Bolkvadze & Bolkvadze (No 4) [2025] FedCFamC1F 535 (11 August 2025)

(a) Each Wednesday from after school or 3.00pm to 6.00pm; and

(b) In week one and every second week thereafter, each Saturday and Sunday from 2.00pm to 6.00pm (with the first weekend of care commencing on the weekend following the making of these orders);

(c) During all school terms and during all school holidays at the conclusion of Terms 1, 2 and 3, in accordance with orders 4(a) and 4(b) herein, following the pattern of care which applied during term periods; and

(d) Such other times as the parties may agree in writing.

1. The time that the children X and Y spend with the mother in accordance with Order 4 herein shall be subject to their views.
2. The mother (including by her agents, save for lawyers engaged to represent her interests) is restrained by injunction from:

(a) Contacting any medical practitioner or therapist assessing or providing treatment to any of the children (which includes other staff of the clinic/practice from which those providers offer their services); and

(b) Providing any information, in writing (which includes electronic communication), to any medical practitioner or therapist assessing or providing treatment to any of the children (which includes other staff of the clinic/practice from which those providers offer their services), unless expressly requested by the practitioner or therapist in writing.

1. The mother may meet with any medical practitioner or therapist assessing or providing treatment to any of the children if requested by the practitioner or therapist to do so and may communicate with them/the staff of the clinic/practice from which the providers offer their services, to schedule an appointment.
2. Orders 18 and 19 of the orders of 24 February 2025 be varied to the extent that the father may select the clinic to provide the P Family Therapy and, for that purpose, the written agreement of the mother as to the selected therapy provider shall not be required.
3. The father is to provide to the mother, in writing (via the parenting communication application used by the parties) every 14 days, a summary which is to include the following information:

(a) Particulars of any attendance of a child or children upon a medical practitioner or therapist assessing or providing treatment to any of the children in the preceding 14 day period, with such to include a summary of the outcome of that attendance and any recommendations made by the medical practitioner or therapist; and

(b) Particulars of any medication being taken by any of the children and, or, any changes to the medication regime prescribed (as applicable) in each 14 day period.

1. Pursuant to section 68L of the Act, an Independent Children's Lawyer be appointed for the children and Legal Aid NSW is requested to provide such representation.
2. The parties provide to Legal Aid NSW and, or, the Independent Children's Lawyer, if requested, all documents thus far filed in these proceedings by that party together with all existing orders and copies of any relevant reports.
3. Leave is granted to the Independent Children's Lawyer to issue more than 5 subpoenas.
4. Pursuant to section 62G of the Act, the parties and the children X, Y, and Z are directed to attend with a Court Child Expert (practicing under their appointment as a family consultant) nominated by the Court Children's Service (the Court Child Expert) for the purposes of the preparation of a Child Impact Report at the dates and times below, or as otherwise directed by the Court Child Expert.

Part 1 of the event will occur by video, using Microsoft Teams, on 27 October 2025, with:

(a) the Applicant to attend at 9.00am; and

(b) the Respondent to attend at 10.30am.

Microsoft Teams links will be provided to the parties by the Court Child Expert prior to the event.

Part 2 of the event will occur in person at the Sydney Registry on the morning of 28 October 2025. Specific details regarding the attendance of the parties and the children on this date will be provided to the parties at Part 1 of the event.

1. Each party shall do all things necessary to ensure the children attend upon the Court Child Expert pursuant to Section 62G(3A), unless otherwise determined by the Court Child Expert that Section 62G(3B) applies.
2. The parties and the children shall continue to attend at such times, dates and places as the Court Child Expert may advise.
3. Not later than 4.00pm on 19 August 2025 the parties must provide their contact telephone numbers and email addresses to ...@....
4. Pursuant to order 13 herein, the Court Child Expert shall provide a written report to the Court and the report shall deal with the following matters:

(a) Any agreement reached between the parties;

(b) Identification of key issues requiring resolution;

(c) Any views expressed by the children. and any matters (such as the children's maturity or level of understanding) that would affect the weight that the court should place on those views;

(d) The impact of the issues/dispute before the Court on the children;

(e) Any other matters that the Court Child Expert considers important to the welfare or best interests of the children.

1. Upon completion, the Child Impact Report shall be provided to the Court for release to the parties, including by way of order made in Chambers.
2. The Court Child Expert be at liberty to inspect any material filed by the parties and documents produced on subpoena and pursuant to ss 67ZBD or 67ZBE of the Act.
3. Leave is granted to the Independent Children's Lawyer to relist the matter on 48 hours' notice.
4. The balance of the applications for interlocutory relief as sought by the father in his initiating application filed 21 June 2025 and by the mother in the document marked as Exhibit 1 are otherwise dismissed.
5. The matter be adjourned to 1 December 2025 at 9.30am for case management hearing.

1. The mother informed the Court that she would attend to the filing of the documents upon which she relied at the hearing which, at the time of the hearing, were not drafted in publishable form (as was the case for the minute of orders the mother sought be treated as her Response being Exhibit 1 and her affidavit).
2. The mother appears to have filed response material on 7 August 2025. Those documents have not been reviewed for consistency with the documents upon which she relied at the hearing.

