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.….…………Signed………….. Presidential Member H Robinson REASONS FOR DECISION 1. This matter is an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal in XD 519/2025 (Original Tribunal) dated 2 September 2025 to dismiss an application made by the appellants. In contention before this Tribunal (Appeal Tribunal) was the issue of whether the adjournment should be granted, whether the adjournment application should be considered on the material before the Tribunal and without a hearing, and whether the appeal should be dismissed pursuant to sections 32(1)(a) and 23(1)(c) of ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACAT Act) as frivolous and vexatious.

2. On 17 December 2025, the Appeal Tribunal made orders to decide the adjournment on the papers and without a hearing, orders to dismiss the adjournment application, and orders to dismiss the appeal. The Appeal Tribunal also ordered that reasons would be published. These are those reasons.

The parties 3. This is the latest matter in a sequence of litigation between Mr and Mrs Bolaram, originally the applicants and now the appellants (the appellants), and the 1 Construction Occupations Registrar (COR). The named respondent is the person currently appointed to that role; the appellants chose to commence, and continue, these proceedings against him in his personal capacity “trading as the ACT government”. For ease of reading, I will refer to him as the respondent or the COR.

4. The litigation arose from a decision of the COR of 28 February 2023 to refuse to issue the appellants a certificate of occupancy under section 69(2) of the Building Act 2004 (Registrar’s decision) in relation to a residence built upon their property (the property). The COR says that the property does not comply with certain statutory planning requirements. The appellants, through various actions, are seeking a certificate of occupancy for the property as is.

1 See Bolaram v Australian Capital Territory [2020] ACAT 108; Bolaram v Australian Capital Territory [2021] ACAT 64; Bolaram v Construction Occupations Registrar [2023] ACAT 61

5. The original application, XD 519/2025, was commenced by the appellants by way of civil dispute application lodged 23 April 2025 (original application). In that application, the appellants sought that the Tribunal: 1. Immediately cease all forms of public nuisance, harassment, discrimination, civil wrongs, judicial power abuse, public office misconduct, and any ongoing or continued criminal conduct associated with this matter; 2. Issue the Certificate of Occupancy and Use for [the Property]; Or alternatively: [Order the Respondent] to issue the Certificate of Occupancy and Use with immediate effect in accordance with the Building Act 2004 under Section 69 and the statutory powers & responsibilities of the 2 appointed Building Certifier.

6. In making the original application, the appellants used the standard “civil dispute 3 application” form. On the front of that form is a series of boxes that asks an applicant to identify the grounds upon which the application is made. The appellants ticked “application under other authorising laws” and identified the 4 relevant laws as the Building Act 2004, the Planning and Development Act 2007, the Building Regulation 2004, and the Discrimination Act 1991.

7. Attached to the original application form were 84 pages of submissions. The submissions reference, at length, previous decisions made by the tribunal. The submissions also include allegations of harassment, discrimination, abuse of public office, administrative misconduct, misfeasance in public office and other things by various persons associated with the tribunal and the ACT Government. None of these allegations are clearly particularised.

8. On 3 June 2025, the respondent lodged an interim application seeking to strike out the original application pursuant to section 32(2)(b) of the ACAT Act on the basis that it was frivolous and vexatious and lacking in substance (original strike out application).

2 Appellant’s civil dispute application filed 23 April 2025 at [4] 3 The Tribunal may, in writing, approve forms under s 117(1) the ACAT Act. A civil dispute application must be made using the civil dispute application form: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedures Rules 2024, r 100 4 This Act was repealed by way of the Planning Act 2023, s648. That section has since been repealed – see Republication 1: https://www.legislation.act.gov.au/View/a/2023-18/20230620- 81221/html/2023-18.html and republication 2: https://www.legislation.act.gov.au/View/a/2023-18/20231127-82573/html/2023-18.html

9. Both the original application and the strike out application were listed for hearing before the Original Tribunal on 2 September 2025. After hearing from the parties, the Original Tribunal granted the respondent’s interim application to strike out the proceedings and determined that the matter be dismissed (the original dismissal decision).

