Blundell v R - [2019] NSWCCA 3 - NSWCCA 2018 case summary — Zoe

NSWNSWCCA

Blundell v R

[2019] NSWCCA 3

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)|2018-09-26|Before: Payne JA, Johnson J, Adams J

View original source

At a glance

Source facts

Court

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)

Decision date

2018-09-26

Before

Payne JA, Johnson J, Adams J

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (43 paragraphs)

[1]

] VSCA 109 R v Lam (Ruling No 20) (2005) 159 A Crim R 448; [2005] VSC 294 R v Mendez [2011] QB 876 R v Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; [2001] NSWCCA 29 R v Robert Millar (Contractors) Pty Ltd [1970] 2 QB 54; [1970] 1 All ER 577 R v Russell [1933] VLR 59 R v Spiteri-Ahern (No 11) [2017] NSWSC 1820 R v Stringer [2012] QB 160 Tierney v R [2016] NSWCCA 144 United States v Peoni (1938) 100 F.2d 401 Texts Cited: AP Simester, "The Mental Element in Complicity" (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 578 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law, The General Part, (1961, 2nd ed) JC Smith, "Criminal Liability of Accessories: Law and Law Reform" (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 453 JW Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (12th ed, 1964) New South Wales Law Reform Commission, "Complicity" (Report 129, December 2010) Professor Fisse, "Howard's Criminal Law" (1990, 5th ed) Professor Gilles, "Criminal Law" (1997, 4th ed) Smith and Hogan, "Criminal Law" (1983, 5th ed) Category: Principal judgment Parties: Nathan John Blundell (Appellant) Regina (Crown) Representation: Counsel: G Bashir SC with A Bonner (Appellant) H Roberts (Crown)

[2]

Solicitors: Legal Aid Commission of NSW (Appellant) Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown) File Number(s): 2015/57978 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: Supreme Court of New South Wales Jurisdiction: Criminal Date of Decision: 14 December 2016 Before: Hall J File Number(s): 2015/57978

[3]

Judgment

PAYNE JA: I agree with N Adams J.
JOHNSON J: I agree with N Adams J.
N ADAMS J: On 18 October 2016, Nathan Blundell ("the appellant") was convicted as an accessory before the fact to the murder of Corey Power ("the deceased") following a jury trial before Hall J. He was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years. That sentence commenced on 7 July 2015.
Mr Power was killed on 29 August 2013 by Owen Fuller. Mr Fuller beat him to death with a tomahawk. The appellant was not present at the scene. Mr Fuller made admissions and was later convicted of the deceased's murder. The appellant was tried based on his encouragement and assistance to Mr Fuller through words alone and in circumstances where he was not present at the scene.
The appellant appeals against his conviction under s 5(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). He does not seek leave to appeal against the sentence imposed on him.
This appeal concerns what was described by senior counsel for the appellant at the hearing of this appeal as the "ill [sic-in] frequently visited shores of accessory before the fact". It raises questions regarding the proper directions to be given to a jury when the Crown case relies upon principles of accessorial liability but disavows any reliance upon principles of joint criminal enterprise or extended joint criminal enterprise.
The appellant relies upon two grounds of appeal but Ground 1 has four sub-grounds such that there are in fact five separate complaints made. All five complaints pertain to the trial judge's summing up and are as follows: "Ground 1(a): The trial judge erred in directing the jury that it was not necessary to prove that an accessory before the fact to murder said to have 'encouraged' the primary offender in fact encouraged the primary offender by his words or actions. Ground 1(b): The trial judge erred in failing to give proper directions on causation in an offence of accessory before the fact to murder. Ground 1(c): The trial judge erred in directing the jury that assisting and encouraging is a continuous act that persists until the substantive offence is committed. Ground 1(d): The trial judge erred in failing to give proper directions as to the knowledge required to be proved in an accessory before the fact to murder and further, in failing to direct the jury that recklessness would not suffice. Ground 2: The trial judge erred in his directions applying concepts from joint criminal enterprise to directions to the jury on proof of accessorial liability as an accessory before the fact to murder by encouraging and assisting a principal offender's murder of the deceased."

[5]

The indictment

The original indictment charged two counts - one for murder of the deceased and one for accessory before the fact to murder of the deceased. The indictment was amended and when presented at trial contained a single count of being an accessory before the fact to murder. It was in these terms: "On 7 October 2016, the Director of Public Prosecutions on behalf of Her Majesty charges that WHEREAS on 29 August 2013, at Young in the State of New South Wales, Owen Junior FULLER did murder Corey MARK POWER NATHAN JOHN BLUNDELL Between 15 August 2013 and 29 August 2013, at Young in the State of New South Wales, did counsel, procure and encourage Owen Junior FULLER to murder Corey Mark POWER. S 18(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 2 S 346 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 53065"
The indictment stated that the charge was brought under ss 18(1)(a) and 346 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Section 18(1)(a) of the Crimes Act provides that: "Murder shall be taken to have been committed where the act of the accused, or thing by him or her omitted to be done, causing the death charged, was done or omitted with reckless indifference to human life, or with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person, or done in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission, by the accused, or some accomplice with him or her, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for life or for 25 years."
Section 346 of the Crimes Act provides that: "Accessories before the fact - How tried and Punished Every accessory before the fact to a serious indictable offence may be indicted, convicted, and sentenced, either before or after the trial of the principal offender, or together with the principal offender, or indicted, convicted, and sentenced, as a principal in the offence, and shall be liable in either case to the same punishment to which the person would have been liable had the person been the principal offender, whether the principal offender has been tried or not, or is amenable to justice or not."
Section 346 does not define the term "accessory before the fact" nor does it set out the elements of such an offence. By way of contrast, the Crimes Act describes the role of the accessory before the fact to "minor indictable offences" in s 351 (which is otherwise in similar terms to s 346) as follows: "Any person who aids, abets, counsels, or procures, the commission of a minor indictable offence, whether the same is an offence at Common Law or by any statute, may be proceeded against and convicted together with or before or after the conviction of the principal offender and may be indicted, convicted, and punished as a principal offender."

[6]

The Crown case

Much of the evidence in the Crown case was not in dispute. The majority of it comprised a printout of a series of text messages and Facebook messages between the appellant and the deceased, the appellant and Mr Fuller, and Mr Fuller and the deceased. The appellant made a voluntary statement to police on 30 August 2013 and participated in three electronically recorded interviews with suspected persons ("ERISPs"). A statement of agreed facts signed by the appellant became Exhibit D. The Crown case can be summarised as follows.
As at late July or early August 2013, the appellant, the deceased and Mr Fuller all resided in Young. They were three young men who were using illicit drugs and seeking to obtain money to buy drugs.
In late July or early August 2013, the appellant purchased a white Suzuki Swift from the deceased for $600. About two days later, the appellant attempted to return the vehicle to the deceased. The deceased took the vehicle back and agreed to reimburse the appellant by supplying him with drugs to the value of $600. He failed to do so.
On or around 8 August 2013, the appellant and Mr Fuller committed a break and enter at a business in Young and stole a utility truck and a trailer which contained tools and machinery. The appellant, Mr Fuller and the deceased agreed that the deceased would take the goods on consignment which would be on-sold for money or drugs and that the deceased would give the appellant and Mr Fuller $2,000 of the total proceeds. The deceased went to Canberra and disposed of the stolen goods but did not provide any money or drugs to the appellant or Mr Fuller after his return from Canberra.
On 16 August 2013, the appellant enquired of the deceased by way of Facebook message, "[h]ow'd ya go with that coin". The deceased responded that the stolen goods were still in his car. On the morning of 19 August 2013, the appellant said that he needed "at least 200 of that coin by tomorrow". The deceased had not replied by mid-afternoon. The appellant sent the deceased another message telling him that he would come and find him on the weekend. It is from this point that the threatening discourse between the parties escalated, with the following exchange taking place at a time when the deceased was still in Canberra: Deceased: "see ya then" Deceased: "trying to threaten me are we I will jump all over your fucken head u little wannabe come get ya generatorn t aint worth shit without the immobiliser" Appellant: "Well I ain't fuckin happy look how long ya takin n u can't even reply to say wats going on I been trying to get hold of you so either start payin up or bring the shit back" Appellant: "N u took the cunt there u bring it back" Deceased: "u comin over so u can get it then aye im not a little punk u think u can talk shit to buddy so if ya wanna staunch up bring it" Appellant: "Yea in wat car fuckhead u fucked it n dnt worry were comin for ya cunt u fuckd more ppl than me around ey" Appellant: "I wnt even touch ya the boys will have fun kickin the cunt outta ya n I dnt need no generator lol us boys work together Owens already got a down payment bud so one way or another were getting paid our 600" Deceased: "bring it ya cumstains I hope yous are ready owen tried last time this time I be ready make me laugh cunt I be waiting and I be alone cause I don't need boys ha ha ha got 1 for each of ya and another 20 rounds so see ya soon buddy" Appellant: "Lol talk shit only needa knock u on the head like the dog u are" Appellant: "I ain't getting my money on here so jus fuck up n wait till we see yay u toothless fuck" Deceased: "ha ha u wont do shit cause you're a skinny junky bitch gotta get boys to do your shit cause u aint got no balls ya little boy and now u wanna bring my teeth into it im gonna knock yours out start playing with men you gonna get flogged like one I know where u are u wont see it comin but u will know when its done" Deceased: "We aye I got boys to fuckwit so be careful what u say buddy cause I have my boys come see you and it wont be pretty and I not talking no more I see you very soon mate" Appellant: "Yea n ill be getting u first cunt ur a cretin junky with debts all over town u deserve everyting u get cunt" Appellant: "Now fuck off ya scummy piece of shit" Deceased: "pfft don't matter what happens mate im gonna get you so u be ready mate"
Between 20 August and 22 August 2013 there were further similar threatening message exchanges between the appellant and the deceased. The last of those messages was sent at 3:20pm on 22 August 2013.
After the last of the messages between the appellant and the deceased, the appellant made a brief telephone call to Mr Fuller (which was not recorded) after which time Mr Fuller and the appellant had the following exchange over text message between 6:16pm and 6:38pm: Mr Fuller: "I'm thinking if he comes we take this shit to a hole new level that this town hasn't seen before and end the shit tonight I'll do it but I need you there" Appellant: "Yea or just make him remember it" Mr Fuller: "Yeah remember the look in my eyes and knowing that he will never be able to fuck over any cunt again" Appellant: "Na u save that for later in life we will jus chop index n look" Mr Fuller: "Yeah we'll maybe I shouldn't come aye cause I don't know man my head just ticking" Appellant: "Ur right ill sort him if I need back up I'll ring ya" Mr Fuller "I'll come brah cause its mine and your life he playing with bout time we started playing with his and got him into the state that he does his self saves us" Appellant: "Yea we will talk when we together pigs could be anywhere" Mr Fuller: "Yeah I no man I can't trust no cunt bro I'm counting on you here man" Appellant: "Ur right bro we will get through it or we will go to the home of the best bud sa" Mr Fuller: "Yeah or straight through man" Appellant: "Yeah make it worth it if we doin that" (emphasis added)
The following exchange then took place between 10:28pm and 11:34pm on 22 August 2013: Appellant: "We right bro, u know, that every cunt spinning, but u the only one I can trust we in it together trying to be quiet ears everywhere." Mr Fuller: "Yeah ducking oath give me a yell straight up before anything happens and Ill be there." Appellant: "U right bro nothing will happen."Mr Fuller: "Aye you heard woof from the dog lol" Appellant: "Lol yeah no bite" Mr Fuller: "He shoulda been born a catdog lol" Appellant: "Haha all meow no bite cant even come see me"
There was no evidence adduced at the trial of any other relevant exchanges between either the appellant and Mr Fuller or the appellant and the deceased until 28 August 2013. The evidence disclosed that, on or about that day, the deceased returned to Young from Canberra.
On 28 August 2013, the following text message exchange took place between the appellant and Mr Fuller between 8:28am and 11:55am: Appellant: "Corey in town bol keep an eye out. If you see him, jump on his head" Appellant: "I nearly got him last night but was gone before I clicked onto wat was happening n who it was" Mr Fuller: "Yeah sweet. Make sure you ring me when you find him" Appellant: "Yeah, he at Marras so jus hopin he leaves sometime soon" (emphasis added)
The reference to "Marras" in the above exchange is a reference to "Tammarra Horne" who gave evidence at the trial. She and the deceased had a young daughter together.
The last time that the appellant made contact with Mr Fuller prior to the deceased's murder was this message at 11:55am on 28 August 2013. However, later that date Mr Fuller sent another message to the appellant: "Is he walking". Then at 2:49pm, Mr Fuller called the appellant who did not answer. He then sent the appellant a further message saying "It's Owen" followed by a further unanswered call. At 2:54pm, Mr Fuller again called the appellant but received no answer. This was the last time that Mr Fuller attempted to contact the appellant prior to the murder.
The appellant's former girlfriend, Samantha Martin, gave evidence that the appellant stayed with her on the night of the deceased's death (28/29 August 2013) and had slept until the morning. This evidence was not challenged by the Crown in cross-examination.
In the early hours of 29 August 2013, Mr Fuller woke up and logged onto the Facebook account of his former girlfriend, Amelia-Rose Luke-Browning. He noticed that the deceased had sent a message to her Facebook account whilst Mr Fuller was logged in. Mr Fuller decided to impersonate Ms Luke-Browning so as to lure the deceased to a remote location. When the deceased went to that location, Mr Fuller beat him to death with a tomahawk.
Two unanswered calls were made by Mr Fuller at 4:18am and 4:20am on 29 August 2013 respectively followed by a text message to the appellant which said "Oi bro I got Corey answer".
Ms Martin's evidence was that when she woke up on 29 August 2013 (about an hour and a half before the appellant) she went on Facebook and saw that a dead man had been discovered in Young. She told this to the appellant when he woke up to which he said, "I wonder who it is?" The appellant then charged his phone at a neighbour's house and when he returned he showed Ms Martin the "Oi bro I got Corey answer" message sent by Mr Fuller (although she did not remember the precise wording). Ms Martin gave evidence that the appellant was worried and told her he was stressing "about Corey". The appellant did not leave Ms Martin's residence until 11:00am on 29 August 2013.
Mr Fuller made full admissions that he had attacked the deceased. He was later convicted of the deceased's murder. Mr Fuller did not give evidence at the appellant's trial. His ERISP was not played to the jury nor was the transcript of it provided to them. Defence counsel had sought to put before the jury the following question and answer from Mr Fuller's interview: "Q. 1296: so did you speak to anyone at or before the murder? A. I didn't even know it was going to happen like."
The trial judge told defence counsel that there was already sufficient evidence before the court to enable the appellant to make the point that Mr Fuller acted unilaterally and with spontaneity and therefore this question and answer was not put before the jury.
The appellant made a voluntary statement to police on 30 August 2013 (Exhibit C) and participated in three ERISPs: Exhibits J, K and L respectively. Those three ERISPs took place on 30 October 2013, 7 November 2013 and 24 February 2015.
In the first ERISP on 30 October 2013, the appellant told police that the deceased had not paid him the outstanding $600 and that he had intended to "flog him when I seen him but not kill him". He asked police "why would I kill him? Then I can't get my $600." He said that had he found the deceased he "probably would've had a few words and if he got lippy back, probably would've punched him in the mouth". He denied that he was involved in the murder. He said that he had informed people that he wanted to get the deceased, that he asked them to send him a message if they saw the deceased and that he wanted to fight the deceased as he owed him $600. He also said that the deceased was a mate and did not deserve to die like that. The appellant did not deny that he had messaged Mr Fuller in the weeks prior to the deceased's death and had asked Mr Fuller to inform him if he got hold of the deceased. The appellant said that the last message to the deceased was that he was "going to flog the fuck out of you when I see you, cunt", but reiterated that the deceased was a good mate. He denied involvement in the murder.
During the appellant's second ERISP on 7 November 2013 he said that the deceased owed Mr Fuller money for the stolen generator. He did not deny that he told the deceased several times that he was going to "bash him" in relation to the outstanding $600.
During the third ERISP on 24 February 2015, the appellant said that he had not told police "the whole truth" because he feared for his safety. He then informed police that it was Mr Fuller who sent the message saying "Oi bro I got Corey answer" and that the deceased owed him and Mr Fuller $2,000 ($1,000 each) with respect to the stolen generator and tools and that this was the basis for the messages he had sent. The appellant said that he sent messages on 19 August 2013 to the deceased with the intention of "just geeing him up". He said that he had shown Mr Fuller the messages exchanged between him and the deceased "all the way through". He said that the last messages between him and the deceased were exchanged a week before the deceased had been killed. The appellant denied that he had told Mr Fuller to kill the deceased or that he arranged it.
The appellant said that he had received a message from Mr Fuller a week prior to the murder and thought it said that Mr Fuller was "going to kill him" (the deceased) but that he thought Mr Fuller was "just talking it up". He said that he did not remember writing the text which read "jus chop index n look". The appellant said that Mr Fuller had found a tomahawk one day and said words to the effect of "I just want to hit someone with this". However, the appellant told him "don't do that you mad cunt you'll end up killing some cunt" and that Mr Fuller had thrown the tomahawk away later that day.
There was no dispute at the trial as to the manner and cause of the death of Mr Power. The sole issue at trial was the role, if any, the appellant played in his death.
Tammarra Horne gave evidence that she had been in a relationship with the deceased from 2005 to the end of 2011 and they had a daughter together who was born in May 2009. She had remained on friendly terms with the deceased and he would visit from time to time. At some point in August 2013 the deceased stayed with her as he was having issues with his girlfriend, Debbie Nasser. He was staying at her house at the time of his death.
During the time that the deceased stayed with Ms Horne, she, Ethan Ritchens (her new boyfriend) and the appellant were at her home. Mr Fuller showed up and when the deceased answered the door, Mr Fuller punched him. Ms Horne witnessed this from the kitchen. A fight between Mr Fuller and the deceased ensued in the front yard and Mr Ritchens broke them up. She recalled the deceased and Mr Fuller talking thereafter and shaking hands before Mr Fuller left. The appellant was not present at that time.
Ms Horne gave evidence that a couple of days after the fight between Mr Fuller and the deceased the appellant attended her home and informed her that he and Mr Fuller had stolen the generator and tools. She said that a week or so later the appellant again attended her house and told her that the deceased had not paid them for the generator. The appellant said that they were going to send some boys over to Canberra but did not go into detail about that.
The mother of Ms Horne's ex-partner, Sophie Anderson, gave evidence. She recalled the appellant telling her that the deceased owed him "about $600 for something that was stolen" and that he was "going to get the cunt".
Ms Nasser, the deceased's former partner from Canberra, also gave evidence. She said that during a trip on 10 August 2013 (she had picked up the deceased from Young and they were heading back to Canberra), the deceased told her "that apparently Owen and Nathan had done an armed robbery at the Caltex Service Station and that Owen had confronted him because he'd been telling people about things about what they'd been doing around town, and Owen had punched him in the face and that Nathan and him had been exchanging messages, and Nathan wasn't happy about… what was happening…". At a later occasion the deceased told her he had received messages of a threatening nature from the appellant but that he put it down to them being "just little smart mouths".
Ms Martin also gave evidence that she remembered having a conversation with the appellant about three weeks prior to the murder of the deceased during which the appellant said that the deceased owed him money for some tools and that after a few weeks "he got angry about it and said he was going to bash him". She was "reasonably sure" that the words used were "I'm going to bash that cunt". Ms Martin agreed that the appellant said to her on 29 July 2013 that he was stressed. She said that appellant had told her he was stressing about the deceased because he had sent messages to him saying that he was going to get someone to "bash" him if he did not give him money for the tools.
The Crown relied upon the evidence that the appellant knew Mr Fuller had access to a tomahawk. There was a message from the appellant to Mr Fuller that "If you see him jump on his head" and a message "chop index n look". There was thus evidence that the appellant intended to encourage Mr Fuller to cause really serious bodily injury to the deceased. In terms of assistance, the Crown's case was that the appellant assisted Mr Fuller by telling him that the deceased was back in Young and then later that day telling him that the deceased was at a particular place at a particular time.