1. In deciding this application, I have had regard only to the documents placed before me and, or, accepted into evidence at the hearing.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Bolkvadze & Bolkvadze has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. As recently as 24 February 2025, Christie J made final orders which provided for the final parenting arrangements for the parties' three children ("the final parenting orders"): X (aged 15), Y (aged 14), and Z (aged 10). Her Honour's reasons for judgment became Bolkvadze & Bolkvadze (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 107 ("reasons for judgment").
2. On 21 June 2025, the father filed an Initiating Application (alongside an affidavit and Notice of child abuse, family violence or risk) in which he implicitly sought for the final parenting orders to be reconsidered. In that application, the father sought the discharge of a range of the final parenting orders and that different parenting orders be made, including restraints upon the mother.
3. In an affidavit also filed that day, the father set out his evidence as to the events which had occurred after the final parenting orders had been made, asserting a significant change of circumstances relating to the care of the children and which he said supported the application being heard with some urgency.
4. On 1 August 2025, I conducted a case management hearing with a view to allocating the matter an urgent interim hearing. On that occasion, the mother had not succeeded in filing her response documents (it appears that she had prepared and filed certain documents which had been filed in a new matter, with a new file number; there were apparently other difficulties with the mother's documents such that they were not, at that time, filed in the matter before the court).
5. On that occasion, I directed the mother to file and serve any amended material with respect to the parenting application by 2.00 pm on 5 August 2025. The documents which had, at that time, been prepared by the mother appeared to also seek relief with respect to financial and property matters. The mother was informed on 1 August 2025 that the father's application related to parenting matters only and that she could not utilise s 65DAAA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") as a vehicle to seek to revisit the final property orders made. She was encouraged to obtain legal advice.
6. The matter came before me on 6 August 2025 for hearing of the s 65DAAA application and if successful, what interim orders needed to be made relating to the care of the children. At the commencement of the hearing that day, the mother had not filed her Response to Initiating Application or supporting documents, but had forwarded a lengthy affidavit to chambers that morning. The mother had additional difficulties that morning and was late in her arrival to court. The commencement of the hearing was delayed to enable the mother's attendance.
7. In circumstances where the mother had only served the father with that affidavit (and without a Response to an Initiating Application) that morning, I granted the mother additional time to engage with Family Advocacy and Support Services ("FASS") at the court and to prepare a Response setting out the orders she sought. In the discussions which occurred with the mother that morning, it became clear that she also sought (or did not oppose) the final parenting orders being revisited.
8. During the mention of the matter that morning, I invited the mother to review her affidavit such that she could identify for the court, those annexures (from her affidavit which was 95 pages, including annexures) which she wanted to tender in support of her submissions. I also identified to the mother that those parts of her affidavit dealing with financial issues would not be read by me. Further time was extended to the mother, at her request, to enable her to complete this process. Consequently, the hearing did not commence until approximately 12.00 pm.
9. Being without legal representation in proceedings of this nature is challenging and I was concerned to afford the mother reasonable opportunities to prepare for the hearing and I explained to her on several occasions, the process and what would occur (see Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348; (2001) FLC 93-072). It was apparent that, nonetheless, there were occasions when the mother became overwhelmed and experienced some distress. The experience of listening to the submissions being made on behalf of the father resulted in some dysregulation by the mother.
10. The subject children have been, variously, diagnosed with a number of medical and mental health conditions. It is clear from the reasons for judgment that the management of the health and therapeutic care of the children has long been a source of conflict and dispute between the parties.
11. The mother is also neurodivergent. It was apparent that at times the mother was quite overwhelmed by the challenge of addressing matters before the court and locating documents to which she wanted the court to have regard.

1. The final parenting orders provide for the children to live with the parents on a week about basis and for the parents to have joint responsibility for making decisions in relation to all major long-term issues concerning the children, save for decisions in relation to major long-term issues regarding the children's health and medical needs, for which the father has sole responsibility pursuant to Order 9.
2. The father is required to provide certain information to the mother relating to the children's medical and therapeutic care.
3. The father was required to do all things necessary to engage Z in a specified family-based therapy with a particular named clinic (or other provider as agreed) to assist Z with his diagnosis of an eating disorder. The mother was permitted (Orders 19 to 21) to receive information and to participate in that therapy, as requested by the therapist. The mother was restrained (Order 15) from taking the children to attend upon a medical provider and, or, therapist for assessment or treatment and was restrained from providing instructions to the children's medical providers or therapists, unless requested by them or with the father's consent in writing.

SECTION 65DAAA OF THE ACT

1. After seeking confirmation from the mother that I understood her orders sought (the way in which that occurred and her orders sought are outlined and summarised below), I was satisfied that the parties agreed that there needed to be a reconsideration of the final parenting orders pursuant to s 65DAAA of the Act.
2. As will be set out below, it is not controversial that there has been a breakdown of adherence to the living arrangements for the children as provided in the final parenting orders. Since 16 May 2025, Y has been living with the father, having sought his father's assistance in collecting him from outside the mother's home on that occasion. On 14 July 2025, the mother directed the father to retain X and Z in his care (at least until a particular event in mid-August 2025). At this time, all three children remain in the father's care and are not spending time with the mother.
3. Of additional concern, there have been certain disruptions to the provision of medical care and therapy for Z since the final parenting orders were made. The father says that this is directly attributable to the impact of the mother's engagement with medical specialists, leading to their refusal to assist the family. Therapy that Z was intended to engage in, relating to a particular disorder (and as stipulated in the final parenting orders) is not occurring. A particular diagnostic medical procedure for Z was also cancelled abruptly, again, on the father's case, because of the mother's communication to that specialist.
4. While the events underpinning these recent changes are to some extent disputed between the parties, it is clear that there has been a complete breakdown of the longstanding week about care arrangements between the two households (which had been in place since shortly after separation and was confirmed in the final parenting orders). Z's medical and therapeutic care is presently being disrupted as a consequence of events which have occurred since the final parenting orders were made.
5. The parties are in agreement that the final parenting orders need to be reconsidered. Section 65DAAA(3) makes clear that the court retains the discretion as to the reconsideration of final parenting orders, even when the parties consent to that occurring.
6. In the reasons for judgment, Christie J observed at [132] that:

Each party contends that his or her proposal will best meet the children's needs but the reality is that the children's needs may not be entirely met whatever orders the Court makes. It is however, beyond question that they need the litigation to end.

1. Regrettably, the evidence before the court makes clear that further engagement and consideration of the living and care arrangements for these children is necessary and in their best interests, the circumstances for which will be addressed more fully below.
2. As a consequence of the consent position, the hearing focussed upon what interim orders needed to be made as to serve the children's best interests and about the future management of the matter.

