1. Soon after arrival, the Applicant and his family settled in Western Australia.
2. The Applicant's history is chronologically summarised in Annexure A. His criminal record commences at 18 years of age in 1985 and continues with little interruption until 2019, with further offences committed in November 2021 and June 2023. There were, however, noticeable gaps in offending between June 2012 - August 2016 and October 2007 - June 2010.
3. On 30 July 2024, the Applicant was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment by the Perth District Court. He had previously been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment (whether suspended imprisonment orders or immediate terms) on 12 March 2018, 15 February 2017, 13 February 2017, 16 May 2012, 14 May 2008, 16 January 2006, 15 January 2002, 7 July 2000, 12 May 1994 and 1 October 1992.
4. The Applicant's transitional (permanent) visa was mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act in November 2024.[6] He made representations to the Minister seeking revocation of that decision.[7]
5. On 19 September 2025, the delegate refused to revoke the mandatory cancellation decision.[8]
6. The Applicant was notified of the reviewable decision by email to his solicitor transmitted on 22 September 2025.[9] This notification package complied with the requirements of s 501G of the Migration Act and was a method of service prescribed by reg 5.02 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Migration Regulations) for persons in immigration detention.
7. The Applicant sought review of the delegate's decision, within time, on 24 September 2025.[10]
8. The Applicant was separately refused conditional release on parole by the Prisoners Review Board of Western Australia (PRBWA) on 3 February 2025 and 25 September 2025.[11] He completed his term of imprisonment on 22 November 2025, was detained under s 189(1) of the Migration Act and taken to Yongah Hill Immigration Detention Centre, pending the outcome of the review.[12]

1. The parties appeared before the Tribunal on 4, 5, and 10 December 2025. The hearing was conducted in a hybrid manner, with the Applicant appearing in-person and the Respondent appearing by video-link. The Applicant was represented by Ms Rondik Mizori of Tang Law Pty Ltd. The Minister was represented by Ms Miriam Williams of MinterEllison.
2. The following documents were marked as exhibits:

(a) Joint Hearing Bundle, including the parties' respective Statements of Facts, Issues and Contentions and reply submissions (1,887 pages) (Exhibit 1); > > (b) Bundle of medical documents relating to the Applicant (seven pages) (Exhibit 2); > > (c) Letter from Ms Erryn Nundle dated 1 December 2025 (Exhibit 3); > > (d) Completion Report for the Pathways Programme completed at Karnet Prison Farm between August and November 2025, dated 18 November 2025 (five pages) (Exhibit 4) > > (e) Western Australian Family and Domestic Violence Common Risk Assessment and Risk Management Framework (CRARMF), Fact Sheet 7 - Impacts of family and domestic violence on children (dated October 2021) (three pages) (Exhibit 5); and > > (f) Various Prosecution Notices from the Northam Magistrates Court for criminal charges dealt with on 27 June 2018, 13 March 2018, 12 March 2018, 8 May 2017, 13 February 2017, 31 August 2016, and 7 February 2011 (28 pages) (Exhibit 6).

3. At the hearing of the review, the Applicant was advised, in simple terms, of his right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination prior to his giving evidence.[13] He was reminded of that right throughout the hearing.
4. The Tribunal took oral evidence from the Applicant, his partner, mother, and Dr Phil Watts, clinical and forensic psychologist.

Irrelevant material, familial association and recusal

1. On 4 December 2025, and during the Applicant's evidence-in-chief regarding police attendance at his residential address regarding reported incidences of 'family violence',[14] the Tribunal identified that the WA Police Incident Report,[15] Running Sheet,[16] and Restraining Order Details[17] documents concerning an incident on 14 November 2021 indicated that one of the attending police officers was related to the presiding member (sibling), and that the related constable had issued the Applicant with a police order under s 30A of the Restraining Orders Act on that date. The Tribunal immediately informed the parties of the issue and invited any application or submission to be made following the luncheon adjournment.
2. The Minister's counsel subsequently identified that the related constable appeared elsewhere within the Joint Hearing Book as the investigating officer for a charge of common assault in circumstances of aggravation said to have been committed on or about 21 March 2024 (Charge PE 16541/2024).[18]
3. This criminal charge does not appear on the Applicant's History for Court dated 15 October 2025,[19] and the only information about the charge is the 'List of Charges Report' dated 15 October 2025[20] and the 'brief copy' of the Statement of Material Facts (SoMF).[21]
4. Consistent with what the Tribunal said in Re PGQM and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] ARTA 1245, at [9]-[14],[22] the Charges Report and any associated SoMF are irrelevant and prejudicial documents which should not have been included within the Joint Hearing Bundle.
5. For the reasons given by the Tribunal in Re Lynch and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] ARTA 452 (Lynch), at [42], a SoMF is not evidence of the commission of an offence. Similarly, neither is the fact of the commencement of a prosecution by the state. Every person is presumed by law to be innocent of a charge made against them until they either admit the charge by formally pleading guilty in a court or the charge is proved.[23] The burden of proof lies with the prosecution and the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt.[24]
6. The Joint Hearing Bundle included a copy of the Applicant's juvenile record. For the reasons given in Lynch, at [51]-[65], this should not have been included and the Tribunal is required to disregard those juvenile outcomes and the charges to which they relate.
7. The Applicant, through his counsel, did not seek recusal because of the irrelevant material before the Tribunal or the familial association with the police officer. Rather, he sought that the Tribunal disregard the 14 November 2021 incident and associated police order.
8. In response to that interlocutory application, the Tribunal indicated its tentative view that the documentation stood solely for the proposition that the related constable had made a police order in accordance with Div 3A of Pt 2A of the Restraining Orders Act on 14 November 2021. This, in turn, was a 'jurisdictional fact' for the purposes of the Applicant's conviction in the Northam Magistrates Court on 15 November 2021 for an offence of breaching the police order on that date (Charge NOR 1547/2021).[25]
9. The Applicant's counsel accepted the above characterisation and otherwise waived any objection to the Tribunal continuing to determine the review on the grounds of apprehended bias.[26] The Minister took a neutral position.
10. In addition to waiver, the Tribunal did not consider there to be a proper basis for recusal for two reasons:

(a) First, the test for reasonable apprehension of bias was confirmed in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, at [6] and [8].[27] It is an objective test, and the views expressed by persons associated with a decision-maker are not generally sufficient to disqualify the decision-maker. > > > (i) In this matter, the thing which might be said to lead the Tribunal to decide the case other than on its legal and factual merits is reference within the material before the Tribunal to the Applicant having previously had various interactions with a relative of the presiding member, in that relative's official capacity as a police constable. There was no articulation of any logical connection between that factor and any asserted apprehension that this Tribunal may not decide the review on its merits. However, it may be assumed that there was at least an implied assertion that the Tribunal may favour the Minister, and the Minister's case about whether the Applicant perpetrated family violence for the purposes of the Direction, because the relative had previously formed the belief, in November 2021, that it was necessary and appropriate to make a police order under s 30A of the Restraining Orders Act. > > > > (ii) The Tribunal is an independent quasi-judicial body. It is constituted by a legally qualified member or someone with specialist training or experience in a subject matter relevant to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.[28] The hypothetical reasonable observer is taken to know that such a person (particularly, a legally qualified member) is required by training, tradition, and oath to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial, and the prejudicial.[29] The Tribunal accepts that there is a 'first degree' relationship with a potential witness. The Tribunal had no prior knowledge of the relative's previous interactions with the Applicant, which were in discharge of that relative's separate office,[30] and which were largely peripheral to the issues before the Tribunal (generally narrative in nature and unlikely to be meaningfully disputed). There had also been no communication with the relative about those interactions. In the event, the related constable was not sought to be called as a witness by either party. > > > > (iii) In Kaycliff Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal & Anor (1989) 18 ALD 782, the Full Court were dealing with a case where the husband of the presiding member of the Broadcasting Tribunal ('Mr Joseph') had made statements of his own views on a matter under consideration by that Tribunal 'outside and without the authority of [the] Tribunal'. The Full Court referred to the evidence about the association and the commentary that had been made (788-789). It then said: > > The primary judge expressed the view that: "... it would be wrong to conclude that a casual statement by a husband of his views on a matter under consideration by a tribunal of which his wife is a member gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that the husband's views might have been formed after discussion with his wife, or might be communicated to his wife." > > We agree. Although we have found no authority directly bearing on the point, it appears to us that statements made outside and without the authority of a court or a tribunal by persons who are not its members cannot, in general, disqualify it from proceeding. Persons of considerable public credibility may on occasions make gratuitous statements as to a court's or a tribunal's established attitudes, perhaps even as a stratagem to create embarrassment. We think there are dangers in accepting the doctrine that statements of that kind can prejudice the right or affect the duty of a judge or tribunal member to sit. > > Here, the relationship between Mr Joseph and the chairman might have induced Mr Griffin to think that Mr Joseph's views of the matter were derived, at least in part, from discussions with his wife, but he did not say they were and in fact they were not; Mr Joseph was merely, if perhaps incautiously, expressing his own view. > > ... > > We are of opinion that, on the primary judge's findings, the chairman cannot have been disqualified by what Mr Joseph said... > > > Similarly, in Agnew v Prisoners Review Board (No 2) [2012] WASC 175, Hall J (as his Honour then was) rejected an argument that a prison charge had been improperly determined by a prison superintendent because his wife was an education officer at the prison and there had previously been an adverse incident report made against the prisoner by the wife ([53]-[59]). > > (b) Second, and less persuasively, the Tribunal was required, by force of s 500(6L) of the Migration Act, to determine this review by 15 December 2025. The Joint Hearing Bundle was in five volumes, which is unusually lengthy for matters of this kind. The review also raised deep issues about the best interests of children where they are in state care. It would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reconstitute the Tribunal and to re-list the matter to ensure that it was heard and determined by that date (even if reasons were to follow the decision required to be made).[31]

1. In approaching the information and evidence before the Tribunal, the Tribunal notes that:

(a) its procedures are generally discretionary and are to be based upon the circumstances of the proceeding, including any provisions of the enabling act and the ART Act and rules;[32] > > (b) it must act with as little formality and technicality as a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permits;[33] > > (c) it is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it considers appropriate.[34] Relevantly, cl 7(1) of Direction no. 110 - Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA (the Direction) reinforces this point by providing that, when applying the relevant considerations pertaining to the decision to be made, 'information and evidence from independent and authoritative sources should be given appropriate weight_';_ > > (d) the procedural flexibility accorded to the Tribunal does not absolve it from the obligation to make findings of fact based upon material which is logically probative in which the rules of evidence provide a guide;[35] > > (e) when making findings of fact which have 'serious' or 'grave' consequences to a party, the Tribunal is free to consider the evidence and other material that is before it - and the more centrally relevant a particular fact may be to the decision reached, the Tribunal would express greater caution in evaluating the factual foundation for it;[36] > > (f) where adverse findings are sought to be inferred from circumstantial evidence, the Tribunal will have regard to well-known principles for drawing inferences of that kind, which require the Tribunal to: > > > (i) consider the weight to be given to the united force of all of the circumstances taken together; > > > > (ii) apply the standard of proof at the final stage in the reasoning process; > > > > (iii) weigh the inference to be drawn from the proven facts against realistic possibilities as distinct from possibilities that might be regarded as fanciful; and > > > > (iv) find the allegation is not proved where there are competing possibilities of equal likelihood or where the choice between them can only be resolved by conjecture.[37]

1. The question for determination by the Tribunal is whether the decision not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's transitional (permanent) visa is the 'correct or preferable decision' on the material before the Tribunal.[38]
2. Section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act provides that a mandatory cancellation may be revoked if:

(a) the Applicant makes representations in accordance with the invitation to do so given by the Minister under s 501CA(3); and > > (b) the decision-maker is satisfied that: > > > (i) the Applicant passes the character test (as defined by s 501); or > > > > (ii) there is another reason why the mandatory cancellation should be revoked.