10. The Original Tribunal gave oral reasons on the day. In summary, the Original Tribunal decided that: (a) the tribunal can only decide a matter under appropriate authorising laws; (b) the legislation which the appellants relied upon did not provide for a civil dispute of the kind made by the appellants to be made to the tribunal; and (c) the discrimination claim was not properly referred to the Tribunal under the process set out in the Human Rights Commission Act 2005 (HRC Act).

11. On 26 September 2025, the appellants lodged the present appeal against the original dismissal decision.

12. On 15 October 2025, there was a directions hearing before a differently constituted Appeal Tribunal, and orders were made for the progress of the matter. Those orders included leave for the respondent to file an application for the dismissal of the appeal, and a proposal to decide any dismissal application on the basis of the documents, without hearing form the parties, as per section 54 of the ACAT Act and rule 65 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedural Rules 2004 (ACAT Rules). Parties were invited to make submissions on the proposal by 5 November 2025.

13. To put the proposal in context, some observations need to be made about the first appellant’s conduct during that directions hearing, and particularly the language used. That includes the following, directed toward either the Tribunal or the solicitors for the respondent: (a) “My documentation completely was ignored by the bloody fucking idiot, 5 that [Original Tribunal]”.

5 Transcript of hearing dated 15 October 2025, page 11, lines 4-5 6 (b) “You bloody motherfucking assholes”. 7 (c) “Fuck yourself. Fucking cunts”. 8 (d) “You motherfucking white cunts”. 9 (e) “You dumb motherfucking cunts”. 10 (f) “That fucking bitch, the Chinese bitch”.

14. The first appellant was belligerent toward the Tribunal, the solicitor for the respondent and, it would appear from the transcript, the second appellant, his 11 wife.

15. On 23 October 2025, in accordance with the direction of 15 October 2025, the respondent filed an application for interim or other orders seeking that the appeal be dismissed under section 32(2)(b) of the ACAT Act (appeal dismissal application). In the same application, the respondent sought an order pursuant to section 32(2)(b) that the appellants be directed not to make a subsequent application to the tribunal in relation to the decision of the construction occupations registrar.

16. On 5 November 2025, the appellants lodged an interim application seeking that the appeal proceedings be stayed pending the outcome of judicial review proceedings he had lodged in the ACT Supreme Court in relation to five tribunal 12 proceedings. The grounds are stated to be: Jurisdictional conflict risk • Administrative law uncertainty • Bias concerns requiring higher court oversight • Procedural fairness breach requiring correction • Systemic abuse documented in earlier correspondence (Notices of Urgency, procedural complaints, August– September letters) All prior letters referenced herein by incorporation.

17. The appellants subsequently lodged two further documents, one entitled “formal legal response” on 6 November 2025 and another entitled “Last and Final warning

6 Transcript of hearing dated 15 October 2025, page 12, line 45 7 Transcript of hearing dated 15 October 2025, page 13, line 1 8 Transcript of hearing dated 15 October 2025, page 13, line 6 9 Transcript of hearing dated 15 October 2025, page 13, line 12 10 Transcript of hearing dated 15 October 2025, page 13, line 17 11 Transcript of hearing dated 15 October 2025, page 14, line 5 12 XD 519/2025, XD 712/2025, AA 55/2025, AA 331/2025, and AT 24/2023 and correction Notice to ACAT, Respondents, and to ACTGS before the matter will escalate to the ACT Supreme Court – Criminal” on 7 November 2025.

18. On 18 November 2025, this Appeal Tribunal made orders that included a proposal pursuant to rule 65 of the ACAT Rules that that the adjournment application also be considered in chambers and without a hearing (the proposal). Order two of those orders provided that if either party wished to make further submissions in relation to the proposal they should do so by 9 December 2025.

Should the adjournment application be decided on the papers?

19. On 5 December 2025, the first appellant lodged a document entitled “Notice Requiring Tribunal to Cease All Hearings” (the cessation notice). The notice is stated to “formally require” the Tribunal “to cease all further hearings, listings, administrative steps, coercive directions pre-determined dismissals, collusions with the ACTGS or interlocutory determinations”, and thereunder listed a number of matters to which he is a party, including XD 519/2025 and this appeal. In the cessation notice, the first appellant says that the proposal to determine both the dismissal application and an adjournment application entirely on the papers denies him procedural fairness and “deepen and compound the identified jurisdictional errors.”