[8]

The elements of the offence

During the opening address on 10 October 2016, the Crown Prosecutor told the jury that the elements of an accessory before the fact to murder were: that the death was in fact a murder; that the accused "intentionally encouraged the commission of the offence and/or intentionally set out to assist in preparations in the offender to commit that offence"; that "the crime that was committed was one that [the appellant] intended would be committed or was within the scope of what he believed would be committed"; and that before the crime by Mr Fuller was committed, the appellant had neither a genuine change of mind nor expressly instructed Mr Fuller not to commit the offence.
The Crown Prosecutor also told the jury that to "counsel" is to "order, advise, encourage or persuade" and that to "procure" means "to intentionally take steps to ensure that an offence was completed by the principal." The Crown case, as opened to the jury, was that the appellant "assisted, encouraged or procured" Mr Fuller to inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased.
Defence counsel disagreed with the Crown's formulation of the elements of the offence and, in his opening address, informed the jury that the trial judge would correct this. He identified in his opening that the three real issues in the trial were whether the appellant intentionally encouraged Mr Fuller to commit the murder; whether the crime that was committed was one that the appellant had intended; and whether the appellant knew the essential facts of what made up the crime that Mr Fuller committed.
The disagreement as to the elements of the offence arose again throughout the trial. One of the areas of dispute was the question of whether it was correct to describe the crime committed as being within the "scope of what he believed would be committed" as opposed to the appellant intending that a certain offence would be committed and encouraging Mr Fuller to carry it out.
The transcript reflects that on 13 October 2016, defence counsel submitted that a case alleging an accessory before the fact to murder could not be proved through principles of joint criminal enterprise and extended joint criminal enterprise. It was submitted that terms like "scope" and "contemplation" were inapplicable. The transcript reflects that his Honour accepted this at that time.
In his closing address, the Crown Prosecutor stated that the fundamental question was whether the appellant had encouraged or assisted Mr Fuller to assault the deceased and, if so, whether he intended by that encouragement or assistance that Mr Fuller would inflict very serious bodily injury upon the deceased. Despite the Crown Prosecutor opening on a case of, inter alia, "procuring" the murder, there was no reference to procuring in the closing address.
The trial judge ultimately directed the jury that the Crown case was one of encouragement (in that the appellant had used words like "jump on his head" and "chop index") and/or assistance (in that the appellant told Mr Fuller that the deceased was back in town and that he was at "Marra's"). No objection was made to the Crown case being left to the jury on that basis and it is not the subject of any ground of appeal.

[9]

The summing up

The complaints made about the summing up are all directed at the elements of the offence and the conflation of the relevant principles with those of joint criminal enterprise and extended joint criminal enterprise. His Honour directed the jury as to the charge brought against the appellant in these terms: "…the charge against the accused is, as you have heard, to the effect that he was an accessory before the fact of murder. That is to say, that he assisted and encouraged Owen Fuller to commit a crime against Corey Power, and the Crown alleges in this case, that he encouraged and assisted in the offence of assault to inflict grievous bodily harm upon Corey Power" (emphasis added).
In the context of explaining the concept of circumstantial evidence to the jury, his Honour told the jury: "The Crown has invited you to infer from what was said, knowledge in the accused, knowledge of what Mr Fuller intended to do to Mr Power, the deceased. That, you well (sic) infer the Crown says, that he had state of mind to encourage him to assist him to that end, to inflict grievous bodily for reasons the Crown says is associated with this money issue, and the failure by the deceased to come good with his part of the deal and so on."
Shortly afterwards, in the context of directing the jury as to what they had to be satisfied of beyond reasonable doubt, his Honour stated: "That is to say, as to the accused's alleged participation which is spoken of as being encouraging and assisting in bringing about the infliction of grievous bodily harm upon the deceased."
His Honour provided the jury with written directions entitled "Elements of the Offence". This document was marked "MFI 12". Before reading it to the jury his Honour stated: "It is also important that you pay some attention to what I say orally. As you would expect, the summary document doesn't tell you everything that you need to know, it simply summarises the essential parts of it. So you will need to have some regard to both the document itself and to what I say by way of further oral directions."
His Honour then read MFI 12 to the jury. It was in these terms: "The accused is charged with the offence of being an accessory before the fact, namely, that between 15 August 2013 and 29 August 2013 at Young, he assisted and encouraged Owen Junior Fuller to murder Corey Mark Power. The elements of the offence are: 1) That the offence of murder was committed by the principal offender. 2) That the accused knew all the essential elements and circumstances necessary to show that the principal intended to assault and inflict upon the victim, grievous bodily harm, meaning really serious bodily injury. 3) That the accused, by his conduct and/or words, intentionally assisted or encouraged the principal offender to commit the crime. The Crown [is] required to prove beyond reasonable doubt each of and all of the elements 1, 2 and 3 above."
In terms of the first element set out in MFI 12, his Honour explained that it was common ground that the offence of murder was committed and that they were to "take that element as established beyond reasonable doubt".
His Honour then directed the jury about the remaining two elements: "One is that the Crown has to prove the conduct, whether by words and/or by actions, of the accused, and the second element or limb, that he did so, if you find he did, undertake such conduct or act with a state of mind, state of mind being knowledge, firstly, of all the essential facts and circumstances; knowledge to show that the principal offender intended to assault and inflict upon the victim, grievous bodily harm. That's element 2, and in that second limb as well with intention - with the intention to assist and/or encourage the offender to commit the crime. So in most criminal offences… there are two aspects to be proven by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt; the acts or the conduct. In this case, the alleged encouragement, the alleged assistance and secondly, the state of mind that, if those acts you find were committed, that they were done with an intention; state of mind, intention to assist, to encourage and/or encourage the offender, in this case Owen Fuller, to inflict grievous bodily harm…"
His Honour then went on to describe "the first limb" being "the acts, the conduct". His Honour said as follows: "Members of the jury, let me deal a bit more with the first limb that I've just referred to, the acts, the conduct. So you examine the evidence to determine what, on the evidence, you find was the alleged conduct, and/or words spoken by the accused to Owen Fuller. Do you find that the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that he said things to Owen Fuller that amounted to him giving him assistance to assault Mr Power with a view to inflicting grievous bodily harm upon him? Do you consider that the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the accused said words to Mr Fuller that constituted encouragement to Mr Fuller to physically assault Mr Power with a view to inflicting grievous bodily harm upon him? Do you consider the evidence establishes both such assistance and encouragement, or one or the other, or alternatively, as I've said, either of those? Or do you find that the evidence does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that he gave any assistance? Or do you find on the evidence, that the accused did not provide any encouragement to Owen Fuller to do that act, that crime of assaulting Mr Power with a view to inflicting grievous bodily harm upon him? So you will need to examine the evidence to see what did he do. Did he assist Mr Fuller in his intention to inflict grievous bodily harm? What did he say? Well you need to look at the documents to look at the evidence to determine what he said, and is what he said in your finding beyond reasonable doubt, an encouragement by the accused of Owen Fuller to do just that, to assault with a view to inflicting grievous bodily harm upon Mr Power?" (emphasis added)
The trial judge referred to the necessity for the Crown to establish that the appellant encouraged Mr Fuller with "a view to inflicting grievous bodily harm" upon the deceased five times during his summing up. All five references were made during the directions given to the jury about the elements of the offence. Four of these references are extracted in the previous paragraph and the fifth is extracted below at [68].
His Honour then moved to the element concerning the appellant's "mental state": "When I'm talking about mental state, as you've already gathered, what I'm talking about is knowledge of facts, intention of mind or belief as to what Mr Owen Fuller intended to do. These words 'knowledge', 'intention' and 'belief' concern what I've referred to as the mental element of the offence of the accessory before the fact to the offence of murder. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt as one of the elements of the offence charged that the accused, Mr Blundell, had knowledge of all the essential facts necessary to constitute the commission of the offence by the accused."
In this respect, his Honour set out the Crown case as follows: "The Crown says he had knowledge that Owen Fuller was set upon intending to - was going to assault Mr Power, and assault him so badly as to inflict grievous bodily harm upon him of some form or another… and it's a matter for you to assess the evidence as to whether… you are not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he had knowledge of all the necessary facts that this is what Fuller was intent on doing, was going to do, and to assist him and encourage him. If you find that he didn't set out to do any acts by way of assistance or give words of encouragement, as I have said, that would be the end of it. If he did, did he have knowledge of the essential facts and circumstances to show what Fuller intended to do as per element number 2 on document MFI 12. To have committed the offence charged, the accused must have intentionally participated in the offence committed by Owen Fuller, and accordingly, he must have had knowledge of the essential matters which went to make up the offence of murder committed by Mr Fuller, whether or not he knew those matters amounted in law to the offence of murder." (emphasis added)
In terms of the requisite knowledge, the trial judge repeated that the Crown had to establish that the appellant knew the essential facts - "that Fuller was going to assault Mr Power with a view to inflicting on him grievous bodily harm" (emphasis added). His Honour then went on to state: "…So in summary, assisting or counselling or encouraging the commission of an offence requires the intentional assistance or encouragement of doing those things. The intention by Owen Fuller to inflict really serious injury upon Mr Power, where the accused has knowledge that the former intends to do so. It is not necessary for the Crown to prove that the accused, Mr Blundell, knew that the assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm in law, amounted to the offence of murder, as I have earlier indicated, as a result of death resulting from really serious bodily injury. The necessary intent or state of mind is absent if the accused lacked the knowledge that Owen Fuller was going to do something which amounts to assault to inflict really serious bodily injury upon Mr Power." (emphasis added)
His Honour then went on to discuss the evidence given at trial. It was during this section of his summing up that his Honour first used the term "design": "Members of the jury, it's a matter for your assessment as to whether you read these communications as falling into segments, whether they are to be viewed as a whole showing an ongoing theme, or whether there's some twists and turns and stops and then restarting communications or whether it forms a pattern or part of a design, if you like." (emphasis added)
As will be extracted below, the term "design" was then used a further six times by his Honour, all in the context of summarising the defence counsel's closing address.
During the trial judge's summary of the defence closing address, his Honour referred to the submission made that there were unforeseen events that occurred after the appellant's last communication with Mr Fuller and that they were a result of Mr Fuller's own folly that night and not encouraged by the appellant. Those events were Mr Fuller logging onto his former girlfriend's Facebook, the deceased messaging that account, Mr Fuller impersonating her and luring the deceased to pick "her" up. That submission was summarised by the trial judge in these terms: "Were these events something Owen Fuller decided upon and they (sic) not part of the design intentionally encouraged by the accused, Mr Higgins asked."
His Honour then gave further directions in the context of summarising the defence closing address which incorporated the term "enterprise" (mentioned five times) along with "design." His Honour directed the jury in relation to that issue that they must consider "whether later events, occurring whether opportunistically or not, may still remain part of the design of some enterprise that an accused person encouraged in the first place and/or assisted". His Honour went on, to state: "In other words, if there were additional opportunistic matters, were they separate and apart and a completely new design and the original enterprise, which was encouraged, has ceased? Or if there are these new additional facts, merely additional facts as to what was encouraged and not some independent influence causing Fuller to act. Members of the jury, it is possibly putting it in somewhat complex [sic] but it just raises the question again, as jurors who have been paying attention to the case, to the submissions, and indeed to what I have been saying, you use your common sense. You look at the evidence and see whether or not you are satisfied that whatever enterprise Fuller embarked upon in assaulting Power, was that something new and separate and different from the enterprise that he and Mr Blundell had been discussing in the lead-up to the tragic event. In other words, are the [inaudible] still operating or is the original design the primary driving force? If it was and if you do find there was encouragement and/or assistance, then you have heard what the Crown case is. If you were to find that that were not the case, and that it was something completely separate and different, then that would be otherwise, that would not have been part of the enterprise that was encouraged and part of the original design." (emphasis added)
After summarising the remainder of defence counsel's closing address, the trial judge then provided the jury with a document entitled "Legal Principles" which was marked "MFI 14". That document was in these terms: "1. It is not necessary, in cases where the accused "encouraged" the primary offender, for the Crown to prove that he was actually encouraged by the accused's words or actions. 2. The accused's state of mind is to be assessed at the time he gave the relevant encouragement or assistance, rather than at the time of the offence. 3. It is not necessary to prove knowledge of the particular time and place where the crime was to be committed. 4. There is no requirement that the Crown show that the accused contemplated as a possibility the particular way in which [the victim] was to be harmed, or that any particular weapon was to be used, for that purpose. 5. Assisting and encouraging is a continuous act and persists until the substantive offence is committed at which time the accessory's offence is also committed."
After handing copies of MFI 14 to the jury his Honour then stated: "Members of the jury, they are principles which apply in a case such as this. They may or may not have relevance depending upon your assessment. Members of the jury, I will have handed down another document. Just before I go to that, there is one other matter I wanted to mention. Members of the jury, I said in the course of my summing up about the requisite intention of the accused that must be proved. It is dealt with in the elements document but I will just make clear that the accessory's knowledge or awareness of the principal offender's intention, that is Mr Fuller's intention to do an act with a particular state of mind is the relevant point in time. That is, it is appropriate to speak of the accessory's knowledge, that is, the accused's knowledge or awareness of Mr Fuller's intention to do an act with a particular state of mind at the time when the accessory, that is the accused in this case, assists or encourages."
His Honour then provided a copy of "MFI 15" to the jury (an index) and concluded his summing up.