3. In Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 27; (2022) 275 CLR 582, the majority of the High Court described this section of the Migration Act as conferring 'a wide discretionary power' to revoke a mandatory cancellation if the decision-maker (whether the Minister, their delegate, or the Tribunal on review of a delegate's decision) is satisfied that there is 'another reason' why the cancellation should be revoked.[39] The majority held that the assessment of whether there was, in fact, 'another reason' was to be undertaken by reference to the representations made by the Applicant.[40]
4. In reviewing decisions of this kind, the Tribunal must comply with the Direction given by the Minister under s 499(1) of the Migration Act.[41] This is a legislative constraint on the Tribunal's process of reasoning.[42] However, as the Full Court identified in Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 296 FCR 582,[43] the principles stated in Drake (No 2)[44] regarding the application of governmental policy, and the Tribunal's ability to depart from it where appropriate, remain applicable.
5. Informed by the principles set out in cl 5.2 of the Direction, the Tribunal must 'take into account' the factors identified in cls 8 and 9 of the Direction (where relevant) in deciding the application.[45] In this review, those relevant factors are:

(a) the protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct; > > (b) whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence; > > (c) the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia; > > (d) the best interests of minor children in Australia; > > (e) the expectations of the Australian community; > > (f) the legal consequences of the decision; and > > (g) the extent of impediments if removed.

1. The Applicant was notified of the mandatory cancellation decision on 8 November 2024 by hand and whilst he was in custody.[46] This notice complied with requirements of ss 501CA(3) and 501CA(3A) of the Migration Act, read with reg 2.55(3)(a) of the Migration Regulations.
2. Regulation 2.52(2)(b) provides that any representations seeking revocation of a mandatory cancellation decision must be made to the Minister within 28 days after the person is given notice of the mandatory cancellation.
3. Regulations 2.52(3) to 2.52(6) set out the way representations are to be made, including that they are to be in English (or accompanied by translation) and that they must include specified information, such as personal identifiers and 'a statement of the reasons on which the person relies to support the representations.'
4. The Applicant made representations seeking revocation of the cancellation decision within the specified timeframe, from 20 November 2024.[47] These representations complied with the content requirements of the Migration Regulations.
5. Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied that Applicant made representations in accordance with the invitation for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(a) of the Migration Act.

1. The Tribunal must decide whether the Applicant passes the character test as defined by s 501 of the Migration Act.[48] Failure to pass the character test arises as a matter of law.[49]
2. Section 501(6)(a) of the Migration Act sets out that a person does not pass the character test if 'the person has a substantial criminal record (as defined by subsection (7))'. The term 'substantial criminal record' includes when 'the person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more_'_[50] and, when they have been 'sentenced to 2 or more terms of imprisonment, where the total of those terms is 12 months or more'.[51]
3. It was common ground that the Applicant did not pass the character test by virtue of the sentences of imprisonment imposed by the District Court of Western Australia on 30 July 2024. The Tribunal agrees and notes the separate sentences of imprisonment imposed by the courts of this State on the various dates set out in paragraph [8] above. These sentences each count for the purposes of the character test even if they were, in fact, suspended imprisonment orders (as was the case for most of the Magistrates Court outcomes).[52]
4. The Tribunal finds that the Applicant does not pass the character test found in s 501(6)(a) of the Migration Act because he has a 'substantial criminal record' as defined in ss 501(7)(c) and 501(7)(d) of the Migration Act.
5. The Tribunal is therefore not satisfied that the Applicant passes the character test for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(b)(i) of the Migration Act.

1. As the Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant passes the character test, the Tribunal must then determine whether, having regard to the representations made by the Applicant, and to any relevant primary and other considerations contained within the Direction, there is 'another reason' why the Cancellation Decision should be revoked.

1. The Tribunal is required to consider whether the Australian community requires protection from harm said to have arisen from the criminal activity or other serious conduct engaged in by the Applicant to date, and from any risk of such harm arising in the future.[53] This is a two-stage process, requiring consideration of both the nature and seriousness of conduct to date, and the risk to the community if further offences are committed or the Applicant engages in other serious conduct.[54]
2. It should be noted at this juncture that the Tribunal is not sentencing the Applicant for his past deeds. That has already happened. Rather, the Tribunal must assess whether his 'continued presence here would be opposed to the safety and welfare of the nation'.[55]
3. The concept of 'risk', and whether it is 'unacceptable', under cl 8.1.2(1) of the Direction is not the same thing as the 'likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct'.[56] For this purpose, an 'unacceptable risk' is a risk which the Tribunal considers to be 'unacceptable' having regard to a variety of considerations, including:

(a) the nature and seriousness of the Applicant's criminal offending and other conduct to date (including the sentences imposed by the courts for a crime or crimes); > > (b) the likelihood of the Applicant engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct; and > > (c) the nature of the harm that could be caused by further offending.

4. The Direction informs the Tribunal's risk assessment, at cls 5.2, 8.1(1), 8.1.1(1), and 8.1.2(1), by reiterating, amongst other things, that the Executive Government:

(a) is committed to 'protecting the Australian community from harm as a result of criminal activity or other serious conduct by non-citizens'; > > (b) considers identified types of conduct to be 'very serious' or 'serious'; and > > (c) considers that 'the Australian community's tolerance for any risk of future harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases.'

5. It follows that the 'risk' referred to in the balancing exercise contemplated by those clauses of the Direction is not any risk that an applicant may commit further criminal or other serious conduct but is calibrated towards the Tribunal's assessment of the nature and degree of the harm said to be in prospect in the case at hand.

Nature and seriousness of the conduct to date

1. The Applicant's criminal and other serious conduct is summarised in Annexure A, including the sentences imposed by the courts for various offences.
2. It was common ground that the Tribunal should find that the Applicant had engaged in very serious crimes.[57] This was patently the case.
3. The Applicant's conduct to date includes the following:

(a) 14 June 2023, Criminal damage by fire: the Applicant drove (without authority) to a service station and purchased a jerry can of petrol at 08.00 am. With a co-offender, he went to an address on Broome Terrace in Northam. The co-offender got out of the Applicant's car and covered a Kia Optima motor vehicle with petrol from the jerry can. He then set the car, and himself inadvertently, on fire. The co-offender then attempted to douse the fire on his clothes in the neighbouring Avon River. He returned to the vehicle, and they drove away. The offending was captured by the Shire of Northam CCTV cameras. The Applicant was arrested later that morning and made admissions to police. He told them that the Kia Optima was owned by the father of his partner's 'lover' but used by the son/lover (whom the Tribunal will call Mr DP). He said that he had been in a 'Love Triangle' with Mr DP and his partner for several years, and that Mr DP had been supplying the partner with illicit drugs. Christian DCJ found that the offending was 'premeditated to a degree' and motivated by hate for Mr DP.[58] The Applicant and his co-offender were both sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment in the Perth District Court. Christian DCJ found that the Applicant played a crucial role in the arson offence and that he provided the motive.[59] > > (b) 23 February 2018, Assault occasioning bodily harm; being armed in a way that may cause fear; breach of protective bail conditions: The Applicant was sitting on a bench outside the Northam Regional Hospital when he saw his partner and Mr DP walking together. At the time, the Applicant was on a bail undertaking with protective bail conditions preventing him from being within 50 metres of his partner. He stood up from the bench, grabbed a metal crescent wrench from his bag, approached the pair and swung the wrench at Mr DP in an overhead fashion. Mr DP blocked the strike with his left forearm, causing him pain and swelling to the arm. Mr DP then fled into hospital. The Applicant was arrested on 27 February 2018 and made admissions. The Applicant was sentenced to 8 months' imprisonment, suspended for 12 months, for the assault occasioning bodily harm in the Northam Magistrates Court on 12 March 2018. > > (c) 21 June 2017, being armed in a way that may cause fear: On 21 June 2017, the Applicant attended the address of Mr DP, over what is described as a 'property dispute'. After being refused permission to take the property in question, the Applicant stood on the footpath at the front of the property and produced a hammer from his backpack. He then yelled words to the effect of 'do you want some of this'. The hammer, and yelling, was witnessed by a police officer, who was driving by the scene. The Applicant was arrested and made full admissions. He was sentenced to a Community Based Order (CBO) of 8 months' duration in the Northam Magistrates Court on 13 March 2018. > > (d) 8 February 2017, breach of Violence Restraining Order (VRO); breach protective bail conditions: On 25 January 2017, the Northam Magistrates Court issued a VRO, prohibiting the Applicant from approaching his partner or children and limiting their communication. On 6 February 2017, the Applicant also entered a bail undertaking which included a protective bail condition that he comply with the terms of the VRO that had been issued. On 8 February 2017, police were notified that the Applicant was at his partner's home address. Police found him laying on a couch at the back of the property. The Applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 7 months' imprisonment, suspended for 12 months, in the Perth Magistrates Court on 15 February 2017. > > (e) 2 April 1993, aggravated sexual penetration; indecent assault: The facts of this unlawful conduct are set out in the Court of Criminal Appeal judgment on the Applicant's application for leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence.[60] The Applicant was convicted of one count of indecent assault and one count of aggravated sexual penetration following a jury trial in the Supreme Court between 10-12 May 1994. Justice Walsh, sitting in the Court of Criminal Appeal, referred to the trial judge's factual findings as follows: > > The facts are that on the date of the offence you, Bolderson, had joined up with [co-offender] and eventually gone with him to the Coogee Caravan Park to a cabin in which he lived with the complainant, he de facto wife, [JM]. During the course of the afternoon and evening you consumed a considerable quantity of liquor and all three of you became intoxicated. > > Later in the evening [JM] put her two children to bed in the double bed in the cabin and the drinking continued. Eventually [JM] decided to go to bed and she shifted the two children into their bunks in the other room. She then went to bed and fell asleep. [JM] was awakened to find you, Bolderson, on top of her. > > [The trial judge] then goes on in his reasons to deal with what occurred after that. He further on in those reasons states: > > You, Bolderson, realised that the incident had gone too far when [the co-offender] punched [JM] in the face and you helped her to get away. > > [JM] was able to grab her two sons and ran from the cabin and sought help. You, [co-offender], chased her and would have continued with the assault upon her, but for the fact that your two children were present with her. In the course of the trial each of you had no hesitation in denigrating and using disparaging remarks about [JM]. You, Bolderson, in her evidence called her a slut on a number of occasions. > > Your attitude shows no remorse at all and there is no indication from either of you that would give the court any confidence in your prospects of rehabilitation. You each have significant criminal records and each have previously been sentenced to imprisonment. I can see little to distinguish between you in the conduct on the night in question. > > You each sexually assaulted [JM] without any thoughts or considerations for her feelings. > > The Applicant was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment on both counts by the trial judge. He was refused leave to appeal against his conviction and the sentences imposed by the Court of Criminal Appeal. The sexual penetration was aggravated because the offence was committed in company and the Applicant did bodily harm to the complainant. The Court of Criminal Appeal observed that 'it is probably sufficient ... to emphasise that the circumstances of the commission of these offences, and in particular [the Applicant's] participation in them, were extremely serious and demonstrated on the part [of the Applicant] and [his] co-offender a total disregard for the rights of the unfortunate woman who was treated in a thoroughly undignified way and subjected to a sexual assault under circumstances of violence' (Walsh J). The Court of Criminal Appeal considered the sentence imposed by the trial judge to be a 'moderate sentence and certainly well within the range of a sound sentencing discretion' (Walsh J) and 'well within a sound discretionary judgment [in circumstances where there was an aggravated sexual assault by penile penetration and where this] was a particularly bad case having regard to the circumstances of aggravation that were involved' (Malcolm CJ) (Heenan J agreeing with both Malcolm CJ and Walsh J). > > (f) Around October 1992, indecent assault: The Applicant was convicted in the Bunbury District Court of one count of indecent assault on 1 October 1992. The Court of Criminal Appeal in August 1995 described the facts as involving 'an attempt to have sex with a young woman, [who he] dragged [to] the back of the house, even though she was protesting.' The Applicant was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment. > > (g) Around December 1985, robbery with violence: The Applicant was convicted in the Perth District Court of one count of robbery with violence on 23 December 1985. The Court of Criminal Appeal in August 1995 described the facts as involving 'the snatching of a handbag from a 78-year-old lady, causing her to fall to the ground and receive hospitalisation for injuries.' The Applicant was sentenced to 2 years' probation and 200 hours of community service.