20. A second document filed by the first appellant the same day warns of an immediate commencement of criminal proceeding in the ACT Supreme should the Tribunal not cease determining the matter. It goes on to say that the Tribunal is “hereby required to seize all forms of public office abuse and judicial power abuse”, failing which the appellants will: …have no choice but to commence proceedings seeking significant financial compensation - no less than 5 million per affected applicant - and pursue all applicable criminal and civil remedies available against the individuals responsible and a minimum of 10 years imprisonment against 13 each criminal.

21. I take these documents to be the appellants’ submissions in relation to the proposal.

13 Email from Mr Bolaram to the tribunal dated 2 December 2025

22. Unfortunately, neither of the appellants’ submissions provides much in the way of detail as to the basis for the claims of denial of procedural fairness, although there is reference to “procedural hostility.” As best I can determine, the appellants argue that they cannot have a fair hearing on the adjournment application unless provided with an opportunity to address the Tribunal orally.

23. By way of submissions lodged 10 December 2025, the respondent supported the proposal that the adjournment application be determined on the papers. The respondent particularly pointed in particular to the conduct of the first appellant at the previous hearing. The respondent also submitted the issues for determination involve the application of established legal principles and do not require further evidence or the assessment of credibility of any witness.

24. While the principles upon which an adjournment may be granted are clear, the principles upon which a matter will be determined on the papers are not.

25. Section 36 of the ACAT Act provides that: 36 Applications to be heard The tribunal must hear each application made to it unless the tribunal— (a) refuses to hear the application, or part of the application, or dismisses it; or (b) decides not to hold a hearing. Note 1 The tribunal may refuse to hear an application, or part of an application, or dismiss it under s 32 (2) (a) and (b) and decide not to hold a hearing under s 54. Note 2 The tribunal may make rules to facilitate the early resolution of matters arising in applications, including rules about referring an application to an agency that the tribunal considers is more appropriate to handle the application (see s 25 (1) (c)).

26. “Application” is defined in the Dictionary to the ACAT Act to mean: application— (a) for this Act generally—means an application under section 9; and (b) for parts 5 to 9 includes— (i) a matter referred or appealed to the tribunal under any authorising law; and (ii) a matter heard or dealt with by the tribunal on its own initiative. Examples—authorising laws under which a matter may be referred to the tribunal 1 Crimes Act 1900, s 331 (Referral to ACAT) 2 Human Rights Commission Act 2005, s 53A (Referral of discrimination complaints other than commission-initiated discrimination matters)

27. Section 9 provides: 9 Applications under authorising laws A person may apply to the tribunal if an authorising law provides that the application may be made.

28. It would appear that section 54 is directed to the final determination of an “application”, being a matter in the tribunal made under section 9 of the ACAT Act and not to the determination of interim applications by way of interim 14 orders. However, the Tribunal notes that some interim orders, including strike out applications, and sometimes adjournment applications, do have the effect of finally determining the matter. Accordingly, without deciding whether to determine the adjournment application on the papers, the Tribunal has adopted the process set out in section 54 of the ACAT Act and rule 65 of the ACAT Rules for determination of whether both the interim applications in this matter should be decided on the papers (noting section 65 applies to all hearings).

29. Section 54 of the ACAT Act provides that: 54 Decisions without hearing (1) The tribunal may, on application by a party or on its own initiative, decide an application on the basis of documents, without the parties, their representatives or witnesses appearing at a hearing. Note The procedures of the tribunal must be as simple, quick, inexpensive and informal as is consistent with achieving justice and the tribunal must observe natural justice and procedural fairness (see s 7). (2) The tribunal may give each party to an application notice to the effect that— (a) the tribunal proposes to decide the application on the basis of documents, without the parties, their representatives or witnesses appearing at a hearing; and

14 See ACAT Act s 53 (b) if the party wishes to make representations about the proposal, the party must make the representations within— (i) 21 days after the day the notice is given; or (ii) if the tribunal decides that a shorter period is required in all the circumstances of the application—the shorter period. Note The rules may prescribe a longer period for making representations (see s 25 (1) (e) and (2)). (3) The tribunal may decide not to hold a hearing in relation to the application only if the tribunal— (a) has given notice under subsection (2); and (b) has taken into consideration any representations made by a party within the 21-day period or shorter period decided by the tribunal under subsection (2) (b); and (c) is satisfied that— (i) it is in the public interest not to hold a hearing; and (ii) the tribunal has sufficient information to make an informed decision on the application. Note The tribunal must observe natural justice and procedural fairness (see s 7).

