimbursed for the full fee of a private driver without deductions at $93.50 for every trip to her children's tennis lessons.

1. The insurer now accepts that invoice 0129 should be considered [3] and points out at [4] - [6] what is in dispute.
2. The insurer submits as follows:

(a) church and tennis - there are no submissions as to why chauffeur over taxi or Uber services should be paid "other than the general preferences and concerns";

(b) school bus - the insurer contacted the Australian Christian College and was advised the cost of a trip was $4 - $5 per child per trip and there was no requirement to pre-pay or pre-register. The insurer notes the report of

13 February 2025 records that the claimant's children have been catching public transport and the claimant's own statement is that they use it if necessary, which the insurer says supports the children have the capacity to use public transport and school buses. The insurer says the reasonable costs of travel to and from school should be limited to the costs submitted by the insurer.

1. The insurer summarised that the amount of disputed invoices was $4,230.49 of which $1,404.72 had been paid and $614.18 was to be paid and the sum of $2,219 remained.

1. Ms Bonsu's application for statutory benefit (claim form) is dated 7 July 2025. She refers to a previous motor accident claim in respect of an accident on 11 May 2023, says she does not know the claim number but identifies the insurer as QBE.
2. She describes the accident as a rear end collision on the Great Western Highway. She says her forehead hit the steering wheel and her head bounced back into the seat and the car was "disabled". She says she got out of the car and the driver that hit her did not have his license details and she called emergency services. She says she was taken to hospital by ambulance.
3. In her description of injuries, she refers to injuries from a "previous mva" and she says, "I was not suffering from an injury, but I have injuries from previous accident in the same area."
4. The claimant says she is a full-time lawyer and had three working days off after the accident. She did not consent to the insurer contacting her employer.
5. The claimant provided a statement dated 18 December 2025 in which she says:

(a) she is 48 years of age and lives with her children who are 11 and 13 and who attend the Australian Christian College in Marsden Park [1];

(b) before the accident and since July 2024 she was a commercial lawyer with the Department of Home Affairs but resigned in September 2025 "as I was struggling to travel to the office in Parramatta" [4];

(c) she is the sole carer of her children and responsible for driving them to and from school and extracurricular activities [5];

(d) each trip to school was 15 minutes (and 15 minutes to return home) and that she drove her children to school each and every day of the school term [6];

(e) on Tuesdays she picked up her daughter first (and returns her home - a 30 minute round trip) then drives back to school to pick up her son after Futsal training (an additional 30 minutes) [7];

(f) she drives her son to and from soccer training twice a week (Monday's and Thursdays) as well as to soccer games on Saturday [7];

(g) her daughter attends swimming and is driven there and back on Thursdays [8];

(h) before the accident she would also drive her children to and from church as well as driving her son to youth group on Fridays [9];

(i) during the week she estimates 12 hours of travel and 7.2 hours of travel during school holidays [10];

(j) she is unable to drive due to her psychological symptoms and because the insurer has denied funding her children have not been attending after school activities as regularly as they did before the accident [12];

(k) she says she relies on others to transport her children "my son is only able to attend soccer matches and training when a family member is available to drive him" and they can only go to church and, her children (plural), when a member of the congregation can take them [12];

(l) she says, "it is not feasible" for her children to catch public transport as it involves catching the bus but that buses do not stop at every stop and the button needs to be pressed and "it is very difficult for my children to know where to get off". She said she attempted to have her children take the bus, but they got off at the wrong stop and got lost [13];

(m) her work before the accident was flexible and she was permitted to work from home 7.00am to 7.00pm and take breaks as required to drive her children to and from school, and

(n) she says she has attached receipts and an excel spreadsheet [15].