4. Unfortunately, the then Chief Justice of Western Australia was somewhat prescient in August 1995. His Honour remarked, in respect of the Applicant and the April 1993 offending:

The applicant clearly has a serious drug and alcohol abuse problem. That is calculated to have the applicant reoffending and returning to prison for increasingly lengthy terms unless he commits himself to changing his lifestyle. He has been described as having a lack of insight into his problems and a reluctance to follow the advice of those who seek to help him. Consequently, until his attitude changes it is unlikely that he would be responsive to treatment. Unless he does change his attitude the cycle of drug and alcohol abuse, reoffending, with inevitable prison terms, will be the cycle which will face him for the rest of his life. There will be an opportunity during the time which is spent serving the sentence which has been imposed upon him to consider what kind of a future he wishes to have.

5. The Applicant's criminal offending and other conduct to date includes violent and/or sexual crimes, including against women, and acts of family violence (that is, violent, threatening or other behaviour that coerces or controls a member of his family or causes them to be fearful).
6. The Applicant has 15 convictions for either breaching the terms of a restraining order (whether a police order or a violence restraining order) or breaching protective bail conditions. He has a serious traffic record, including driving under the influence of alcohol on multiple occasions.
7. The Tribunal has no hesitation in finding that the victims of the Applicant's offending, particularly in each of the examples described in paragraph [52] above, have each been harmed by the Applicant. Christian DCJ referred to the victim impact statement given by Mr DP's father to the District Court in 2024 and recited in her Honour's sentencing remarks that he had spoken about the distress and psychological harm caused by the arson offence. Mr DP was no doubt scared when he was attacked by the Applicant on 23 February 2018 (and, for that matter, the Applicant's partner would likely have been fearful too). The Applicant's partner and children were each scared when the Applicant continued to return to the family property in breach of various orders in late 2016 and early 2017. These incidents, and the circumstances prevailing in the family home, caused the State to intervene and to place the children into provisional protection and care. Protection orders (until 18) were subsequently made by the Children's Court in August 2019. The victims of the Applicant's sexual crimes were clearly physically and psychologically harmed by the offending. It can also be inferred that the Applicant's early violence against the elderly victim in 1985 would have caused considerable harm, given that this victim was said to have been hospitalised.
8. The Applicant has a 13-page History for Court in Western Australia. His unlawful conduct has, overall, been frequent and it is cumulatively significant. However, the Tribunal does not accept the Minister's submission that there is an evident trend of increasing seriousness. The Applicant's most serious offences were, in fact, committed in the 1990s; though this does not mean that his most recent offences were not themselves serious. Equally, the Tribunal accepts that the Applicant was starting to reduce his alcohol and drug use prior to committing the arson in 2023, and that his offending had decreased in frequency from late 2019.
9. The last three factors in cl 8.1.1(1)(g) to (i) of the Direction are not relevant.
10. For the above reasons, the Tribunal finds that the nature and seriousness of the Applicant's criminal offending and other serious conduct to date to be very serious.

Risk to the Australian community should the Applicant engage in further conduct

1. The Tribunal is required to have regard to the future risk that may be posed by the Applicant to the Australian community by considering, cumulatively, the nature of the harm to individuals or to the community should the Applicant engage in further criminal or other serious conduct, and the likelihood of the Applicant engaging in such conduct.[61] There is no statutory constraint on the way that risk is assessed by the Tribunal other than that there must be a rational and probative basis for the assessment.[62]

1. The Minister identified the nature of harm to individuals, or the Australian community, should the Applicant re-offend as 'significant physical and psychological harm'.[63] The Applicant did not take issue with that characterisation.[64]
2. Dealing first with the recent criminal damage by fire offence, in R v Catts (1996) 85 A Crim R 171, the Court of Criminal Appeal observed that 'arson in any form is very easy to commit. It is simple and easy to do and the consequences can be and often are extremely destructive, if not tragic' (176). Similarly, in R v S (a child) (1992) 60 A Crim R 121, the Court remarked that 'it is not simply a property offence. It frequently exposes officers of the Fire Brigade and others to the risk of personal injury or even death. It has a personal impact upon the owners and occupiers of premises' (135). Christian DCJ, when sentencing the Applicant in July 2024, remarked that the Applicant's offending 'is serious because it was, to a degree, premeditated and motivated by revenge or a dislike of the victim's son because of his relationship with your partner. Also, there is always a risk of fire spreading and endangering life and property.'[65]
3. Second, it is notorious that family and domestic violence has short and long-term physical, emotional, psychological, financial, and other effects.[66] Every victim is, of course, different and the individual and cumulative impact of each act of violence will depend upon many factors. Exhibit 5 indicates, in the context of the impacts of family violence on children, that:

A recent review by the Australian Domestic Violence Clearinghouse found that 'more than two decades of international research definitively shows that infants, children and adolescents experience serious negative psychological, emotional, social and developmental impacts to their wellbeing from the traumatic ongoing experiences of domestic violence' (Sety 2011). These impacts are often cumulative - that is, they amass over time.

4. Thirdly, the Tribunal identified the harm caused by acts of violence including sexual violence in Re DMFR and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] ARTA 28, at [45]-[46] as follows:

[45] ... as the Chief Justice of Western Australia observed in Musgrave v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 67; (2021) 289 A Crim R 17 in respect of the equivalent [sexual] offence in this State: > > [7] ...Other than in the pages of the Criminal Code, sexual offences do not exist in the abstract. They are always, and in every case, a violation by one (or more than one) human being of another human being. And the impacts of such violations have on each individual victim are as many and varied as the individual experiences of victims themselves. To suggest that "all things being equal" one form of violation is inherently more serious than the other is incoherent because, when it comes to such matters, "all things are never equal". > > [46] Acts of violence, including sexual violence, are well-known to have negative effects on those who experience or witness them. Those effects are not restricted to physical injury or psychological harm, nor are they restricted to the immediate victims, but may also extend to their families and support groups who must deal with the consequential trauma, and to the first responders and those within the criminal justice system more broadly.

5. Lastly, turning to harm caused by traffic offences, particularly driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, in RQRP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 266, McKerracher J observed that:

[48] It may also be accepted that there is a degree of separation in the committing of certain offences between the criminal act and any potential harm. Such offences encapsulate conduct that does not necessarily require an element of harm to another person to attract criminal sanction and can be distinguished from other crimes such as those involving direct violence where the harm arises immediately upon the doing of the act. It is clear that child pornography and drink-driving offences fall into the former category. However the critical feature of these acts is that they attract criminal sanction because committing them creates a greater risk that much more serious conduct that does cause direct and significant harm could result. ... In the case of drink-driving, the act poses an unacceptable risk to the life and wellbeing of other road users.

6. For the above reasons, the Tribunal finds that the nature of the harm to individuals or to the Australian community should the Applicant re-offend is variable, ranging from relatively minimal impact to potentially catastrophic impact. It was properly accepted by the Applicant that any re-offending could have 'wide-reaching effects on the community'.[67]

1. The Applicant was diagnosed with an 'anti-social personality disorder, alcohol disorder and alcohol-related psychotic disorder (with delusions and hallucinations)' in 1997.[68] He told the Tribunal (and the State) that he had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia about a decade ago, for which he is medicated. He also told the State that, prior to his most recent incarceration in July 2024, he had been using methamphetamines once a month and did not think this had any impact upon him.[69]
2. The Applicant completed several sexual offending courses in the 1990s.[70] He also completed the Skills Training for Aggression and Control (STAC) course for violent offending between January and February 1995.[71] The Applicant's various parole orders in the 1990s included conditions that he engage in substance abuse counselling as directed.[72] Though the first parole order was cancelled in July 1993.
3. The Applicant provided the Tribunal with a bundle of medical records from 2022 and 2023 (Exhibit 2) indicating that:

(a) he suffered a stroke in the left posterior temporal lobe in March 2022; > > (b) presented to the Northam Hospital in May 2022 with symptoms indicative of a transient ischemic attack (self-discharged); and > > (c) presented to the Royal Perth Hospital in December 2023 with symptoms consistent with 'likely acute minor stroke/transient ischaemic attack'. He advised the neurology registrar that his last intravenous drug use was two weeks prior to his attendance. He self-discharged.

4. The Applicant was in the community, on bail, between 21 August 2023 and 30 July 2024. He told the Tribunal that he had ceased illicit drug use after his strokes, and alcohol use for six months prior to committing the arson, and that he had 'fallen off the wagon' on 14 June 2023.
5. In July 2024, Christian DCJ had the benefit of two pre-sentence reports (not before the Tribunal). Her Honour summarised the risk factors identified by the psychologist that authored one of those reports as follows:

Now, the psychologist identified a number of risk factors you have for re-offending. They include some antisocial attitudes, antisocial peers, a lack of pro-social leisure activities, and substance abuse issues.

Christian DCJ thought the Applicant was not genuinely remorseful for the arson offence because of his attempts to minimise the offending and to blame the co-offender. She remarked that the Applicant had not taken any steps to address the risk factors identified by the psychologist set out above, and, on that basis, her Honour was 'unable to conclude that [the Applicant is] at low risk of re-offending.'