[10]

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Before turning to consider the grounds of appeal it is necessary to identify the relevant principles applicable to the prosecution of a person charged with being an accessory before the fact in circumstances where no alternate case relying on either joint criminal enterprise or extended joint criminal enterprise is relied upon by the Crown. A survey of the relevant decisions from which the principles concerning accessorial liability are to be derived reveals that it has become increasingly uncommon for a case to be brought against an accused person solely on the basis of accessorial liability. It is of interest to note that, although the High Court has considered the scope of accessorial liability and joint criminal enterprise on a number of occasions, some of the questions raised in this appeal have never been considered by the High Court.
The appellant does not contend that MFI 12 and the elements documents were wrong per se. Rather, the complaint is that the directions in MFI 12 were insufficient and that two of the directions in MFI 14 were wrong at law. The appellant's arguments traced the relevant common law principles derived from decisions in both Australia and in the United Kingdom. In order to understand the parties' submissions, it is necessary to first set out the relevant passages from a number of the decisions relied upon.
The relevant difference between primary liability (joint criminal enterprise) and derivative liability (accessorial liability) was explained by McHugh J in Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; [1998] HCA 75 ("Osland") as set out below at [111] do not consider it necessary for the purpose of this appeal to consider in any detail the principles of joint criminal enterprise and extended joint criminal enterprise. It is sufficient that I extract the relevant passage from the decision of the High Court in McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; [1995] HCA 37 ("McAuliffe").
The Court in McAuliffe (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ) stated the relevant principles to be as follows: "The doctrine of common purpose applies where a venture is undertaken by more than one person acting in concert in pursuit of a common criminal design. Such a venture may be described as a joint criminal enterprise. Those terms - common purpose, common design, concert, joint criminal enterprise - are used more or less interchangeably to invoke the doctrine which provides a means, often an additional means, of establishing the complicity of a secondary party in the commission of a crime. The liability which attaches to the traditional classifications of accessory before the fact and principal in the second degree may be enough to establish the guilt of a secondary party: in the case of an accessory before the fact where that party counsels or procures the commission of the crime and in the case of a principal in the second degree where that party, being present at the scene, aids or abets its commission. But the complicity of a secondary party may also be established by reason of a common purpose shared with the principal offender or with that offender and others. Such a common purpose arises where a person reaches an understanding or arrangement amounting to an agreement between that person and another or others that they will commit a crime. The understanding or arrangement need not be express and may be inferred from all the circumstances. If one or other of the parties to the understanding or arrangement does, or they do between them, in accordance with the continuing understanding or arrangement, all those things which are necessary to constitute the crime, they are all equally guilty of the crime regardless of the part played by each in its commission. Not only that, but each of the parties to the arrangement or understanding is guilty of any other crime falling within the scope of the common purpose which is committed in carrying out that purpose. Initially the test of what fell within the scope of the common purpose was determined objectively so that liability was imposed for other crimes committed as a consequence of the commission of the crime which was the primary object of the criminal venture, whether or not those other crimes were contemplated by the parties to that venture. However, in accordance with the emphasis which the law now places upon the actual state of mind of an accused person, the test has become a subjective one and the scope of the common purpose is to be determined by what was contemplated by the parties sharing that purpose." (footnotes omitted)

[13]

Johns v The Queen

The decision in Johns v The Queen (1980) 143 CLR 108; [1980] HCA 3 ("Johns") concerned whether the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise could attach liability to an accessory before the fact. The phrase "accessory before the fact" is used by the court in that decision to describe the participant in the joint criminal enterprise not present at the scene. Although it is a decision concerned with joint criminal enterprise and "common purpose" (extended joint criminal enterprise) it was held in Johns that there is no practical difference between an accessory before the fact and an accessory at the fact besides the presence of the offender, and also that a person not present at the scene can nonetheless be liable as a principal as part of a joint criminal enterprise/common purpose.
The appellant in Johns was the driver of a car used in an attempted robbery. He had waited for the principal offenders knowing that one of them carried a pistol, was quick-tempered and capable of becoming violent. The attempted robbery took a bad turn and, in the absence of the appellant, the victim was shot and killed. The appellant was indicted for murder on the basis that he was engaged in a joint criminal enterprise with the principal offenders.
Two questions arose in Johns concerning the doctrine of "common purpose". The first was whether the doctrine of common purpose could extend to accessories before the fact. The plurality held that the doctrine of common purpose did extend to an accessory before the fact and that it was not necessary for a party to be present at the scene of an offence to be acting in pursuit of a common purpose with others who were present (see Mason, Murphy and Wilson JJ at 130-1 and Barwick CJ at 112). Barwick CJ held at 112: "As a separate submission, it was said that in any case an accessory before the fact could not be convicted merely on the basis of his participation in a joint enterprise or common design. In my opinion, these submissions are clearly unacceptable. In the first place, there is no reason in principle why the participant in a common design or joint enterprise cannot be held as responsible as other participants simply because he remains an accessory before the fact and does not actively participate in the execution of the enterprise to which he has agreed or encouraged. Nor was any authority produced, whether in text book or reported decision, to support the proposition. In my opinion, the participant in a joint enterprise or common design is liable for all that occurs in the course of its execution which is of a kind which fairly falls within the ambit of the enterprise or design, though he is not present at its execution and is only sought to be made liable as an accessory before the fact. The responsibility for acts done within the ambit of the enterprise or design cannot be confined to those who actively participate in or are present at the performance of those acts." (emphasis added)
Mason, Murphy and Wilson JJ said at 125-6: "True it is that the common law distinguishes for the purposes of classification between the accessory before the fact and the principal in the second degree, but this classification is quite unrelated to the doctrine of common purpose. The object of the doctrine is to fix with complicity for the crime committed by the perpetrator those persons who encouraged, aided or assisted him, whether they be accessories or principals. Broadly speaking, the doctrine looks to the scope of the common purpose or design as the gravamen of complicity and criminal liability. There is nothing in this to suggest that the criterion of complicity and liability should differ as between accessory and principal in the second degree. If they are both parties to the same purpose or design and that purpose or design is the only basis of complicity relied upon against each of them, there is no evident reason why one should he held liable and the other not. In each case liability must depend on the scope of the common purpose. Did it extend to the commission of the act constituting the offence charged? This is the critical question. It would make nonsense to say that the common purpose included the commission of the act in the case of the principal in the second degree but that the same common purpose did not include the commission of the same act in the case of the accessory before the fact. Yet this is precisely what the appellant's submission does say." (emphasis added)
The High Court adopted the statement of principle of Street CJ in R v Johns [1978] 1 NSWLR 282 at 289, where his Honour quoted JW Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (12th ed, 1964) ("Russell on Crime") at 289 as follows: "Nowadays, it is submitted, the test should be subjective and the person charged as accessory should not be held liable for anything but what he either expressly commanded or realised might be involved in the performance of the project agreed upon. It would, on this principle, therefore be a question of evidence to satisfy the jury that the accused did contemplate the prospect of what the principal has in fact done."
Their Honours continued at 130-1: "In our opinion these decisions support the conclusion reached by Street C.J., namely, 'that an accessory before the fact bears, as does a principal in the second degree, a criminal liability for an act which was within the contemplation of both himself and the principal in the first degree as an act which might be done in the course of carrying out the primary criminal intention - an act contemplated as a possible incident of the originally planned particular venture'. Such an act is one which falls within the parties' own purpose and design precisely because it is within their contemplation and is foreseen as a possible incident of the execution of their planned enterprise." (emphasis added)
Their Honours then described s 346 of the Crimes Act as manifesting a legislative intention that an accessory before the fact be treated as a principal (at 133): "The appellant's argument flies in the face of the legislative intention manifested in s. 346. The intention there expressed is that the accessory is liable to the same punishment as the principal. The punishment prescribed for the principal is the mandatory sentence of penal servitude for life. Yet the effect of the appellant's argument is that the accessory may be sentenced to a lesser punishment. It is an argument that is not only at odds with the specific provision relating to punishment in s. 346 but it is also at variance with the intention, plainly expressed in the section, that an accessory before the fact is to be treated in all respects as a principal."

[14]