1. The claimant refers to her children video calling her after the accident and that a family member drove them home and a cousin came to help.
2. The claimant says she tried to return to work on 12 February 2025 but could not and ceased working, resigning in September 2025. She says she has recently secured a new role and is hoping to work from home five days a week.
3. The claimant provided screen shots of the distance from home to school and that the public transport trip from home to school took 27 minutes including walking from home to the end of the street and a short walk at the end of the journey. A car trip was 5.7km and took 9 - 16 mins.
4. The claimant provided an excel spreadsheet of travel expenses claimed with the total of $4,341.89 of which $4,016.89 was said to be unpaid[10].
5. There were five "cash receipts' from Taxi Pay attached and a series of invoices but no receipts from Watch Investments Pty Limited for "car hire" addressed to the claimant. A BSB and account number was provided as the method of payment on some of these invoices. Some of the invoices refer to Watch Investments and others to Watch Investment. There are no receipts from Watch Investments to suggest these invoices have been paid.
6. The claimant provided a medical certificate completed by Dr Devineni dated

9 December 2025 certifying that the claimant's daughter Isla was unable to attend swimming as the claimant was unable to drive her "for medical reasons." 7. The claimant has provided a further statement dated 5 February 2026. She says:

(a) her son is 13 and will turn 14 in June of this year and her daughter is 11 and will turn 12 in July of this year [2];

(b) both children attend the same school and travel together when their schedule permits [4] - [5];

(c) the term dates were 29 January to 11 April 2025; 28 April to 4 July 2025; 28 July to 26 September 2025 and 13 October to 3 December 2025 [6];

(d) if she drove her children, it would take 15 minutes to get them to school and the bus 747 takes them 27 minutes including 11 minutes of walking [7];

(e) if they miss the 747 bus there is a 751 bus which takes about an hour including 50 minutes of walking time [8];

(f) there is no bus home that follows the same route - there is a 747 bus which takes around 39 minutes of walking and 9 minutes of riding the bus [9];

(g) the College has a private bus service at a cost of $1,200 per child with registration required at the commencement of the school year and she "believes" getting a place on the bus after the commencement of term is "very unlikely" [10];

(h) her daughter is afraid of dogs and there are several dogs on the three-block walk to school [10];

(i) her children are uncomfortable with the private school bus and she relies on family and friends, paid services and some use of public transport [10];

(j) while she does not recall the exact dates her children did try using public buses soon after the accident they complained about it and got off at the wrong stop and complained about the buses being crowded and they had difficulty with the heavy school bags and sporting equipment [11];

(k) she says her children have used public transport "intermittently ... when no other option [was] available." For most of the school year she has relied on paid transport, family support and public transport. The stress of organising transport from them has contributed to her stress and reduced her ability to "focus on my recovery" [12];

(l) she does not travel with her children to school unless she is required at school, she prefers her children to travel alone using private car services because she "prefers to avoid travelling when I can" and she prefers not to go with her children to after school activities";

(m) she does not like her children taking Ubers on their own and she has ridden in Ubers to go to medical appointments and does not like doing so due to their "sub-par driving standards" [13];

(n) she prefers "a consistent and known driver" rather than a different driver for every trip and that one of her family members uses that driver and so she trusts their services which helps her manage her stress [14];

(o) the claimant has corrected two matters raised by the insurer with the initial needs assessment report and says her children were not using public transport before the accident and that her parents were overseas at the time the report was written but do not reside overseas. They are 76 and 70 and can only provide occasional assistance. In addition, she has three sisters and one brother, and they are also not available to provide regular assistance [15] and [16];

(p) the claimant says she is the sole carer of her children, and she provided a part of a notice which would appear to be a document in support of a claim for child support from the father of the children [17];

(q) she says the birthday party on 5 July 2025 was her son's and that she and her children were transported to the party and she was then transported to the funeral on the evening of the same day, and

(r) she says she did not attend church on 25 May 2025 or 1 June 2025 and that she has not attended church services "for the majority of 2025" although she does say she has attended church on a "small number of occasions" during 2025.

1. Ms Bonsu relies on a statement from Pastor Akomeah dated 5 June 2025 which says:

(a) he has known the claimant for eight years and that she previously attended church weekly on Sundays with her two children, and

(b) since the accident the claimant has not been to church and only her children attend church now along with youth services on Friday evenings.

1. Ms Romeo, whose initial request prompted this dispute, sent an email to NRMA on

19 June 2025[11] taking issue with the insurer's internal review decision as follows:

(a) Ms Romeo agrees the claimant's ability to drive was not assessed but asserts this was because her driving could not be assessed due to her psychological injury;

(b) the claimant had been self-funding her children's transport needs due to her inability to drive;

(c) a trial of public transport resulted in her children getting lost which exacerbated her mental health symptoms;

(d) she made a recommendation for travel assistance based on the claimant's "current functional capacity and mental health status";

(e) Ms Romeo gathered information about the Safe2Go driving program but has not herself recommended it as the claimant "is not currently a suitable candidate', and

(f) Ms Romeo says it is important for NRMA to understand "the serious psychological implications that false or misleading statements" made by NRMA (in its internal review decision) have had on the claimant.