30. Section 36 requires that the Tribunal “hear each application”, then section 54 deals with the dispensing of a “hearing” and “determination” of “the matter” on the “documents” when certain requirements are met. Does this mean that the process in section 54 must be followed on any occasion that the Tribunal wishes to determine the matter on the papers, even if the parties agree, or even request 15 it ? This would appear to come down to what is meant by the word “hearing”.

31. There is no definition of “hearing” in the ACAT Act. The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law provides that a hearing is a: 16 general term for the presentation of a matter before a tribunal.

32. Again, there is no clarification as to what “before a tribunal” means.

33. Additionally, section 45 provides that:

45 Taking part other than in person

15 Noting that is not the case here 16 nd The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (2 ed, 1993) ‘hearing’ The tribunal may direct that a person may take part or give evidence in a preliminary conference or hearing of an application by a method of communication, or a combination of methods of communication, that allows people to hear what each other person taking part says without the people being in each other’s presence.

34. This would seem to suggest that the default method taking part is the parties “being in each other’s presence”, presumably at the tribunal, with directions made for attendance by other means.

35. Having regard to these terms, while there is some question as to whether section 53 is directed to a situation where the Tribunal determines to decide a matter without further evidence or submissions from the parties beyond what has already been filed, or whether it applies to the disposal of the matter by way of hearing “on the papers”, with directions made for evidence and submissions, but without an oral hearing, the latter interpretation appears to be more consistent with the legislative intention – that is, the hearings as a default be in person and face to face oral hearings. Neither party in this matter made submissions about this issue. The Tribunal has proceeded on the more cautious approach that section 53 is directed to any proposal to finally determine a matter without oral hearing (albeit after the filing of evidence and/or submissions).

Hearings on the documents – consideration and legal principles

36. In approaching any procedural matter, the Tribunal is required to be simple, 17 quick, inexpensive and informal as is consistent with achieving justice, and its procedures must be implemented in a way that facilitates the resolution of issues between the parties so that the cost to the parties and the tribunal is proportionate 18 to the importance and complexity of the matter .

37. It is not unusual for the Tribunal to determine adjournment applications on the papers. Indeed, the Tribunal has an adjournment policy that is available on its

17 ACAT Act Section 7(a)(i) 18 ACAT Act Section 7(a)(ii) 19 website which specifically states that the decision may be made a deputy registrar in chambers. Such adjournments usually involve an exercise of discretion.

38. The distinguishing factor in this case is that the appellants are arguing that the Tribunal must adjourn the matter, because the appellants have lodged a proceeding in the ACT Supreme Court that raises similar issues and also seeks review of the Tribunal’s original decision. This is a legal question as well as a discretionary one. 20

39. It is a longstanding principle that a fair hearing is open and oral. Oral hearings should not be dispensed with lightly. They are not, however, an absolute requirement of procedural fairness: Li Shi Ping v Minister of Immigration [1994] FCA 1275 (Li Shi Ping) at [36]-[38]. Much will depend on the circumstances, issues, legislation and subject matter: Zhang v Minister of Immigration [1993] FCA 489 at [42]. The ACAT Act specifically provides a process for hearings to be on the papers where certain requirements are met. The Tribunal may make this decision on its own initiative. It is entirely appropriate, and indeed is required, that the Tribunal have regard to case management principles when considering whether to hear a matter on the papers. However, these remain but one consideration. As the ACT Supreme Court held in R v McBride [2007] ACTSC 8 at [7], “issues of practicality and convenience must give way to the overwhelming interest, now recognised by the Human Rights Act 2004, that every accused must be afforded a fair trial.” No matter the efficiencies to be gained, the Tribunal could not dispense with an oral hearing if the appellants were denied a fair hearing because of that decision.

