1. The application for review of the Board's decision was heard on 10 May 2013.The Applicant appeared on his own behalf and the Respondent was represented by Ms K. Katavic of Counsel.
2. As the facts were largely agreed, the hearing proceeded by way of submissions. At the conclusion of the hearing the Tribunal reserved its decision.
3. After the hearing, the Applicant sought leave to provide further evidence in the form of a Statutory Declaration from Mr Ismaeel Julius, declared on 28 May 2013, and a tax invoice by Chamberlains dated 3 October 2012. Noting the Objects and Principles in sections 6 and 7 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 ('the ACAT Act') and the particular circumstances of this case, on 12 June 2013 the Tribunal allowed the Applicant to lodge this evidence and granted the Respondent until 21 June 2013 in which to file any material in reply. The Tribunal received the Respondent's further submissions on 17 June 2013.

1. The Applicant contends that he is eligible for HBC as the contract, although dated 10 September 2012, was executed by him on 31 August 2012 and the document was dated on the date of exchange, 10 September 2012 by his solicitors. He further contends that "date of first execution" and "date of exchange" are two completely different dates and each holds a different weight in evidence and stance within legislation.
2. This involves the Tribunal considering when the agreement for sale of a property is entered into and how this affects the Applicant's HBC application and, in particular, when does the "first execution" of an agreement for sale arise.

1. Section 108A of the Taxation Administration Act (1999) ('the TAA') provides that a taxpayer in relation to whom a reviewable decision is made may apply to ACAT for a review of the decision. "Reviewable decision" is defined in section 107A of the TAA as a determination by the Commissioner of an objection by the taxpayer to an assessment; a decision mentioned in Schedule 1, section 1.2; or a decision under a tax law that is prescribed for this section. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to review the Respondent's decision as the decision was the outcome of the objection by the Applicant (taxpayer) to an assessment.
2. Applications for HBC are influenced by the date that an agreement for the sale of a dutiable property was entered into. Section 7 of the Duties Act 1999 ('the Duties Act') deals with the imposition of duty on certain transactions concerning dutiable property and states:

7 Imposition of duty on certain transactions concerning dutiable property

(i) an agreement for the sale or transfer of dutiable

(ii) a declaration of trust over dutiable property;

(2) A transfer or transaction mentioned in subsection (1) is a dutiable

grant, of a Crown lease over land, includes the grant of a new lease

following the surrender or determination of a Crown lease over land that includes part or all of the land over which the new lease is granted.

transfer does not include a transaction treated as a transfer by chapter

Note Ch 3 treats certain transactions as transfers (eg, acquiring an interest in a landholder - see s 85 and s 86). Duty may be charged under ch 3 on those transfers. These may involve the vesting of property under a court order, which would otherwise be a transfer for s (1) (a) or (b) (i) (see dict, def transfer, par (a) (v)).

1. Subsection 8(1) of the Duties Act provides

8(1) The duty charged by this chapter on a dutiable transaction

mentioned in section 7 (1) (b) is to be charged as if each such

dutiable transaction were a transfer of dutiable property.

1. Relevantly subsection 8 (2)(c) provides

(2_) For the purpose of charging duty under this chapter, in relation to a dutiable transaction mentioned in column 2 of an item in table 8:_

(a) the property mentioned in the item, column 3 is taken to be the property transferred (and a reference in this Act to property transferred includes a reference to such property);

(b) a person mentioned in the item, column 4 is taken to be the transferee of the dutiable property (and a reference in this Act to a transferee includes a reference to such a person);

(c) the transfer of the dutiable property is taken to have happened at the time mentioned in the item, column 5 (and a reference in this Act to the "time" when a transfer occurs includes a reference to such a time_)._

1. In accordance with the above Table, an agreement for sale or transfer is taken to have occurred when the agreement is entered into.
2. Subsection 10(a) of the Duties Act defines "land in the ACT" as a dutiable property.
3. Section 11 of the Duties Act refers to when a liability for duty arises. It states:

11(1) A liability for duty charged by this chapter arises when a transfer

(2) However, if a transfer of dutiable property is effected by an

instrument, liability for duty charged by this chapter arises when the

1. Section 243 of the Duties Act refers to execution of instruments and states:

(1) For this Act, an instrument is taken to be first executed the first time

that it is signed and sealed, or signed (as the case may be) by any

(2) However, a contract made by acceptance of an offer contained in

an instrument is taken to be first executed when the offer is

(3) If an instrument is ineffective because of a failure of the necessary

parties to execute it, a refund may be made of any money paid for

1. The following Disallowable Instruments were made under section 139 of the TAA:
   • Determination No. 1 - The Taxation Administration (Amounts Payable - Eligibility - Existing Homes - Home Buyer Concession Scheme) Determination 2012 (No 1) (D12012-98) which applied to
     • (1) a Crown lease that is granted between 6 June 2012 and 31

(2) a transfer of a Crown lease first executed between 6 June 2012

_(3) an agreement for the transfer of a Crown lease, if - _

(a) the agreement precedes the transfer of the Crown lease;

(b) the agreement is first executed between 6 June 2012 and 31 August 2012, inclusive.

• Determination No. 2 - The Taxation Administration (Amounts

Payable - Eligibility - New and Substantially Renovated Homes and

Land only - Home Buyer Concession Scheme) Determination 2012

(1) a Crown lease that is granted on or after 1 January 2013; or

(2) a transfer of a Crown lease first executed on or after 1 January

_(3) an agreement for the transfer of a Crown lease, if - _

(a) the agreement precedes the transfer of the Crown lease;

(b) the agreement is first executed on or after 1 January 2013.

This determination contained the following definition in section 4:

_(7) Eligible property means an estate in fee simple or a Crown lease that - _

(a) has a dwelling upon it that is a new home or a substantially

renovated home, or is subject to an 'off the plan' purchase

agreement as defined in Section 16A of the Duties Act 1999; and

(b) has a dutiable value less than the upper threshold.

Determination No.2 contained the following transitional provisions:

DI2012-98 continues to apply to a grant, transfer, or an agreement to transfer

a lease on an existing home between 6 June 2012 and 31 August 2012 inclusive. DI2012-100 continues to apply to a grant, transfer, or an agreement to transfer a lease on new and substantially renovated homes or land only, between 6 June 2012 to 31 December 2012 inclusive.

• The Taxation Administration (Amounts Payable - Eligibility - New and Substantially Renovated Homes and Land only - Home Buyer

Concession Scheme) Determination 2012 (No 1)(D12012-100) applied to

(1) a Crown lease that is granted on or after 6 June 2012; or

(2) a transfer of a Crown lease first executed on or after 6 June 2012; or

_(3) an agreement for the transfer of a Crown lease, if - _

(a) the agreement precedes the transfer of the Crown lease; and

(b) the agreement is first executed on or after 6 June 2012.

1. The Duties Act 1999 does not provide specific requirements for various dealings in relation to real property in the ACT. Part 2.2 of the Civil Law (Property) Act 2006 ('the Property Act') sets out general rules about property Section 201 states:

(1) An interest in land cannot be created or disposed of by a person

(a) by writing signed by the person or by the person's agent

204 Proceedings do not lie on certain unwritten agreements

(1) A proceeding does not lie against a person on a contract for the sale

or other disposition of land unless the agreement on which the

proceeding is brought, or a memorandum or note of the agreement,

is in writing signed by the person or by the person's agent properly

(a) applies to contracts whenever they were made; and

(b) applies to land under the Land Titles Act 1925; and

(c) does not affect the law about part performance or sales by a court.

_(1) A deed (whether or not it affects property) must be - _

(b) attested by at least 1 witness who is not a party to the deed,

(3) An instrument executed after 1 July 1920 that is signed and attested

in accordance with this section is taken to be sealed if the instrument

is expressed to be an indenture or deed or to be sealed.

(4) A deed executed and attested in accordance with this section may be

proved in the same way that a deed not required by law to be

1. The Civil Law (Sale of Residential Property) Act 2003 ('Residential Property Act') sets out the required steps and documents that may form part of a contract for sale, or proposed contract, for the sale of residential property in the ACT. Section 7 defines seller as:

seller_, of residential property, means a person who - _

(a) has a legal or equitable interest in the property that the person

(b) offers to sell, or invites an offer to buy, the interest.

1. Section 9 sets out a specific list of 'required documents' for the sale of a residential property.
2. Subsection 10(1)of the Residential Property Act states-

10 Proposed contract etc to be available for inspection

(1) A seller of residential property commits an offence if all the

required documents are not available for inspection by a prospective

buyer (or an agent for a prospective buyer) at all reasonable times

when an offer to buy the property may be made to the seller.

