BJJ25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 340

1. Mr BJJ25 is a citizen of Malaysia. He applied for a Protection (Subclass 866) visa in September 2019 shortly after he arrived in Australia. His claims for protection lacked specificity and he provided little in the way of supporting material. A delegate of the first respondent (the minister) refused the application without interviewing the applicant. The delegate's decision turned on country information reports which suggested the applicant would not be at risk if he were to return to Malaysia given the claims he had made. Those reports also suggested the Malaysian authorities would be willing and able to protect the applicant from any of the risks he described.
2. Mr BJJ25 sought merits review of the delegate's decision.[1] When the Administrative Review Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing, the applicant requested that the Tribunal decide the matter 'on the papers' pursuant to s 106 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act). The applicant did not take up the opportunity to provide any submissions or further information in support of his claims.
3. The Tribunal made its decision on the papers on 15 January 2025. The Tribunal concluded the delegate's decision should be affirmed after the Tribunal found it was not persuaded on the evidence that the applicant had made out his claims. Whereas the delegate had focused on the country information reports without dwelling on the veracity of the applicant's account, the Tribunal was not satisfied on the limited material available that the applicant's claims had any substance.
4. Mr BJJ25 has now sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. He has identified three grounds of review in which he criticises aspects of the Tribunal's decision. I will deal with each of the grounds below. It was also necessary to consider whether there are any issues arising out of the Tribunal's decision under s 106(3) of the ART Act to accede to the applicant's request that the matter be decided without a hearing. That required me to grapple with three recent decisions of this Court, namely:
   • LLR24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G 1227;
   • BYI25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1671; and
   • EES25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1797.
5. I invited the parties to make supplementary submissions on any issues that might arise out of these cases. The minister provided submissions. The applicant did not.
6. I am satisfied the application for judicial review should be dismissed. I explain my reasons below.

1. Mr BJJ25's claims for a protection visa were set out in his application. The application is reproduced in exhibit one (the court book) at pp 1ff. His claims are outlined at pp 13-15.
2. The applicant asserted he was involved in a relationship with a Muslim woman before he left Malaysia. He said that was a problem because the laws in Malaysia did not permit mixed relationships between Buddhists and Muslims. The woman's parents also objected to the relationship. Mr BJJ25 said there was a worry the couple had been or would be reported to the police. He said the relationship ended tragically when the woman suicided. The applicant said he also attempted to take his own life at the same time and on subsequent occasions. He said his partner's family harassed him, and he continued to contemplate suicide. He added the police would not assist him. He noted in the form (at p 14 of the court book) that he thought it would be possible for him to relocate within the country to an area where he would not face the risk of harm. He decided to leave Malaysia in 2019 and travelled to Australia.
3. The applicant did not provide any supporting information despite being given the opportunity to do so during the primary decision-making process. The delegate's decision refusing the application is dated 1 October 2019. In the statement of reasons, the delegate appeared to accept the applicant's claim that he was involved in a mixed relationship, and accepted persons in mixed relationships in Malaysia might face family pressure and social stigma. The delegate relied on country information reports when it expressed doubts that the applicant would face harm on account of his involvement in a mixed relationship. The delegate also found the Malaysian authorities would protect the applicant from unlawful abuse. Given the availability of effective protective measures in Malaysia, the delegate was satisfied the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution and was not a refugee. The delegate also concluded the applicant did not face a real risk of suffering significant harm. That finding disposed of the claim for complementary protection.

1. The Tribunal wrote to Mr BJJ25 on 2 October 2019. The letter is reproduced in the court book at pp 45ff. The Tribunal acknowledged receipt of Mr BJJ25's application for review. It invited Mr BJJ25 to provide any information or written arguments in support of his case. The applicant did not provide anything. The Tribunal also told the applicant about free legal advice services that might assist him in an email on 28 August 2024.
2. The Tribunal wrote to the applicant again on 19 December 2024 to invite him to attend a hearing. That letter is reproduced at pp 50ff of the court book. The hearing was listed for a date in January 2025.
3. Under a heading which read 'Things to do before the hearing', the Tribunal's letter said:

Please provide all documents you intend to rely on to support your case by 8 January 2025 if you have not already done so. The decision made by the department should set out the reasons for the decision, and you should have regard to these, and any changes in your circumstances, in providing documents and preparing for the hearing. Any documents or written arguments sent to us should be in English and if not then accompanied by a translation from a qualified translator [Emphasis added].

1. After talking about the arrangements for the hearing, the letter included the following information about an alternative procedure leading to a decision. The letter said:

What if I want the Tribunal to make a decision without holding a hearing

You can use the enclosed 'Response to hearing notice' form to request the Tribunal to make a decision without a hearing. However, you may still be required to attend the hearing if the Tribunal is unable to determine the issues in your absence. If you request the Tribunal to make a decision without a hearing, and we still require you to attend, we will inform you of this before the hearing date.

Please note that if you request the Tribunal to make a decision without a hearing, and the Tribunal proceeds to make a decision because it considers the issues can be determined in your absence, this does not guarantee you will receive a favourable decision.

