The applicants submitted that the agreement was a residential tenancy agreement such that the Tribunal could resolve their dispute with the respondents. The applicants provided submissions in support of their application that the first applicant conceded were prepared using artificial intelligence software.

The Tribunal considered whether there was rent payable under the agreement such that the exclusion under s 5(1)(d) of the Act did not apply, and whether the Residential Parks Act 2007 would apply in relation to the agreement.

• The parties agreed that no money had been paid for rent and therefore, the Act cannot apply to the agreement from which this dispute arises and the Tribunal cannot hear and determine the application;
• The Residential Parks Act 2007 applies only to agreements between a resident of a residential park and the park owner. Clearly, the land in question here was not a residential park in accordance with the definition under that Act;
• The Tribunal considers that providing a written submission which grossly misrepresents the effect of statutory provisions and cites non-existent cases in support could fall foul of either ss 48 and 49 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013.

Residential Tenancy - Jurisdictional matters - Existence of residential tenancy agreement

Residential Tenancies Act 1995 ss 3, 5, 24, 86

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ss 48, 49

McColl v Hearse [2016] SACAT 38

Dismissal of application for lack of jurisdiction (H&C)

Made under the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 ss 3, 5, 24

1. The applicants, Mr Blackmore and Ms Cederman, reside or resided on land owned by Ms Comley and Mr Smyth. The application arises from a dispute between the parties. The application, lodged on 13 May 2025, states that the applicants request that "SACAT urgently:
   • Issue an order preventing the landowners from disconnecting our water and electricity
   • Recognise the validity of our original agreement including the three month notice clause
   • Support our family in maintaining access to basic utilities until we can transition safely off the property within the agreed time frame"
2. Correspondence between the applicants and the respondents indicated that the respondents denied that the agreement was a residential tenancy agreement. The applicants lodged several submissions prior to the hearing, including a submission giving reasons why the Tribunal should accept that the agreement is a residential tenancy agreement and should exercise jurisdiction.
3. The application is made under the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (the Act) which only gives the Tribunal powers to deal with two types of agreement: residential tenancy agreements and rooming house agreements. The residential arrangement described by the applicant self-evidently does not involve a rooming house. It follows that, unless the applicant resides or resided on the respondent's property under a residential tenancy agreement, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction, or in plainer terms, has no lawful powers to determine the dispute and make orders.

1. In Mr Blackmore's submission titled "Legislative Analysis - SACAT Jurisdiction & Tenancy Recognition", he cited three provisions of the Act and one provision of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013. As "Supporting Case Law", the submission cited three Tribunal cases, one each from New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. These references were all in support of his arguments that the relevant agreement was a residential tenancy agreement and therefore within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. On scrutiny of the legislation and the cases, I concluded that the legislative provisions did not express the things ascribed to them by the submission. For example, the submission asserted that s 86 of the Act "prohibits the unlawful disconnection of essential services like water and electricity and provides a statutory right to redress" whereas s 86 actually provides that a tenant may serve a notice on the landlord to terminate a periodic tenancy without specifying a ground.
2. A scrutiny of the cases cited showed that none of the three exists. The citations belonged to cases unrelated to residential tenancy agreements and between parties with names different from those in the submission. My search of the relevant Tribunal databases on austlii.edu.au found no cases, in any year, with corresponding party names.

1. The submission asserts that paragraphs 5(1)(d) and 5(1)(e) of the Act "do not apply where the nature of the arrangement involves exclusive possession, permanence, and ongoing mutual obligations". Paragraph 5(1)(e) of the Act relates to the agreements commonly known as rent-to-buy agreements and I do not consider it to have any relevance. However, paragraph 5(1)(d) of the Act is centrally relevant and, in my view, determinative:

5 - Application of Act > > (1) This Act does not apply to - > > ... > > (d) an agreement conferring a right to occupy premises for the purpose of residence but under which no rent is payable; or > > **Example - ** > > An agreement under which families exchange houses for an agreed period would not be a residential tenancy agreement if no rent were payable under the agreement.

2. The initial informal written agreement referred to "Chris and Holly to work on the certified organic farm in mutual exchange for living, while electricity, water and insurance costs, to be paid by Chris and Holly in either hours or money". The parties agreed that, as a simple fact, no money had been paid for rent.
3. The definition of residential tenancy agreement in s 3 refers only to 'valuable consideration" in exchange for the right to occupy, and labour would certainly constitute valuable consideration. However, the provision quoted above uses the word "rent". At common law, rent might be payable by any form of valuable consideration, but in McColl v Hearse [2016] SACAT 38, President Parker held that for the purposes of the Act, "rent" has a narrower meaning than in the common law, and means money.
4. Contrary to Mr Blackmore's submission, the Act does not provide an exception to this exclusion, in any circumstances. The conclusion is inescapable that the Act cannot apply to the agreement from which this dispute arises, and the Tribunal cannot hear and determine the application.
5. Mr Blackmore, in writing and orally, submitted that the Tribunal should deal with the dispute applying principles of common law, equity, natural justice and good will. Whereas a superior court automatically has power to deal with applications, subject only to the Constitution, tribunals are creatures of statute. They exist only to the extent that statute law creates them, and they may only exercise powers that a statute gives them. The relevant statute here, the Residential Tenancies Act 1995, prevents the Tribunal from exercising any powers in relation to this agreement.
6. The parties may wish to seek independent legal advice in relation to the dispute.

Inapplicability of Residential Parks Act 2007

1. I note that the applicants resided on the respondent's land in a dwelling (a tiny house) that they say they own. This circumstance would also rule out any jurisdiction under the Act, as the agreement would not be conferring on the applicants a right to occupy premises but would be conferring a right to occupy land. Although alternative Acts were not raised in the submissions, this appears analogous to a residential park site agreement under the Residential Parks Act 2007, where the right conferred by the agreement (in exchange for valuable consideration) is to occupy the site and to install or locate a dwelling on it.
2. However, that Act applies only to agreements between a resident of a "residential park" and the "park owner". A residential park is defined as land used for a complex of dwellings with residential park tenancy agreements and/or sites with residential park site agreements. Clearly, the land in question here was not a residential park.

1. I questioned Mr Blackmore as to how he had prepared his submission regarding jurisdiction. His initial answer referred to his own research and speaking with RentRightSA. I repeated my question, and after his response commenced in the same way, I expressed my near-certainty that the submission was the product of ChatGPT or similar artificial intelligence software. Mr Blackmore conceded that it was.
2. The South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, in ss 48 and 49, permits dismissal of applications in certain circumstances. In relation to the submission in question, I commented during the hearing on two such circumstances: abuse of process and attempting to deceive another party or the Tribunal. Providing a very detailed written submission which grossly misrepresents the effect of statutory provisions and cites non-existent cases in support could well fall foul of either provision.
3. Having considered his response and on reflection, I accept that Mr Blackmore was not consciously doing either of those things but rather was enlisting the support of a tool without proper regard to, or perhaps awareness of, its limitations in this respect.