40. In relation to the adjournment application, no party has indicated that they wish to call evidence or cross-examine anyone in relation to the adjournment application. There is no need for oral evidence, nor for the assessment of the credibility of any party. Each party has been given a clear opportunity to put their arguments through written submissions and have done so. These are arguments

19 ‘Adjournments’, ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal(Web Page), <https://www.acat.act.gov.a u/what-to-expect/adjournments> 20 See also Malhous v Czech Republic [2001] ECHR 466 and Oganova v Georgia [2007] ECHR 915 in favour of the matter being decided papers. These were arguments in favour of the strike out application being decided on the papers, too.

41. The Tribunal accepts that the appellants would prefer to address the Tribunal on the adjournment application orally. This is an entirely reasonable preference. However, the appellants do not point to any reason why they cannot address the Tribunal in writing, nor indeed to any disadvantage to them were the matter to be decided in chambers.

42. The first appellant’s conduct at the first directions hearing was unacceptable and unreasonable. Members of this Tribunal, like members of the profession generally, are expected to have a robust approach to conflict, including a reasonable tolerance for coarse language driven by frustration, but there are limits. This Tribunal does not intend to expose members, court and registry staff and solicitors representing other parties to unnecessary verbal abuse.

43. My concern, moreover, is not just for the other parties, but the first appellant. It is apparent from the transcript that he finds hearings challenging. Having regard to what I have read in both the submissions and transcripts of previous hearings, I would go so far as to suggest that the appellants, particularly the first appellant, are better served presenting their arguments in writing, in circumstances where they have time to reflect. Oral hearings in which the first appellant becomes agitated and abusive are not conducive to the prompt and efficient resolution of this matter.

44. Finally, the Tribunal should not allow the conduct of a party to compromise the efficient operation of the Tribunal. The appellants are professional people capable of putting their arguments on paper.

45. Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied that it can decide the adjournment application without the need for an oral hearing.

Decision in relation to the adjournment

46. The decision whether to adjourn a matter is discretionary. However, legislation and case law establish a framework for the exercise of that discretion. Relevant sources include: (a) Rule 63 of the ACAT Rules provides that the tribunal may adjourn a hearing at any time or date.

(b) ACAT Practice Note Number 2 of 2020 sets out the matters that must be considered by the tribunal in considering a request for an adjournment . These are: (a) section 6 (the objects of the Act) and section 7 (the principles applying to the Act) of the ACAT Act; (b) the reason for the adjournment; (c) any disadvantage the requesting party or the public might suffer if the adjournment is not granted; (d) the attitude of each party to the adjournment; (e) any prejudice to each other party, or where relevant, to the public if the adjournment is granted; (f) the length of the adjournment ; and (g) any other relevant matter.

47. The objects of the ACAT Act, set out in section 6, relevantly include ensuring that access to the tribunal is simple and inexpensive for all people who need to deal with the tribunal and that applications to the tribunal are resolved as quickly as is consistent with achieving justice. The principles in section 7 of the ACAT Act provide that in exercising its functions, the tribunal must seek to ensure the procedures of the tribunal are as simple, quick, inexpensive, and informal as is consistent with achieving justice and are implemented in a way that facilitates the resolution of the issues between the parties so that the cost to the parties and the tribunal is proportionate. The tribunal also has an obligation when making procedural orders to observe natural justice and procedural fairness. The effect of these considerations is that while the tribunal has a broad discretion to adjourn matters, there are factors that a tribunal member must consider before making that decision.

48. The primary ground for the adjournment is that the appellants have lodged proceedings in the Supreme Court seeking judicial review of various decisions made by this Tribunal in determining their applications (ADJR application) i.e., that there are similar proceedings in another jurisdiction. In the ADJR application, the appellants seek the same relief as they do in this application, being “a declaration that the dismissal of XD 519/2025 by ACAT on 2 September 2025 was unlawful and void …”. The grounds for the ADJR application are similar to those cited in the present matter as well — jurisdictional error, denial of procedural fairness, abuse of judicial power, mischaracterisation of a substantive matter as interlocutory and a failure to consider mandatory evidence and public office abuse.