1. Ambulance records note no airbags deployed and that the claimant said her chest hit the steering wheel and her head hit the car seat. She complained of headache and neck pain. The accident was said to have occurred at 70km per hour.
2. The police report says the speed limit was 60km per hour, the claimant's pre-accident speed was 15km per hour and the other vehicle's speed limit was 40km per hour.
3. The insurer provides an investigation report which suggests the collision occurred when the claimant merged suddenly into a lane without indicating.
4. The insurer has provided a number of Allied Health Recovery Request forms (AHRR) for physiotherapy and psychological treatment.

1. The claimant relies on an email from Mr Fahim sent to the insurer on 12 June 2025[12]. He says the claimant "is unable to drive independently in the immediate future." He says the claimant meets the criteria for a post-traumatic stress disorder with symptoms including "intense fear, panic and intrusive thoughts directly linked to her accident that impair her ability to drive." He does state she is able to travel as a passenger, and he supports her claim funding for transport services.
2. He outlined his treatment plan including graded exposure to driving and reduction of symptoms. He did not support a "Safe2Go" driving program at that time as in his view it would likely exacerbate her symptoms.
3. Ms Bonsu provided a report from Mr Fahim, dated 7 July 2025[13]. He has a history of symptoms starting soon after the accident and that the claimant had not experienced psychological injuries before. He documents extensive symptoms. He diagnosed a post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder. He refers to the claimant's children having been lost on one occasion after catching public transport to school. Mr Fahim has no history of any of the claimant's previous accidents, injuries or conditions other than acknowledging the claimant exacerbated pre-existing back and neck injuries.
4. The claimant told Dr Fahim she had avoided all driving due to fears of further accidents and her inability to drive her children was causing significant distress as was the financial strain paying for her children's transport.

1. Dr Devineni wrote a referral to Ms Verzi on 21 February 2025 noting that the claimant had been involved in three motor accidents and that after the most recent one she was anxious about her children and was avoiding driving and feeling anxious. A similar referral was written on 19 March 2025 to psychologists Matthew Gullotta and Kevin Fahim.
2. Dr Devineni wrote to the insurer on 7 March 2025 advising them of the claimant's previous accidents and the fact that the claimant was fearful of driving and required urgent psychological assistance.
3. Dr Devineni provided a report dated 8 August 2025 to the claimant's solicitors.[14] He refers to the claimant suffering physical and psychological injuries and is unable to drive due to "severe anxiety and panic symptoms" and he supports assistance with transport and a driver to take her to and from work, attend appointments and help her children get to school.
4. The claimant was said to have severe symptoms, she had been started on Sertraline medication and was unlikely to be driving for the next six months.
5. A similar report was written on 10 August 2025 to NRMA[15] referring to "severe neck, upper back, shoulder, lower back and leg pains" and post-traumatic stress disorder. The claimant said she was "currently working in a job where she can't take much time off work and describes that this job is very important for her career progression. She is pushing herself to continue working ..."
6. The claimant was said to be distressed at having to fight with the insurer and being denied transport assistance which was exacerbating her mental health issues and he supported the claim for transport and domestic assistance.
7. Certificates of capacity were provided[16] which suggest:

(a) no capacity to work from to 4 to 7 February 2025;

(b) no capacity to work from 5 to 6 February 2025 but capacity for some type of work from 7 March 2025 to 19 February 2025 being eight hours a day five days a week;

(c) no capacity from 18 February 2025 to 11 March 2025;

(d) capacity to work for eight hours a day five days a week from 23 March to

21 April 2025;

(e) no capacity to work from 10 April to 23 July 2025, and

(f) capacity to work for eight hours a day five days a week from 23 July to

19 September 2025.

1. No records from the claimant's employer as to the claimant's work before the accident and after the accident have been provided.