1. It is not in dispute that, for the Applicant to be eligible for the HBC scheme, in accordance with Determination No.1, his home being an established home, the contract for sale needed to be first executed after 6 June 2012 and on or before 31 August 2012 (in accordance with the transitional provisions in Determination No. 2).
2. The Tribunal notes that the Applicant agrees and has not disputed the date of exchange of contract for the property occurred on 10 September 2012. The Tribunal finds that the date of exchange of the contract for the property was 10 September 2012.
3. The Tribunal notes that section 9 of the Residential Property Act sets out a comprehensive list of required documents for the sale of residential property. Pursuant to this section a seller would commit an offence if they marketed their property without a contract for sale. The list includes a copy of the proposed contract for the sale; it does not include a Sales Advice. The Sales Advice is not capable of giving rise to legal obligations between the parties.
4. The Respondent contends[2] that no offer is made by a seller at the time the contract for sale is prepared and provided to the agent prior to the marketing of the property, or when a copy of same is provided to the buyer or his solicitor. It is merely an act by the seller, in conformity with the law, to provide all required information to the prospective buyer in order to seek their interest in the property. The Tribunal agrees.

1. The Tribunal has carefully considered the following reasons set out by the Applicant in the Application:

"The department has used date of exchange as when the assessment is to be made at 10 September 2012 and not the evidence, legislation and case law provided about the execution on 31 August 2012.

My interpretation is that s.243 of the Duties Act 1999 and section 219 of the Civil Law (Property) Act 2006 need to be taken into consideration along with case law, specifically of DAVID AND JANE HAGAN V THE COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL REVENUE (Administrative Review) [2010] ACAT 4 AT 4 of 2010, namely item 18. This specifically talks about the execution of the agreement, signed and sealed as per the date of the execution.

I believe it is an important fact that the contract, as prepared and provided to my solicitor on 24 August 2012 remained unchanged. Essentially leaving the signatures executing the documents meaning both are identical in nature, content and intent as of date of execution by the purchaser. Original contract also provides this as evidence...."

1. The Applicant contends that the proper interpretation of section 243(2) of the Duties Act is that 'a contract made by acceptance' 'of an offer' contained in an 'instrument' is 'taken to be first executed' when the 'offer is accepted'. He submits that this interpretation enables the Tribunal to find that the date of agreement and execution was on 31 August 2012 as he, the taxpayer, accepted the terms provided by the vendor and executed the document on 31 August 2012 with completion of settlement and subsequent purchase of the property in the following weeks.
2. The Statutory Declaration from Mr Julius, who was the solicitor who acted on behalf of the Applicant in the purchase of the property, corroborated the Applicant's evidence that he executed the Contract for sale on 31 August 2012. The Statutory Declaration also alleges that the Seller's solicitor had confirmed on 30 August 2012 that the Seller's Counterpart Contract was signed and ready to effect exchange the following day, 31 August 2012. While the Statutory Declaration also alleges that both Contracts were identical in form on 31 August 2012 there was no evidence that Mr Julius had inspected the Seller's Counterpart contract on that day or before exchange on 10 September 2012. The only attendance recorded for 31 August 2012 on the invoice of professional fees was the meeting with the Applicant. For the reasons set out below, it is immaterial to the Tribunal's decision that the contracts were identical on 31 August 2012.
3. The Statutory Declaration does not explain why the contracts were not exchanged until 10 September 2012. The Tribunal notes that the invoice states that stamp duty arrangements were discussed with the Applicant on 31 August 2012. The Applicant, who knew his eligibility for the HBC ceased on 31 August 2012, told the Tribunal that his solicitor knew he wanted the HBC. Given this, the Tribunal can only conclude that there must have been sound legal reasons why the contract was not exchanged on 31 August 2012.
4. In response to a Tribunal question at the hearing the Applicant said that finance arrangements were still being made following his signing the contract on 31 August 2012. The Invoice corroborates this evidence. Indeed, it states that on 3 September 2012 the solicitors acting for the Applicant drafted an email to client "requesting update re finance and purchase status". It appears to the Tribunal that a sound legal reason why the contracts were not exchanged on 31 August 2012 is that the Applicant's finance had not been finalized and his solicitor was ensuring that until the finance had been approved the contract would not be exchanged and the Applicant would not be legally bound to the terms of the contract.
5. The Applicant referred the Tribunal to the 2010 Tribunal[3] decision of Byrne v Commissioner of ACT Revenue[4] ('the Byrne case'). While the Byrne case also concerned an unsuccessful HBC application the issue before that Tribunal was whether there was discretion to extend time for the lodgment under the Taxation Administration Act 1999. Senior Member O'Neil considered the meaning of the words "date of agreement" used in subsection 16(1)(c) of the Duties Act 1999. In the Byrne case, the Applicant had contended that the phrase should not mean the date the agreement was signed but the date the agreement became unconditional. In paragraph 21, Senior Member O'Neil rejected that contention.
6. The Applicant in the present case referred the Tribunal to part of the second sentence of paragraph 21 in the Byrne case, namely: "...The plain meaning of the words is the date the agreement was signed....." and urged the Tribunal to follow Senior Member O'Neil's statement.
7. However, it is clear to the Tribunal upon reading paragraph 21 that this part of the paragraph cannot be read in isolation of the remainder of that paragraph. Paragraph 21 states: "...The plain meaning of the words is the date the agreement was signed which prima facie is the date which appears on the document, that is 20 April 2008. It is on this date that the rights of the parties arose and indeed it is on this date that Mr Byrne's right to rescind the contract if the condition in it is not fulfilled also arose." (the Tribunal's emphasis).
8. In applying what Senior Member O'Neil stated in the whole of paragraph 21 to the present case it would follow that the date that appears on the Agreement of 10 September 2012 is the date that the rights of the parties arose. The date of 31 August 2012 does not appear on the Agreement for Sale in the present matter. It is not the date when the rights of the parties arose. For the reasons set out below, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the parties had agreed that their rights would arise on the signing of the contract or before contracts were exchanged.
9. The Applicant also asked the Tribunal to follow an earlier Tribunal decision Hagan and Hagan v The Commissioner for Australian Capital Revenue[5] ('the Hagan case'). The Hagan case also concerned an HBC application and a Deed of Family Arrangement and, inter alia, whether there was discretion to extend the time for making an HBC application. Presidential Member Professor Spender considered the time limit for HBC applications[6], the date duty must be paid[7] and when the liability for duty arises in section 11 of the Duties Act 1999. Presidential Member Professor Spender stated at paragraphs 18 and 19:

'18. Section 243 of the Duties Act nominates the time that an instrument is first executed as "the first time it is signed and sealed, or signed (as the case may be) by any party to it.".

19. The legislative provisions set out above establish that the HBC application must be lodged within the time that the duty is payable and the duty was payable in this case within 90 days of the execution of the Deed of Family Arrangement on 24 April 2009....'

1. Unlike the present matter, there was no dispute in the Hagan case in relation to the date the Deed was signed or executed. It was not necessary for Presidential Member Professor Spender to consider in detail section 243 and section 11 of the Duties Act 1999. This case does not assist the Applicant.
2. In considering the Applicant's other contentions, the Tribunal noted that he disputes the Respondent's submission that the date of exchange is the date the offer was accepted and has pointed out to the Respondent in his email correspondence[8] that, notwithstanding his requests, the Respondent has not identified to him where in the legislation it is specifically stated that the "instrument must be exchanged." He asserted that, as defined in section 9 of the Duties Act, in determining the form of a dutiable transaction it is immaterial whether or not a dutiable transaction is effected by an instrument or by any other means, including electronic means.[9] The Tribunal refers, below, to its consideration of the relevant legislation.
3. In his Statement of Facts and Contentions the Applicant concluded with the following submission:

The crucial date of 31 August 2012, being the date of execution of the contract for sale is lawful as acknowledged and accepted by the respondent under section 219 of the Civil Law (Property) Act 2006, leaving section 243 of the Duties Act 1999 being applicable and lawful in the execution and validity of the contract for sale. This, when read in conjunction with section 11(2) of the Duties Act 1999, shows that the execution is when the HBC should be applied as of 31 August 2012 as per the evidence and the complex nature of the legislation.

In his application the Applicant pointed out that "the purpose of a scheme like this is for the assistance to help a low income, single person to enter a rough and tough property market, and I clearly fit into this category."