1. In the father's Initiating Application, he sought interlocutory orders, which can be summarised as follows:

(a) He sought to discharge various final parenting orders, including the week about care of the children and orders relating to the mother's engagement with medical providers and therapists;

(b) He sought that he continue to exercise sole decision making for the long-term issues relating to the children but sought to discharge any requirement for input by the mother;

(c) He sought a spend time regime of three hours after school each Wednesday and between 2.00 pm and 6.00 pm on Saturday and Sunday every second weekend;

(d) He sought orders that, during school holiday time (in term holidays), the children would spend seven days of time with the mother, limited to 10.00 am to 6.00 pm each day (and that such should also occur, on an alternating weekly basis, over the long summer holiday period);

(e) He sought orders for the two older children to spend time with the mother subject to their views;

(f) He sought to restrain the mother from any engagement with the medical providers and therapists upon whom the children attend, save for at the request of any of the providers; and

(g) He sought an order directing him to continue the P Family Therapy through a particular provider (or another provider at his nomination, should that provider be unable to assist the family).

1. Prior to the commencement of the hearing and after the father had an opportunity to read the mother's affidavit, provided that morning, I was advised by the father's counsel that her client no longer proposed any orders for spend time arrangements for the children with the mother. It was submitted that aspects of the mother's evidence had led the father to conclude that the children were at some risk in spending unsupervised time with the mother. Those matters are addressed further below.
2. At the commencement of the hearing, the mother prepared a document, with the assistance of the FASS team, which I accepted as her Response for the purposes of the hearing and which became Exhibit 1.
3. The mother sought orders which can be summarised as follows:

(a) The discharge of certain orders of the final parenting orders (being Orders 10, 11, 12, 13, 14(a), 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21).

(b) The amendment of Order 3 (which provides for the children to live in a week about arrangement with each parent) and instead make orders which provide for the children to live with the mother from 3.00 pm Wednesday until 3.00 pm Thursday in the following week. This would result in an increase in the time that the children lived with the mother by one day and one night across the fortnight (and a reduction to the time the children were in the father's care).

(c) The mother sought the necessary amendment to orders relating to school holiday time (to reflect her proposed care pattern across the term and long summer holidays, unless otherwise agreed).

(d) The mother sought the discharge of orders providing the father with final decision making with respect to medical and health matters, and instead, sought that such would be exercised solely by her in addition to educational matters.

(e) Consequently, the mother sought to discharge Order 15, which restrains her engagement upon the medical practitioners and therapists of the children. Similarly, the mother sought to vary Order 22 such that she was permitted to provide the medical practitioners and therapists with the orders.

(a) His Initiating Application filed on 21 June 2025;

(b) His affidavit filed on 21 June 2025;

(c) His document titled "Father's contentions as to change in circumstances" (filed 31 July 2025 and which became Exhibit 2); and

(d) His case outline document filed 31 July 2025.

(a) A typed document which set out her summary of the orders she sought to change and the new orders she proposed ought to be made in their place (and which I took as addressing the interim orders she also sought);

(b) Her affidavit which she advised had been affirmed that morning (here I note that I only had an unsworn copy, but I accepted her representations as to her affirming of that evidence); and

(c) Her case outline document filed on 1 August 2025 (Exhibit 25).

1. The father's counsel and the mother each identified additional documents which were made into exhibits. While I have had regard to each of those documents, I will only refer to those exhibits which have proven to be of relevance or assistance to me in making my decision.

THE KEY EVENTS AND CHANGES SINCE THE FINAL PARENTING ORDERS

1. On the evening of 16 May 2025, the father deposes to receiving text messages from Y who was at that time in the mother's care. The father says that he had missed the messages when they were sent by Y but he was later awakened by a phone call from Y, in the early hours of 17 May 2025, requesting that the father collect him. The father collected Y that night and observed that he was distressed. Y, who is 14 years of age, has remained in the father's care since that night.
2. Y's text messages to the father are Exhibit 12. Y had advised the father in his first text message that his mother wanted the father to collect him.
3. The mother does not provide direct evidence about these events in her affidavit. The mother identified that she had set out, in an email to Y's school, a summary of the events that had occurred and which lead to Y being in his father's care. That email is Exhibit 24. It appears that the mother had become distressed on the evening of 16 May 2025 in response to aspects of Y's behaviour.
4. Her communication to the school goes over three pages and addresses broader and more historical matters too. Curiously she invites the recipient of the email to assess and determine if Y wants to return to his father's care that afternoon (or return to the mother). The mother advises the school:

(a) That Y has spoken with her at length that night about his "profound sense of hopelessness regarding the future - primarily due to climate change, but also referencing economic instability, lack of secure employment and the housing crisis".

(b) She describes the conversation as deeply distressing and that she felt shaken by it but notes that such conversations had become more frequent with Y.

(c) Later that evening, when urging Y to bed, she was met with increasing resistance and that Y confided "that the last four months" (since the final parenting orders had been made) had been the most stressful of his life and "that his sensory sensitivities have worsened and become unmanageable".

(d) She had felt "overwhelmed by [Y]'s words and removed myself from the situation, experiencing hyperventilation in the kitchen".

(e) She describes Y later that night sobbing uncontrollably and that he "appeared terrified, telling me 'you don't love me' and 'don't touch me'. He said he needed to be with his father. His father picked him up around 1.00 am".

1. The mother's account of these events suggests that it was highly challenging for her and that she was unable to retain her composure in those circumstances. I also note that she did not engage directly with the father to secure his assistance in collecting the child - that task was left to Y.
2. In the mother's communication with the father (after Y had been collected by the father) in a parenting application, Our Family Wizard, and which became Exhibit 3, she suggested that Y should remain in the father's care: "I don't think he should be encouraged to come back here until we have get [sic] to the bottom of what's going on for him". The mother does not advise the father of her own vulnerability that night or what Y may have experienced of her distress.
3. In those eight messages to the father, sent between 1.08 am and 10.03 am, the mother sets out her observations of Y's engagement and behaviour in her care and urges the father to pursue further investigations about Y's functioning. In the first message, the mother says: "I am deeply concerned about his mental health and my heart breaks for him. I am devastated at the mental decline that I am seeing in our children".
4. In her message to the father sent at 6.54 am, the mother says:

[Mr Bolkvadze]. For the love of God, and the love of your children; please do not insist to [Y] that he comes back here today. He isn't eating here and it's a child welfare crisis. If you kick him out, he has nowhere realistically where he thinks he can go which could cause self-harm. I have serious concerns about this possibility... You can anticipate further decline in his school grades in June. It may be considered child abuse if you don't respond appropriately. [Y] has had to shape shift in his head to justify that you are his safe parent, despite ongoing evidence to the contrary. He needs his cognitive distortion to be addressed and taken seriously urgently.