49. Certainly, there are some commonalities of issues between the present proceedings and the ADJR application. However, this alone is not a reason for an adjournment of the proceedings — or at least, the appellants could not point to a legal principle to the effect that it was. Parallel proceedings may be an abuse of process, but that would be a basis for an application by the respondent to dismiss the proceedings, not a request for adjournment by the appellant.

50. The appellants are entitled to seek the assistance of the Supreme Court in resolving their concerns about the conduct of the tribunal. However, the Tribunal has a statutory obligation to hear every matter and to do so as quickly as is consistent with justice. The appellants have not raised issue or basis upon which this Tribunal would abrogate its responsibility to continue with this matter and determine it. For example, there is no question before the Supreme Court as to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction or power to determine this matter, nor is it clear that there is any issue that requires preliminary determination by the Supreme Court for example a referred question of law.

51. Further, there is nothing in the appellants’ application that establishes any kind of prejudice to them arising from the Tribunal continuing to hear the present application. There is, for example, no need to call evidence on this appeal or put witnesses in the position of giving evidence twice. The Supreme Court proceedings are listed for further hearing in March 2026, and should the appellants wish to seek review of this decision, finalising it now may provide them with time to amend their ADJR application.

52. Accordingly, applying the factors: (a) Section 6 (the objects of the Act) and section 7 (the principles applying to the Act) of the ACAT Act are in favour of proceeding to decide the matter. (b) The appellants have pointed to no principle that would entitle the Tribunal to abrogate its responsibility to hear the matter pending the outcome of the judicial review proceeding in the Supreme Court. (c) The appellants have failed to identify any compelling prejudice to them if the proceedings continue pending the outcome of the Supreme Court proceedings. (d) The respondents oppose the adjournment, although, in noting that, the Tribunal is also satisfied that there is no real prejudice to the respondent or the public if the proceedings are adjourned. (e) The adjournment would be considerable — it is unlikely that the Supreme Court matter will be determined until well into 2026. (f) The Tribunal deciding this matter on the papers without a hearing will ensure that the matter is not listed for hearing at a time when the appellant is overseas, and the original timeframe has allowed for the submissions to be lodged prior to their absence from Australia — as they have been.

53. Additionally, the appellants will have the usual appeal avenues available to them in respect of the appeal decision, including an appeal to the Supreme Court, and the potential to amend their ADJR proceedings in that jurisdiction to consider this matter, as completed in the Tribunal.

54. The considerations weigh in favour of the Tribunal declining to adjourn the matter. The interim application seeking an adjournment is dismissed.

Should the application be dismissed for being frivolous and vexatious?

55. The principles for determining whether an action should be dismissed for being frivolous or vexatious or lacking in substance are well established both in this 21 tribunal and in other jurisdictions.

21 Elbashir v Focus ACT Ltd [2024] ACAT 76 at [27]

56. An action is frivolous or vexatious if it is “so obviously untenable that it cannot 22 succeed” or where there is “no real question to be tried in the sense that the 23 claim is bound to fail”.

57. Where an applicant is self-represented, the tribunal must seek to ensure the proper administration of justice in a manner which is procedurally fair to both parties. This can be particularly challenging where one party is legally represented and the other is not. In Pikula-Carroll v ACT Corrective Services [2023] ACAT 33 at [31]–[32], the Tribunal called for the exercise of caution when making summary dismissal applications in discrimination proceedings where an applicant is self-represented. It pointed out that relevant evidence may be given at the hearing and: it is not uncommon for a complainant’s case to change at the hearing as new evidence emerges and its significance is appreciated, often for the first time, as a result of questioning by the tribunal. Provided a respondent is afforded procedural fairness in dealing with the new material, there is nothing surprising, unusual or unfair about this, particularly where the complainant is self-represented and the respondent has legal representation, as is typically the case.

58. As such, it is not unusual for some flexibility to be shown at first instance when it comes to the parameters of a claim, particularly in civil claims. The tribunal typically exercises quite some caution in striking out a matter at first instance.

59. However, there is no purpose to be served in allowing proceedings to continue on foot in circumstances where the applicants’ case, taken at its highest, cannot possibly be sustained nor the relief sought granted.