Giorgianni v The Queen

The appellant placed significant weight on the decision of Giorgianni v R (1985) 156 CLR 473; [1985] HCA 29 ("Giorgianni"). That case did concern a case of an accessory before the fact in which there was no reliance by the Crown upon principles of joint criminal enterprise. The appellant had leased a truck which was driven by his employee. The truck collided with other vehicles when its brakes failed which caused the death of multiple persons. The appellant was not present at the time of collision however he was convicted of culpable driving causing death. The charge had been brought on the basis that the appellant and his employee had worked on the truck 10 days prior to the collision and that the appellant ought to have known of the defects.
There were two issues before the Court. First, whether a person could be liable as an accessory before the fact to the strict liability offence of dangerous driving occasioning death. Second, whether recklessness (as opposed to actual knowledge) as to the existence of facts and circumstances which would render the driving dangerous was sufficient to constitute criminal liability.
In relation to the first issue Gibbs CJ made the following observations (at 478): "There is no reason why a person who counsels or procures another to drive a vehicle, knowing that the person persuaded to drive the vehicle is drunk, or that the vehicle is so defective as to be dangerous, should not be liable, in accordance with the ordinary principles embodied in s.351 of the Crimes Act, if the vehicle is involved in a collision causing death. This view is supported by Reg. v. Robert Millar Ltd. (1970) 2 QB 54, where it was held that an employer who instructed an employee to drive a vehicle, knowing it to be in a dangerously defective condition, was guilty of the offence of dangerous driving causing death."
His Honour then went on to consider the second question of whether it was necessary to prove that the accessory before the fact knew all the circumstances which made what was done an offence or whether recklessness was sufficient. His Honour considered the terms of s 52A of the Crimes Act and observed that: "The very words used in s.351, and the synonyms which express their meanings - eg. help, encourage, advise, persuade, induce, bring about by effort - indicate that a particular state of mind is essential before a person can become liable as a secondary party for the commission of the offence, even if the offence is one of strict liability."
Gibbs CJ went on to refer to the observations of Judge Learned Hand in United States v Peoni (1938) 100 F.(2d) 401 ("United States v Peoni") where his Honour referred to a number of statutory definitions and then stated: "It will be observed that all these definitions have nothing whatever to do with the probability that the forbidden result would follow upon the accessory's conduct; and [that] they all demand that he in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed. All the words used - even the most colourless 'abet' - carry an implication of purposive attitude towards it."
Gibbs CJ went on to state (at 480): "In other words, the person charged as a secondary party should in some way be 'linked in purpose with the person actually committing the crime ...': R. v. Russell (16), per Cussen A.C.J."
His Honour next noted that s 351 of the Crimes Act is based on s 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (UK) which was declaratory of the common law on the subject (at 480). His Honour went on to state (at 480): "Although it was said, in Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1975] EWCA Crim 1; (1975) Q.B. 773, at p.779, that there is a difference between the four words (aids, abets, counsels, procures) used in the section, and that each word must be given its ordinary meaning, it is apparent that the ordinary meanings of some at least of those words overlap and that sometimes the words are used in particular combinations or as a phrase which is to be considered as a whole: In re Charles Smith (1858) 3 H& N 227, at pp 237-238 [1858] EngR 533; (157 ER 455, at p 459); A-G v. Able (1983) 3 WLR 845, at p 855; (1984) 1 All ER 277, at p 285. When used in relation to felonies, the words 'aid and abet' described the action of a person who was present at the commission of the offence and took some part therein (who was called a principal in the second degree as well as an 'aider and abettor'), whereas 'counsel and procure' described an accessory before the fact who was not present at the commission of the offence: cf. Ferguson v. Weaving (1951) 1 KB 814, at pp 818-819. The usage was not always uniform or discriminating. The distinction between principals in the first and second degree and between principals and accessories now generally has no legal importance: see Johns (T.S.) v. The Queen [1980] HCA 3; (1980) 143 CLR 108, at p 117 and ss.345-347 of the Crimes Act." (emphasis added)
Gibbs CJ went on to state: "No similar distinction was drawn in the case of misdemeanours, and at common law, in cases of misdemeanour, anyone who, in the case of a felony, would have been a principal in the second degree, or an accessory, was a principal offender and was treated as if he had taken the same part as the active perpetrator of the facts constituting the offence: Gould & Co. v. Houghton (1921) 1 KB 509, at p 516. The reason for mentioning those matters, which are now largely of historical interest, is that statements in the authorities regarding the mental state necessary to constitute a person an accessory before the fact in the case of a felony will apply equally to a person who has counselled or procured the commission of a misdemeanour. Further it will be found that statements which refer to the knowledge and intention necessary to make a person an aider and abettor will often be equally applicable to a person who has counselled or procured the commission of the offence."
In further considering the question of whether knowledge (as opposed to recklessness) is sufficient to convict an accessory before the fact, Gibbs CJ made the following observations at 481 (a passage relied upon by the appellant in this matter): "Russell on Crime, 12th ed. (1964), p151, states that 'the bare minimum' which is necessary to constitute a person an accessory before the fact is that his conduct should indicate '(a) that he knew that the particular deed was contemplated, and (b) that he approved of or assented to it, and (c) that his attitude in respect of it in fact encouraged the principal offender to perform the deed'. The passage is cited with approval in Attorney-General v Able [1984] W.B., at p. 809. There is a strong body of authority which supports the view that knowledge of the facts is necessary before a person can be made liable as a secondary party for the commission of an offence. In Johnson v. Youden (1950) 1 K.B. 544 at p. 546, Lord Goddard C.J. stated the position in relation to aiders and abettors as follows: 'Before a person can be convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of an offence he must at least know the essential matters which constitute that offence. He need not actually know that an offence has been committed, because he may not know that the facts constitute an offence and ignorance of the law is not a defence.' This statement has been frequently cited with approval, and not only in relation to the case of aiders and abettors…"
Gibbs CJ (at 482) then referred to numerous other cases that stand as authority for the general principle that "a person can be convicted as a secondary party only if he had knowledge of the essential circumstances." In terms of wilful blindness his Honour then observed (at 482) that: "One qualification that must be accepted is that wilful blindness, the deliberate shutting of one's eyes to what is going on, is equivalent to knowledge."
His Honour also noted that: "…the person charged must have intended to help, encourage or induce the principal offender to bring about the forbidden result. In other words, both knowledge of the circumstances and intention to aid, abet, counsel or procure are necessary to render a person liable as a secondary party…" (citations and footnotes omitted)
In terms of recklessness, Gibbs CJ held (at 487) that: "…it is not correct to say that a person may be convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence simply because he has acted recklessly."
His Honour summarised the relevant legal principles as follows (at 487-8): "My view of the law may be summed up very shortly. No one may be convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence unless, knowing all the essential facts which made what was done a crime, he intentionally aided, abetted, counselled or procured the acts of the principal offender. Wilful blindness, in the sense that I have described, is treated as equivalent to knowledge but neither negligence nor recklessness is sufficient."
Justice Mason explained the use of the terms "aid", "abet", "counsel" and "procure" at common law and observed that there is no legal distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal in the second degree beyond presence. His Honour stated (at 492): "In felony at common law the terms 'aid' and 'abet' are generally used to refer to the conduct of a principal in the second degree, or one who is present at the commission of the offence by the principal offender, while the terms 'counsel' or 'procure' are generally used in relation to the conduct of an accessory before the fact, or one who is absent at the time of the commission of the offence: 4 BI. Comm. 34-36; Ferguson v. Weaving [1951] 1 K.B. 814, at pp. 818-819. In substance, however, there appears to be no distinction between a principal in the second degree and an accessory before the fact beyond the question of presence." (emphasis added)
His Honour discussed the "doctrine of secondary participation to statutory offences involving no mental element", as considered in a number of cases, and then said (at 494): "In general, the absence of intention as an element of the substantive offence has not been regarded as obviating the necessity for knowledge on the part of the secondary party of the essential facts constituting the offence. The 'link in purpose' between the secondary party and the principal offender is not established where a person does something to bring about, or render more likely, the commission of an offence by another in circumstances in which, through ignorance of the facts, it appears to him to be an innocent act." (emphasis added)
This passage from the judgment of Mason J was also relied upon by the appellant; in particular the need for the jury to be told that there must be a link in purpose between the secondary party and the principal offender and that the secondary party must do something to "bring about, or render more likely" the offence.
In their joint judgment in Giorgianni, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ held at 505 (referring to cases such as Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544), that: "Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence requires the intentional assistance or encouragement of the doing of those things which go to make up the offence. The necessary intent is absent if the person alleged to be a secondary participant lacks knowledge that the principal offender is doing something or is about to do something which amounts to an offence." (emphasis added)
In terms of whether recklessness could apply to an offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring, their Honours said (at 506-7): "For the purposes of many offences it may be true to say that if an act is done with foresight of its probable consequences, there is sufficient intent in law even if such intent may more properly be described as a form of recklessness. There are, however, offences in which it is not possible to speak of recklessness as constituting a sufficient intent. Attempt is one and conspiracy is another. And we think the offences of aiding and abetting and counselling and procuring are others. Those offences require intentional participation in a crime by lending assistance or encouragement. They do not, of course, require knowledge of the law and it is necessary to distinguish between knowledge of or belief in the existence of facts which constitute a criminal offence and knowledge or belief that those facts are made a criminal offence under the law. The necessary intent is absent if the person alleged to be a secondary participant does not know or believe that what he is assisting or encouraging is something which goes to make up the facts which constitute the commission of the relevant criminal offence. He need not recognize the criminal offence as such, but his participation must be intentionally aimed at the commission of the acts which constitute it. It is not sufficient if his knowledge or belief extends only to the possibility or even probability that the acts which he is assisting or encouraging are such, whether he realizes it or not, as to constitute the factual ingredients of a crime. If that were sufficient, a person might be guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence which formed no part of his design. Intent is required and it is an intent which must be based upon knowledge or belief of the necessary facts." (emphasis added)

[15]

Osland v The Queen

Osland v The Queen is a decision of the High Court concerned with principles of joint criminal enterprise rather than those of accessorial liability. However, relevantly for present purposes, the Court in that matter considered the differences between primary and derivative liability. Mrs Osland and her son were charged with murdering Frank Osland. The Crown case was that Mrs Osland mixed sedatives into the deceased's dinner and, while he was sleeping, her son fatally struck him with an iron pipe in the presence of the appellant.
The appellant and her son were tried together and neither disputed that they had killed the deceased. Rather, each of them relied on provocation and self-defence on the basis of years of violent abuse. The appellant was convicted of murder but the jury was hung with respect to her son. The son was later re-tried and ultimately acquitted.
The appellant and her son were charged with murder on the basis that they were parties to a joint criminal enterprise to murder the deceased. The main issue for the High Court was whether the verdicts between the appellant and her son were logically inconsistent. In his judgment dismissing the appeal, McHugh J looked at the nature of different types of criminal liability and complicity as follows (at 341 to 343): "At common law, a person who commits the acts which form the whole or part of the actus reus of the crime is known as a 'principal in the first degree'. There can be more than one principal in the first degree. However, a person may incur criminal liability not only for his or her own acts that constitute the whole or part of the actus reus of a crime but also for the acts of others that do so. The liability may be primary or derivative… Those who aided the commission of a crime but were not present at the scene of the crime were regarded as accessories before the fact or principals in the third degree. Their liability was purely derivative and was dependent upon the guilt of the person who had been aided and abetted in committing the crime. Those who were merely present, encouraging but not participating physically, or whose acts were not a substantial cause of death, were regarded as principals in the second degree. They could only be convicted of the crime of which the principal offender was found guilty. If that person was not guilty, the principal in the second degree could not be guilty. Their liability was, accordingly, also derivative. However, there is a third category where a person was not only present at the scene with the person who committed the acts alleged to constitute the crime but was there by reason of a pre-concert or agreement with that person to commit the crime. In that category, the liability of each person present as the result of the concert is not derivative but primary. He or she is a principal in the first degree. In that category each of the persons acting in concert is equally responsible for the acts of the other or others. The general principle was clearly stated in R v Lowery and King [No 2] by Smith J…" (footnotes omitted)
His Honour then went on to consider the principles of joint and extended joint criminal enterprise which are not presently relevant.
Justice Callinan similarly described the difference between primary and derivative liability at 400 as follows: "The common law originally divided all crimes into three categories: treasons, felonies and misdemeanours. It was only in relation to felonies that there were different levels of participation recognised by law. Originally, the categories of participation were principals, accessories before the fact, accessories at the fact and accessories after the fact. The reason for the lack of differentiation between the parties in misdemeanours and treasons was said to be that treasons were regarded as too serious, and misdemeanours as not serious enough, to justify such fine distinctions. The distinguishing feature of accessories at the fact was their presence at the commission of the crime. Accessories at the fact were described as 'aiding and abetting' the commission of the crime. Accessories before the fact were referred to as having 'counselled or procured' the crime. Different penalties were typically imposed for the various classifications of participation. These classifications also had important procedural implications. Accessory liability was in essence derivative. This necessitated conviction of the principal to ground a case against other participants. Further, there were important implications for jurisdiction."

[16]

R v Phan

Principles of accessorial liability were considered by this Court in R v Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; [2001] NSWCCA 29 ("Phan") but that was not a case concerned with an accessory before the fact either. Rather, that case concerned a principal in the second degree who was present at the scene of the offence. This Court held that the instruction given by the trial judge did not sufficiently address the matters required to be proven to establish the liability of the appellant in circumstances where he asserted that his presence at the scene was accidental, that he was unconscious at the time of the shooting, and that he did not provide any encouragement or assistance to the shooter. In that context, Wood CJ at CL (with whom McClellan and Smart JJ agreed) stated: "[69] Moreover, mere acquiescence or assent to a crime does not make a person liable as a principal in the second degree. What was needed in such a case is proof that the principal in the second degree was linked in purpose with the person actually committing the crime, and was by his or her words or conduct doing something to bring about, or rendering more likely, through encouragement or assistance, its commission. [70] In Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, Hawkins J, at 557-558 identified the essential requirement for such a case in the following passage: 'In my opinion, to constitute an aider and abettor some active steps must be taken by word, or action, with the intent to instigate the principal, or principals. Encouragement does not of necessity amount to aiding and abetting, it may be intentional or unintentional, a man may unwittingly encourage another in fact by his presence, by misinterpreted words, or gestures, or by his silence, or non-interference, or he may encourage intentionally by expressions, or gestures, or actions intended to signify approval. In the latter case he aids and abets, in the former he does not. It is no criminal offence to stand by, a mere passive spectator of a crime, even of a murder. Non-interference to prevent a crime is not itself a crime. But the fact that a person was voluntarily and purposely present witnessing the commission of a crime, and offered no opposition to it, though he might reasonably be expected to prevent and had the power so to do, or at least to express his dissent, might under some circumstances, afford cogent evidence upon which a jury would be justified in finding that he wilfully encouraged and so aided and abetted. But it would be purely a question for the jury whether he did so or not.' [71] Cave J, in the same case, said at 539: 'Now it is a general rule in the case of principals in the second degree that there must be participation in the act, and that, although a man is present whilst a felony is being committed, if he takes no part in it, and does not act in concert with those who commit it, he will not be a principal in the second degree merely because he does not endeavour to prevent the felony or apprehend the felon.' [72] Similarly, in All[a]n (1963) 3 WLR 677, Edmund Davies J said at 683: '…before a jury can properly convict an accused person of being a principal in the second degree to an affray, they must be convinced by the evidence that, at the very least, he by some means or other encouraged the participants. To hold otherwise would be, in effect … to convict a man on his thoughts, unaccompanied by any physical act other than the fact of his mere presence.'" (emphasis added)
His Honour went on to state at [78]: "To that extent, the non accidental presence of the appellant and his acquiescence in or assent to what occurred would not be enough, unless it was also made clear that the Crown had to establish that such assent or acquiescence amounted to that degree of encouragement or assistance as would constitute him a principal in the second degree."
Smart J agreed with Wood CJ at CL and in separate reasons observed the following in relation to the elements of the offence of being an accessory present at the scene (at [104]): "Usually a jury is told that the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the commission of the crime of murder by the principal offender (b) the presence of the accused at the time the crime was committed (c) the accused knew all the essential facts or circumstances necessary to show the crime was committed by the principal offender (including that the principal offender intended to kill the deceased or inflict grievous bodily harm upon the deceased); (d) with that knowledge, the accused intentionally assisted or encouraged the principal offender to commit the crime. It is then necessary for the jury to be told the elements which the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt for them to be satisfied that the principal offender committed the crime. This may overlap with sub-paragraph (c) above."
His Honour went on to observe: "[106] In Giorgianni at 481 Gibbs J pointed out that similar matters need to be proved in the case of an accessory before the fact and that of an aider and abettor. Mason J at 493 stated that in substance 'there appears to be no distinction between a principal in the second degree and an accessory before the fact beyond the question of presence'. [107] Again, in Giorgianni at 481 Gibbs J cited this passage from Russell on Crime 12th ed (1964) p151 'the bare minimum which is necessary to constitute a person as an accessory before the fact is that his conduct should indicate (a) that he knew that the particular deed was contemplated and (b) that he approved of or assented to it, and (c) that his attitude in respect of it in fact encouraged the principal offender to perform the deed'. Gibbs J went on to point out that the law had developed and that knowledge of the facts is necessary before a party can be made liable as a secondary party for the commission of an offence (481-482). Further, the person charged must have intended to help, encourage or induce the principal offender to bring about the forbidden result (482)." (emphasis added)
The appellant submits that the trial judge failed to give directions consistent with these passages in Phan concerning the need for a causal link.