1. There was nothing in evidence to support the contention that the child was at risk of being "kicked out" by his father.
2. In a message to the father on 19 May 2025 (Exhibit 27), the mother declares her requirement that Y should return to her care (in accordance with the final parenting orders).
3. The communication to the father and to the school (and the mother's evidence more generally) suggests that the mother holds the view that this child's welfare is being adversely impacted by the consequences of the final parenting orders.
4. Exhibit 12 is a series of text messages from the mother to Y starting at 2.10 am on 17 May 2025 and concluding on Thursday 12 June 2025. I understand that Y has not responded to any of the mother's text messages. Many of the text messages are expressions of the mother's love and pride in the child and are an attempt by the mother to retain some connection with a child who is absent and choosing not to engage in communication in return.
5. However, on occasion, the mother communicates with the child about adult issues, including:

(a) The court proceedings;

(b) Details of limitations in the court orders;

(c) Her views of her own difficulties about the event which had occurred between them (describing it as "triggering and somewhat traumatic" and that she "is a wreck with confusion and frustration" and that "being triggered and dysregulated is normal for humans in challenging conditions");

(d) She expresses her opinion about the father's responses to her ("your father's physical response to me which is not considered to be a normal response for a divorced coparent. The orders are for 5050 which suggests that the feeling of fear and risk of harm that ur father felt: feels towards me was not validated by the third parties");

(e) She shares information about things a marriage counsellor advised the parties;

(f) She tells the child that the father has "responded with complete avoidance of me outside of texts (since 2022)" and "I fear the same pattern occurring with you";

(g) She admits to feeling "frustrated, stressed and angry on occasion in the last year as a response to very challenging circumstances where I regularly felt not credible, not believed and powerless which did trigger disproportionate responses at times";

(h) She shares her views and understanding about disproportionate and avoidant responses being linked to trauma and, or, unmanaged mental health issues;

(i) She advises him that her psychologist has said she has "some trauma"; and

(j) She asks Y about the extent to which his own psychologist is helping him, then observes "she doesn't have a specialty in trauma or neurodivergence but rather in [mental health disorders] so if you don't think she is helpful; you can ask to switch".

1. In a later text message, the mother returns to the theme of conflict "between stressed humans who love each other".
2. The content of some of the messages are of concern and may inappropriately place the child in the centre of the ongoing dispute between his parents and, or, cause him to feel responsible for his mother's wellbeing. Christie J was aware of the "significant emotional toll" the proceedings had taken on the children (reasons for judgment at [130]). These more recent events are likely to have added to that burden.
3. Z's health needs require ongoing assessment and support, and particular orders were made about this in the final parenting orders. The father deposes to steps he had taken to secure Z an appointment with a specialist to perform an important diagnostic procedure. That procedure was scheduled to occur in May 2025. The father advised the mother of this plan in April 2025. The father says that in May 2025, he received a telephone call from Dr TT who advised him that he would not perform the procedure on Z because of correspondence he had received from the mother. The father asked the mother to provide him with a copy of the correspondence. The mother has not done so and her communication to Dr TT is not in evidence.
4. The mother does not directly address these events in her affidavit. The mother places no evidence before the court to explain her part in these events. It is of considerable concern that despite the terms of the final parenting orders, the conduct of the mother appears to have disrupted Z receiving necessary diagnostic assessment.
5. The father had also taken steps to engage Z (and the wider family) in the therapy foreshadowed in the final parenting orders. The father deposes to communications he received from the doctor undertaking that therapy to the effect that she will not continue, because of the mother's engagement with that doctor and her practice.
6. The child had his first session of that therapy in May 2025. The children and the mother engaged in a session on 6 June 2025 and that was the first time that Y had been with his mother since the events of 16 May 2025. The father deposes to being advised by the older children that the mother "hassled" Y about resuming a particular medication. His sister intervened and asked her mother to stop. The attitude of the mother as to the medication requirements of the children was identified by Christie J (and the experts) as being rigid given her view that "the 'optimal dose' of ADHD medication would help the children achieve their maximum potential" (the reasons for judgment at [126]).
7. Dr UU (who provides the therapy) communicated to the parties about a future session to occur at the mother's home and made clear certain boundaries with respect to the nature of communications to her office and during the therapy sessions. It appears that the mother communicated with Dr UU in a fashion which Dr UU found unhelpful. Dr UU advised the father that the mother had refused to make a booking for a therapy session at her home.
8. Similarly, Dr E, who is the children's paediatrician, wrote to both parties on 10 June 2025 expressing her concerns about barriers which she said obstructed her ability to provide care to Z (Exhibit 6). She described the barriers as "parental discord; variations in history provided by each parent; excessively lengthy email communications". Dr E makes clear in that letter that "email communication is no longer acceptable".
9. Dr E provides a comprehensive update to Z's general practitioner on 13 June 2025 (Exhibit 7), including confirming his diagnosis of an eating disorder and stressing the importance of Z's school attendance. In that letter, she makes clear that she does not want further communications from the mother outside of the monthly scheduled meeting.
10. Dr E expresses further concerns for Z and the children more generally in a letter to the general practitioner dated 15 June 2025 (Exhibit 8), expressing concerns for the mother's health and functioning. In that letter she advises the general practitioner that she had made a mandatory report to the NSW Department of Communities and Justice ("DCJ"). Certain records from the DCJ are in evidence (Exhibit 17) and corroborate the receipt of certain concerns on a date which aligns with the reported actions of Dr E.
11. One instance of the mother's communications with Dr E became Exhibit 9. On 16 June 2025, the mother sent to a member of staff at Dr E's rooms, an extensive email to which are attached five attachments (the attachments are not in evidence). The body of the email is a copy of an email which, it appears, the mother sent to the father that expresses certain views about actions he has taken, including events dating back to 2022. She suggests in that email that others involved in the care of the children were "concerned" about the father's conduct. She also makes allegations as to the father's conduct after the end of the marriage (which predates the making of the final parenting orders). It is difficult to discern the benefit to the children's paediatrician in receipt of a document setting out the mother's views of, and criticisms of, the father's historical conduct. The mother also appears to suggest that the father has not provided sufficient or accurate background information to Dr E. The email concludes (directed to the father):