1. The Respondent maintains that the date on the contract, 10 September 2012, is the relevant date as that is the date the contracts for the property were exchanged, and for the purpose of the HBC scheme the date the contract was exchanged and dated is the date the contract was first executed.
2. Essentially, the Respondent's argument is that subsection 11(2) and subsection 243(2) of the Duties Act are to be read together. While subsection 11(2) provides that the liability to pay duties arises, if effected by an instrument, when the instrument is first executed; subsection 243(2) unequivocally states that, as in this case when the instrument in question is a contract made by acceptance of an offer, that contract is taken to be 'first executed when the offer is accepted'. The Tribunal is satisfied and finds that the instrument in this matter is the contract for sale.
3. The Tribunal now turns to consider the words "first executed."
4. 'First Executed' is defined in section 243 of the Duties Act. Subsection 1 refers to an instrument and states-

(1) For this Act, an instrument is taken to be first executed the first time

that it is signed and sealed, or signed (as the case may be) by any

(2) However, a contract made by acceptance of an offer contained in an

instrument is taken to be first executed when the offer is accepted.

1. Subsection 243(2) specifically refers to a contract made by acceptance of an offer contained in an instrument and further states that this 'contract' is taken to be first executed when the offer is accepted.
2. The Tribunal is satisfied that section 243(1) is subject to the qualification in section 243(2), and that section 243(2) is the relevant section to be applied in this matter. It is, therefore, necessary to establish when the offer in this matter was accepted as that is the date when, in accordance with subsection 243(2), the instrument will be taken to be first executed.
3. The Tribunal now considers the words in section 243(2) - "when the offer is accepted".
4. Both the Applicant and the Respondent referred the Tribunal to authorities in contract law. The Applicant referred the Tribunal to L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd[10], Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd[11] and Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd[12]. In L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd the English Court of Appeal found that a person was bound by his or her signature on a contract. However that case did not concern the sale of real estate, the date of execution of the contract, the import of the date of exchange of the contract or the issues before the Tribunal in the present case. While the L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd decision was referred to by Lord Justice Moore-Bick in Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd, it does not assist the Applicant in the present matter. The issue in Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd concerned misrepresentation and the content of a contract which the Appellant had signed but not read. It also did not raise any of the issues before the Tribunal in the present case.
5. While the Tribunal agrees with the Applicant that the High Court considered L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd in Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd , the High Court decision does not assist the Applicant in the present matter. Their Honours , Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ, in a joint judgment, noted the significance with which a signature is viewed by the law and the established position that where a document is signed then, absent fraud, it is immaterial whether or not the signatory read the agreement signed or even knew its contents. It is not in dispute that Mr Bloxham signed the Contract or that he had read and understood the contract.
6. The issue before the Tribunal is when does the "first execution" of an agreement for sale arise in the context of the relevant legislation.
7. The Respondent referred the Tribunal to Parkin v Pagliuca[13] in which the NSW Supreme Court, citing the judgment in Sindel v Georgiou[14] said:

"Exchange of contracts is very well established means of forming a binding agreement for the sale of real property. Long established and well established practices and customs among solicitors in New South Wales which affect what is understood as formation of a contract by exchange are described in the judgment of the High Court in Sindel v Georgiou. [1984] HCA 58; (1984)154 CLR 661. After communications in which it is established that the vendor and purchaser are each prepared to enter into a written agreement, and the terms are established, their solicitors meet, each produces a form of contract signed by the solicitor's client, and the two documents so produced are compared to confirm that the counterparts conform exactly. Then the counterparts are exchanged, literally: each solicitor hands the counterpart signed by his client to the other solicitor, and this event is the formation of their written contract. The parties may or may not have reached agreement and had a written or oral contract before that event; there are a number of possibilities, illustrated in Masters v Cameron [1954] HCA 72; (1954) 91 CLR 353 and the learning on that leading case.

The large advantage of contract formation by exchange of contracts is that after exchange each party is in possession of a memorandum of contract in writing signed by the other party, satisfying the Statute of Frauds and its successor provisions ss.23C and 52A of the Conveyancing Act 1919.

This advantage is enhanced by recent legislation prescribing matters which a Contract for Sale of Land must say in writing."