1. There are, in my view a number of inconsistencies and uncertainties in the evidence. For example, the claimant has said in her statement and her submissions that she drove her children to and from school every day and to and from their after-school activities every day. She says her employer allowed her to work flexibly to do this including working from home (presumably for five days a week) and allowed her to take breaks to attend to her children and their needs. The claimant was, according to her statement, working in an office in Parramatta before the accident which is at least a one hour trip by public transport. If the claimant drove her children to school at 8.30am, then drove home (as she has claimed she did) before catching public transport to work she would be unlikely to get to work before 10.00am and would have to leave work after four hours work by 2.00pm to get to school in time to pick up her children, every day of the week. If she was working full time from home this would be inconsistent with her evidence that she was struggling with travel to Parramatta to work.
2. The statement from the claimant's pastor that Ms Bonsu had not been to church at all since the accident is inconsistent with the claimant's later statement that she did go to church sometimes. The claimant's statement that only her son goes to youth group on Fridays is inconsistent with a latter passage in her statement where she refers to both her children going to youth group.
3. The claimant claims two hours and twenty minutes of travel to take both her son to soccer training and her daughter to swimming with both activities occurring on Thursday afternoons. There is a lack of clarity in the claimant's statements as to how she managed the logistics of these two separate events.
4. The claimant's initial submissions state there is Futsal competition on Wednesday afternoons, yet the claimant's statement does not deal with this.
5. The claimant's subsequent submissions refer to the claimant taking her children to tennis which is not covered by the claimant in any of her statements.
6. There is no clarity about the seasonality of the children's sporting activities. For example, as I understand it, soccer is usually a winter sport whereas tennis and swimming are predominantly summer sports.
7. The claimant initially submitted she was single and had no family who could provide assistance, yet in her statements she says family members have been taking her son to soccer matches.
8. The claimant's submission that her children were incapable of getting themselves to and from school and had made previous attempts (plural) to get to school unsuccessfully is inconsistent with the claimant's initial statement and the report of Ms Romeo which refers to a single attempt or incident. This is also inconsistent with the claimant's further statement that her children have been catching public transport and may have been taking the school bus, but prefer the services of a private driver.
9. The claimant says the school bus is an option but had to be arranged at the beginning of the school year. The insurer has obtained information from the school to the contrary.
10. Finally, I note there is no agreement as to the amount outstanding. The claimant suggests in final submissions it is the sum of $1,968, the insurer says it is the sum of $2,219.

1. Due to the amount of the care that is in dispute, the unavailability of costs and the requirement of the Commission for proportionate decision making, I do not propose to hold a conference to put these inconsistencies to the claimant. The parties have agreed for the matter to be determined on the basis of the material put before me.
2. I accept that the claimant has required transport services since the accident for herself and her children because of her injuries and I generally accept the evidence in her statements.
3. I will deal with each of the categories and types of activity and make findings in respect of the type of transport assistance for each. I will then remit the matter back to the insurer and leave it up to the parties to resolve between themselves whatever sum is owing to the claimant in accordance with the findings.
4. I am hopeful that the findings will form the basis for agreements and action in relation to transport services claimed beyond those services that are the subject of the current proceedings.

1. The insurer has conceded that the claimant was injured in the motor accident and could not, during 2025 drive because of her accident-related psychological or psychiatric injuries.
2. The insurer agrees that engaging a taxi, private ride share (such as Uber) or chauffeur service is a form of employing someone to perform a service and that driving the children to and from school and after school activities is a form of domestic services thereby bringing the transport services in dispute within the scope of s 3.26.
3. The insurer concedes that the four pre-conditions of s 3.26(1) are met that is:

(a) the claimant's two children were and are dependants within the meaning of s 3.26(1)(a) and that before the accident the claimant used to drive them to school and to after school activities. Even though she may have worked full time and in an office in Paramatta, she says her employer was flexible enough to allow her to attend to the drop off and pick up and take her children to after school activities;

(b) the children could not drive themselves to school, church or after school activities;

(c) that, after the accident there was a reasonable expectation that the claimant would have provided at least six hours of transport services to her children per week for at least six months but for the accident-related injuries, and

(d) there was a need for the transport services and that need was reasonable in all the circumstances.