If you acknowledge that you have caused significant harm to the children since having parental responsibility, consider if you have an ethical responsibility to relinquish medical responsibility through consent in a bid to restore the children to thriving and achieving outcomes to the level of 2023.

1. The same day, the mother emails the father the content of an email directed to Dr UU and Dr E (and the father), about which she says "I can't forward this to [Dr E] or [Dr UU] until our next appointment. For your interest." That email is Exhibit 10. In that email intended for the doctors, but not at that time sent, the mother expresses certain views as to "the progressive deterioration of outcomes" for the children, and "which has made me increasingly heightened and fearful for our children's wellbeing". She appears to offer explanations to Dr UU for her conduct:

... your seeming unwillingness (a misunderstanding) to incorporate the endocrinology report findings, in front of the children, caused me distress (which in turn unsettled the children).

1. That admission as to her conduct when with the doctor, in front of the children, adds weight to the other evidence before the court, to the effect that the mother's engagement with Dr UU may have been unhelpful for the children and apparently caused the doctor concern.
2. Consistently in the mother's communication to the doctors, to the school, and to the father, is criticism and, or, concern that the "full" picture relating to the health and functioning and prior medical assessments of the children has not been provided. It is clear that she does not trust the father to discharge his obligations in managing the medical care of the children (as provided under the final parenting orders) and that she continues to believe that a child, or the children, have been misdiagnosed and, or, are not being properly treated and supported. That distrust appears to consistently shape the mother's engagement with the father and her unwillingness to accept the terms of the final parenting orders, with respect to decision making and management of the particular health needs of the children.
3. The distrust of the father is also manifest in her belief, expressed in her affidavit, that the father has manipulated and, or, forged communications from some of the medical providers, alleging:

(a) "...spoofing of email aliases designed to appear as if they originated from me (a form of cybercrime intended to mislead recipients)";

(b) "Infiltration of my personal contacts list, which was subsequently used to craft messages that impersonated treating professionals";

(c) "...tactics not only undermined my ability to communicate clearly and respectfully with treating professionals but also created an atmosphere of confusion and mistrust. I believe these behaviours represent a form of coercive control - using technological deception to manipulate the views of treaters and position me as "delusional" or "fixated" within the clinical narrative"; and

(d) "...suspicious changes in logos, signatures and copy patterns - further support my concern that some of these communications may not have originated from legitimate clinical sources".

1. Some of these extraordinary allegations are at best explained by the mother as being based upon a comparison which she states she has undertaken of various emails sent from different email addresses within the medical practice and her observations about different fonts, email addresses and how signature blocks may appear in different instances.
2. Counsel for the father confirmed that her client denied any proper basis for such allegations. That denial did not assuage the mother's suspicions and at various points in the hearing, she sought to object to the tender of various emails to and from the medical providers on the basis that she suggested they had been tampered with.
3. In a letter dated 5 August 2025 to the father from Dr UU (which was part of Exhibit 15), Dr UU advised that Z was being discharged from the disorder therapy program because the child did not have:

... adequate support across both parents' households" and that the mother "did not book necessary appointments when requested and did not indicate willingness to continue with treatment sessions...

1. In that letter, Dr UU repeated the cautions she had provided to the parents regarding the need for boundaries around communication to the practitioner and stated that: "[Z]'s mother did not comply with requests to communicate within these boundaries".
2. The doctor indicates that she is willing to resume treatment for Z in the event the child was living with the father and if the mother was restrained from initiating communications with the doctor. Dr UU indicates further:

... it is important that treatment strategies are applied consistently in households where the child resides" and that "clear and enforced clinical boundaries are necessary in order to maintain a safe and appropriate therapeutic relationship.

1. I note that the letter was prepared by Dr UU in direct response to a request made of her by the father (those emails are also part of Exhibit 15). While Dr UU has expressed an opinion in the letter of 5 August, which effectively mirrors the wording suggested to her by the father in one of his emails of the same date, it is clear from the communications between the father and Dr UU that she had communicated these sentiments on 4 July 2025 in a letter to the children's general practitioner. I accept that Dr UU wrote the matters expressed in the letter of 5 August 2025 as a reflection of her concerns for the child Z and her views about the benefits to him of resuming his therapy.
2. Another matter of concern raised by the father in support of his application is the extent to which the children may be absent from school while in the care of each parent. The mother quite properly observes that school refusal for the children had been a matter the subject of challenge for the parents before the final parenting orders were made (and was considered in the reasons for judgment). The father suggests that in the current school term, Z had been absent from school on 17 out of 20 days that he was in the mother's care. Of those absences, 13 were unexplained absences.
3. The mother provided evidence of alleged inconsistency between the data she could observe on the school's site versus the data available to her when accessing the information from the parent portal. The mother communicated her concerns to the school about this potential anomaly. It remained unclear to me however, whether the mother was saying that Z had in fact attended school on many or some occasions beyond those observed by the father based on the school records. It was difficult to obtain a clear answer from the mother as to her own observations of Z's attendances from her household (that is, when in her care). The evidence remains subject to some uncertainty. I do not disregard the possibility that the school records (as viewed by parents) may be inaccurate given that the school appear to be investigating the mother's concerns and have not rejected the possibility of error in their communications to the mother. I do not have the benefit of clear evidence from the mother about Z's attendance at school.