1. In a Parole Review Report dated 5 December 2024,[73] it was observed that the Applicant had 'been afforded 21 opportunities for community supervision and has breached 10 orders issued, suggesting he may have difficulties abiding by conditions set by the [PRBWA].'[74] However, it was observed that the Applicant had demonstrated good prison conduct and had participated in voluntary programmes in an attempt to address his offending behaviour.[75] In view of unconfirmed accommodation or employment, unmet treatment needs, and the Applicant's migration status, the Department of Justice did not support release on parole.[76]
2. The Applicant was reviewed by Dr Phil Watts, clinical and forensic psychologist, at Acacia Prison on 31 December 2024.[77] During that interview, Dr Watts tested the Applicant's intellectual functioning and found him to have 'verbal capacity [in] the range of mile intellectual disability [and] perceptual reasoning [in] the borderline of intellectual disability.'[78]
3. In his first report, dated 4 January 2025, Dr Watts opined:

[34] My opinion in this matter is that Mr Bolderson's criminal record is quite classic of someone with a neuro-cognitive impairment, where they are low-functioning, lack the capacity to think about consequences and, when it is coupled with alcohol or drug-use, the offences tend to be ones lacking insight and any thought of consequence. There is also an element that many offences are in company of others and he follows along. He is a follower and not leader according to his mother. > > [35] This type of offending has a tendency to diminish if people are able to stay off alcohol and drugs, and also as they age. However, they never completely remit as it is caused by a brain-based lack of capacity. > > [36] I considered using the IORNS (Inventory of Offender Risk, Needs, and Strength) to determine actuary based risk. Unfortunately he lacked the capacity to read the questions. However, he did not present with criminal orientation, psychopathy or aggression. He did however have a lack of personal resource (cognition), negative social influences and interpersonal problems. > > ... > > [41] Mr Bolderson indicated that he is "working on myself in jail". He said that he is doing one-one-one counselling, attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) once a week. He would like to do a violence prevention course, but will probably be released before he can do that. He indicated he has been doing some education courses to try and improve his literacy. I believe it is important that he is showing some attempt at bettering himself, and while that will not eliminate risk, certainly ceasing alcohol and substances will significantly lower risk. > > [42] In summary, based on my clinical assessment of Mr Bolderson and the sources of information I have had access to, I would opine that his risk of sexual reoffending is low and will remain that way. However, in regards to his general risk of reoffending, I would suggest that the risk will remain moderate, based on the likelihood of not having the capacity to [consider] consequences and acting without thinking. However, this risk will become lower both due to ageing and if he maintains abstinence from substances.

Dr Watts' second report dated 5 October 2025 was largely consistent with the contents of the first report.[79]

1. The PRBWA denied the Applicant release on parole on 2 February 2025. Their reasons for that decision were as follows:

The Board is satisfied that [the Applicant] has unmet treatment needs (substance abuse and poor consequential thinking) as evidenced by the nature of [his] current offences and [his] criminal history. [He has] not had the opportunity to participate in treatment programmes in custody to meet these treatment needs. Until such time as [he has] been provided with an opportunity in custody to participate in and complete an appropriate treatment programme, the Board considers that [he is] an unacceptable risk to the safety of the community if released on parole. Your extensive criminal history includes violence which suggests a high risk of re-offending.[80]

2. The Applicant was assessed for treatment needs by the State in April 2025.[81] The Department of Justice clinician used two actuarial assessment tools: the Level of Service/Risk, Needs Responsivity tool (LS/RNR), and the Violence Risk Scale - Screening Version (2nd version) (VRS-SV) (Wong and Gordon, 2001).

(a) On the LS/RNR, the Applicant scored medium for alcohol/drug problems; scored highly on risk/need profile for criminal history, leisure/recreation, pro-criminal attitude/orientation, anti-social pattern; and he scored very highly for education/employment, family/marital, and companions. The clinician scored the Applicant with an overall score of 34 or very high needs.[82] The clinician indicated that the score was reduced in relation to alcohol and drugs given the Applicant's incarceration and lack of recent use of both alcohol and other drugs.[83] However, this remained a treatment need.[84] It was noted that the Applicant had 'clinically significant treatment needs in regard to his court history and anti-social pattern, linked to his associations with anti-social companions and underpinned by pro-criminal attitudes.'[85] > > (b) On the VRS-SV, the Applicant scored 11 for static factors and 12 for dynamic factors.[86] The clinician indicated that the Applicant presents as high risk of re-offending violently.[87] The static factors were identified as his age at first conviction (19), juvenile conduct, violence throughout his lifespan which includes sexual offending, general violence as well as family and domestic violence.[88] The dynamic factors were identified as the Applicant's 'violent lifestyle' (given the range of violent behaviours evident within his court history), his 'use of interpersonal aggression which has escalated within the context of FDV in [the] index offence and depicts both reactive and premeditated violence, emotional control as well as impulsivity where his violent behaviour is exacerbated during periods of relationship breakdown, his long term reliance [on] alcohol and other illicit substances (methamphetamine) as a coping strategy, along with peer group influences, and is underpinned by limited problem solving skills and poor consequential thinking.[89] The factors which have predisposed Mr Bolderson to criminal behaviour include personality traits in which he presents as submissive given his early diagnosis of an anti-social personality disorder in 1997, and an anxious attachment style despite his affirmations to the contrary.'[90] > > (c) The clinician recommended that the Applicant participate in the Stopping Family Violence men's behaviour change programme and the Pathways addiction and offending programme.[91]

3. The Applicant completed the Pathways Programme at Karnet Prison between 7 August 2025 and 6 November 2025.[92] He also completed the Allied Drug and Alcohol Programmes and Treatment (ADAPT) programme whilst in custody, run by Cyrenian House and Holyoake.[93] The Tribunal obtained the Pathways programme completion report under summons issued during the review hearing (Exhibit 4). The authors of that report indicate in their summary and recommendations dated 18 November 2025:

[The Applicant] attended 94 out of the 100 hours of the program, as well as a pre-program interview and two other individual sessions. > > The following factors were identified as treatment needs for Mr Bolderson:

• - Impulsivity / lack of emotional control/ poor consequential thinking
• - Limited problem-solving skills
• - Long-term AOD use

Some of the significant treatment gains observed in Mr Bolderson at the conclusion of the program include his decision to abstain from alcohol and other drugs, demonstration of problem solving, stress management and refusal skills, and consistent demonstration of appropriate emotional regulation and prosocial behaviour throughout the program. > > Protective factors for Mr Bolderson include having strong family support, his intention to rebuild his relationship with his partner, willingness to engage in further voluntary programs for personal and professional development and a desire to engage pro-socially within society which includes continuing his journey towards higher education. > > In managing Mr Bolderson's risk of relapse and reoffending, the following list of recommendations could be used to monitor his progress upon release:

• - Monitor continued engagement with pro-social influences
• - Monitor participation on voluntary courses and counselling in the community
• - Monitor engagement with training and employment.

Throughout the program, Mr Bolderson had been willing to acknowledge and address his treatment needs. He had made treatment gains, and his protective factors were identified as outlined above. Should Mr Bolderson be offered parole, it would enable authorities to monitor the implementation of his risk management plan.

1. The PRBWA denied the Applicant's request for review of their original parole refusal decision on 25 September 2025 (with the same reasons for decision that they gave in February 2025).[94]
2. Unfortunately, the Applicant was not able to complete any courses aimed at family and domestic violence and parenting skills in prison. He did complete short 'peaceful pathways' courses in 2025.[95] He was referred for one-to-one parenting support with the Wugening Aboriginal Corporation, through their ReSet Programme, upon release.[96] The Applicant intends to continue to engage with drug and alcohol counselling provided by Holyoake and Alcoholics Anonymous (AA).[97] He told the Tribunal that he had recently acquired an AA Sponsor, 'Barry'. The Tribunal was also provided with a reference from a former Holyoake counsellor in Northam, Mr Mark Allan.[98]
3. On 22 October 2025, the PRBWA decided not to make a 'post sentence supervision order' (PSSO) in relation to the Applicant under s 74D(1) of the Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA) (Sentence Administration Act).[99] The PRBWA reasons for that decision indicate that they did not consider a PSSO was 'required on this occasion'. The Tribunal notes that the Board must make a PSSO in respect of a prisoner if it considers that 'the order is necessary for the prevention of harm to the community from further offending by the prisoner'.[100] The Tribunal was not provided with the associated report prepared for the Board by the Department of Justice.
4. The Applicant was released from prison on 22 November 2025 and has been detained at Yongah Hill Immigration Detention Centre since.
5. In prison, the Applicant completed a Certificate I in General Education for Adults and some vocational training.[101] He described this as 'opening a door' for him and told the Tribunal about his plans to continue that further education and to continue to inspire his children to pursue their own education.
6. Dr Watts gave oral evidence before the Tribunal on 5 December 2025. He said that his testing of the Applicant's intellectual functioning indicated that the Applicant was in the bottom 1-2% of the population. He recounted that the Applicant had been quite motivated to do drug and alcohol counselling during their December 2024 interview. He told the Tribunal that it was difficult to know whether that stated motivation was genuine. He observed that the Applicant's low functioning meant that his 'brain does not get consequence well' and that, because of his cognitive makeup, risk of re-offending could not be eliminated and there were impulsive tendencies. Dr Watts observed that whilst the Applicant is putting a lot of effort to 'stop things' regarding alcohol and other drugs, his low brain function does result in increased risk of re-offending. Dr Watts thought that the Applicant's participation in courses was positive and that abstinence from alcohol and other drugs will significantly lower risk. He said that continued support was important, and that AA counselling was probably the best model of therapeutic support for the Applicant because of their simple and concrete rules around not drinking (zero alcohol versus controlled drinking). Dr Watts described familial support as critical for the Applicant because he will 'flounder without it'. He described the Applicant's elderly mother as 'quite motivated' in this respect but admitted that she had her own health struggles. Dr Watts also opined that the Applicant had limited executive brain function and that he would struggle to organise himself if he were removed to the UK.
7. The Tribunal provided Dr Watts with a copy of the Treatment Assessment Report dated April 2025. He opined, relevant to the historical anti-social personality disorder diagnosis referenced within that report, that he did not think this diagnosis was playing a significant role 'anymore'. He thought that the Applicant 'wants to grow up and have a life' and though he 'cannot say with any surety that there will not be a trigger and a binge, and the Applicant will then go do something stupid, he hopes that if he manages his alcohol use, rings his sponsor, and does something rather than drink', that there will be low risk of re-offending. However, he admitted that this was a hope and that the underlying risk was still there.
8. In cross-examination, Dr Watts was asked whether his opinion of moderate risk was based upon abstinence from alcohol and other drugs. He said that if the Applicant could maintain abstinence, then he would put the risk as lower than moderate. His opinion that the risk was moderate was premised on the assumption that the Applicant may not manage his alcohol use completely. He said that if he was sure that the Applicant would use alcohol or other drugs, then the risk profile would be higher than moderate. He said his assumptions included that the Applicant lives a 'stressful life', with his mother being seriously ill and his dysfunctional relationship with his partner (who has her own mental health and substance use issues). He accepted that if those stressors increased, then this 'may lead to relapse drinking and cascade.'
9. For the above reasons, the Tribunal finds, on the evidence before it, that the Applicant poses, at best, a moderate likelihood of re-offending in a general and/or violent manner. It accepts that the risk of sexual re-offending is lower than moderate given the passage of time since those offences were committed. The Applicant has ongoing treatment needs relating to substance use, family violence, problem-solving/consequential thinking, and impulsivity. Steps have been taken to address some of those issues (especially, forced sobriety), but the Applicant requires further supervision and support, particularly in a community setting.