1. The letter attached a fact sheet about the hearing process. In the first paragraph, under the heading 'What is a hearing?', the fact sheet explained:

The hearing is an opportunity for you to give evidence and present arguments to us relating to the issues arising in your case. We may also take evidence from other persons.

1. In December 2024, Mr BJJ25 returned the 'Response to hearing notice' which is reproduced at pp 61ff of the court book. He ticked a box that said "No, I will not participate in the hearing, and request the Tribunal to make a decision on the papers without holding a hearing". He did not provide any additional information or submissions in support of his claims; he relied on the contents of his application for a protection visa.
2. The Tribunal responded to the request for a decision on the papers on 2 January 2025. It confirmed it would cancel the hearing and proceed to make a decision on the material before it.
3. The Tribunal's decision and statement of reasons is reproduced in the court book at pp 69ff. After recounting the history of the matter, the Tribunal noted the applicant's request to have the matter decided without a hearing pursuant to s 106(1) of the ART Act. The Tribunal correctly observed s 106(3)(c) required the Tribunal to "consider whether it appears that the issues for determination in the proceedings can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties to the proceeding" (at [11]). It then set out the issues which arose for consideration and explained (at [14]):

In this case, it appears to the Tribunal that the issues for determination in the proceeding can be adequately determined in the absence of a hearing. The Tribunal has before it a copy of the Department's file. This includes a copy of the protection visa application form, which contains his biographical information and protection claims. Based on this information, the Tribunal is able to determine the applicant's identity and receiving country. It is also able to form conclusions about whether he meets the criteria for a protection visa in accordance with ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the [Migration Act 1958 (Cth)] without seeking further evidence or submissions from the applicant.

1. The Tribunal thereafter summarised the claims contained in the applicant's application for a protection visa. It then observed (at [19]):

The applicant's protection visa applicant does not include any evidence in support of his claims regarding his relationship, his girlfriend's death, nor any medical evidence relating to his mental health.

1. The Tribunal noted the reasoning in the delegate's decision before discussing the relevant criteria in s 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) and other mandatory considerations. The Tribunal then addressed the claims and evidence before it. The gravamen of the decision is captured at [32]-[33] where the Tribunal said:
   1. There are insufficient details about the applicant's claimed relationship with a Muslim woman. Apart from the applicant's mere assertions, there is no evidence to support his claims about the death the Muslim woman, the circumstances of her death, or that her family have attempted to harm the applicant in the past. He has not provided any information or supporting evidence to substantiate his claims or that he is of continued interest to Muslim woman's family or any other person. The applicant has been in Australia for several years and there is no information that he has been contacted or is aware of any issues or incidents in Malaysia that causes him to fear for his safety if returned to Malaysia.
   2. Given the very limited nature of the applicant's evidence which lacks sufficient details, I am not satisfied that the applicant was in a relationship with a Muslim woman as claimed, nor do I accept his claims in relation to the death of the Muslim woman or that he left Malaysia for the reasons claimed. Consequently, I do not accept the applicant's claims about the impact of the Muslim woman's death on his mental health, that he is at real risk of self-harm, or that he faces any risk of being harmed if returned to Malaysia for the claimed reasons.
2. The Tribunal recorded its findings on the key issues at [35]-[36]:
   1. On the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Nor am I satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm.
   2. I am not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
3. While the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision, my discussion of the reasons of both decision-makers should make clear that their reasoning differed. Whereas the delegate's decision to refuse the visa was based on country information and the availability of adequate protective measures for the applicant given the claims about his relationship, the Tribunal did not accept the claims about the relationship or other matters.

1. Mr BJJ25 was not represented before me. He said he drafted the grounds of review in the application with the assistance of an interpreter. There are three grounds which can be summarised as follows:
   • First, the Tribunal failed to properly assess the evidence and claims in his application. He referred in particular to the claim made in his application for a visa that he experienced threats and harassment at the hands of his late girlfriend's family. He also referred to the cultural and societal pressures faced by persons involved in interfaith relationships. He said those things might amount to systematic and discriminatory risks;
   • Second, the Tribunal did not consider the applicant's mental health issues which were compounded (or perhaps exacerbated, I would interpolate) by threats and social stigma; and
   • Third, the Tribunal applied the wrong standard of proof, effectively requiring that it be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.
2. I have already alluded to a further issue which might arise out of the Tribunal accepting the applicant's request to have the matter decided on the papers pursuant to s 106 of the ART Act. I will return to this issue below after I have dealt with the three enumerated grounds of review.
3. The first ground is without substance. The Tribunal did refer to the applicant's claims about the risk he might face from members of his late girlfriend's family at paragraphs [18] and [32], and it also referred to the applicant's claims about the acceptability of interfaith relationships at [30]. While the references to each of those matters are brief, that is a reflection of the paucity of detail in the material provided by the applicant in connection with these claims. Indeed, that is the whole point of the Tribunal's finding: the Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant provided sufficient evidence to substantiate his claims. Given s 5AAA(2) of the Migration Act makes clear the applicant is required to provide the material which would enable the decision-maker to conclude he was a person owed protection obligations, that conclusion was unsurprising. It was certainly open to the Tribunal on the limited material that was provided.
4. The second ground must also fail. The Tribunal did refer to the applicant's claim that his mental health was at risk, but the Tribunal noted (at [33]) the absence of supporting evidence in this regard. Mr BJJ25 confirmed before me that he had not provided any medical evidence to the Tribunal. In the circumstances, it is wholly unsurprising that the Tribunal found it was not satisfied the applicant experienced a mental health condition which might need to be considered as part of his claims. The Tribunal's findings were certainly open to it having regard to the limited material provided.
5. The third ground must also be rejected. The Tribunal does not say anything in its reasons to suggest (either expressly or by implication) it was applying a more stringent standard of proof than the one applicable under the law.