[17]

R v Lam and Lam v R (VSCA)

The question of whether an accessory present at the scene needs to have actually encouraged the principal was considered by the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Lam (2008) 185 A Crim R 453; [2008] VSCA 109 ("Lam (VSCA)") at 474-5 ([89]) in an appeal from the decision of Redlich J in R v Lam (Ruling No 20) (2005) 159 A Crim R 448; [2005] VSC 294 ("Lam").
In Lam, seven persons were accused and ultimately convicted of murdering the deceased on the basis that they had each participated in a joint criminal enterprise. The Crown case was that three of the accused were principals in the first degree and the remaining four were principals in the second degree, being present but not participating in the acts which caused the deceased's death. Those acts were said to have occurred after a fight broke out among a group of Vietnamese youths at the Salt nightclub in South Yarra on 8 July 2002. The alleged principals in the second degree were said to have aided and abetted the acts of the principals in the first degree by assisting or encouraging the principals in the first degree to commit the offence.
It was the Crown case that three of the principals in the second degree were present at the scene where the principals inflicted injuries upon the deceased which caused his death. In the case of two of them it was alleged that they had driven their motor vehicles to the murder scene to assist or encourage the principals in the commission of the offence. It was said that, once they alighted from their motor vehicles, they stood close to the deceased while some of the injuries resulting in his death were inflicted and that they thereafter returned to their motor vehicles and waited with the intention to assist the principals in the first degree by driving them away from the scene. In relation to the third principal in the second degree it was alleged that he had chased the deceased and then stood in close proximity to him as he was attacked by one or more of the principals thereby encouraging them to commit the offence.
Although the three men charged with being a principal in the second degree each admitted to being present in the vicinity of the crime scene, each of them claimed that he had not performed any act which constituted assistance or encouragement of one or more of the principals and that their mere presence could not constitute aiding and abetting.
The decision in Lam concerned rulings as to the appropriate directions to be given to the jury at trial. One of the questions which arose for the trial judge was whether the prosecution must establish that the act or acts said to constitute aiding and abetting in fact assisted or encouraged the principal in the first degree. Redlich J reviewed a long line of authorities including Phan, in relation to which his Honour stated the following: "[71] In R v Phan Wood CJ at CL with whom McLennan J agreed, after referring to Coney, Russell, Allan, Clarkson, Roughley and Giorg[i]anni said: 'Moreover, in Giorg[i]anni, the Court made it clear that the principal in the second degree must actually know that the crime is being committed or will be committed. To that extent, the non-accidental presence of the appellant and his acquiescence in or assent to what occurred would not be enough, unless it was also made clear that the Crown had to establish that such assent or acquiescence amounted to that degree of encouragement or assistance as would constitute him a principal in the second degree.' [72] The Court considered that there was no general principle by which assent or acquiescence without more could give rise to a liability. What was needed was proof that the principal in the second degree was: 'Linked in purpose with the person actually committing the crime and was by his or her words or conduct doing something to bring about, or rendering more likely, through encouragement or assistance, its commission'. [73] No reference was made in Phan to the third head of liability discussed by Smith J in Lowery & King of 'intentionally conveying by words or presence and behaviour that one is assenting to and concurring in the commission of the crime.'" (footnotes omitted)
His Honour then held that (at [76]-[77]): "[76] In answer to the question whether the prosecution must establish that the principal in the first degree was aware of the acts said to constitute aiding and abetting, a distinction must be drawn between acts of assistance and acts of encouragement. The primary offender need not be aware of acts of assistance performed by the principal in the second degree with the requisite knowledge and intention. Acts of encouragement must be viewed differently. For the words or conduct of an accused person to have the capacity to encourage the perpetrator of the crime, the words must be spoken and the conduct take place in the presence of the primary offender. The prosecution must establish that the secondary participant conveyed or communicated to the principal offender his encouragement by words or by his presence and behaviour that the offence should be committed. The prosecution need not establish that the principal in the first degree was aware of the words or acts of encouragement so long as they were communicated or conveyed with the necessary intention by the secondary participant and in circumstances where the principal offender could be aware of them. [77] The prosecution is not required to establish that the acts said to constitute aiding and abetting in fact assisted or encouraged the principal in the first degree. The suggestion in some of the authorities to which I have referred that it must be established that the principal in the first degree was in fact assisted or encouraged do not in my respectful opinion accord with principle or those authorities which I regard as persuasive and plainly correct. Such a direction to a jury would be too favourable. It would impose an impossible burden upon the prosecution, who would rarely be in a position to place evidence before a jury as to the effect of the secondary participant's conduct on the principal offender's state of mind." (emphasis added)
The Victorian Court of Appeal in Lam v R (VSCA) affirmed the directions given by Redlich J as set out in Lam (at 474).

[18]

Likiardopoulos v R (VSCA)

Likiardopoulos v R (2010) 30 VR 654 ("Likiardopoulos (VSCA)"), was another Victorian decision concerned with principles of joint criminal enterprise. The appellant and six co-accused were charged with murder after a young, intellectually handicapped man was brutally beaten to death. The Crown withdrew the charge against one co-accused and accepted pleas of guilty to lesser charges in relation to the others. Accordingly, the appellant was the only person charged with murder.
The appellant was charged as a principal with the murder of the deceased. It was alternatively left to the jury that he was guilty on the basis that he had directed and encouraged the principal offenders to murder the deceased. The Crown case was that he had assaulted the deceased and encouraged others to assault him. He was thus said to be a party to a joint criminal enterprise to inflict really serious injury on the deceased and that, pursuant to that enterprise, one or more co-offenders had carried out the act or acts causing the deceased's death. The jury subsequently returned a guilty verdict of murder.
On appeal to the Victorian Court of Appeal, one of the appeal grounds was that the trial judge had fallen into error by directing the jury that the Crown did not have to prove that the alleged acts of counselling or procuring did in fact cause or even encourage the principal or principals to commit the offence. On this point, the Court (Buchanan, Ashley and Tate JJA) said as follows (at 678-80): "[103] …appellant's counsel submitted that 'a counsellor or procurer's behaviour must in some sense be causative of the principal's crime'. He relied upon the statement by Professor Sir John Smith in Reshaping the criminal law: essays in honour of Glanville Williams, that 'procuring' requires causation, by contrast with 'counselling.' [104] Counsel for the Crown submitted that Sir John Smith's essay, in which the author differentiated between the concepts of 'abet' and 'counsel' on the one hand, and 'procure' on the other, did not represent the law in this country. He referred to R v Russell, R v Wong and Giorgianni v R. He cited also R v Lam, and referred to Archbold's Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice, and Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law. … [111] Applicant's counsel submitted that Lam left open the question whether a causative element was required when 'procuring' was relied upon by the Crown. So to submit involved, as we see it, the contention that what Australian courts have held to be the unity conveyed by verbs 'counsel', 'procure', 'aid' and 'abet' is incomplete. There is no warrant for such a conclusion. The verbs have been said to have a particular meaning in the criminal law; assuming the availability of a dictionary meaning of 'procure' to different effect, it does not touch the meaning which is relevant for present purposes. … [113] Because of the view we take as to the state of the law concerning the required knowledge of one who counsels or procures a principal offender, it is unnecessary to consider whether the reference in the judge's charge to assistance and encouragement by 'counselling and procuring', rather than to 'aiding and abetting', was apposite. If it was not, it could only have been worse for the appellant."

[19]

Likiardopoulos v The Queen (HCA)

The decision of the Court of Appeal in Likiardopoulos was considered in Likiardopoulos v The Queen (2012) 247 CLR 265; [2012] HCA 37 ("Likiardopolous (HCA)"). The sole issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge fell into error in leaving the accessorial case to the jury in circumstances where the Crown had accepted pleas of guilty to lesser offences from those it was alleged were the principal offenders. The Court dismissed the appeal. Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ observed (at [20], citing Giorgianni at 487-8 per Gibbs CJ a; at 500 per Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ) that: "…the accessorial case relied on evidence that the appellant directed and encouraged others to assault the deceased. On the accessorial case, the appellant's guilt of murder would be established by proof that one or more persons assaulted the deceased intending to do him really serious injury, and that with knowledge of those facts, the appellant intentionally assisted or encouraged that person or those persons in the commission of the fatal assaults." (footnotes omitted)
In making distinct the differences between "counselling", "procuring", "aiding" and "abetting", Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said (at [23]): "In the present case, the trial judge used the language of counselling and procuring in directing the jury respecting accessorial liability. However, as noted above, these are the words used to describe the accessory before the fact who encourages or instigates the offence but who is not present at its commission (the principal in the third degree). The accessory who is present at the scene assisting or encouraging its commission (the principal in the second degree) is said to aid and abet the principal offender. Her Honour directed that it was the Crown case that the appellant 'directed, encouraged and exhorted others present to inflict really serious injury to [the deceased]' and that he knew the essential circumstances of the offence (that they were going to administer a severe beating to the deceased with the requisite intention) 'because he was present at the time when that was being done'." (footnotes omitted)

[20]

R v Spiteri-Ahern

The appellant placed reliance upon the decision of Rothman J in R v Spiteri-Ahern (No 11) [2017] NSWSC 1820 ("Spiteri-Ahern"), a decision following a judge-alone trial involving four co-accused. One of the co-accused, Ms Barber, was charged with being an accessory before the fact on the basis that she agreed with a co-offender to lure the deceased to a certain location. Rothman J observed at [21] that "the manner in which the Crown seeks to prove this offence has been less than satisfactorily explained. In particular, the elements of the commission of the offence of accessory before the fact were not the subject of detailed explanation."
His Honour went on to observe the following at [30]-[37]: "[30] Unfortunately, it is necessary to refer briefly to the common law definition of accessory before the fact, because the Crimes Act does not define the term. Under the common law, historically, an accessory before the fact was a person who, while not present at the location of the felony at the time the felony is committed, counsels or procures another to commit that offence: see William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 4. As the reasons for judgment of Mason J (as His Honour then was) in Giorgianni, make clear, the terms of a provision such as s 346 or s 351 of the Crimes Act do not themselves create a substantive offence, but are declaratory of the common law and procedural in nature: Giorgianni at 490. Further, once the nature of s 346 and s 351 of the Crimes Act is understood, one must then examine the common law concept of secondary participation and not the terms of the section in order to determine criminal liability: Giorgianni at 492. [31] The terms 'aid' and 'abet' were generally used to refer to the conduct of a principal in the second degree; the terms 'counsel' or 'procure' were generally used to refer to the conduct of an accessory before the fact: Giorgianni at 493. However, as Mason J then stated, 'in substance, … there appears to be no distinction between a principal in the second degree and an accessory before the fact beyond the question of presence': Giorgianni at 493. His Honour was, of course, referring to felonies (as they were then known) and not misdemeanours. [32] Further, as Mason J remarked, by reference to the judgment of Cussen ACJ in R v Russell [1933] VLR 59 at 67, all of the terms 'aid', 'abet', 'counsel' or 'procure' are instances of the one premise, namely, that the person charged as a principal in the second degree is in some way linked in purpose with the person actually committing the crime and, by his or her words or conduct, doing something to bring about, or rendering more likely, the commission of such offence. Having discussed that history, it is necessary then to turn to the issues of accessory before the fact, in particular. [33] First, it is necessary to note, for relevant purposes, that there must be a causal link between that which is done by the accessory before the fact and the commission of the offence. That causal link does not need to be direct, but it must be in existence. Mere acquiescence will not amount to accessory before the fact. [34] The alleged accessory, in this case Ms Barber, on the allegations of the Crown, need not conduct herself or perform the act with the intention or desire that the crime be committed, but she must have believed, at the time of the conduct, that the commission of the offence by Ms Spiteri-Ahern is a distinct possibility, namely, it must be a crime within the accessory's contemplation or one of the same general type: Director of Public Prosecutions (Northern Ireland) v Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140; R v Ancutta (1990) 49 A Crim R 307 at 312; Bruce v Williams (1989) 46 A Crim R 122 at 129. [35] Further, a person cannot be convicted of secondary participation at common law, unless the person knows the facts which must be proved to show that the offence has been committed: Giorgianni at 494. Suspicion of the existence of the facts does not of itself amount to knowledge of the facts: Giorgianni, per Gibbs CJ at 487. [36] The summary of the offence or a necessary element of the offence, described by Gibbs CJ in Giorgianni is worth reciting: 'No one may be convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence unless, knowing all the essential facts which made what was done a crime, he intentionally aided, abetted, counselled or procured the acts of the principal offender. Wilful blindness, in the sense that I have described, is treated as equivalent to knowledge but neither negligence nor recklessness is sufficient.' (See Giorgianni at 487-488) [37] The plurality reasons for judgment in Giorgianni (Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ) referred (Giorgianni at 500) to the need, in order for the accused to have aided, abetted, counselled or procured, for the accused to have intentionally participated in the principal offences and, as a consequence, 'must have had knowledge of the essential matters which went to make up the offences … whether or not he knew that those matters amounted to a crime': Giorgianni, per Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ, at 508."
Rothman J found that the Crown had not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accessory had knowledge that the information she provided was for the purpose of the principal inflicting grievous bodily harm or the purpose of killing (at [182], [190]). The possibility or probability of the purpose did not suffice (at [183], [190], [195]).