Conclusion on the protection of the Australian community

1. The Tribunal finds the Applicant to pose a risk to the Australian community. It has found that:

(a) further involvement in criminal or other serious conduct has potential for very serious harm; and > > (b) the Applicant poses an, at best, moderate likelihood of committing such conduct in the reasonably foreseeable future notwithstanding that he has been attending the rehabilitative courses available to him in prison or immigration detention.

2. The question that arises then is whether that risk is 'unacceptable'.
3. The Minister argued that the risk was unacceptable because of the potential for serious harm and the fact that the Applicant has long-standing substance use issues, had previously been non-compliant with court orders, his recent abstinence had not been tested in the community, and the protective factors had not aided in reducing his risk of re-offending in the past.[102]
4. In response, the Applicant argued that the Tribunal should take into account his good behaviour in prison and the 'substantial steps taken towards rehabilitation'.[103]
5. The Direction contains policy guidance, at cls 5.2, 8.1(1), 8.1.2(1), to the effect that:

Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to enter and/or remain in Australia. Being able to enter and/or remain in Australia is a privilege Australia confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law-abiding, will respect important institutions, such as Australia's law enforcement framework, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community (cls 5.2(1), 8.1(1)); > > The safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian Government' (cls 5.2(2), 8.1(1)). To that end, the Government is committed to protecting the Australian community from harm as a result of criminal activity or other serious conduct by non-citizens (cl 8.1(1)); > > Non-citizens who engage or have engaged in criminal or other serious conduct should expect to be denied the privilege of coming to, or to forfeit the privilege of staying in, Australia (cl 5.2(3)); > > The Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they engaged in conduct, in Australia or elsewhere, that raises serious character concerns. This expectation of the Australian community applies regardless of whether the non-citizen poses a [measurable] risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community (cl 5.2(4)); > > With respect to decisions to ... revoke cancellation a visa, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct by non-citizens who have lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age (cl 5.2(6)); > > Decision-makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case. In some circumstances, the nature of the non-citizen's conduct, or the harm that would be caused if the conduct were to be repeated, may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify ... revoking a mandatory cancellation (cl 5.2(7)); > > The inherent nature of certain conduct such as family violence is so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify ... revoking a mandatory cancellation... even if the information available at the time of consideration suggests that the non-citizen does not pose a [measurable] risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community (cl 5.2(8)); and > > In considering the need to protect the Australian community ... from harm, decision-makers should have regard to the Government's view that the Australian community's tolerance for any risk of future harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases. Some conduct and the harm that would be caused, if it were to be repeated, is so serious that any risk that it may be repeated may be unacceptable (cl 8.1.2(1));

6. The Tribunal is authorised, but not bound, to give weight to the above policy guidance.[104] The Tribunal respectfully considers the policy considerations identified above to be appropriate, and to conform with the terms of the Migration Act and the nature of the power found in s 501 and its analogous provisions.
7. The Applicant contravened the expectation that he be law-abiding and not cause or threaten harm to the Australian community. Whilst there is a level of tolerance afforded to him, as someone who arrived in Australia as a young person, that tolerance is offset by the nature of the conduct engaged over a very lengthy period and the risk of its repetition. The Applicant was fortunate that his earlier offending did not come to the Minister's attention in the 1990s. It was equally fortunate that there has not been a repeat of the serious sexual offences committed in 1992-1993. There have, however, been repeated instances of violence throughout the Applicant's criminal history. The Tribunal has found that the Applicant poses an, at best, moderate likelihood of re-offending in the reasonably foreseeable future, including in a violent manner. It accepts that the risk of sexual offending has decreased from the risk posed by the Applicant in the 1990s. The overall risk of the Applicant re-offending is considerably higher than a trivial or transient risk. The seriousness of the potential harm caused by further violent offending (including acts of family violence) cannot be underestimated. It is conduct that the Australian Government does not condone and which the Tribunal is commanded to protect the Australian community from. The Tribunal is conscious of the adverse effects that a conclusion of this kind might have on the Applicant and his family and has weighed that in the balance, given the burden that such a conclusion might have on the outcome of the review based upon an assessment made about the risk of commission of future crimes. Nevertheless, the Tribunal considers that the Applicant poses an unacceptable risk to the Australian community.
8. The Tribunal finds this primary consideration to weigh determinatively against revocation.

Whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence

1. The parties agreed that this primary consideration was relevant because the Applicant has been convicted of offences which involve 'family violence' for the purposes of the Direction.[105]
2. The Tribunal repeats its observations in Re MBBG and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] ARTA 53, at [80]-[84], and at paragraph [28] above, regarding the Tribunal's approach to family violence and the evidence before it.
3. Most of the Applicant's offences relevant to this primary consideration are for breaching the terms of police orders or violence restraining orders made under the Restraining Orders Act. The term 'family violence' is defined in s 5A of that Act as follows:

(1) A reference in this Act to family violence is a reference to -

(a) violence, or a threat of violence, by a person towards a family member of the person; or

(b) any other behaviour or pattern of behaviour by the person that coerces or controls the family member or causes the member to be fearful.

(1A) Behaviour or a pattern of behaviour referred to in subsection (1)(b) -

(a) may occur over a period of time; and

(b) may be more than 1 act, or a series of acts, that when considered cumulatively coerces or controls the family member or causes the member to be fearful; and

(c) is to be considered in the context of the relationship between the person and the family member as a whole.

(2) Examples of behaviour or a pattern of behaviour that may constitute family violence include (but are not limited to) the following -

(a) an assault against the family member;

(b) a sexual assault or other sexually abusive behaviour against the family member;

(c) stalking or cyber‑stalking the family member;

(d) repeated derogatory remarks against the family member;

(e) damaging or destroying property of the family member;

(f) causing death or injury to an animal that is the property of the family member;

(g) unreasonably denying the family member the financial autonomy that the member would otherwise have had;

(h) unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet the reasonable living expenses of the family member, or a child of the member, at a time when the member is entirely or predominantly dependent on the person for financial support;

(ha) coercing, threatening, or causing physical abuse, emotional or psychological abuse or financial abuse, in connection with demanding or receiving dowry, whether before or after any marriage;

(i) preventing the family member from making or keeping connections with the member's family, friends or culture;

(j) kidnapping, or depriving the liberty of, the family member, or any other person with whom the member has a family relationship;

(k) distributing an intimate image of the family member without the family member's consent, or threatening to distribute the image;

(l) causing any family member who is a child to be exposed to behaviour or a pattern of behaviour referred to in this section.

(3) For the purposes of this Act, a person who procures another person to commit family violence is taken to have also committed the family violence.

The term 'family member' is defined in s 4 of the Restraining Orders Act.

1. In contrast, the term 'family violence' is defined in cl 4(1) of the Direction as follows:

family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful.

Family member is defined as 'a person who has, or has had, an intimate personal relationship with the relevant person.'[106]

1. It has been remarked that there is 'an exact symmetry of language between the definition of family violence in s 4(1) of the Direction and the definition of family violence in s 4AB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (Family Law Act).'[107]
2. The Tribunal does not need to resolve the divergence of recent appellate authority as to whether the definitions of 'family violence' in the Direction and the Family Law Act are inclusive/exclusive of particular kinds of conduct.[108] This is because the Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant has convictions that involve violent, threatening or other behaviour which coerced or controlled a member of his family or caused them to be fearful.
3. It has been held by the WA Court of Appeal that whether behaviour is coercive, controlling, or which causes a person to be fearful is to be judged by an objective standard.[109] Proof of an intent to intimidate or proof that family member has in fact been intimidated is not necessary.[110] However, the effect of the behaviour on the family member is a relevant consideration.[111]
4. For the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal finds that the Applicant's partner and children are 'members of the [Applicant's] family' for the purposes of cl 4(1) of the Direction because they are persons who have, or have had, an intimate personal relationship with the Applicant.[112] The same could not be said for Mr DP. However, the Applicant's conduct towards Mr DP was directly relevant to their respective relationships with the Applicant's partner (and the asserted 'love triangle' between them).
5. The Applicant has been in an intimate relationship with his partner, Ms Nundle, since the early 2000s.[113] Whilst the Applicant's record indicates convictions for breaching various orders in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it is not clear that these are in respect of Ms Nundle or in respect of an earlier relationship. The Applicant and Ms Nundle's first child was born in February 2006. Various orders have been issued from January 2008 onwards.
6. The Department of Child Protection (DCP) received ten 'domestic violence incident reports' between February 2009 and April 2013.[114] During these incidents, both adults (the Applicant and his partner) are reported to be heavily intoxicated.[115] As the Applicant's counsel identified, when the Applicant and his partner were intoxicated, their arguments would often escalate, resulting in police involvement and the issuances of restraining or police orders.[116] It is clear from the DCP and police records provided to the Tribunal that the family violence committed by the Applicant was at times reciprocated by Ms Nundle. For example, some of the earlier incident reports (from 2010, 2013) refer to claims made that the Applicant was physically attacked by Ms Nundle.[117]
7. The Tribunal was taken to a Safety and Wellbeing Assessment conducted by DCP between November 2016 and February 2017.[118] This assessment indicates that child assessment interviews were conducted with the two oldest children, as follows:

[R] has disclosed seeing Dad hurt Mum by attacking her and is worried that Mum has bruises from Dad. [R] reports that her and her brother had run to the phone box to call police when Dad has taken the phone [off] [T]. [R] disclosed that she was worried when she and [T] had seen a machete in the garden and [R] disclosed that [E] and [N] had gotten swung at by a machete. > > [T] has disclosed having to call 000 after Dad had knocked Mum's door down, pulled her hair and chased her. [T] had stated that this had happened more than once. [T] also disclosed that his father had told the children not to listen to their mother and to let him in if Mum kicks him out. [T] discussed seeing bruises on his mother's arm from his father and disclosed being hit and pushed and that Dad has hit and pushed [R].[119]

