Bolaram v ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2025] ACTSC 537

The orders made on that occasion were: (a) The ninth [defendant] is to file and serve any application for summary dismissal of the application, including any evidence and/or submissions in support of such an application, by 12 December 2025. (b) The applicants and remaining respondents are to file any evidence and/or submissions in reply to the application for summary dismissal of the application by 13 February 2026. (c) The ninth [defendant] is to file any evidence and/or submissions in reply by 27 February 2026. (d) The matter be listed for directions at 9:30am on 6 March 2026.

The appellant’s notice of appeal identifies the following grounds: • Treated the Ninth [defendant] as authorised to file an application for summary dismissal on behalf of all 27 Respondents, despite no authority under Part 2.21 CPR. • Relied on an unfiled, unsigned, unsealed ACT Government Solicitor “Draft Directions” document, delivered by a barrister from Blackburn Chambers with no Notice of Representation; • Bound Respondents with separate and distinct legal interests without consolidation or proper notice, contrary to Part 2.4 CPR; • Prevented or obstructed participation of the Applicants’ Building Certifier Mr. John Bates by ACT Government / Unauthorized Blackburn Chambers barrister Mr. Brodie Buckland, where Mr. Bates was ended up waiting in the café within the Supreme Court Building ground floor. • Failed to consider the Applicants’ filed Form 3.5, Form 6.11, Medical Addendum, the Application to Cancel Order dated 25 Nov 2025 and previous email requests to consider and provide SC 404/2025 – Clarification of Jurisdiction. • Issued an order without Registrar identification, in breach of Part 2.52 CPR. (Emphasis in original.)

As articulated before me, the primary complaint of the appellant was about the apparent joint representation of the responding parties and about the reliance that the Court placed on a draft document that was handed up in the course of the directions hearing, but perhaps most importantly a concern that any summary judgment process was a distraction and had the potential to delay the hearing of the primary application which the appellants bring in their proceedings.

The activity performed by the Senior Deputy Registrar on 21 November 2025 was the making of directions pursuant to r 1401 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) (the CPR). The directions relate to an application that is apprehended from the ninth defendant for summary dismissal of the appellant’s claim. The proposed application has not yet been filed.

A defendant is empowered by r 1147 of the CPR to apply to the court for summary judgment against the plaintiff at any time after filing a notice of intention to respond or defence. The ninth defendant filed a notice of intention to respond on 14 November 2025.

In the circumstances, the ninth defendant has an entitlement to file an application for summary judgment at any time without prior notice to the court. In this instance, the path that was taken was to seek some directions from the court which are essentially concerned with a timetable for the filing of evidence in anticipation of hearing the proposed application for summary dismissal.

In that regard, the court has a broad discretionary power pursuant to r 1401 of the CPR to give any directions about the conduct of the proceedings it considers appropriate, at any stage of a proceeding, and even though the direction may be inconsistent with another provision of the rules.

In accordance with Pt 5.1 of Sch 5 of the CPR, a registrar, including a deputy registrar, is empowered to make directions pursuant to r 1401.

I am quite satisfied that the Senior Deputy Registrar was in this instance acting within her powers to make the orders in the nature of directions that she made on 21 November 2025.

The making of an order in the nature of directions under that rule is fundamentally an exercise by the Registrar of discretion.

This appeal thus constitutes an appeal from an interlocutory order of a registrar involving an exercise of discretion. Relevant principles

As the decision appealed from is interlocutory in nature, leave to appeal is required.

In McKay v Paule [2022] ACTCA 72 at [24], Mossop J summarised the relevant principles to be applied by an appellate court in determining whether or not to grant leave, as follows: (a) Leave will be granted sparingly to avoid delaying and fragmenting the hearing of cases. (b) A court will be particularly hesitant to grant leave where the decision is one in respect of practice and procedure or is made in the exercise of a discretion. (c) Decisions which, though interlocutory, determine substantive rights will more readily be the subject of the grant of leave. (d) The party seeking leave bears the onus of satisfying the court of the necessary criteria to justify the grant of leave. (e) The court will ordinarily grant leave where the decision is wrong and prejudice (sometimes referred to as “substantial prejudice”) will be suffered by the appellant. (f) Leave may also be granted where the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration or, to put it another way, where the decision is “attended with difficulty and [its] correctness is open to dispute” (Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 400) and, if it is wrong, significant consequences will be suffered by the applicants. (g) It may be a factor favouring the grant of leave that: (i) the decision involves a matter of public importance; or (ii) the decision may affect the fairness of the trial, a consideration under s 21 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), though this can also weigh against the decision if the appeal results in unfair delay or fragmentation of the trial.

In this case the decision: (a) Concerns a minor matter of procedure; (b) Is an exercise of discretion; and (c) Determines no substantive rights.

Each of those factors ought to lead to a reluctance to grant leave to appeal the Registrar's decision.

There is also no indication that the decision will affect the fairness of the trial. Orders

For the reasons articulated above leave to appeal is refused and the appeal is dismissed.

I will make an order that the costs will be costs in the cause.