1. While the objects of the Act set out in s 1.3 acknowledge the importance of supporting injured persons (see s 1.3(2)(a) and (b)) there are also objects which encourage financial responsibility and a desire to keep compulsory insurance affordable (see s 1.3(3)(a).
2. What is a reasonable cost of transport services and what is not requires a similar balancing Act between what the claimant wants and needs and what the scheme can afford and should pay. While the claimant and her children might have issues with dogs, the cold, their load and the crowds, prefer a chauffeur driven lift to school and activities, and the insurer is only obliged to pay for what is reasonable as in fair and sensible, appropriate and moderate.
3. The disputed invoices generally concern three types of transport services:

(a) trips to school;

(b) trips to after and out of school sporting activities, and

(c) trips to church and youth group activities at church.

1. I make the following findings based on the evidence:

(a) each trip to school with the claimant driving took 15 minutes (and 15 minutes to drive home) - this is based on the evidence and annexures to the claimant's statement;

(b) public transport (bus) takes 27 minutes for the children including 11 minutes of walking time to and from the bus stop and there are limited services - this finding is based on the evidence of the claimant and annexures to her statement;

(c) semi-public transport (the school provided bus) is available to and from school and the closest pick up and drop off point is not far from the claimant's home - this finding is made based on the map of the school route provided by the insurer, and

(d) the claimant's children were during 2025 in school years 8 and 6 and turned 13 and 11 respectively in the middle of the year. They attended the same school. This is not disputed.

1. In my view it is reasonable for children aged 11 and 13 to be travelling by public (or semi-public) transport to and from school. Neither party expressed the need for expert opinion, and therefore I make this finding based on my own experience and information drawn to the attention of the parties from the NSW Department of Education website which suggests:

(a) children up to age 10 should be closely supervised (and care givers should ride with them), and

(b) children should be walked to the bus stop by their care givers and their hands held up to age 10.

1. I agree with the claimant and do not consider it appropriate for her children to be travelling to school on their own (or as two children together) by taxi or Uber. It is unlikely that every taxi driver or Uber driver would have the appropriate working with children or police checks to suggests that taxi or ride share drivers should be entrusted with the care of one or both minors.
2. There is no medical evidence to suggest that Ms Bonsu could not walk her children to and from a public bus stop (11 minutes away) or the bus stop used by the school's own bus services.
3. While the claimant has given evidence of at least one time when her children got off at the wrong bus stop, there is insufficient evidence to suggest the claimant has difficulty riding on public transport and that she could not, as the Department of Education suggests, plan the route to school with her children, travel the route to school with her children to help familiarise them with the route, show them where to get off and so on.
4. It follows therefore that I do not consider it reasonable for the insurer to pay the cost of private or chauffer transport to and from school as claimed by Ms Bonsu.
5. As the insurer has conceded s 3.26(1) is satisfied, I find that the correct and preferable decision is for the insurer to pay the cost of the children's public transport or the cost of the school bus as replacement domestic (transport of children) services that the claimant used to provide to her children before the accident on a gratuitous basis.

(a) on Tuesdays the claimant made two trips to school in the afternoon. One to collect her daughter and bring her home and the other to collect her son after Futsal and bring him home - it has not been challenged that the claimant made these trips before the accident every Tuesday of every school term in 2025;

(b) on Mondays and Thursday Ms Bonsu's son attends soccer training. The insurer has not challenged the timetabling of this activity, and I accept therefore the claimant's evidence given in her statement that before the accident she would take her son (with her daughter presumably in tow) to her son's soccer training twice a week, and

(c) on Thursdays Ms Bonsu would take her daughter to swimming - the insurer has not challenged the timetabling of this activity, so I accept the claimant's evidence that she took her daughter to swimming before the accident every Thursday (with her son presumably in tow).