8. DCP summarised their involvement to date, as at February 2017, as follows:

Chronology of Domestic Violence Incident Reports and history of [DCP] involvement with family - violence had been perpetuated by [the Applicant] plus alleged drug and alcohol misuse by both [parents]. After a recent DVIR [R] has told police that she is scared of her father returning to the home. > > Based on the information gathered during the Safety and Wellbeing Assessment process the Department is substantiating the likelihood of emotional harm of [R, T, E and N] against their father [the Applicant] as a result of the Domestic Violence they have witnessed. > > It is believed that there is ongoing Domestic Violence perpetrated by [the Applicant] as evidenced by the Domestic Violence Reports that have been received in the past and which have escalated recently and from the statements the children have made during their Child Assessment Interviews. During Child Assessment interviews the children have disclosed significant worries for Dad assault Mum and have disclosed to both the Department and Police that they are scared of their father hurting their mother. > > [The Applicant] has demonstrated his power and control over [Ms Nundle], which includes at times violence and manipulation. The Department had attempted to safety plan with [the Applicant] and engage him in appropriate support agencies however [the Applicant] continued to return to the residence and did not complete programs he had started. Up until recently [Ms Nundle] had continued to allow [the Applicant] back in the home however [Ms Nundle] has applied and been granted a Violence Retraining Order and understands and can articulate the impact that the violence has had and could have on her children. A safety plan has been developed with [Ms Nundle], the children and [redacted] this plan was recently tested and has worked resulting in the police being called and the VRO being served on [the Applicant]. > > Therefore, it is assessed that the children [R, T, E and N] are not in need of protection and care as defined under section 28 of the Act. However due to the Department substantiating the emotional harm of the children against [the Applicant] and [Ms Nundle] not calling police in the past and allowing [the Applicant] to return to their home, it is recommended that this case be transferred to Intensive Family Support to continue to work with the family....[120]

9. The Tribunal was also taken to a series of police incident reports from 2016 onwards.

(a) In a report dated 3 June 2016,[121] police attended the family home after being called by Ms Nundle to do so when the Applicant returned to the address after being told by her to leave earlier that day. At one stage, Ms Nundle used pepper spray on the Applicant. The children were asleep at the time police attended and the Applicant was issued with a 24-hour police order. > > (b) In another report from 4 December 2016, police attended in response to a call from the Applicant claiming that his partner was inside with a machete.[122] Police found Ms Nundle in a 'hysterical state', across the road with two of the children. There was a reported dispute about withdrawn funds from their bank account. Both parties made reference to chasing the other around the property with the machete. The machete was found on the bedroom floor and seized. The Applicant was issued with a 24-hour police order. > > (c) On 27 December 2016, the Applicant and Ms Nundle had an argument in front of their children.[123] R and T, then both around 10, have gotten scared and run to the public telephone box around 1 km away and called police, stating that their father was assaulting their mother. There were disputed accounts given by the Applicant and Ms Nundle about what happened. Police only observed minor scratches to Ms Nundle's arm. The Applicant was issued a 24-hour police order.

10. On 1 March 2017, the Applicant's four children were taken into provisional protection and care of the Chief Executive Officer of DCP under s 37(2) of the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA) (CCS Act) on the grounds that the children have suffered and are likely to suffer harm as a result of neglect (s 28(2)(c)(v)) (as opposed to physical, sexual or emotional abuse) and that their parents have not protected, or are unlikely to protect, each child from harm, or further harm, of that kind.[124]
11. The Tribunal finds that the Applicant's criminal offences committed against Mr DP on 21 June 2018, 23 February 2018, and 14 June 2023 were each calculated to coerce and control Ms Nundle.
12. However, it must be acknowledged that the Applicant's partner and children remain supportive of him today.[125] The Applicant became quite emotional during the Tribunal hearing when he was taken to the letters drafted by his older children, and the Tribunal considers this response to have been genuine. It was clear that the Applicant appreciates that he did cause his immediate family to be fearful on occasion.
13. In assessing the seriousness of the family violence engaged in by the Applicant, the Tribunal notes that:

(a) there is a pattern of both 'adjudicated and non-adjudicated' family violence towards the Applicant's partner, and a trend of increasing seriousness in the sense that the Applicant escalated his attacks against Mr DP from 2017 in an attempt to coerce and control Ms Nundle; > > (b) the cumulative effect of the repeated acts of family violence is demonstrated by the repetitive nature of the breach offences, where the Applicant would be ordered to leave and he would return shortly thereafter; > > (c) the Applicant has engaged in programmatic intervention since the last known act of family violence in June 2023, including: > > > (i) he admitted his guilt to the arson offence and his underlying motivations for it; > > > > (ii) has been assessed by clinicians with elements of both minimisation and victim blaming, and has outstanding treatment needs in this respect; > > > > (iii) he has taken considerable steps to address some of the factors which contributed to his conduct, particularly substance use and anger management, as evidenced by his completion in the Pathways programme and other courses aimed at peaceful resolution of conflict; > > > > (iv) both the Applicant and Ms Nundle have expressed a desire to complete further treatment/counselling and to re-gain custody of their minor children in due course. > > (d) The Applicant has re-offended since being warned by the police and the courts about the consequences further family violence. Relevantly, the Tribunal notes that each restraining order/police order was explained to the Applicant when it was served upon him, and that he received suspended imprisonment orders in February 2017 for breaching the terms of both a restraining order and the conditions of a bail undertaking, and again in March 2018 regarding the assault against Mr DP in Ms Nundle's presence.

14. The Australian Government's concerns are stated to be 'proportionate' to the seriousness of the family violence engaged in (Direction, cl 8.2(1)). The Tribunal finds that the Applicant has engaged in acts of family violence, which has included physical violence (ranging from common assault to bodily harm and to arson) and coercive and controlling behaviour against his former partner. On occasion, this conduct occurred in the presence of their children. There are some accounts which refer to conduct directly against the children but there was insufficient evidence before the Tribunal to sustain them. The Tribunal accepts, however, that they were, at times, scared of the Applicant (particularly the older children). There have been recent steps taken towards rehabilitation and to deal with the underlying criminogenic needs. However, these steps do not materially detract from the seriousness of the conduct engaged, particularly in circumstances where the conduct was long-standing, continued, and, in part, in breach of multiple orders made by the courts or by police. Accordingly, the Government's 'serious concerns' are engaged to a considerable degree. This primary consideration weighs moderately against revocation.

Strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia

1. The Tribunal is required to consider any impact of the decision on the Applicant's immediate family members in Australia.[126]
2. The Tribunal must also consider the strength, nature, and duration of any other ties that the Applicant has to the Australian community, having regard to how long he has resided in Australia,[127] and the 'strength, duration and nature of any family or social links with Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents and/or people who have an indefinite right to remain in Australia'.[128]

1. The Applicant's 'immediate family members'[129] in Australia comprise:

(a) his mother and step-father; > > (b) his brother; > > (c) his partner; and > > (d) his four children.

2. Each of the above family members are either permanent residents or Australian citizens.
3. The Applicant's mother is 80 years of age. Her husband is 79 years of age. They became Australian citizens in September 2005.[130] The Applicant's mother is seriously ill, suffering from Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) and heart disease.[131] She appeared before the Tribunal in a wheelchair. It was clear from her evidence that she loves her son and was very distressed by the prospect of him being permanently removed from the country.[132] Mrs Bolderson admitted in oral evidence that she might be able to travel to the UK for a short period to see the Applicant but noted that there were financial constraints and that she was not in good health. She had no real knowledge of the Applicant's offending to date, to the point that at one stage in her evidence she referenced a recent conversation with one of the Applicant's children where she had told the grandchild that the Applicant had done a 'wrong thing' (the arson) but was not a bad person. Nevertheless, Mrs Bolderson thought the Applicant had 'changed his ways' and told the Tribunal that the Applicant had a loving relationship with his children and that they adore him. She spoke about the Applicant travelling down to see his children in Bunbury or Collie and the Applicant showing an interest in the older children's studies (for R, this was early childhood teaching; and for T, this was an apprenticeship). In a joint letter dated 10 December 2024,[133] Mrs Bolderson and her husband wrote that they have always found the Applicant 'to be an honest loving, caring, thoughtful son, also funny, he just has this ability to make you smile and make you feel special'. They stated that they did not think they would cope emotionally if the Applicant was to be removed. The Applicant told the Tribunal that if his visa was to be restored, he intended to provide his parents with physical assistance such as changing/washing the linen, cooking, mowing the lawn, and vacuuming the pool. He appeared to be genuine in his stated intention to 'prove that he could do the right thing' in this regard. He told the Tribunal that his mother was recently starting to take up aged care supports and that he was ashamed that he had otherwise exhausted their retirement funds in paying for his legal fees and things like his mortgage whilst he has been in prison and had his disability support pension (DSP) cancelled. In this respect, the Tribunal was told that the Applicant had been in receipt of the DSP since the early 2000s and that this ceased with the cancellation of his visa (and incarceration).
4. The Applicant's brother lives in Bridgetown, 270 km south of Perth. The Applicant told the Tribunal that his brother was 'dead straight' and that he was a retired truckdriver. The brother wrote two letters to the Tribunal,[134] indicating that the thought of the Applicant being removed 'is devastating for all of us'; and that he should be given 'the opportunity to continue [his] progress [towards rehabilitation] surrounded by the love and stability of his family here in Australia.'[135] In his first letter dated 7 December 2024, he observed that he had been aware of the Applicant's 'poor choices in his life' but had noticed, with the passing of age, that he was starting to make better choices. The brother referred to the Applicant thinking Australia was his home and his fear that the Applicant's 'life would deteriorate in a foreign land'. The Applicant told the Tribunal that he spoke with his brother every few weeks. In his second letter dated 10 October 2025, the brother stated that the Applicant's 'presence is an important part of our [family's] daily life, and losing him to deportation would cause immeasurable hardship and emotional distress to all of us.'[136]
5. Ms Nundle, the Applicant's partner, wrote the Tribunal a series of letters[137] and she gave oral evidence. In her first letter, Ms Nundle wrote that the Applicant 'is the most compassionate and reliable person I know and [that she believes] he is entirely capable of not re-offending.' She referred to the support he provides her, including towards her own recovery. She told the Tribunal that she and her children are part of the Noongar people, the Aboriginal inhabitants of the southwest corner of Western Australia, and that 'our family and [the Applicant] would suffer severely if he were deported.' The Applicant and Ms Nundle own a home in Northam, which is mortgaged with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia.[138] In her first letter, Ms Nundle indicated that she was struggling to make repayments on that loan. In her second letter, Ms Nundle referred to the Applicant teaching their children 'a lot', and how this was valuable and still holds importance. The second letter referred to their plans, echoed in oral evidence, of selling the family home and moving to be closer to the children (and away from negative influences). She referred to how her mental health has deteriorated in the Applicant's absence.[139] In the second letter, and in her oral evidence, Ms Nundle told the Tribunal that the Applicant and her would sometimes fight and argue and that there had been 'bits of violence', but he had 'never really physically hurt me'; 'never tried to hit me or attack me'. She said that she had been coerced into putting VROs onto the Applicant in the past by Mr DP. She told the Tribunal that Mr DP had been physically violent to her and was now in prison for a 'bad assault' against her, and that the Applicant was nothing like him. Ms Nundle thought that they were 'very much over all of that' now and said that she was not scared of the Applicant. She was asked about the various police reports where reference was made to her being afraid of the Applicant. In response, she said that there had been too much drinking involved during these incidents and that she had been acting irrationally. Ms Nundle described the Applicant as 'the glue that holds us together' and that he was the only person she trusts. It was clear that she was distressed by the prospect that the Applicant might be removed from the country and that she relied upon him for support, including encouragement to attend mental health or drug counselling appointments. This was supported by other information before the Tribunal.[140] Ms Nundle frankly told the Tribunal that it would be hard to see her children at all without the Applicant being around to 'help her to be better'. She said that she would feel extremely guilty if the Applicant was to be deported. In cross-examination, Ms Nundle indicated that she had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and was in receipt of a DSP. She confirmed that the Applicant had not hit or attacked her (though he may have 'chased her, grabbed her arm'). She said that she regretted scaring their children and putting them through all of this and the arguments that they (Ms Nundle and the Applicant) used to have. She said that the Applicant would never hurt their children. Lastly, Ms Nundle told the Tribunal, after Mrs Bolderson's evidence, that, though their children have been in care since March 2017, the Applicant had always been to see them since then. She thought that the Applicant's removal would impact their children considerably in circumstances where they had been 'sent away' from their home and then 'where their dad has been sent away'.
6. The Tribunal was provided with a letter from Ms Erryn Nundle dated 1 December 2025 (Exhibit 3). Ms E Nundle indicates that she is the Applicant's partner's material aunt and 'a significant member of the Aboriginal community in Melbourne'. She references the long-standing relationship between the Applicant and her niece, expresses the view that the Applicant has 'been supportive both financially of [the niece] and the children giving them a stable home for a substantial time through their lives'. Ms E Nundle thought that it would be detrimental (causing emotional and psychological distress) for her niece, the Applicant and their children if the Applicant was to be removed.
7. The Applicant's oldest child, R (age 19), lives in Perth.[141] In her first letter dated 8 December 2024, she referred to the periods where the Applicant has 'sustain[ed] periods from drinking and allowed him to learn to control his alcohol intake on a healthy level' and his 'great efforts' to 'better himself'.[142] She observed that her father 'is always helping others', particularly her mother, and noted his encouragement of Ms Nundle to attend necessary counselling.[143] R said that she is 'incredibly proud of the steps he has taken towards recovery', and that she firmly believes that it is in the Applicant's best interests, as well as that of his family, for his visa to be restored (including for reasons of family stability).[144] She thought that his removal would have 'devastating impact'.[145] In her second letter dated 4 October 2025, R stated:

I have visited my dad a few times since his imprisonment. Our current relationship is that he is making efforts to rebuild a relationship with me after years apart during which I was in foster care. We need time to spend quality time together with family, further building on a stable and positive relationship. > > As his daughter, if [the Applicant's] visa [remains] cancelled, I and my siblings would have very limited contact with him, as the distance would make it difficult. This would make it hard to maintain a relationship with him and put strain on our relationship as father and daughter.[146]

8. The Applicant's second child, T (aged 18), lives in Collie.[147] He wrote to the Tribunal in the following terms:

...I am writing to express my deep concern regarding the possible deportation of my father...I wish to respectfully share how this decision would have a profound and lasting impact on both my family and me. > > From my perspective, the thought of losing all contact with my biological father is deeply distressing. It feels unjust that he may be removed from my life at such a crucial stage. The possibility of him not being here to witness my achievements or share in important milestones saddens me greatly. > > ...I truly believe that deporting him now would be both morally wrong and detrimental to his continued progress. > > Beyond my own feelings, I am especially concerned for my younger siblings, [E] and [N]. Losing their father at such young and formative ages would be an emotional burden that no child deserves. The absence of a father figure could have lasting effects on their wellbeing and development. > > ... > > I sincerely hope you will consider my words with compassion and understanding. My father is not the same man he once was - he has changed for the better, and we want the opportunity to continue rebuilding our relationship as a family. He deportation would not only punish him further but also inflict lasting emotional harm on those who love him. [148]

9. The Applicant's third child, E (age 13), lives in Eaton with the fourth child, N (age 11).[149] They are both in the care of the CEO of DCP and are subject to protection orders (until 18) made by the Children's Court of Western Australia in August 2019. Those orders give the CEO parental responsibility for each child until they reach 18 years of age.[150] It was a prerequisite for those orders that the Children's Court was satisfied that long-term arrangements should be made for their wellbeing.[151] The protection orders remain in force until each child reaches 18 years of age or they are revoked under Sub-div 7 of Div 3 of the CCS Act.[152]
10. Sub-division 7 makes provision for a parent to apply to the Children's Court to have a protection order revoked.[153] In MJW v Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Child Protection [2012] WASC 66, Mazza J (as his Honour then was), remarked that:

[146] ... The existence of these provisions contemplate that there will be circumstances relating to children which justify a change to a protection order, the imposition of a different protection order or the revocation of the order originally proposed. The paramount consideration in such proceedings is the best interests of the child. Whether an order should be varied or revoked, will depend upon the individual facts of each case. If a litigant is merely dissatisfied with a decision given in child protection proceedings, the appropriate course is to appeal. It would be wrong to apply for a revocation or variation of the order without identifying some material change of circumstances. > > [147] In considering whether to vary or revoke an order, it is relevant to have regard to the original order and the reasons why the order was made. The weight that is given to these matters is for the court hearing the application to vary or revoke. Ultimately, the court must decide what is in the best interests of the children.[154]

11. The Applicant and Ms Nundle both foreshadowed their intention to the Tribunal to complete further programmatic intervention, to sell their property in Northam and to acquire property closer to their minor children and to then apply to revoke the protection orders. That will be a matter for the Children's Court to determine and the mere occurrence of a material change in circumstances will not, of course, require the revocation of the protection orders.[155]
12. The Tribunal was provided with a handwritten drawing annotated by E, where she wrote to the Applicant that she could not wait to see him at Christmas, that it was good to see him in prison and that she misses and loves him.[156] Similarly, the Tribunal was provided with a drawing from N, where he indicates that he loves his father.[157]
13. Dr Watts testified to the Tribunal that:

What we know is that children are biologically half mum/dad and that kids still seek out their parents. Kids with some connection [to their parents] do better than kids without [it]. [There are some] indigenous factors [at play]. Not having a parent available tends to mirror. [The Applicant] is not about to meet their cultural needs but still meets their family connection needs. [When we see children without that connection, they are] on the criminal offending treadmill and/or have mental health issues. Calls to the UK would be a drop in the bucket; some connection with their father will make a difference.

14. It was clear to the Tribunal that the Applicant has a close-knit family in Australia and that each of his immediate family members would be adversely affected by a decision that he be required to be removed from Australia (and that such removal would likely be permanent). The Tribunal gives weight to the best interests of each of his children and the importance of facilitating continuing connection with their father. It accepts that the Applicant is seen to be a support for his partner, and that she may struggle in his absence. The Applicant's parents and sibling would be devasted by his removal.

Strength, nature and duration of any other ties to the Australian community

1. The Applicant advanced a case to the effect that he was a long-term resident, who had established his life, home and family in Australia from a young age.[158] It was accepted in closing submissions that his strongest ties here were to his family (with limited evidence of any other ties), though it was observed that the Applicant owned property with Ms Nundle and that she was particularly reliant upon the Applicant.
2. The Minister accepted that this primary consideration favoured revocation in circumstances where the Applicant's immediate family members would likely be adversely affected by a decision not to revoke the mandatory cancellation, the Applicant had been in Australia since childhood, played a significant role in respect of his partner's rehabilitation and had previously been financially responsible for his family.[159] It was properly not contended that the weight to be given to the Applicant's ties should be diminished because of his lengthy criminal history.
3. The Applicant's status as a British citizen belies the fact that his only ties to that country is his birth and short residence there as an infant. Until he received notice of the mandatory cancellation, the Applicant thought he was Australian and did not know that his permission to remain in this country could be rescinded.

Overall conclusion regarding strength, nature and duration of ties

1. The Tribunal finds that this primary consideration, including the impact of a decision on the Applicant's immediate family and the strength, nature and duration of the Applicant's other ties to Australia, weighs heavily in favour of revocation.

1. The Tribunal is required to consider the best interests of minor children in Australia that are affected by the decision.[160] As there are multiple relevant minor children in this application, the Tribunal is required to give their interests separate consideration to the extent that their interests may differ.[161] Clause 8.4(4) of the Direction outlines the factors that the Tribunal must consider when determining the best interests of a child affected by the decision.
2. The Tribunal has already summarised some of the evidence before it concerning the Applicant's two minor children in the context of the strength, nature and duration of ties primary consideration.
3. It was accepted by the Minister that the best interests of each relevant minor child weighed in favour of revocation but submitted that the weight to be given to those interests should be 'tempered'.[162]

1. In considering the best interests of E, the Tribunal has had regard to:

(a) the nature and duration of the father-daughter relationship, noting that she has been in the care of the CEO of DCP since 1 March 2017 (when she was 4 years 11 months old) but contact with the Applicant has continued (including under supervision, particularly from 2019) and that there was a lengthy period where the child did not see her mother (but she did see her father); > > (b) E is 13 years old, and there is potential for the Applicant to play a positive parental role provided he remains abstinent from alcohol and other drugs (and subject, of course, to the satisfaction of the Children's Court that revocation or variation of the protection orders that are in place is in the child's best interests); > > (c) the contents of Exhibit 5 regarding the impact of family and domestic violence on children; > > (d) the evidence summarised above regarding the likely effect that any separation would have on the child, and the fact that remote contact is no substitute for in-person interaction; > > (e) the fact that while the protection order (until 18) is in force in respect of the child the CEO of DCP has parental responsibility for the child to the exclusion of any other person (CCS Act, s 57(2)) and the child appears to be well-cared for in Eaton. The Tribunal was told that she was excelling at school; > > (f) the child misses and loves her father and is sufficiently mature for that view to be given weight; and > > (g) evidence before the Tribunal indicates that the child has been exposed to family violence perpetuated by the Applicant but there is no evidence that this child has suffered or experienced any physical or emotional trauma arising from the Applicant's conduct.

1. In considering the best interests of N, the Tribunal has had regard to:

(a) the nature and duration of the father-son relationship, noting that he has been in the care of the CEO of DCP since 1 March 2017 (when he was 2 years 6 months old) but contact with the Applicant has continued (including under supervision, particularly from 2019) and that there was a lengthy period where the child did not see his mother (but did see his father); > > (b) N is 11 years old, and there is potential for the Applicant to play a positive parental role provided he remains abstinent from alcohol and other drugs (and subject to the satisfaction of the Children's Court that revocation or variation of the protection orders that are in place is in the child's best interests); > > (c) the contents of Exhibit 5 regarding the impact of family and domestic violence on children; > > (d) the evidence summarised above regarding the likely effect that any separation would have on the child, and the fact that remote contact is no substitute for in-person interaction; > > (e) the fact that while the protection order (until 18) is in force in respect of the child the CEO of DCP has parental responsibility for the child to the exclusion of any other person (CCS Act, s 57(2)) and the child appears to be well-cared for in Eaton. However, the Tribunal was told that he has been misbehaving at school and may benefit from fatherly guidance; > > (f) the child loves his father and the Tribunal infers that he holds similar views to that of E in the absence of evidence to the contrary; and > > (g) evidence before the Tribunal indicates that the child has been exposed to family violence perpetuated by the Applicant but there is no evidence that this child has suffered or experienced any physical or emotional trauma arising from the Applicant's conduct.

