BJV19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 76

Counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant's claim to have been warned to "attend the enquiry whenever they called for" was clearly a requirement to report to the police even though there was no specified date or time for such reporting. Counsel submitted that it was clear that the applicant's release was conditional upon reporting to the police when called to do so. In those circumstances, the applicant submitted that the IAA was unreasonable, illogical and irrational to find that his release without any reporting requirements was in contradiction of the applicant's claims.
The Minister submitted that the applicant's claim essentially was that the applicant was told that he was liable to be summoned to police, and would have to attend if summoned, but that he was otherwise not the subject of any kind of reporting regime. That is, the Minister submitted that any requirement for the applicant to report back was conditional upon the police calling him to do so. However, as found by the IAA, that condition had never been satisfied as the police had never called upon the applicant to report.
The Minister submitted that the highest the applicant's claim rose was that he could have been made the subject of a requirement to report back to police if they had called upon him to do so. However, at no point was such a call made and, accordingly, he was never subject to any crystallised reporting requirement. Thus, the Minister submitted the IAA's finding that the applicant was released with no requirement to report back to the police was fundamentally consistent with the applicant's own claims.
The Court agrees that the applicant has effectively sought to elevate his claim to imply that he was subject to some kind of formal reporting regime. The Court accepts that the evidence before the IAA was that, whilst the applicant may have been warned after release that he must respond if called upon by the authorities, the fact is he was never called upon or issued with any formalised or structured reporting requirements. The IAA did no more than consider the limited nature of the applicant's claim in this respect and then assess it against what had then occurred (or not occurred). There was a cogent and rational basis to the IAA's assessment in this respect.
It may well have been open to the IAA to consider that the statement to the applicant that he should present himself whenever called upon, in the context of suffering two days of mistreatment, may have involved a veiled imperative. Nevertheless, that would be but one finding that was open on the evidence. The rationale set out by the IAA in respect of its finding was clearly logical and permissible having regard to the evidence before it.
No error arises in respect of ground 10.

FedCFamC2G|2026-01-29

The applicant submitted that the IAA's finding that it was implausible that the applicant was permitted to depart the police station with no requirement to report back to the police misrepresents and misunderstands the applicant's claim. The actual claim made by the applicant is as follows (CB 73):

In February 2011, 1 Army officer along with 2 Sri Lankan police officers visited my aunty's house at Trincomalee and took me to Kaakkativu for enquiry. I was kept there for 2 days and was enquired about why I came to Sri Lanka after so many years. They asked me whether I had links with LTTE. I was tortured and burnt with a hot rod on my hands. They repeatedly asking the same questions again and again. I answered them that I did not have any links with the LTTE and I just came to Sri Lanka thinking that the war was over and I could live there peacefully and there was no other reason. My aunty organised for money (50,000 rupees) and gave it to the Police officers and pleaded to release me. I was released after 2 days with the warning that I should attend the enquiry whenever they called for.

Counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant's claim to have been warned to "attend the enquiry whenever they called for" was clearly a requirement to report to the police even though there was no specified date or time for such reporting. Counsel submitted that it was clear that the applicant's release was conditional upon reporting to the police when called to do so. In those circumstances, the applicant submitted that the IAA was unreasonable, illogical and irrational to find that his release without any reporting requirements was in contradiction of the applicant's claims.
The Minister submitted that the applicant's claim essentially was that the applicant was told that he was liable to be summoned to police, and would have to attend if summoned, but that he was otherwise not the subject of any kind of reporting regime. That is, the Minister submitted that any requirement for the applicant to report back was conditional upon the police calling him to do so. However, as found by the IAA, that condition had never been satisfied as the police had never called upon the applicant to report.
The Minister submitted that the highest the applicant's claim rose was that he could have been made the subject of a requirement to report back to police if they had called upon him to do so. However, at no point was such a call made and, accordingly, he was never subject to any crystallised reporting requirement. Thus, the Minister submitted the IAA's finding that the applicant was released with no requirement to report back to the police was fundamentally consistent with the applicant's own claims.
The Court agrees that the applicant has effectively sought to elevate his claim to imply that he was subject to some kind of formal reporting regime. The Court accepts that the evidence before the IAA was that, whilst the applicant may have been warned after release that he must respond if called upon by the authorities, the fact is he was never called upon or issued with any formalised or structured reporting requirements. The IAA did no more than consider the limited nature of the applicant's claim in this respect and then assess it against what had then occurred (or not occurred). There was a cogent and rational basis to the IAA's assessment in this respect.
It may well have been open to the IAA to consider that the statement to the applicant that he should present himself whenever called upon, in the context of suffering two days of mistreatment, may have involved a veiled imperative. Nevertheless, that would be but one finding that was open on the evidence. The rationale set out by the IAA in respect of its finding was clearly logical and permissible having regard to the evidence before it.
No error arises in respect of ground 10.

Through ground 11, the applicant argues that the IAA's failure to accept that the applicant had left Sri Lanka in breach of instructions not to do so was unreasonable, illogical and irrational. Again, this is premised upon the applicant's claim that the applicant was required to report to the police.
The Tribunal's finding in this respect is set out as follows (at [38]):

The applicant claims that he will face harm because he left Sri Lanka despite being told he could not do so. He left Sri Lanka, travelled to Dubai and returned to Sri Lanka legally. He was not subject to any questioning, interest or harassment when doing so and has not claimed that the authorities came looking for him or asked about him during the three months he remained in Sri Lanka between his return from Dubai and his travel to India. I do not accept that the applicant was of any interest to the authorities for having departed Sri Lanka at that time or that he was in breach of any instruction not to do so.