1. On each parent's application, I am being asked to make orders which substantially change the final parenting orders, less than six months after they were made.
2. Each parent makes allegations of some risk to the children in the care of the other parent. The father asserts that the children are at risk of exposure to the mother's dysregulated behaviour and uncertain mental health (being a risk of psychological or emotional harm to the children), and the risk that she will impede their access to appropriate medical care.
3. The mother alleges that the children will not receive appropriate medical care when with the father (or as a consequence of the exercise of his decision-making power), but she supports the children still living with the father, but for less time than previously.
4. Each parent seeks to make long term decisions relating to the children without consultation with the other.
5. The father indicated a change to the orders he sought on an interim basis, after receipt of the mother's affidavit that morning, and made an oral application to that effect. The father relied upon a letter dated 2 April 2025 to the family general practitioner, from Dr VV, a psychiatrist upon whom the mother has attended for some time (Exhibit 16). That letter had not been seen by the father prior to the interim hearing, and it was submitted that the contents of that letter (coupled with other evidence before the court) would cause such concern in the court that no face-to-face time should occur between the children and the mother, pending further investigation (and order in due course). As is explained below, that position was later modified by the father to embrace contemplation of professionally supervised time.
6. It was submitted that the reference in that letter to the mother being assessed for "Complex PTSD" was recently arising and was suggestive of some additional concern with respect to the mother's functioning and wellbeing. I can place limited weight upon the contents of that letter, in circumstances where the treater/author has not provided further information as to the basis of that reference. It is not clear what information was provided to Dr VV, or by whom. That statement appears, at best, to be a report of information (probably) provided by the mother. The accuracy of that report and its basis is not known. It is not supported by additional, clear evidence from the mother as to her current mental health status or steps being taken by her to receive support, to the extent needed, about those matters.
7. It was submitted that aspects of the mother's presentation in court (which was at times heightened and distressed) would also result in additional caution in consideration of the spend time arrangements between the children and the mother.
8. The mother was self-represented at the final hearing. Christie J accepted that the mother, at times, including at the hearing, "presented as heightened or "emotionally labile" when discussing issues related to the children's care" (the reasons for judgment at [98]). That description fairly describes the mother's presentation in court on this occasion.
9. At that time, Christie J noted that there was no evidence to suggest that this had a negative impact upon the children. However, given the more recent events, there is some risk that aspects of the mother's functioning and response to certain matters relating to the care of the children (including her views of optimal medication regimes) may be impacting upon the children and their medical care.
10. One of the experts engaged in the previous proceedings had suggested that if the children were exposed to the mother's "anxious and emotionally labile presentation then this may cause the children distress" but Christie J also accepted that much of the mother's anxiety arose in the context of the litigation (the reasons for judgment at [99]). In circumstances where the litigation is now resumed and given the events which have recently occurred, I recognise that there is some risk that the mother's management of her health may be under strain and the children may be exposed to the manifestation of this strain.
11. The evidence about the mother's engagement with Y on the evening of 16 May 2025 adds some weight to the contention that there may have been some change or deterioration to the mother's mental health or functioning since the final parenting orders were made. In addition, her allegations that the father has manufactured or tampered with email communication, including some which apparently emanated from the various medical practices, is also suggestive of a decline in mental health functioning of the mother.
12. However, the father was initially (through the oral application made on his behalf at the commencement of the hearing) proposing interim orders which would sever all contact between the mother and the children and would remove her from any role in their care and in the process of decision making. While it was proposed by the father that such would occur in the immediate term while a further report (from a Court Child Expert) could be obtained, that proposal gives insufficient attention and weight to the important relationship the children have with their mother and the benefits to them of ensuring that their relationship with her is supported. The expert evidence at the time of the final hearing confirmed that the children were "equally attached to both parents" (the reasons for judgment at [78]).
13. Certainly, at the time of the final hearing, the evidence before the court was that the children wanted to continue a week about care arrangement (the reasons for judgment at [69] and [75]) and Christie J placed significant weight upon those views (the reasons for judgment at [78]). Given the age of the children, the extent to which their views and preferences about their living arrangements may have changed is important (along with factors which may have influenced any such change) and would be given substantial weight in proceedings about their care. Ultimately, those matters (and the extent of any change to their views) will require further investigation.
14. Interim proceedings are by nature abridged and this matter came before the court with some urgency. Clearly, greater clarity about some of the matters summarised above may be gained if additional evidence is obtained in the future conduct of the matter. There are inherent fact-finding limitations in interim proceedings. That does not mean however that simply because material facts have been put in issue, the contested evidence must or should be ignored, particularly in circumstances where that material may have significant bearing on what orders ought to promote the children's best interests (Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82).
15. In considering what parenting orders I am to make; I am to have regard to the best interests of the children as the paramount consideration (s 60CA of the Act). Section 60CC of the Act sets out the matters to which the court is to have regard in determining what is in the best interests of the children.
16. These non-hierarchical factors provide me with a framework to consider the unique circumstances of this parenting matter, while placing the best interests of the children at the forefront of my decision-making. In determining the issues before the court, I have had regard to each consideration prescribed by s 60CC of the Act.
17. In circumstances where the care arrangements provided for in the final parenting orders have broken down (certainly for the two older children) and where other aspects of their care as provided for in those orders have been obstructed, I am persuaded that it is necessary to discharge certain of those orders and replace them with other orders.
18. The children are not presently spending time with the mother. There is some evidence that this change reflects the views of the older two children (certainly of Y who returned to the father's care in circumstances of some distress in May 2025). However, Z is 10 years old and there is no evidence to suggest he does not wish to spend time with his mother (and given his age, such views would be relevant but unlikely to be determinative). I am not persuaded that there should be no time enjoyed between the children and the mother pending further investigation or order. I am particularly conscious that as recently as 24 February 2025, Christie J recognised the many benefits to the children of their continuing relationship with the mother and ordered the continuation of the week about live with arrangements.
19. I am mindful of the care to be taken in undertaking a risk assessment, particularly in the context of an urgent interim hearing. While findings in disputed interim proceedings "should be couched with great circumspection" (Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 093-654), that does not mean that disputed facts are to be disregarded for reliance only upon agreed facts. The majority of the Full Court (Boland and Thackray JJ) observed in SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 at [100]:

... Apart from relying upon the uncontroversial or agreed facts, a judge will sometimes have little alternative than to weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.