2. The Tribunal is prepared to accept the Applicant's submission that his relationship with his children has 'evolved to a loving and caring relationship'. Whether that positive relationship will continue will largely depend upon whether he remains abstinent from alcohol and other drugs. Their relationship is not without hurdles, including the complicated dynamic between the Applicant and Ms Nundle and their respective outstanding treatment needs. Whether there is to be any resumption of parental responsibility will be a matter for the CEO of DCP and the Children's Court.
3. To the extent the Applicant advanced claims based on literature about the effects of removal of Aboriginal children from their families,[163] the Tribunal repeats its reasoning in Re Cao and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] ARTA 1853 at [97]-[105]. The Applicant's children were separated from their parents by the State of Western Australia and having regard to those children's best interests.
4. This proceeding is about potential separation of the father by the Australian Government, from the place of residence/nationality of the children, by 'deportation'. There is no suggestion that the Minister and his Department will not provide the Applicant's family with information about his whereabouts upon any removal to the UK for the purposes of Art 9(4) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed 22 August 1990, [1991] ATS 4, (entered into force 16 January 1991).
5. However, it is 'part of Australian society's cultural awareness and appreciation that kinship, family and community lie at the heart of Aboriginal society, underpinning its laws, rules and social behaviour.'[164] The Tribunal accepts Dr Watts' evidence (quoted above) that the Applicant's presence in the jurisdiction (and in the lives of his children) meets their need for familial connection.

1. For the above reasons, the Tribunal finds that revocation would be in the best interests of the Applicant's two minor children, E and N. Cumulatively, this primary consideration weighs moderately in favour of revocation.

1. This primary consideration is a 'kind of deeming provision',[165] which requires the Tribunal to consider the Minister's articulation of community expectations.[166] Clause 8.5(1) of the Direction provides that 'the Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia'. The Direction goes on to state that:[167]

[w]here a non-citizen has engaged in serious conduct in breach of this expectation, or where there is an unacceptable risk that they may do so, the Australian community, as a norm, expects the Government would not allow such a non-citizen to enter or remain in Australia.

2. Clause 8.5(2) then adds to that first 'norm_'_ and indicates that non-revocation may be appropriate in a particular case 'simply because the nature of the character concerns or offences is such that the Australian community would expect that the person should not be granted or continue to hold a visa'. It specifies identified kinds of conduct, committed in Australia or elsewhere, as attracting that further expectation,[168] including 'acts of family violence'[169] and 'commission of serious crimes against women' (where 'serious crimes' is defined to include crimes of a violent or sexual nature').[170]
3. The Applicant falls foul of both stated norms, and these are identified to 'apply regardless of whether the [Applicant] poses a [measurable] risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community'.[171]
4. The Tribunal is specifically commanded to 'proceed on the basis of the Government's views as articulated' in the Direction, 'without independently assessing the community's expectations in the particular case'.[172]
5. The Tribunal adopts the approach to this primary consideration identified by Justice Horan in RCLN v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 876 at [50]- [59].
6. The Tribunal finds that this primary consideration weighs very heavily against revocation and will weigh this against the other relevant considerations.

1. The Tribunal is required to consider the legal consequences of its decision.[173] That is, the Tribunal must have regard to the statutory framework in which the power to revoke a mandatory cancellation decision exists, including the direct and immediate consequences of an exercise of the power (including any decision under s 105 of the ART Act).
2. There are three major consequences of visa refusal or cancellation under s 501 and related provisions:

(a) a prohibition, within the migration zone, on applying for other types of visas under s 501E of the Migration Act (other than a protection visa or a bridging (removal pending) visa);[174]

(b) refusal/cancellation of other visa applications/visas under s 501F of the Migration Act; and

(c) the possible application of periods of exclusion and special return criteria under s 503 of the Migration Act and SRC 5001 and 5002 in Sch 5 to the Migration Regulations. This includes permanent exclusion where SRC 5001 applies unless the Minister acts personally to grant a permanent visa to the person under s 195A.

1. These adverse consequences can each be avoided by a positive decision to revoke the cancellation decision, but it should not be assumed that Parliament has evinced any preference as to the outcome of the review.[175]
2. When the Applicant's transitional (permanent) visa was cancelled, he became an 'unlawful non-citizen'.[176] That is, a non-citizen in the migration zone that did not hold a visa that is in effect.[177] This status conferred liability to be detained under s 189(1) of the Migration Act and this occurred in November 2025.
3. The Applicant is relevantly required to be detained until he is either removed from Australia under s 198 or he is granted a visa (including having his visa restored to him under s 501CA(4)).[178]
4. Sections 198(1) and (2B) of the Migration Act provide for removal either at written request or where there has been a mandatory cancellation and a subsequent decision made not to revoke that cancellation, respectively.
5. The duty to remove an unlawful non-citizen arises irrespective of whether there has been an assessment, according to law, of Australia's non-refoulement obligations in respect of the non-citizen.[179] However, s 198 of the Migration Act does not require or authorise a non-citizen's removal to a country if, during the course of a protection visa application, there has been a protection finding made for the person with respect to that country.[180]
6. The Applicant did not advance any non-refoulement obligation for consideration and none arises on the material before the Tribunal.[181]
7. There is no reason to suppose that any required removal to the UK would not be practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future.
8. It was accepted by the parties that a likely consequence of a decision to affirm the reviewable decision would be that the Applicant would be excluded from Australia and from the members of his Australian family into the foreseeable future. The Minister submitted that this was an intended consequence of the statutory scheme and that the weight to be given to that adverse prospect was subsumed into the Tribunal's evaluation of the other relevant considerations.[182]
9. The Tribunal disagrees with the Minister's characterisation of the prospect of permanent exclusion. As Chief Justice Allsop remarked in Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 267 FCR 628,[183] cases under s 501 of the Migration Act have human consequences, which require honest confrontation of what is being done to people. In the Tribunal's humble opinion, the prospect of permanent exclusion of a former long-term resident and consequent separation from their Australian-resident family (especially children) ought to be given some weight against that outcome in the ultimate balancing exercise.
10. The legal and other consequences of the Tribunal's decision weigh in favour of revocation.

1. The Tribunal must consider the extent of any impediments that the Applicant may face if removed from Australia to the UK, in establishing himself, and in maintaining basic living standards (in the context of what is generally available to other citizens in that country), taking into account the Applicant's age and health, whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers, and any social, medical, and/or economic support available to him in UK.[184]
2. The Applicant is 59 years of age. He has a hearing impairment (deaf in one ear; partially deaf in the other),[185] a history of strokes or transient ischemic attacks for which he is medicated,[186] and told the Tribunal that his health is otherwise 'quite good'.
3. The Applicant has historical diagnoses of anti-social personality disorder, alcohol disorder, alcohol-related psychotic disorder and paranoid schizophrenia.[187] He appears to be on medication for some of his mental health conditions,[188] and has the outstanding treatment needs identified above in the context of the Tribunal's risk assessment regarding his use of alcohol and other drugs.
4. The Tribunal has previously accepted, in cases such as Re Mizen and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] AATA 3113 at [164] and Re Scott and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] ARTA 997 at [185]-[186], that UK nationals in equivalent circumstances to the Applicant would have access to comparable standards of health care, social welfare and housing support upon any return.
5. There are not substantial language barriers. However, the Tribunal accepts that the Applicant has not lived in, or returned to, the UK for 55 years. Instead, he has lived most of his life in regional Western Australia. There is likely to be considerable cultural shock for the Applicant.
6. The Applicant testified that he was aware that he would be provided with some temporary accommodation by the Australian Government upon any removal to the UK and that he was also aware of the existence of some services in the UK with entities like Prisoners Abroad, including short-term accommodation, a mobile telephone and a small amount of money. He, however, expressed concern that he might be homeless in the UK, at least for a few months, until he was able to obtain a pension. That was a frank and reasonable assessment.
7. The Applicant did not wish to ask his parents for further financial aid and was understandably not minded to sell the family home (and discharge any of the remaining mortgage on that property) to fund any return, particularly when it was otherwise needed by Ms Nundle.
8. The Minister submitted that there would be some impediments to the Applicant being able to establish himself and maintain basic living standards in the UK but submitted that these were not 'insurmountable'.[189]
9. Dr Watts identified the Applicant's low cognitive function (discussed above), and expressed the opinion that he would struggle to 'organise himself overseas'. The Tribunal accepts this is likely to be the case, particularly coupled with the effects of separating the Applicant from his family and home in Australia. The Tribunal considers that the Applicant will be personally and deeply affected by permanent removal to the UK. This potential hardship and subsequent adjustment should not be easily dismissed and it would not be easy for someone with the Applicant's history and particular needs to do so without resorting to further alcohol and other drug use.
10. The Tribunal finds that there are some very real impediments to the Applicant re-establishing himself and maintaining basic livings standards in the UK. The Tribunal thinks, as the Applicant admits, that he likely could do so after a period of adjustment.
11. The prospect of removal is a potentially devastating consequence, which will cause considerable hardship to the Applicant including having associated negative impacts on his immediate family. This other consideration weighs moderately to heavily in favour of revocation.

1. The Tribunal is required to bring together the relevant considerations in this matter and consider, as part of a single evaluation, their relative significance in terms of whether the Tribunal is ultimately satisfied that there is 'another reason' why the mandatory cancellation decision should be revoked.[190]
2. Clause 7(2) of the Direction states that the primary consideration in cl 8.1 (protection of the Australian community) is 'generally to be given greater weight than other primary considerations', and that, otherwise, the relevant 'primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the [relevant] other considerations.' This guidance is consistent with the principle articulated at cl 5.2(2), that 'the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian government'.
3. The above policy guidance does not mean that the other relevant considerations are secondary to the primary considerations, or that the first primary consideration should always be given greater weight than any other relevant consideration (including the other primary considerations).[191]
4. The Tribunal considers that there is not good reason to depart from the above policy in this case.[192] The Tribunal has found that the Applicant has engaged in very serious criminal conduct to date, including acts of physical, sexual and family violence, and that he poses an unacceptable risk to the Australian community of engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct, including acts of violence. That risk is moderate at best (though lower for further acts of sexual violence). The Australian Government is committed to not conferring the privilege of remaining in this country on the perpetrators of family and sexual violence. In this respect, the Applicant has engaged in multiple very serious acts of both. In particular, the nature of the Applicant's sexual conduct in the 1990s is conduct which the Australian community would properly expect would cause the Australian Government to determine that the Applicant not continue to hold a visa. In the Tribunal's view, the first, second and fifth primary considerations, when taken together, comprehensively outweigh all of the other relevant considerations in these circumstances. Whilst the factors in the Applicant's favour, including his lengthy residence and familial ties (including children) and the impediments to his removal carried real force, they did not dispel the ultimate conclusion drawn from all of the circumstances that the Applicant should not be permitted to remain in this country.
5. In summary, the Tribunal, after considering each of the relevant considerations identified within the Direction, is not satisfied that there is 'another reason' to revoke that cancellation decision. The correct decision is therefore to affirm the reviewable decision.

I certify that the preceding 177 (one hundred and seventy-seven) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of General Member J Papalia

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