The Court observes that the applicant's initial claim (set out above), taken at its broadest, does not constitute the police prohibiting the applicant from departing Sri Lanka. It simply amounted to a claim that the applicant was to present himself to the police, if so asked. In that sense, there is nothing in that claim that is indicative of any restriction on movement.
In any event, the IAA simply looked at the evidence that the applicant had departed Sri Lanka without incident. That was a rational basis to reject any claim that he would be at harm. The applicant's travel to Dubai occurred after the police had purportedly issued the applicant with a warning that he must present himself upon request. There was no evidence that the applicant's travel was anything other than lawful. The Tribunal considered the circumstances of the applicant's travel to Dubai in granular detail and had regard to the fact that he had travelled on a passport and had returned to Sri Lanka through Colombo airport without incident or harassment. The Tribunal also had regard to the applicant's evidence that he had travelled to India in December 2011, on a date after he had returned from Dubai. The applicant's evidence was that he had again travelled lawfully using his Sri Lankan passport, albeit he claims to have subsequently lost that passport whilst in India.
The Court accepts that the applicant's lawful travel in and out of Sri Lanka after he had received the warning from the police was a rational and relevant basis to find that he was not of interest to the authorities and that he was under no restrictions as to his travel.
There was no error in the approach or findings made by the Tribunal in this respect. Accordingly, the Court finds that ground 11 is not made out.

Ground 12 asserts that the IAA erred when it found that the applicant was of general interest to the Sri Lankan authorities. In this respect, the applicant noted that the IAA had accepted that the applicant had been the subject of severe treatment amounting to torture. The applicant said that the reduction of this treatment to "general interest" irrationally minimised what amounted to torture. Furthermore, the applicant submitted that the extent of such treatment demonstrated that the applicant was specifically targeted by the Sri Lankan authorities.
With respect, the applicant has misconstrued the finding made by the IAA. The actual finding made is as follows (at [33]):

Country information before me indicates that young Tamil males from the North and East of Sri Lanka were subject to arrests, detention, mistreatment, and in many cases, torture by the security forces at this time. I am prepared to accept that as a young Tamil male, and a recent returnee from India, who was not otherwise known to the authorities, the applicant was of general interest to the authorities and that this led to the detention, interrogation, assaults and mistreatment that he has claimed. I accept that such questioning would have included questions about his and his family's links to, or sympathies with the LTTE but I do not consider that this line of questioning, of itself, indicates any more than a general suspicion of the applicant, such as was reportedly experienced by many Tamil males at this time. I also take into account the applicant was not asked any questions about his uncles of their claimed links to the LTTE on any of the three occasions he was questioned, nor was he accused of being linked to the LTTE because of his uncles. I am not satisfied that he was of any adverse interest to the authorities arising from his association with these uncles.

Importantly, the IAA's finding was grounded in identified country information, including reports from DFAT, the UK Home Office, the United States Department of State, and the UNHCR.
It is not the case, as the applicant has submitted, that the IAA had minimised the harm that had occurred to the applicant in the past. The term "general interest" merely reflected the language of the country information and referenced that, in the past, a general interest in young Tamil males from the areas formerly under LTTE control had led to people being subject to harm if they met that profile. However, the IAA went on to engage in a substantial and detailed review of the country information in respect of the current situation. The IAA observed (at [44]):

...the most recent DFAT information does not indicate that at the present time, Tamils or Tamil males from the North, who have no other profile, face a real chance of harm from the authorities...because of those factors alone.

The IAA observed that the UK Home Office had stated that "a person being of Tamil ethnicity would not in itself warrant international protection" (at [45]). Furthermore, the IAA had regard to the applicant's own evidence that he had not had any role with the LTTE and had consistently denied any family involvement with the LTTE when questioned by the authorities.
The Court accepts that the mistreatment meted out to the applicant when detained previously did amount to serious harm. That was not in question. However, the IAA's use of the term "general interest" was directed not towards the severity of his prior treatment but rather to the identification of those who might now be at risk of adverse treatment. On the basis of country information, the IAA found that those of general interest, whilst at risk in the past, were no longer at risk. That was a finding which was grounded in the country information and rationally open on that evidence.
Ground 12 is not made out.

The application for review has failed to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the IAA.
Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-one (51) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard.

Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025

Before the Court lies an application for review of a decision of the then Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA) affirming an earlier decision of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant him a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (SHEV). For the applicant to succeed in this Court, he must establish that the IAA decision contains a jurisdictional error (Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476). This Court cannot undertake a review of the merits of the decision under review.
For the reasons set out below, the Court has not found any jurisdictional error in the IAA decision. On that basis, the application cannot succeed.

In relation to the proposed grounds, the applicant contends that the Tribunal lacked a logical and rational basis, and reached legally unreasonable conclusions, regarding the applicant being released from the Sri Lankan authorities.
It is well established that extreme illogicality or irrationality must be shown measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions (per ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; (2016) 250 FCR 109 at [47]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 at [148]).

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