[21]

NSWLRC Report 129

The New South Wales Law Reform Commission ("NSWLRC") Report 129, "Complicity", was published in December 2010. The terms of reference were to review the law of complicity with a view to, inter alia, possible codification of this area of the law. Although the recommendations for change made in the report have not as yet been acted on, the report contains a statement of the common law in this area. Relevantly, the elements of accessory before the fact are set out at 2.12 - 2.15 as follows (The footnotes in the report have been reproduced in the body of the relevant text): 2.12 An accessory before the fact is a person who is not present when an offence is committed, but who counsels or procures or encourages or otherwise assists another person to commit the offence (footnote: Giorgianni v The Queen at 481 and 493) 2.13 At common law, for a person to be guilty as an accessory before the fact to an offence committed by another person (the principal in the first degree): the other person must have committed the offence (footnote: R v Glennan [1970] 91WN (NSW) 609, 615; Giorgianni v The Queen at 491, although it is not necessary that the principal in the first degree be convicted: King v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 423 as, eg, where there is a difference in the evidence admissible against each offender; or where the identity of the principal offender is unknown, so long as the offence is shown to have occurred). the accused must have known the essential facts or circumstances, which must be established in order to prove the commission of the offence, by the other person (footnote Giorgianni v The Queen at 481, 488, 500), including the necessary state of mind for that person (footnote: Although not necessarily the result of the act which the accessory understood was to be committed: Stokes v The Queen (1990) 51 A Crim R 25, 37-38; and see Likiardopoulos v The Queen [2010] VSCA 344 [81]-[82] and [99]) (recklessness on the part of the accessory will not suffice, but proof that the accessory deliberately abstained from inquiry can provide a basis for an inference of actual knowledge) (footnote: Giorgianni v The Queen at, 487-8, 495, 505, 507-508) and the accused must have intentionally provided advice or encouragement to the other person to commit the offence, or assisted in the preparation for it, or have otherwise taken steps through persuasion or otherwise to cause its commission. 2.14 The accused will not be guilty, if he or she does not honestly believe the commission of the offence is a possibility (footnote: R v Harding [1976] VR 129; R v Truong (Unreported, NSWCCA, 22 June 1998); or, if he or she had countermanded or withdrawn their assistance or encouragement for its commission: Tietie v The Queen (1988) 34 A Crim R 438; R v Croft [1944] KB 295). 2.15 There is no requirement, at common law (except arguably in the case of an offence involving the element of procuring),(footnote: Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] 1 QB 773, 779. The suggestion to this effect by Sir John Smith in Reshaping the Criminal Law has been held to be inapplicable under Australian law by reason of the acceptance that the collocation of expressions traditionally employed convey a single composite concept: Likiardopoulos v The Queen [2010] VSCA 344 [107]-[111]), for there to be a causal connection between the assistance or encouragement given and the commission of the offence, (footnote: R v Calhaem [1985] QB 808, see B Fisse, Howard's Criminal Law (5th ed, Law Book Company, 1990) 329, although there must in some way be a link in purpose with the person actually committing the offence.(footnote: R v Russell [1933] VLR 59, 67 (Cussen ACJ); Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473, 480.
The NSWLRC cited the United Kingdom decision in R v Calhaem [1985] QB 808 ("R v Calhaem"). and Professor Fisse's, "Howard's Criminal Law",1990, 5th ed, at page 329 in support of the statement that there is no requirement for any causal connection between the act of encouragement and the commission of the offence. I consider the decision R v Calhaem below at [151]. The relevant passage from Professor Fisse's text (at 329) relied upon by the NSWLRC is as follows: "Although D must promote the commission of the principal offence this is not to say that D's promotion need have a causal influence on the principal offender (footnote: see generally Smith, "Complicity and Causation" [1986] Criminal Law Review 663; Kadish, "Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine" (1985) 73 California Law Review 324; Heart and Honore, Causation in the Law (2nd. Ed.) pp 377-388; Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed.), pp 134-135
Professor Fisse goes on to state at 329: "Scattered through the case law are suggestions that some causal nexus must be established (Footnote: See e.g., White v Ridley (1978) 21 A.L.R. 661 per Stephen J.; O'Sullivan v Truth and Sportsman (1957) 96 C.L.R. 220 at 228; Lenzi v Miller [1965] S.A.S.R. 1 at 14; Anderson [1966] 2 Q. B. 110 at 120; Attorney - Generals Reference (No. 1 of 1975 ) [1975] Q.B. 773 at 780; Attorney-General v Able [1984] 1 Q.B. 795 at 81. See further Smith, "Complicity and Causation" [1986] Criminal Law Review 663)) but the weight of authority supports the view that liability for complicity depends on manifestation of assent or authorisation rather than causal connection" (footnote: Johns v The Queen (1980) 143 C.L.R. 108. White v Ridley (1978) 21 A.L.R. 661 at 669 per Gibbs J.; R v Calheam [1985] 2 W.L.R. 826; Howell v Doyle [1952] V.L.R 128 at 134; State v Tally, 102 Ala 25 (1894).
This statement of the relevant law is consistent with Professor Gillies' statement in "Criminal Law", 1997, 4th ed, at page 162 where he wrote: "There need not be a causal connection between an act of accessoryship and the commission of the crime charged (Footnote Calheam at 813ff). The authorities have never required this".

[22]

Decisions from the United Kingdom

The appellant relied upon the decisions in R v Mendez [2011] QB 876 ("Mendez") and R v Stringer [2012] QB 160 ("Stringer"), as authority for the proposition that the principal must have acted with the assistance or encouragement of the accessory.
The difficulty with placing reliance on these decisions is that they were both decisions concerned with extended joint criminal enterprise at a time shortly before the decision in R v Jogee [2016] 2 WLR 681; [2016] 2 All ER 1; [2016] UKSC 8 ("Jogee") and I am not satisfied that they reflect the common law of Australia as was confirmed by the High Court in Miller v The Queen (2016) 259 CLR 380; [2016] HCA 30 ("Miller v The Queen"). In order to explain why I do not consider these cases to reflect the common law of Australia it is necessary to have regard to the fact that the common law of Australia and that of the United Kingdom have diverged in relation to principles of extended joint criminal enterprise.
In Clayton v The Queen (2006) 81 ALJR 439; [2006] HCA 58 at 444 ("Clayton") the High Court was invited to rule that the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise as stated in McAuliffe should be either abandoned or confined. When the High Court, by majority, declined to do so, one of the reasons was that principles consistent with McAuliffe form part of the common law in other countries.
On 18 February 2016, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held in Jogee that the common law had taken a "wrong turn" and that there is no place for extended joint criminal enterprise liability in the law.
Following the decision in Jogee, the High Court was invited in Miller v The Queen to consider the scope of the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise as stated in McAuliffe and determine whether it should be either abandoned or confined. The Court held that the principle of extended joint criminal enterprise liability stated in McAuliffe should remain part of the common law of Australia.
Relevantly for present purposes, in Miller v The Queen the relationship between accessorial liability and joint criminal enterprise/extended joint criminal enterprise in terms of the differential position between the United Kingdom and Australia was noted as follows by French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle, Gordon JJ (at [33]-[34]): "The relationship of joint criminal enterprise and extended joint criminal enterprise to general concepts of complicity is contested. Professor JC Smith saw no difficulty locating both within ordinary principles of accessorial liability. As noted, in the case of extended joint criminal enterprise, the secondary party 'lends' himself to the enterprise and in so doing gives assistance and encouragement to the principal in carrying out an enterprise that he knows may involve the incidental offence. The alternative view, proposed by Professor Simester, is that joint criminal enterprise is a sui generis form of secondary participation in a crime and not merely a sub-species of accessorial liability. In Clayton v The Queen, the joint reasons adopt Professor Simester's analysis distinguishing the liability of the aider and abettor from the liability of a party to a joint criminal enterprise. The wrong in the case of the aider and abettor is grounded in his or her contribution to the principal's crime. The wrong in the case of the party to the joint criminal enterprise lies in the mutual embarkation on a crime with the awareness that the incidental crime may be committed in executing their agreement. Acknowledgement of the sui generis nature of the secondary liability that arises from participation in a joint criminal enterprise may be thought to resolve at least some of the anomalies that are suggested to arise from allowing foresight of the possible commission of the incidental offence by a co-venturer as a sufficient mental element of liability." (footnotes omitted)
The reference to Professor Simester is a reference to his article, AP Simester, "The Mental Element in Complicity" (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 578 at 596-598, whereas the reference to Professor JC Smith is a reference to his article, JC Smith, "Criminal Liability of Accessories: Law and Law Reform" (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 453. Suffice it to say that, whereas the High Court has adopted Professor Simester's categorisation of joint criminal enterprise as a stand-alone doctrine, the United Kingdom has followed Professor Smith's contention that it forms part of principles of accessorial liability. It is important to note this significant difference in approach when considering any decisions emanating from the United Kingdom in this area of the law.
In that context, I turn to consider the decisions in Mendez and Stringer.
Mendez was relied upon by the appellant as authority for the proposition that, in a case of accessory before the fact, the "encouragement" or "assistance" must have constituted actual encouragement or assistance to the crime even if the principal did not need assistance or encouragement. As mentioned above, Mendez was an appeal concerned with extended joint criminal enterprise decided prior to the decision in Jogee. Toulson LJ observed at [17] that: "Although some distinguished scholars consider that joint enterprise liability differs doctrinally from ordinary principles of secondary criminal liability, we incline to the view that joint venture liability is an aspect of them, as it is put in Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law,12th ed (2008), 207: 'The only peculiarity of joint enterprise cases is that, once a common purpose to commit the offence in question is proved, there is no need to look for further evidence of assisting and encouraging. The act of combining to commit the offence satisfies these requirements of aiding and abetting. Frequently it will be acts of encouragement which provide the evidence of the common purpose. It is simply necessary to apply the ordinary principles of secondary liability to the joint enterprise.'"
As stated above, this passage does not reflect the common law of Australia as was made clear in Miller v The Queen. The specific passage relied upon by the appellant in Mendez is at [23] where his Toulson LJ observed, in the context of a case of extended joint criminal enterprise: "…in both Attorney General v Able and Calhaem the court recognised that there must be a connecting link between D's assistance or encouragement and P's act, without attempting a precise definition of the connection, other than to say (in Calhaem) that P's act must be done within the scope of D's authority or advice. As an example, the court postulated a case where D encouraged P to kill V, and soon afterwards P became involved in a football riot in which he used a weapon and killed V, without realising that the person he attacked was the same person as D had encouraged him to kill. Although P had done what D encouraged him to do, there would have been no link between D's encouragement and P's act. For D to be found guilty jointly with P, D's conduct must (objectively) have constituted assistance or encouragement at the time of P's act, even if P (subjectively) did not need assistance or encouragement."
Stringer was relied upon by the appellant as authority for the same proposition. Stringer was also a decision of Toulson LJ and was decided after Mendez. Toulson LJ described the appeal as raising issues "…once again about secondary liability for murder and the so-called joint enterprise doctrine". In that context, his Lordship observed the following: "[48] It is well established that D's conduct need not cause P to commit the offence in the sense that 'but for' D's conduct P would not have committed the offence (see Mendez and Thompson at paragraph 23). But it is also established by the authorities referred to in Mendez and Thompson that D's conduct must have some relevance to the commission of the principal offence; there must, as it has been said, be some connecting link. The moral justification for holding D responsible for the crime is that he has involved himself in the commission of the crime by assistance or encouragement, and that presupposes some form of connection between his conduct and the crime. The Law Commission observed at paragraph 2.33: 'However, the precise nature of this sufficient connection is elusive. It is best understood, at least where D's conduct consists of assistance, as meaning that D's conduct has made a contribution to the commission of the offence'. [49] In a case of encouragement, as contrasted with assistance, the Law Commission suggested that the encouragement 'must have the capacity to act on P's mind'. The way that the court put it in Mendez and Thompson was that D's conduct must (objectively) have constituted assistance or encouragement, even if P (subjectively) did not need assistance or encouragement. Whereas the provision of assistance need not involve communication between D and P, encouragement by its nature involves some form of transmission of the encouragement by words or conduct, whether directly or via an intermediary. An un-posted letter of encouragement would not be encouragement unless P chanced to discover it and read it. Similarly, it would be unreal to regard P as acting with the assistance or encouragement of D if the only encouragement took the form of words spoken by D out of P's earshot. The Law Commission gave the example of words shouted by D, a football spectator, in a large crowd some distance away from an incident on the pitch involving P (paragraph 2.36)."
Toulson LJ went on to observe that "[w]hether D's conduct amounts to assistance or encouragement is a question of fact" (at [51]) and that "[t]here may be cases where any assistance or encouragement provided by D is so distanced in time, place or circumstances from the conduct of P that it would be unjust to regard P's act as done with D's encouragement or assistance" (at [52]).
Not only am I required to approach any decision from the United Kingdom concerned with extended joint criminal enterprise with some caution, I am not satisfied that either of these decisions stand as authority for the proposition that the principal offender needs to be actually encouraged in any event; only that there need be such encouragement or assistance in the sense of the act of encouragement being capable of constituting encouragement.
The appellant also relied upon the decision in R v Calhaem referred to above in Mendez, as standing as authority for the proposition (in the United Kingdom), that there must be "some connection" between the counselling and the commission of the offence. As stated above at [134] to [137], the decision in R v Calhaem is advanced in the relevant texts and by the authors of the NSWLRC Report 129 as authority for the proposition that there is no requirement for there to be a causal connection between the assistance or encouragement given and the commission of the offence.
R v Calheam concerned a case where the applicant had hired a private investigator to kill a woman who was having an affair with her solicitor. The private investigator killed the woman after receiving a down payment of £5000. The private investigator became the principal witness for the prosecution. He gave evidence that he had no intention of killing the deceased. Rather, he merely intended to act out a charade to make her think that an attempt had been made to murder her. He gave evidence that after the deceased screamed he had "gone berserk" and hit her several times with a hammer and killed her. It appears he stabbed her in the neck with a knife afterwards. The applicant was convicted.
A number of points were raised on her appeal. Relevantly for present purposes one of the complaints made was that there need be a "substantial causal connection" between the acts of the applicant and the commission of the offence. Lord Justice Parker gave the judgement of the court. He noted (at 812) that "the point is a novel one, on which there is no direct authority." His Lordship went on to observe the following at 813: "We must therefore approach the question raised on the basis that we should give the word 'counsel' its ordinary meaning, which is, as the judge said, 'advise,' 'solicit,' or something of that sort. There is no implication in the word itself that there should be any causal connection between the counselling and the offence. It is true that, unlike the offence of incitement at common law, the actual offence must have been committed, and committed by the person counselled. To this extent there must clearly be, first, contact between the parties, and, secondly, a connection between the counselling in the murder. Equally, the act done must, we think, be done within the scope of the authority or advice, and not, for example, accidentally when the mind of the final murderer did not go with his actions. For example, if the principal offender happened to be involved in a football riot in the course of which he laid about him with a weapon of some sort and killed someone who, unknown to him, was the person whom he had been counselled to kill, he would not, in our view, have been acting within the scope of his authority; he would have been acting entirely outside it, albeit what he had done was what he had been counselled to do."
His Lordship referred to a number of decisions, concluding that none of them were of particular assistance. His Lordship then referred to the "modern textbook writers", in particular Smith & Hogan and Granville Williams, and observed that the approach taken by them was consistent with that taken by the trial judge who did not give a direction that there was any necessity for there be a "substantial causal connection" between the counselling and the commission of the offence. The relevant passage in Glanville Williams, Criminal Law, The General Part, 2nd ed. (1961) at 383 relied upon by Parker LJ was in these terms: "where two persons independently and at different times instigate a third to commit a crime, and he does so, each of the two can be convicted as an accessory, it being unnecessary to show which, if either, had an effect upon the mind of the principal. This is an inevitable rule."
The relevant passage in Smith & Hogan, Criminal Law, 5th ed. (1983) extracted in full by Parker LJ in R v Calheam at 817 is somewhat lengthy. It is sufficient for present purposes if I simply extract the following portion of it: "It is clearly the law that an attempt to counsel does not amount to counselling. Proffered advice or encouragement which has no effect on the mind of the principal offender is not counselling [Reg. v Clarkson [1971] 3 All ER 344]. This is not to say that the counselling must be a cause of the commission of the offence. So to require would be to insist that the counselling must be a sine qua non of the offence i.e., that D1 would not have committed the offence if he had not been counselled. This would confine counselling (and abetting) much too narrowly. If it were incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the offence would not have been committed but for D2's advice or encouragement it seems safe to say that the point would figure much more prominently in the law reports. On the contrary, the facts of many cases where D2 has been held liable suggest that the offence would have been committed whether he had participated on not and no one seems to have suggested that this should be a defence."
After extracting the above passage Parker LJ went on to state the following: "Taking the natural meaning of the word, and there being nothing in the authorities to bind us to adopt one or other construction, we take the view that the approach in Smith & Hogan and Glanville Williams is correct. The natural meaning of the word does not apply the commission of the offence. So long as there is counselling-and there was ample evidence in this case of that fact-so long as the principal offence is committed by the one counselled, and so long as the one counselled is acting within the scope of his authority, and not in the accidental way or some other similar way as I have suggested with regard to an incident in a football riot we are of the view that the offence is made out".