1. In terms of Futsal there is no evidence about whether there was a "season" for this sport or whether this activity took place every Tuesday of every week of term throughout the year however as it has not been challenged, I accept it is so. There is also no evidence about how long Futsal training takes or at precisely what time it starts, but in my view, it is reasonable for the claimant to travel by public transport from her home to meet her younger child at school and remain there with her younger child while the older child plays Futsal. I then consider it reasonable for the three members of the family to take an Uber or taxi home together.
2. As there is no evidence to suggest the claimant cannot take public transport and due to her employer's flexible working policy, I find that the correct and preferable decision is for the insurer to pay the cost of Ms Bonsu's public transport to school on Tuesdays and for the cost of an Uber or taxi back home afterwards for the family of three together after Futsal training was over.
3. The claimant's submissions refer to a Futsal competition on Wednesdays. There is no evidence from the claimant in her statement about Futsal competition on any day of the week. While the submissions suggest this competition occurs in Riverstone, there is no evidence about the time or seasonality of this competition. I do not propose to make any findings in respect of Futsal competition. However, noting I am remitting the matter back to the insurer and for the purposes of resolving a potential dispute, if the claimant used to drive her son to these competitions and drive him home, I am assuming the claimant's daughter would go too (and not be left at home alone). If the location of the Futsal competition was not a location convenient for public transport, then on that basis it would likely be reasonable for the claimant to be reimbursed for expenses incurred in catching public transport to school to pick up her son and daughter and then taking an Uber or taxi to the Futsal competition and home again.
4. In terms of the claimant's daughter's swimming, noting there is no evidence to suggest the claimant cannot take public transport and noting her employer's flexible working arrangements, it is reasonable for the claimant to be reimbursed the cost of her public transport to school to collect her children on Thursdays and for the cost of an Uber or taxi to take the family to swimming and then home from the swimming pool.
5. In terms of the claimant's son's soccer, again noting there is no evidence to suggest the claimant cannot take public transport and noting her employer's flexible working arrangements, it is reasonable for the claimant to be reimbursed the cost of her public transport to school to collect her children and then the cost of an Uber or taxi to take the family to the location of soccer practice and then home.
6. The claimant's son's soccer competition took place on a Saturday. Again, while there is some suggestion of where it took place, there is no evidence about the seasonality of the competition. As the competition occurs on a weekend when the claimant does not have to worry about her work commitments, I am of the view that it is reasonable for the claimant to travel to soccer competitions with her son (and presumably daughter in tow) and for them to be able to navigate public transport together. I do not consider the cost of a private chauffer driven car to be a reasonable cost that the insurer is required to pay.

1. The claimant said that before and after the accident she would drive her son to youth group at church on Fridays. I note that later in her statement she refers to her children (plural) going to youth group. The claimant's Pastor and the claimant also said that before the accident as a family they would go together to church on Sundays.
2. As part of the claim under s 3.26, I am considering here only those occasions when the children go to church on their own and the children's attendance at youth group on Fridays. For the reasons I gave earlier I do not consider it appropriate for them, as minors, to be catching a ride share vehicle such as an Uber or taxi to church on their own. As the journey there from the claimant's home is 20km and public transport on Sundays is presumably less frequent I do not consider it reasonable to expect the claimant's 11- and 13-year-old children to navigate that route themselves. I therefore consider it reasonable for the claimant's children to travel to church on Sundays (on their own) by way of a private vehicle where the driver is known to the claimant and her children.
3. If the claimant's children attended church on Sundays with their mother, then I consider that is not an expense to be dealt with as part of the s 3.26 claim.
4. In terms of the travel to youth group on Friday nights there is limited information about what time this occurred, for how long it lasted and so on. In her initial statement the claimant said she used to take her children out to dinner every Friday night, and it may be that the youth group and dinner activity occurred one after the other. If the claimant's son was travelling to youth group on his own and not associated with the dinner out every Friday night then I consider the replacement of those domestic (transport) services that the claimant provided to her son should be reimbursed on the basis of a private vehicle where the driver is known to the claimant and her children and not the Uber or taxi rate offered by the insurer.
5. If the claimant's son's attendance at youth group (or both children's attendance) was part of the family dinner out on Friday nights before the accident, then I do not consider costs associated with that activity to be part of the s 3.26 claim. That would be a family activity and not a children's own activity.