1. In Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97; (2022) FLC 94-092 ("Isles & Nelissen"), the Full Court cited with approval the observations of Austin J in Fitzwater & Fitzwater [2019] FamCAFC 251; (2019) 60 Fam LR 212, which explains as follows:
   1. The assessment of risk is a predictive exercise and while it is, naturally enough, liable to be influenced by factual findings about past events, the contemplation of risk entails the foresight of possible harm. It is an oddity to expect that the mere possibility of future harm can or should be proven as a probability, as has been implied before (Potter and Potter [2007] FamCA 350; (2007) FLC 93-326 at [110], [129]). Risks of harm must be heeded even if they are improbable eventualities.
2. In the usual course of undertaking the risk assessment, the court is to identify the contended risk event, assess the likelihood of it occurring, and then consider the magnitude of harm which might follow if the risk event does occur. In that context, the consideration becomes whether, in light of those matters, the risk of harm is acceptable or not (Tree J in Chiles & Petrenko [2024] FedCFamC1A 112 at [32] discussing Isles & Nelissen).
3. The father submits that the mother presents some risk to the children but his primary solution to that risk assessment was to entirely suspend time. If the children spending unsupervised time with the mother created risk for them (that her affect and mental health or general functioning might be a risk of emotional or psychological harm), which the father argued was unacceptable, then, consideration of risk mitigation ought to then be undertaken (noting the very clear benefits to the children of their relationship with the mother, as found by Christie J in the reasons for judgment). In that context, the father accepted that implementation of professional supervision would act to mitigate that risk (and this became, in effect, his secondary position). The father submitted that if supervised time was to occur, the mother should bear the costs of such and that she had resources available to her as consequence of final property orders made in February 2025. There was no evidence before the court as to the availability of professional supervision services including as to wait times and costs.
4. This is a balancing exercise. I am reluctant to make an order which may create barriers to the mother continuing to spend time with the children, with the consequence that the time does not occur.
5. At an interim hearing, when the hearing is by necessity an abridged process and where findings of fact as to disputed matters are not readily available, I am to have regard to matters which are not controversial and, or, evidence from independent sources (including in this instance, the medical providers). Significant in this exercise are the findings made in February 2025 by Christie J, particularly as to the benefits to the children of their relationship with both parents. Challenging aspects of the mother's functioning were known by the court at that time and were considered.
6. In light of the matters that I have explored above, I decline to make the orders sought by the mother. The evidence does not support the children living with the mother for more time than that of the father, nor does it support the mother holding sole decision-making responsibility for the children. I am persuaded that the recent events addressed previously in this judgment, also support the conclusion that the current arrangement (of a week about living arrangement) should be suspended, to enable further evidence to be obtained - particularly from a Court Child Expert. Recent events have already had an adverse impact on the children (including distressing engagement with the mother, for Y, and a disruption to the medical care to be provided to Z).
7. I am also not persuaded that the best interests of the children will be met by making the orders sought by the father (in his oral application) to suspend all time between the children and the mother, nor (his alternative position) to impose supervision of the mother's care of the children.
8. While the court is required to consider what arrangements would promote the safety of the children from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect or other harm (s 60CC(2)(a)) - which includes risk of psychological and emotional harm - the absolute protection derived from an order for no time creates other risks, including the risk of loss of the many benefits of the children's relationship with the mother. Similarly, I am not persuaded that supervision of the mother's time with the children is an appropriate response to the identified risk, especially when that application was made at the last minute and where the court has no evidence about the logistics of that outcome. The consequence of that may be in fact that the children do no spend time with the mother.
9. I accept however, that the evidence does suggest that there may have been some deterioration in the mother's health and functioning and I do have some concerns, currently, as to her capacity to provide for the developmental, psychological and emotional needs of the children (s 60CC(2)(c)). At this preliminary stage, until further evidence about this is obtained, it is in the best interests of the children to proceed with some caution.
10. I will make orders as previously proposed by the father in his application, for the children to have specific day time periods of care with the mother (as set out in his Initiating Application at paragraph 5 of the interlocutory orders he sought). I will make orders that recognise that the older children will spend time with the mother, subject to their views, giving due recognition to their age.
11. This outcome will give the children the opportunity to maintain weekly connection with the mother (and the benefits they derive from such, consistent with s 60CC(2)(e) and as found by Christie J), without the mother being responsible for their extended care including school attendance (the evidence about which is presently disputed but which, if established, adds to the vulnerability of the children in the mother's care). It also will enable the father to take necessary steps to restore engagement with the medical providers.
12. By ordering daytime care only, the father's role in making decisions about the medical care of the children will be protected and the children will receive the benefit of consistent application of medication - the father will attend to decisions about particular medication and prescribed dosage, for the children, as applicable, before they spend time with the mother.
13. The frequency of the time proposed will ensure that the children are spending time with the mother each week with the benefits to them of such - this will provide a secure and beneficial foundation for future care arrangements, which may include the restoration of a shared care arrangement or the mother providing substantial care of the children.
14. I identify however that there may be additional risks for the children in having overnight time with the mother at this time - the events relating to Y and the mother's response to that and her failure to frankly advise the father of her own vulnerabilities at that time, weigh against the prospect of continuing overnight care at this time. Some of the mother's more recent engagement may be suggestive of a deterioration in her mental health functioning and until those matters are explored further (and the mother has an opportunity to place evidence before the court about this) a cautious and protective approach to the spend time arrangements for the children is appropriate. I am also mindful that the older children may elect not to spend time with the mother, and this may create a situation where only Z, at 10 years of age, is spending time with the mother without the benefit of the support and reassurance of his older siblings. Again, caution is warranted in that circumstance.
15. I will order the re-appointment of the Independent Children's Lawyer. Noting the age of the children, this will aid in ensuring that the views of the children are obtained and placed before the court appropriately.