60. Having reviewed the submissions of both parties, I am satisfied that this appeal is one of those cases. Stated briefly, the relief sought by the applicants on appeal was either outside the original tribunal’s jurisdiction, and hence is outside the Appeal Tribunal’s jurisdiction, or beyond what it would be appropriate to make on appeal. This means it is frivolous and vexatious, in the legal sense of those words, and it is appropriate that I dismiss it.

22 General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 at [8] 23 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 4) [2005] FCA 244 at [17]

61. A party to the original application may, by application, appeal the decision to the 24 tribunal on a question of fact or law. The appeal tribunal may, as it considers appropriate, deal with an appeal as a new application; or as a review of all or part 25 of the original decision on the application by the tribunal, but the authorities are clear that in all cases the purpose of the appeal is the identification and correction 26 of error. An appeal is not an opportunity to raise new arguments, overlooked on the first occasion, or to have a ‘second go’.

62. In deciding the appeal, the appeal tribunal has all the powers and duties of the 27 tribunal appealed from. This means that there must be an application under an appropriate authorising law for the purposes of section 9 of the ACAT Act, and the applicant must be able to establish the statutory basis upon which the application is brought and the relief sought may be granted.

63. In the original application, the appellants sought an order that either the Tribunal issue, or the COR be directed to issue, a Certificate of Occupation under section 69(2) of the Building Act. They have not articulated any basis upon which the original tribunal, sitting in its civil jurisdiction, or this Appeal Tribunal, could make either Order. The application is doomed to fail. This alone is sufficient basis to strike out this part of the appeal application.

64. However, even were this not the case, the question of the issue of the Certificate of Occupancy and the use of the property was the subject of previous proceedings in the tribunal’s administrative review jurisdiction — see Bolaram v Construction Occupations Registrar [2023] ACAT 61, decided 12 October 2023. Those proceedings were brought, appropriately, in the tribunal’s Administrative Review jurisdiction. If the applicants were dissatisfied with the outcome of that decision the appropriate thing for them to have done would have been to appeal that decision. The Original Tribunal could not review it through collateral civil process, and nor can this Appeal Tribunal.

24 ACAT Act s 79(3) 25 ACAT Act s 82(1) 26 Mansour v Dangar [2017] ACAT 49 at [17]-[23], especially [18] 27 ACAT Act s 82(2)(a)

65. Further, the bringing of identical proceedings seeking the same remedy in a different jurisdiction is arguably an attempt to relitigate the decision of 12 October 2023 and that would be an abuse of process. I will come back to that shortly.

66. Looking to the other orders sought by the appellants on appeal, they are clearly equally problematic.

67. The appellants sought an order or the initiation of “an independent inquiry into misconduct by Tribunal Members, Registrar staff, and ACT Government 28 Solicitors.” Again, neither at first instance or on appeal, have the appellants identified an authorising law giving the tribunal the power to make such an order In the absence of being able to identify a authorising law, let alone an error by the original tribunal, the appeal on this point is doomed to fail.

68. The appellants seek an award of “costs and damages” for harm caused including medical, reputation, professional and personal damage.

69. Compensation for damages was not sought in the original application and the failure of the original tribunal to make an order for damages is therefore not a matter that can be raised on appeal.

70. Further, the power of the Tribunal to order “costs” in very limited. Section 48 of ACAT Act provides that: 48 Costs of proceedings (1) The parties to an application must bear their own costs unless this Act or another territory law otherwise provides or the tribunal otherwise orders. (2) However— (a) if the tribunal decides an application in favour of the applicant, the tribunal may order the other party to pay the applicant–– (i) the filing fee for the application; and (ii) any other fee incurred by the applicant that the tribunal considers necessary for the application; or Examples––par (ii)

28 Application for appeal dated 26 September 2025 • a fee for a business name or company search • a filing fee for a subpoena • hearing fees (b) if the tribunal considers that a party to an application caused unreasonable delay or obstruction before or while the tribunal was dealing with the application—the tribunal may order the party to pay the reasonable costs of the other party arising from the delay or obstruction; or (c) subject to section 49, if a party to the application contravenes an order of the tribunal—the tribunal may order the party to pay the costs or part of the costs of the application to the other party; or (d) if the application is an application for review of a decision under the Heritage Act 2004, the Planning Act 2023 or the Urban Forest Act 2023, and the tribunal makes an order under section 32 (2) (Dismissing or striking out applications)— the tribunal may order the applicant to pay the reasonable costs of the other party arising from the application. Note A legal expense relating to a proceeding in the tribunal may be recoverable as a debt under the Unit Titles (Management) Act 2011, s 31. (3) For subsection (2) (d), reasonable costs of the other party arising from the application include reasonable legal costs but do not include holding costs. Examples—holding costs • interest and lender imposed charges associated with a loan • costs of engaging workers and subcontractors and hiring equipment for a development