[28]

Consideration of ground 1 (a) and (b)

These grounds concern whether the trial judge erred in providing the jury with the written direction in MFI 14 that "[i]t is not necessary, in cases where the accused 'encouraged' the primary offender, for the Crown to prove that he was actually encouraged by the accused's words or actions" (emphasis added). As stated above, his Honour simply read this direction to the jury and did not go on to supplement it with any further oral directions beyond stating that the principles in MFI 14 "may or may not have relevance depending upon your assessment."
Having regard to the decisions relied upon by the appellant, I am not satisfied that any of them stand as authority for the proposition that the Crown must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the principal offender was actually encouraged by the accused's words or actions to the extent that he was subjectively encouraged by those words or actions.
The appellant placed significant weight on the passage from Russell on Crime quoted by Gibbs CJ in Giorgianni (at 481). The third of the three elements said to be necessary for before the fact accessorial liability was that the accessory's "…attitude in respect of it in fact encouraged the principal offender to perform the deed" (emphasis added). The difficulty with reliance upon this extract from Russell on Crime is that Gibbs CJ was at that time considering whether recklessness (as opposed to actual knowledge) is sufficient for the mental element of an accessory before the fact. It was in that context that his Honour cited the passage from Russell on Crime with approval in support of the proposition that "knowledge of the facts is necessary before a person can be made liable as a secondary party for the commission of an offence." In other words, the extract from Russell on Crime was relied upon as support for the proposition that recklessness as to the facts is an insufficient mental element for accessorial liability.
Similarly, Gibbs CJ's adoption of the passage from United States v Peoni at 479-80 (see above at [95]) was also made in the context of addressing the necessary state of mind of the secondary party. United States v Peoni did not concern causation either.
The appellant also relied upon the observations of Mason J in Giorgianni (at 494) where his Honour stated: "In general, the absence of intention as an element of the substantive offence has not been regarded as obviating the necessity for knowledge on the part of the secondary party of the essential facts constituting the offence. The 'link in purpose' between the secondary party and the principal offender is not established where a person does something to bring about, or render more likely, the commission of an offence by another in circumstances in which, through ignorance of the facts, it appears to him to be an innocent act." (emphasis added)
Again, it is important to consider this passage in the context of the issue before the Court in Giorgianni, being the relevant mental element for an accessory before the fact. The words "linked in purpose" and "render more likely" which Mason J adopted from R v Russell were directed at that issue. Nowhere in Giorgianni does any member of the High Court suggest that there must be "actual encouragement" of the principal offender.
More recently in Likiardopolous (HCA), the High Court addressed the basis of the appellant's liability in order to dispose of the ground concerned with inconsistent verdicts. Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ, (with whom French CJ and Heydon J agreed in separate judgements), set out the elements of accessorial liability at [20] (extracted above at [129]). Their Honours also held that the evidence in that trial "was capable of proving that those whom the appellant was said to have directed and encouraged to commit the offence had murdered the deceased" ([27]). At [38], their Honours observed that the evidence from two of the co-offenders who had pleaded guilty to manslaughter supported "as a step in proof of the appellants accessorial guilt, the finding that one or more of those whom he had directed or encouraged had assaulted the deceased with the intention which made the act murder."
Although that decision was concerned with a different issue than in the present appeal, it is relevant that these passages from Likiardopolous (HCA) at [20], [27] and [38] do not suggest that there is any requirement of proof that the acts relied upon to establish aiding and abetting in fact assisted or encouraged the principal in the first agree to commit the offence. Nor do any of these passages suggest that any causal link must be established between the acts of assistance and encouragement and the commission of the crime.
The appellant also relied upon the decision of this Court in Phan but I do not consider that decision to be authority for the proposition that the Crown must establish that the principal was in fact encouraged by an accessory before the fact either. The appellant contends that Hall J should have given directions consistent with the decision of Wood CJ at CL at [68]-[72] in Phan (extracted above at [114]). In particular, reliance was placed on his Honour's observation at [69] that: "What was needed in such a case is proof that the principal in the second degree was linked in purpose with the person actually committing the crime, and was by his or her words or conduct doing something to bring about, or rendering more likely, through encouragement or assistance, its commission." (emphasis added)
When Wood CJ at CL made this observation his Honour was considering the question of whether mere presence at the scene is a sufficient mental element to establish the guilt of a principal in the second degree present at the scene. After making these observations, his Honour went on to refer to the decisions in R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, R v Allan [1965] 1 QB 130; [1963] 3 WLR 677, R v Clarkson [1971] WLR 1402 and R v Russell before observing at [76]: "That there is no general principle by which assent or acquiescence, without more, will give rise to liability can, also, be seen from the decision in Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473 [per] Mason J …at 493…"
Wood CJ at CL then observed at [77]-[78]: "[77] Moreover, in Giorgianni, the Court made it clear that the principal in the second degree must actually know that the crime is being committed or will be committed. [78] To that extent, the non-accidental presence of the appellant and his acquiescence in or assent to what occurred would not be enough, unless it was also made clear that the Crown had to establish that such assent or acquiescence amounted to that degree of encouragement or assistance as would constitute him a principal in the second degree."
The use of the phrases "linked in purpose" and doing something to "render more likely" the commission of the offence referred to in Phan refer to the necessary mental element and do not lend support to any general proposition that there must be proof of causation as contended by the appellant. The words were used by his Honour to distinguish between mere assent by presence as opposed to presence accompanied by some intentional act of assistance or encouragement.
Applying the principles derived from Phan to the present matter, it was necessary for the Crown to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant's "encouragement" amounted to more than mere approval of the crime. It had to be established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant's words constituted intentional encouragement or assistance (Phan at [69] and [78]). The reference by Smart AJ to the requirement that "the accused assisted or encouraged" the co-accused (at [115]), is also a reference in that context to a requirement that the accessory do an act capable of encouraging or assisting accompanied by an intention to encourage or assist. A direction was not given in these terms by Hall J.
The third decision relied upon by the appellant was the statement by Rothman J in Spiteri-Ahern at [33] where his Honour stated: "There must be a causal link between that which is done by the accessory before the fact and the commission of the offence. That causal link does not need to be direct, but it must be in existence. Mere acquiescence will not amount to accessory before the fact."
His Honour does not cite any authority for the general proposition that there must be a "causal link" between the acts of the accessory before the fact and the commission of the offence. His Honour followed this statement by making the uncontroversial statement that mere acquiescence is insufficient to establish guilt as an accessory before the fact. I am satisfied that what his Honour was meaning to convey in this passage is that there must be actual assistance or encouragement and not mere presence and/or acquiescence. His Honour makes no other statement during his judgment to any requirement that the principal must in fact be assisted or encouraged by the accessory.
Although not directly relevant to this appeal, I note also that the reference by his Honour at [34] in Spiteri-Ahern to it being necessary that the accused believed at the time of the assistance that murder was a "distinct possibility" (see above at [132]), does not appear to be consistent with the authorities.
I have also considered the Victorian decisions in Lam (VSCA) and Likiardopoulos (VSCA). Those decisions are authority for the proposition that in a case of an accessory present at the scene, the prosecution is not required to establish that the acts said to constitute aiding and abetting in fact assisted or encouraged the principal in the first degree. It was common ground at the hearing of the present appeal that the decisions in Phan and Lam (VSCA) could be reconciled because they were concerned with different issues. On that basis it was submitted that there was no need for a bench of five judges to sit to consider any such inconsistency. I accept that to be the case. Although Lam (VSCA) expressly states that no actual encouragement is required for an accessory at the fact, Phan was concerned with what, beyond presence, is required. Phan did not consider the question of whether the principal offender had to be actually encouraged.
The thrust of the appellant's submissions under these grounds is that an additional direction needed be given at the appellant's trial that a "causal link" had to be established and that the Crown must eliminate any reasonable possibility that Mr Fuller was acting without the appellant's assistance/encouragement. It was not suggested that such an additional direction need be given in relation to an accessory at the fact. Rather, it was submitted that the appellant's absence from the scene underscored the need for a causal link based on actual encouragement or assistance to be proved. The difficulty with this submission is that the High Court has held in both Johns and Giorgianni that the only difference between the elements for an accessory before the fact and an accessory at the fact is presence. In those circumstances, it is not open for me to find that an additional element of the offence needs to be proved by the Crown in cases where an offender is prosecuted as an accessory before the fact not present at the scene.
I am thus not satisfied that, in cases where a person is charged with being an accessory before the fact in circumstances where they were not present at the scene and the alleged encouragement is by words alone, an additional element must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, namely, that the words in fact encouraged the principal offender. It is difficult to see how such a subjective concept could be established beyond reasonable doubt in any event. As Toulson LJ observed in Mendez at [23]: "The prosecution do not have to satisfy a 'but for' test, i.e. that P's act would not have happened but for D's assistance or encouragement: Attorney General v Able [1984] QB 795, 812 and Calhaem [1985] QB 808. To require the prosecution to satisfy a 'but for' test would be to place an impossible burden on them in many cases and would be liable to produce perverse and unprincipled results. Where a victim (V) is attacked by a group, it may well be the case that if any one of the group had not taken part in the attack the outcome would have been the same. If the prosecution had to satisfy a 'but for' test in relation to each defendant, the result would be that no defendant had committed the offence, whereas it is proper to regard each as having contributed to it. So it is no defence for D to say that without his assistance or encouragement the offence would still have occurred."
Although I have approached the decision in Mendez with some caution for the reasons set out above at [139], I adopt the concerns expressed by Toulson LJ regarding the difficulties that would arise if actual encouragement had to be established by the Crown beyond reasonable doubt on the part of each of a number of co-offenders. How could the Crown ever establish beyond reasonable doubt the particular encouragement of the principal offender (or principal offenders) by separate co-offenders not present at the scene who encouraged one or more of the principal offenders by words alone? Redlich J made similar observations in Lam in the passage extracted above at [124] where his Honour noted that it would impose "an impossible burden" upon the prosecution to have to establish actual encouragement because it would "rarely be in a position to place evidence before a jury as to the effect of the secondary participant's conduct on the principal offender's state of mind."
Although I am not satisfied that, in cases where the accused is said to have "encouraged" the primary offender, the Crown must prove that the primary offender was actually encouraged by the accused's words or actions, I am nonetheless satisfied that the written direction in MFI 14 should have been explained to the jury in the context of what the jury did have to be satisfied of beyond reasonable doubt. While the jury was instructed that it had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was intentional encouragement of Mr Fuller, that direction did not form part of the written directions in MFI 12. Nor was the jury instructed at any stage as to the meaning of encouragement or that the words of the appellant had to be capable of encouraging Mr Fuller.
In assessing whether the direction was inadequate, it is relevant to note that the Crown Prosecutor at the trial requested that the direction at point 1 of MFI 14 be given because, as he said, "it rebuts, if that is the right word, the contention… the submission by [defence counsel] of this opportunistic, that what was done was done as a result of a number of unforeseen circumstances. It goes to that aspect." Although I am satisfied that the Crown does not need to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the principal offender was in fact encouraged, the fact that the Crown sought this direction to close off an aspect of the defence case illustrates why it was incumbent upon the trial judge to balance this direction with a direction as to the meaning of encouragement and that the words of the appellant had to be capable of encouraging Mr Fuller to inflict grievous bodily harm upon the deceased.
In these circumstances, although I am not satisfied that any additional element needs to be proved in a case of accessory before the fact to the extent of any causation, I am satisfied that the relevant directions in this matter concerning the element of encouragement/assistance were inadequate in the way described above at [176], [184] and [185].
I would not allow Ground 1(a) but I would allow Ground 1(b).

[32]

Consideration

The jury was told at point 5 of MFI 14 that "Assisting and encouraging is a continuous act and persists until the substantive offence is committed at which time the accessory's offence is also committed." As I have already observed, after reading MFI 14 to the jury, it was not otherwise explained to the jury by the trial judge.
The Crown Prosecutor at the trial had sought this direction from Hall J based on the decision in R v Robert Millar. He submitted at trial that the decision in R v Robert Millar was authority for the proposition that assisting and encouraging is a continuous act and persists until the substantive offence is committed.
The principal offender in R v Robert Millar was an employee of a company who drove a lorry knowing that the front offside tyre was in a "defective and dangerous" condition. The tyre blew out and caused a head-on collision which killed six persons. The appellant was the director of the company who had instructed the driver to drive the lorry knowing its defective condition. The journey commenced in Scotland and the deaths occurred in England. The appellant was convicted as an accessory before the fact to the dangerous driving.
The issue for consideration in R v Robert Millar was whether the charge had been brought in the proper jurisdiction given that the journey commenced in Scotland and the offence was charged as having been committed In England. It was in that context that the Court (Fenton Atkinson and Megaw L.JJ and Crichton J) held (at 73): "We are quite satisfied that it is not right on the facts of this case to say that the counselling and procuring was complete, over and done with at the moment that Hart drove his lorry out of the garage at Bridge of Weir [in Scotland]. The counselling and procuring was a continuous act which persisted so long as Hart, in pursuance of his employer's orders, was driving the vehicle on this particular trip in its known dangerous condition on the road. In our view, at the moment this accident happened in Lancashire the appellants were still counselling and procuring the dangerous driving by Hart which brought about this disaster."
I am satisfied that the statement in R v Robert Millar is not one of general application and that it should not have been given in the written direction in MFI 14 or at all.
Nor am I able to accept the Crown submission that this written direction in MFI 14 was just another way of directing the jury that the question of whether the appellant's words were in fact acts of encouragement is to be assessed at the time they were spoken and not some later time. If that was what his Honour had intended to convey with this written direction then there would have been no need for the direction at point 2 in MFI 14 which clearly stated that "the accused's state of mind is to be assessed at the time he gave the relevant encouragement or assistance, rather than at the time of the offence". The addition of a direction that "assisting and encouraging" is a "continuous act" and persists until the offence is complete must have meant to convey something more than this.
The appellant's defence at trial was that the death of the deceased was the result of Mr Fuller's spontaneous acts and the appellant could not have foreseen that he would have had the opportunity to log on to his former girlfriend's Facebook account, pretend to be her, lure the deceased to a secluded spot and then beat the deceased to death with a tomahawk. This was the key issue at the trial. A direction that the appellant's words were "continuous" without further explanation was apt to undermine that defence.
I am satisfied that the judge erred in giving the direction in this matter and that it caused unfairness to the appellant. The question of whether the encouragement "was operative" at the time of the murder was critical to the appellant's defence.
I have considered the fact that the appellant's trial counsel expressly opposed the jury being directed that the prosecution must prove that the accused did not "withdraw" the encouragement or assistance at any time before the murder was committed. It is well established that even if a person has agreed with others to commit an offence, he or she may withdraw from that enterprise or agreement. If he or she does so, then they cease to be criminally responsible for the crime if the others who are party to the agreement go on to commit the crime after the withdrawal. These principles were considered by this court in Tierney v R [2016] NSWCCA 144 at [17]-[21]. Defence counsel at trial opposed any such direction being given in the appellant's trial on the basis that this was not a case of joint criminal enterprise nor extended joint criminal enterprise and thus the principles were not applicable.
In circumstances where the principles pertaining to withdrawal from an enterprise only apply where there has been an agreement in the first place, I do not believe that any criticism can be levelled at defence counsel for resisting such a direction in the circumstances. It was correct at law. Although the Crown relies upon this forensic decision by defence counsel in support of its contention that no error occurred in relation to this ground, I do not accept that to be the case. I consider this general issue further below under Ground 2.
I would allow Ground 1(c) as well.