16. The father's counsel submitted that the cost of re-engaging a single expert, on a private basis, was not supported by the father. I have regard to the Cost Notice filed on behalf of the father and recognise the extraordinary expenditure which has occurred in these proceedings to date. I take into account that the father is meeting all of the costs of the children's care with only modest child support being paid.
17. The father proposed that a Court Child Expert be appointed and that a Child Impact Report be obtained. I accept, with some reluctance, that this is a necessary additional step, including to assist in obtaining evidence as to the views of the children and to make recommendations as to any further inquiries to be made. My reluctance is founded on the extent to which these children have already been engaged with experts (medical and otherwise) and the risk that in this further process, the children are made even more acutely aware of the ongoing litigation and conflict between their parents.
18. There is also the possibility that with the re-appointment of the Independent Children's Lawyer, and after obtaining a Child Impact Report, further discussions and dispute resolution between the parties may occur. That outcome would be consistent with the overarching purpose and the Central Practice Direction. Dispute resolution was not explored prior to the commencement of this round of litigation, given the urgency as identified by the father.
19. I am also persuaded that it is necessary to change the orders about the management of the children's health. I accept the father's evidence about the disruption of Z's therapy, the cancellation of the planned diagnostic procedure, and the risk of disturbance of other ongoing therapeutic relationships intended to benefit the children. Absent further orders, I am concerned that the father's capacity to meet the developmental, psychological and emotional needs of the children (s 60CC(2)(d)) will be compromised. I will discharge certain of the orders dealing with the medical care of the children. The evidence presently before the court satisfies me that without further intervention, the mother will continue her pursuit of outcomes for the children which are consistent with her views and that such will disrupt the optimal care of the children. The mother's conduct since the making of the final parenting orders is suggestive that she cannot presently support taking a secondary role to the father in these matters.
20. I am persuaded the mother ought to be restrained from contacting and, or, communicating with the medical and therapeutic providers for the children. I will order that she may have contact with them, only to the extent such is directed or invited by the provider. The recent events make clear that the restraint is necessary as the mother's conduct has already caused disruption and there is a real risk that the children's care will continue to be disrupted absent a restraint upon the mother. The evidence provides a sufficient foundation to predict the risk to these children if the mother continues to engage as she has - doctors have already cancelled procedures and refused to continue to assist the family, as a direct consequence of their experiences of the mother's engagement.
21. The father argued against an order which would require him to provide the mother with information about the children's medical and therapeutic care. It was submitted that such might result in further dispute and conflict between the parties as the mother may respond in ways that were unproductive. In circumstances where Christie J found that "both parents are equal to the task of providing for the children's needs and their emotional wellbeing" (the reasons for judgment at [103]) and that both were "involved, diligent and curious about the children's medical treatment" (the reasons for judgment at [117]), it is important that the mother remains connected to the care of the children, in a real manner, while these matters are the subject of further investigation. On that basis, I will order the father to provide the mother with written updates, on a fortnightly basis, about the children's therapeutic and medical care and progress. This is particularly important and in the best interests of the children where I am also restraining the mother from directly communicating with the children's medical providers and therapists. The order I will make, will not require the father to engage in further communication with the mother after he has provided the fortnightly update - the extent to which he elects to do so will be a matter for him.
22. I have made certain observations about aspects of the mother's engagement, and her health and functioning. In the adjourned period, the mother will have an opportunity to consider these observations and to obtain particular evidence about this, should she choose to do so.
23. While the father sought in his application to discharge Order 7 of the final parenting orders (relating to the children's education), his counsel indicated that such an order was not pressed. I propose to only discharge those of the final parenting orders which are necessary to ensure the children are able to access medical and therapeutic care, and that the father is able to make decisions about such, absent objection or challenge by the mother.
24. I decline to discharge Order 8 to the extent that there are other long-term decisions to be made by the parties, pending any further hearing of the matter. There is no evidence before me currently which makes clear why the mother should not join with the father in making those decisions. Order 9 of the final parenting orders remains appropriate at this time and does not need to be varied or discharged.
25. I discharge Order 10 in circumstances where the consultation process is no longer workable or constructive to the best interests of the children. While the father sought the discharge of Order 11, I am not persuaded that such needs to occur - the mother has a continuing interest in understanding arrangements for the care of the children and the evidence does not persuade me that she should not have this information. Order 12 remains appropriate, for similar reasons.
26. I will discharge Order 13 as the medical and therapeutic processes for these children have been disrupted as a result of aspects of the mother's engagement. Instead, I will make an order restraining the mother from contacting or communicating with the medical providers and, or, therapists unless they invite her to do so.
27. While the father sought the discharge of Order 14, I will not do so. Those mutual restraints remain appropriate and are protective of the best interests of the children.
28. Orders 18 and 19 relate to the provision of particular therapy for Z. That process was commenced by the father, with a different clinic, as a result of a lack of availability of the named clinic. I will vary Orders 18 and 19 to make clear that the therapy will be conducted by the named clinic or such other clinic as the father selects, given he is the parent who will continue to manage this process (that is, it will not be necessary for the father to secure the mother's written agreement to a particular clinic). It is still appropriate that the clinic has the contact details for the mother such that they may elect to engage with her in the future.
29. I decline to make orders about the care of the children in the long summer holiday period in circumstances where the parties and the court may have the benefit of the Child Impact Report by that time, allowing the parties an opportunity to reach agreement about appropriate holiday arrangements in that context (or, to the extent required, for such to be ordered by the court). The orders the father seeks about that holiday period are quite restrictive and there may be additional and persuasive evidence available in the future which may weigh against the extent of the restrictions as currently proposed by the father. The court will be in a better position to balance the competing considerations as to the best interests of the children with the benefit of that additional evidence and the submissions of the Independent Children's Lawyer.
30. This matter will require future management. I will adjourn the matter for case management hearing following the release of the Child Impact Report.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and fourteen (114) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Simpson.