71. The scope of these powers was recently examined by Mossop J in Jolley v Construction Occupations Registrar (No 2) 2025 ACTSC 341, confirming the decision of Penfold J in CIC Australia Ltd v ACT Planning and Land Authority [2013] ACTSC 96, that section 48(1) does not create a general discretion for the tribunal to order costs. It is unclear how the claim for damages advanced by the appellants falls within the limited scope of the tribunal to grant damages, even were it permissible to raise.

72. The appellant also requests the waiver of his fee. That is a matter for the tribunal’s registrar, with review available through an administrative review process. It is not 29 a matter that can be considered in the context of an appeal.

73. Finally, there is the discrimination claim, a claim that was first raised before the original tribunal.

74. As noted above, the tribunal is a creature of statute and may only hear matters 30 that fall within its jurisdiction as prescribed by “authorising laws”. The ‘authorising law’ for a discrimination claim is section 53A of the Human Rights Commission Act 2005 (HRC Act), which provides: 53A Referral of discrimination complaints (1) This section applies if– (a) either– (i) a complainant is given a discrimination referral statement under section 45(2)(d); or (ii) a statement under section 82 (1) is included in a final report in relation to a complaint; and (b) within 60 days after the statement is given, the complainant requires the commission to refer the complaint to the ACAT. (2) The commission must– (a) refer the complaint to the ACAT; and (b) tell the complainant and the person complained about in writing about the referral. Note The commissioner must also close the complaint (see s 78(2)(d)).

75. As should be plain from this section, it is the “referral” from the HRC pursuant to section 53A(2) of the HRC Act that is the “application” to the Tribunal. There is no relevant referral before the Tribunal. There being no valid referral, neither the original tribunal nor this Tribunal may determine it. If the appellants wish to make a discrimination claim, they need to do so in the proper way.

29 Noting that were the appellants successful, they would be able to make an application that the respondent’s refund to them the filing fee as per ACAT Act s 48(2)(a)(i) 30 ACAT Act ss 9, 11

76. Given the above circumstances, the original tribunal was plainly correct that it could not grant the appellants the relief they sought. The Appeal Tribunal is in no better position to do so.

77. Further, there is a strong argument that this entire appeal is an abuse of process.

78. I make, in closing, the observation that this is the fourth proceeding in which the appellants have sought the same orders in relation to the property on similar grounds. Litigants should not be permitted to misuse tribunal resources by commencing or continuing substantively similar litigation across the tribunal’s jurisdictions, particularly in circumstances where there is a more appropriate 31 process available to determine the substantive issue. Constant litigation is often vexatious. Moreover, the naming of the respondent personally, rather than the position of the COR, and the nature of the language used in documents lodged with the tribunal, which include various threats to commence criminal and civil proceedings, are themselves of a nature that appears designed to intimidate either the respondent or the Tribunal to make decisions in the applicant’s favour. In addition to the vexing nature of this approach, it has the potential to be an abuse of process.

79. The Tribunal must ensure that its procedures “are as simple, quick, inexpensive and informal as is consistent with achieving justice.” It is appropriate that this Tribunal dismiss matters that are lacking in substance at an early stage, unless a different course is needed to achieve justice. The appellants have failed to identify any arguable errors of fact or law by the original tribunal and indeed have failed to clarify on appeal how this Appeal Tribunal can make the orders sought at first instance or on appeal.

80. For the above reasons, I ordered that the appeal be dismissed.

……………………………….. Presidential Member Robinson

31 See, e.g., UBS AG v Tyne [2018] HCA 45 Date(s) of hearing: On the papers Applicant: Self-represented Solicitors for the Respondent: ACT Government Solicitor