1. The Respondent's statement[15] that the Australian Capital Territroy also has a practice of exchanging contracts between parties and dating both the seller's and purchaser's copy of the Contract for Sale to bring into existence a binding agreement between the parties, after which their respective rights and obligations under the contract and law arises (Lewis v Stojanovic & Anor[16]), was not challenged by the Applicant in the present case.
2. In Masters v Cameron the High Court considered whether a signed agreement in writing to sell and to purchase a property subject to the preparation of a formal contract of sale acceptable to the solicitors for the vendor, on its true construction, constituted a binding contract between the respondent and the appellants or was only a record of terms upon which the signatories were agreed as a basis for the negotiation of the contract. In that case, the High Court decided that no binding contract for the sale and purchase of the property was made between the parties and stated:

"Where parties who have been in negotiation reach agreement upon terms of a contractual nature and also agree that the matter of their negotiation shall be dealt with by a formal contract, the case may belong to any of three cases. It may be one in which the parties have reached finality in arranging all the terms of their bargain and intend to be immediately bound to the performance of those terms, but at the same time propose to have the terms restated in a form which will be fuller or more precise but not different in effect. Or, secondly, it may be a case in which the parties have completely agreed upon all the terms of their bargain and intend no departure from or addition to which their agreed terms express or imply, but nevertheless have made performance of one or more of the terms conditional upon the execution of a formal document. Or, thirdly, the case may be one in which the intention of the parties is not to make a concluded bargain at all, unless and until they execute a formal contract. ........

Cases of the third kind are fundamentally different. These are the cases in which the terms of the agreement are not intended to have, and therefore do not have, any binding effect of their own. ........

The High Court referred to numerous cases including _Keppel v Wheeler [17]_where Banks LJ observed:

"I pause here to state plainly what is now well established, that where a person accepts an offer subject to contract, it means that the matter remains in negotiation until a formal contract is settled and the formal contracts are exchanged." (the Tribunal's emphasis)

1. The Tribunal notes the Respondent's contention[18]that the importance of an exchange of contracts for the sale of land and whether there was an intention to contract in the absence of an exchange of counterpart contracts is well established. The Respondent referred the Tribunal to a number of cases[19]. The Tribunal finds this contention persuasive.
2. While this presumption may be rebutted by proof of circumstances that are contrary to, and capable of, displacing the presumption, in the present matter no such evidence was produced.
3. If the parties had agreed that a formal contract would be entered into when the Applicant signed or executed the Agreement, as opposed to formal contracts being exchanged, and that, therefore they were prepared to forego the protection afforded by an exchange of formal contracts, it was incumbent on the Applicant to provide that evidence. The present matter falls into the third category of cases in Masters v Cameron.
4. The Applicant seeks, unsuccessfully, to rely on a distinction between 'execution' and 'exchange' of contracts. The Tribunal is satisfied and finds that the Applicant's offer was not accepted until formal contracts were exchanged, on 10 September 2012. Notwithstanding that the Applicant had signed his copy of the Agreement on 31 August 2012 and, apparently, the Vendor had signed his part of the Agreement on 30 August 2012, each of the parties could have legally withdrawn from the Agreement without consequence up until the formal exchange of the Agreements on 10 September 2012.

1. For the above reasons, ACAT is satisfied and finds that as the offer was accepted on 10 September 2012, the date of exchange of formal contracts, pursuant to subsection 243(2) the date of 10 September 2012 is the date of first execution. It follows that the Applicant's solicitors have inserted the correct date in the Duty form.
2. The decision under review will be confirmed.

FULL REPORT ( ) CASE NOTE ( ) UNREPORTED DECISION ( )

[1] Respondent's outline of submissions dated 10 May 2013,paragraph B

[2] Respondent's Statement of Facts and Contentions, para.32

[3] Applicant's Statement of Facts and Contentions, page 5

[4] [2010] ACAT 9

[5] [2010] ACAT 4

[7] Determination No 2, subsection 4(4) and section 16 Duties Act 1999

[10] [1934] 2KB 394; as discussed by J Spencer in 'Signature, Consent, and the Rule in L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd' [1973] Cambridge Law Journal 104.

[11] [2004] HCA 52

[12] [2006] EWHC 1322; [2006] All ER (D) 70 (Apr)

[13] [2008] NSWSC 168

[14] [1984] HCA 58

[15] Respondent's Statement of Facts and Contentions, para 35

[16] [2011] ACTSC 155

[17] (1927) 1 KB 577, at page 584

[18] Respondent's Statement of Facts and Contentions para 36

[19] GR Securities Pty Limited v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Limited (1986) 40 NSWLR 631, McHugh J at 634 C to F_; Headon & Ors v Clancy (Supreme Court of New South Wales, unreported, 26 June 1997_ per Windeyer J at 5_; Lee & Ors v Ross & Ors_ [2003] NSWSC 289 (Palmer J at [4-] - [41] and Peter Warren (Properties Pty Limited & Ors v Jalvoran Pty Limited [2004] NSWSC 1149 (White J at [25] - [31])