1. There is no evidence about how the claimant managed to take her daughter to swimming, remain for the lesson and return home as well as transporting her son to soccer training both of which occurred on Thursdays. In addition, there is no evidence about the "seasonality" of the after-school activities (Futsal training, soccer practice and swimming training). There is also the uncertainty about Futsal competition and the activities on Friday night (the son's attendance at youth group and the family dinner out). Finally, there is some evidence about the availability of family and friends, and there is also the prospect of a child being unwell and unable to attend after school events. Because of the uncertainties, I do not accept that the insurer should have to pay these expenses up front or in advance. I therefore consider it reasonable for the insurer to reimburse the claimant for the disputed expenses incurred in 2025 based on my findings and upon the production of Opal card statement and receipts evidencing same. I would however encourage the insurer to communicate with Watch Investments and the drivers the claimant prefers to see if some arrangement as to costs could be agreed so as to reduce the potential for disputation in the future.
2. The insurer raised an issue in its submissions about the claimant being allowed expenses incurred subject to a discount or deduction for the costs of running her car, being costs that would have been incurred in ferrying her children to school and their activities had she not been injured.
3. In a damages claim, damages are awarded on the basis of the compensatory principle that is to put a person in the position they would have been in but for the accident and so you can take into account what was in place before and after the accident and adjust damages accordingly to reflect the actual loss[17]. However, in a statutory benefits claim, treatment and care benefits are paid pursuant to the legislative scheme. They are based on the entitlement established in ss 3.24 and 3.26 to the payment of expenses incurred in connection with treatment or incurred after an accident to provide services. The entitlement is governed by limits and restrictions such as the reasonableness of cost in s 3.24(1)(a) or the previous recovery of damages for the loss of capacity in s 3.26(3). There is nothing in ss 3.24 or 3.26 or any other section in Division 3.4 which permits the adjustment of the cost of expenses incurred to take into account a pre-accident situation or pre-existing cost or expense.

1. While the insurer initially declined to pay for all the transport assistance claimed it has since been paying for some transport assistance and has made a number of concessions that depart from the stance taken in its internal review decision. It follows therefore that the insurer's decision contained within that internal review decision should be set aside.
2. Because of the uncertainties and inconsistencies referred to above and in particular due to the absence of any agreement as to precisely what remains in dispute, in accordance with s 7.13(3)(d) I remit the question of the cost of transport services for reconsideration by the insurer in accordance with the findings above which are summarised as follows:

(a) for trips to and from school - public transport or the semi-public school bus;

(b) for trips to after school activities and sport - a mix of public transport for the claimant to attend school and ride share transport with the family to and from activities other than for weekend sport in which case public transport only, and

(c) for trips to church by the children alone and to youth group on Sunday - by private transport from a known driver with appropriate working with children checks and return.

1. In the preliminary conference report of 22 January 2026, I advised the parties that if costs were available under Motor Accident Injuries Regulation 2017 (the Regulation), I will be assessing costs and I invited the parties to include in their final submissions, submissions addressing the issue of costs. I received no submissions from either party about costs.
2. Section 7.13A of the MAI Act empowers a merit reviewer to assess costs including costs for legal services and fees for medico-legal services. Section 8.10 provides for the recovery of costs and expenses in a statutory benefits claim. Section 8.10(3) provides that costs are recoverable by the claimant from the insurer if payment is permitted by the Regulation or if permitted by the Commission.
3. Schedule 1, Part 1, clause 1 of the Regulation declares certain matters to be regulated merit review matters for which costs are available. Disputes concerning s 3.26 are not one of the matters listed therefore no costs are permitted by the Regulation. As I have received no submissions in respect of the award of costs on any other basis, I will not award the claimant any costs in respect of this dispute.

[1] The description of injuries comes from the claim form completed by Ms Bonsu and found at page 59 of her initial bundle of documents.

[2] Page 8 of the claimant's initial bundle.

[3] Page 12 of the claimant's initial bundle.

[4] Page 20 of the claimant's initial bundle.

[5] Page 35 of the claimant's additional bundle.

[6] Page 37 of the claimant's additional bundle.

[7] Page 3 of the claimant's initial application.

[8] [2025] NSWSC 1311 (NRMA v Mayer).

[9] [2020] NSWSC 714 (Moon).

[10] Page 21 of the claimant's additional bundle.

[11] Page 31 of the claimant's initial bundle.

[12] Page 29 of the claimant's initial bundle.

[13] Page 35 of the claimant's initial bundle.

[14] Page 46 of the claimant's initial bundle.

[15] Page 48 of the claimant's initial bundle.

[16] Page 50 of the claimant's initial bundle with more provided at page 65 of the insurer's initial bundle.

[17] See Luntz, H and Harder S "Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death" fifth edition 2021 at [1.1.5].