[36]

Consideration

The jury was directed in MFI 12 that the Crown had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knew all the essential facts and circumstances "necessary to show that the principal offender intended to assault and inflict upon the victim grievous bodily harm". The written direction on the elements was supplemented by oral directions by the trial judge which I have already extracted above at [63]-[68]. Those extracts show that the trial judge told the jury that the Crown case was that the appellant had knowledge that Mr Fuller intended to assault Mr Power so badly as to inflict grievous bodily harm upon him, that he was "going to" do this, and that, with such knowledge, the appellant encouraged and/or assisted him to do so.
The High Court held in Giorgianni that the relevant knowledge to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is that the accessory before the fact knew that the principal was "doing something or is about to do something." The closest the trial judge came to giving this direction was where his Honour directed the jury that "[t]he necessary intent or state of mind is absent if the accused lacked the knowledge that Owen Fuller was going to do something which amounts to assault to inflict really serious bodily injury upon Mr Power." This direction was not repeated nor did it form part of the written direction. As this Court held in Hadchiti v R (2016) 93 NSWLR 671; [2016] NSWCCA 63 at [70], written directions are likely to "decisively frame the jurors' deliberations, as opposed to the jurors' recollections of a lengthy oral address."
I am unable to accept the Crown submission that the failure of the trial judge to direct the jury consistent with Giorgianni may have been because it was considered by his Honour to not be apt for the circumstances of this case. The unusual facts of this matter required such a direction.
There was no reference in any of the exchanges between the appellant and Mr Fuller as to when or how any assault would take place and most of the exchanges are suggestive of the assault taking place when both of Mr Fuller and the appellant were present. In the context of the evidence at trial, I am satisfied that it was not sufficient that the jury only be told that they needed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knew "all the essential facts and circumstances necessary to show that Mr Fuller intended to assault and inflict upon the victim grievous bodily harm". The jury ought to have been fully directed, consistent with Giorgianni (as applied in Phan), that the Crown needed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knew that Mr Fuller was going to intentionally inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased.
I turn next to consider the complaint that no "recklessness" direction was given. I note that, although the position of the Crown in written submissions was that the need for such a direction had not been raised by trial counsel, it was accepted during the hearing of this appeal that that had in fact impliedly occurred.
The principal submission of the Crown in relation to the need for a recklessness direction was that the trial judge was only required to direct the jury on the principles of law necessary to resolve those matters which arise for their determination in a particular trial: R v Chai (2002) 187 ALR 436; [2002] HCA 12 at [18]. It was submitted that there is often no need to give a recklessness direction if it has been properly explained to the jury what is meant by "intention" and that such a direction was given in this case.
The nature of the "encouragement and/or assistance" relied upon by the Crown at trial was words alone gleaned from Facebook and text messages which suggest that what was being discussed was whether the two men would assault the deceased when they were together. The exchanges extracted above show that what the appellant wanted to do was something to make the deceased "remember" it. When Mr Fuller suggested that he wanted the deceased to remember the look in his eyes and know that he would "never be able to fuck over any cunt again" the appellant replied "Na u save that for later in life we will jus chop index n look." Mr Fuller then stated that perhaps he should not come with the appellant when he confronted the deceased, writing: "cause I don't know man my head just ticking". The appellant responded "Ur right ill sort him if I need back up I'll ring ya." Despite the appellant stating that he would meet the deceased on his own, Mr Fuller responded "I'll come brah cause its mine and your life he playing with bout time we started playing with his and got him into the state that he does his self saves us."
The High Court in Giorgianni clearly stated that recklessness is an insufficient state of knowledge to implicate an accessory before the fact. As the extracts above show, the Crown case in this matter relied upon non-specific, generalised talk over a period of time about wanting to assault the deceased. The high point of such assault rising to the level of intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm, was the combination of the appellant suggesting to Mr Fuller that if he saw the deceased he should "jump on his head" and the appellant's earlier reference to chopping (presumably "off") the deceased's index finger. After these discussions in which it was suggested that the two men would assault the deceased together, Mr Fuller beat the deceased to death with a tomahawk 24 hours later on his own. This evidence relied upon by the Crown left open the question of whether the appellant was simply reckless as to what Mr Fuller might do.
On the facts in this case, I am satisfied that a recklessness direction ought to have been given along the lines of: "It is insufficient that the [accused] realised that Mr Fuller may possibly intentionally inflict grievous bodily harm upon the deceased. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the [accused] knew that Mr Fuller was going to intentionally inflict grievous bodily harm upon the deceased."
It is well established that the only difference between the elements of the offence for an accessory before the fact and an accessory at the fact is the element of presence. Thus, the requisite knowledge of the actions of the principal offender is the same for a person such as the appellant (not present at the scene) and a person present at the scene who is able to see precisely what actions the principal is taking: see Giorgianni per Mason J at 492. This highlights the importance of a very clear direction in relation to the necessary knowledge in a case such as the present where the appellant was not present with Mr Fuller when the killing occurred.
Before leaving this ground of appeal, I wish to make an additional observation regarding the Crown case as to the appellant's knowledge of what Mr Fuller was going to do. The written "elements" direction, MFI 12, contained as the relevant element that the appellant knew "all the essential elements and circumstances necessary to show that the principal intended to assault and inflict upon the victim, grievous bodily harm, meaning really serious bodily injury." As stated above, the Crown relied upon the appellant's messages to Mr Fuller that he should "chop index" and some time later, that he should "jump on his head." There is a degree of ambiguity concerning the expression, "jump on his head". It could either be describing a general assault or that he meant for Mr Fuller to literally jump on the deceased's head. Reliance was no doubt placed on the appellant's suggestion that they should "chop index" because if a person's index finger was chopped off then that would amount to grievous bodily harm. The difficulty I have with reliance upon a suggestion that the deceased's index finger should be chopped is that it is difficult to envisage a situation whereby cutting off a person's index finger could ever lead to their death.
In Mendez, Toulson LJ observed the following regarding the history of the common law mental element for murder at [27]-[30], albeit in the context of exploring principles of extended joint criminal enterprise: "[27] There is evidence that in former times grievous bodily harm was understood as being synonymous with life-threatening harm. [28] In 1839 the Criminal Law Commissioners remarked in their Fourth Report (168) XIX 235 xx, xxiv, that 'Neither is there any difference between the direct intention to kill and the intention to do some great bodily harm short of death,…as no one can wilfully do great bodily harm without putting life in jeopardy.' and that 'It is the wilful exposure of life to peril that constitutes the crime.' [29] The Indian Penal Code, introduced in 1860, was intended to reflect English law. Section 300 provides that culpable homicide is murder '…if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or secondly, if it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or thirdly, if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or fourthly, if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death…' [30] Lord Goddard, CJ, expressed the view to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953 that 'a person ought not to be liable to be convicted of murder unless he has intentionally or knowingly endangered life', and said he would direct a jury to the effect that anyone who inflicts grievous bodily harm 'must know that he is likely to cause death' (1953, Cmnd 8932, paragraphs 106, 472). However, the Court of Criminal Appeal held otherwise in Vickers [1957] 2 QB 664. Delivering the judgment of the court, Lord Goddard described as impeccable the direction given by the trial judge in which he said: 'The grievous bodily harm need not be permanent, but it must be serious, and it is serious or grievous if it is such as seriously and grievously to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim…' Vickers was approved by the House of Lords in Cunningham [1983] AC 566."
Although it is to be accepted on the current state of the law that an intention to chop off an index finger is capable of constituting the mental element for murder, the facts in this case illustrate how remote such an intention could be from an intention to kill. Given that no submissions were directed to this issue at the hearing in this matter and also given that the relevant principles are well established, I do not propose to consider that issue any further.
I would allow Ground 1(d) of this appeal as well.

[40]

Consideration

In circumstances where I am already satisfied that the other grounds should be upheld, there is on one view no need to consider this ground as well. Despite this, I propose to do so given that there is some overlap between this ground and some of the other grounds. Although defence counsel made no express complaint about these aspects of the summing up, I am nonetheless satisfied that from the outset defence counsel endeavoured to make clear that this was not a case of extended joint criminal enterprise. He raised this issue at the start of the trial after the Crown suggested that it was an element of the offence that the crime that was committed was one that the appellant "intended would be committed or was within the scope of what he believed would be committed". He raised it again in the context of the admissibility of Mr Fuller's ERISP. I am satisfied that the general issue was raised during the trial and thus Rule 4 is not enlivened.
There are four separate instances during the summing up at which time the trial judge used language more closely associated with principles of joint criminal enterprise/extended joint criminal enterprise than accessorial liability. Those four instances were: his Honour's use of the word "design"; his Honour's use of the word "enterprise"; his Honour's description of the offence is one of an assault "with a view" to inflicting grievous bodily harm; and his Honour's suggestion that there were different segments in the evidence.
His Honour summed up to the jury on multiple occasions on the basis that the essential facts were whether "Fuller was going to assault Mr Power with a view to inflicting on him grievous bodily harm" (emphasis added). It was submitted by the appellant that it is possible that the jury may have concluded that all that was necessary for the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt was that the appellant knew Mr Fuller intended simply to "assault" the deceased "with a view to" inflicting grievous bodily harm. Although Mr Fuller may have "had a view" to inflicting grievous bodily harm, that would not have meant that grievous bodily harm was actually intended.
A real question arises as to whether the jury would have understood that they each had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knew that Mr Fuller intended to inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased rather than intending to assault him with the possibility or probability of grievous bodily harm being inflicted.
As for the use of the word "design" in the summing up, it is to be accepted that of the five occasions during the summing up when the trial judge used the word "design", four of them were when his Honour was repeating the closing address of defence counsel. But I accept the appellant's submission in this Court that, when his Honour repeated that part of defence counsel's closing address, he did not use the word "design" as meaning "intention" (as defence counsel had). Rather, his Honour used the word in a way so as to suggest that the case was one of an agreement of enterprise. Whereas defence counsel had asked the jury to consider whether the unforeseen events were the consequence of Owen Fuller acting opportunistically and independently "or whether it was part of the design intentionally encouraged by Mr Blundell" (emphasis added), his Honour repeated that submission as whether "...later events, occurring whether opportunistically or not, may still remain part of the design of some enterprise that an accused person encouraged in the first place and/or assisted" (emphasis added). His Honour then gave the direction I have extracted at [72] above.
His Honour had earlier told the jury that it was a matter for their assessment as to whether the communications fell into segments, or whether "it forms a pattern or part of a design" (see above at [69]).
I accept the Crown submission that, as a general rule, a trial judge cannot be criticised for simply repeating a word introduced by defence counsel in his or her closing address, but defence counsel had used the word "design" in his closing address in the sense of "intent" as that word was used in Giorgianni at 507 where Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ had observed that: "It is not sufficient if his knowledge or belief extends only to the possibility or even probability that the acts which he is assisting or encouraging are such, whether he realizes it or not, as to constitute the factual ingredients of a crime. If that were sufficient, a person might be guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence which formed no part of his design. Intent is required and it is an intent which must be based upon knowledge or belief of the necessary facts." (emphasis added)
It was not only the reference to the word "design" that was apt to confuse in the summing up in any event. His Honour also used words such as "enterprise" and "scope" in his summing up. It was submitted by the appellant that the direction invited the jury to speculate as to what "enterprise" Mr Fuller embarked upon with his "assault" of the deceased, again suggesting that knowledge of an intentional assault potentially sufficed and that an agreement or "enterprise" prior to the crime existed.
It was submitted on behalf of the Crown during the hearing of this appeal that the jury would not have known about the language of joint criminal enterprise liability such that a lay listener would not hear the words in the same way as a criminal lawyer who knows the origin of those terms. It was submitted that the trial judge was simply telling the jury that it need to be satisfied whether the "enterprise", meaning the "confluence of unforeseen events", was something that was foreseen by the accused. But that is not what his Honour told the jury. Rather, his Honour gave the jury a description of enterprises and new enterprises which did not relate to the written elements of the offence in MFI 12.
It was not the Crown case that Mr Fuller and the appellant had any enterprise or agreement to assault the deceased. Nor was it the case that they were working together and that the liability of Mr Fuller could be imputed to the appellant as it would to a participant in an extended joint enterprise. A possible reason for this may have been the difficulty in gleaning from the Facebook and text messages the terms of the agreement between the two of them as to what would be done. If any agreement can be inferred from those messages, it was that there would be an agreement that the two men would assault the deceased together, which clearly did not occur. As French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle, Gordon JJ observed in Miller v The Queen at [34]: "…The wrong in the case of the aider and abettor is grounded in his or her contribution to the principal's crime. The wrong in the case of the party to the joint criminal enterprise lies in the mutual embarkation on a crime with the awareness that the incidental crime may be committed in executing their agreement."
As a general rule, principles of extended joint criminal enterprise cast a wider net than principles of accessorial liability. However, in this trial, the Crown case was brought on principles of accessorial liability. As stated above under the consideration of ground 1(c), the Crown's disavowal of reliance upon principles of joint criminal enterprise or extended joint criminal enterprise meant that any direction about a "withdrawal" was inappropriate. This fact only compounds the potential for unfairness created by these references to an "enterprise". The question for the jury was whether the appellant had contributed to Mr Fuller's crime, not whether the two men had mutually embarked on the crime.
I am satisfied that the use of the words "enterprise", "design" and the assault being "with a view" to inflicting grievous bodily harm were all apt to confuse in the circumstances of the summing up overall. It does not fall for a jury in a case of accessorial liability such as this to determine whether or not there were separate "enterprises" or an original "design" and any possible subsequent "design" or "participation".
I would allow Ground 2.

Blundell v R

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (43 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (3)

Cases Cited (33)