1. I turn then to potential issues arising out of the fact the Tribunal's decision was made on the papers. Section 106(1) of the ART Act says the Tribunal may make a decision after considering documents and things given to the Tribunal without holding a hearing in any of the circumstances identified in ss 106(2)-(5). Section 106(3) is applicable in this case. It permits the Tribunal to make a decision on the papers in a matter where the only parties are the applicant and a non-participating party if the decision is wholly in favour of the applicant (s 106(3)(b)(i)) or the applicant has requested that course (s 106(3)(b)(ii)). In this case, the Tribunal was acting on the applicant's request. The request was made in the 'Response to hearing notice' form found at p 61 of the court book. After noting the fact of the request in its reasons (at [8]), the Tribunal went on to address the further requirement in s 106(3)(c) which must be satisfied when the Tribunal is considering whether to exercise the discretion in s 106(1). That sub-section says the Tribunal may proceed to make a decision on the papers where:

...it appears to the Tribunal the issues for determination in the proceeding can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties to the proceeding.

1. The parties were invited to provide written submissions about the operation of s 106 given the recent judgments of this Court in: LLR24; BYI25; and EES25. I understand LLR24 is being appealed to the Full Court.
2. Two questions potentially arise in relation to the operation of s 106 in these proceedings. The first addresses whether the Tribunal could reasonably be satisfied "the issues for determination in the proceeding could be adequately determined in the absence of the parties" in circumstances where it was unlikely the applicant could succeed on the material then available. The second question is whether the Tribunal's hearing invitation which drew attention to the delegate's decision caused the review process to be procedurally unfair in circumstances where the Tribunal's decision made on the papers addressed different issues to the delegate's decision.

Was the Tribunal justified in making a decision on the papers?

1. I should say at once I am satisfied the Tribunal discharged its obligation under s 55 of the ART Act to provide the applicant with a "reasonable opportunity" to present his case, which included the opportunity to present evidence and make submissions. That can be seen from:
   • The Tribunal's letter acknowledging the application dated 2 October 2019 which expressly invited the applicant to provide material or written arguments;
   • The email from the Tribunal dated 28 August 2024 which provided information about legal help for applicants with refugee claims; and
   • The hearing invitation dated 19 December 2024 which invited the applicant to attend a hearing to discuss the case. That letter repeated the invitation to provide additional material or arguments that the applicant wanted the Tribunal to consider.
2. Mr BJJ25 did not take up the invitation to provide additional arguments or material to the Tribunal, and he declined the opportunity to attend the Tribunal hearing that was initially scheduled. He requested instead that the Tribunal proceed without a hearing having regard to the material already before the Tribunal. That may not have been a wise choice given the state of that material, but it is also possible he had no alternative because further material might not have been available. In either event, sub-ss 5AAA(2) and (4) of the Migration Act make clear it was the applicant's responsibility to produce sufficient material to establish he was a person that was owed protection obligations. The Tribunal was not required to interrogate the applicant's reasons for making the request for a decision on the papers, and it was not required to make his case for him or provide him with what amounted to an advisory opinion in which it declined to entertain the request for a hearing on the papers unless and until the applicant addressed shortcomings in his case.
3. The Tribunal's reasons make clear it turned its mind to the issues which fell to be decided in the review: at [13]. Having provided the applicant with ample opportunity to present evidence and submissions, the Tribunal found there was no reason to think the applicant had any further material to present nor were there any other issues that would require a hearing: at [12]. That finding was clearly open to the Tribunal having regard to the applicant's passive approach to the delegate and the review. The Tribunal also noted (at [14]) it had the contents of the departmental file which included:
   • the application form containing the applicant's biographical details, so the Tribunal could determine the applicant's identity and the receiving country; and
   • the protection claims set out in the form.
4. In those circumstances, the Tribunal concluded (at [14]) it was in a position to reach conclusions about whether the applicant satisfied the criteria in s 36(2) of the Migration Act. Once it was satisfied it could perform its statutory task, it was entitled to proceed as it did. The fact the applicant's case was unlikely to elicit a positive response to the statutory questions identified at [13] because of gaps in the evidence does not mean the Tribunal was obliged to insist on a hearing. It was entitled to proceed without reverting to the applicant.
5. At the hearing, I asked Ms Rayment, solicitor for the minister, whether she was able to identify any examples where the Tribunal might not be satisfied "the issues...can be adequately determined" in the absence of the parties. She ventured the Tribunal might refuse a request from an applicant to make a decision on the papers where the Tribunal had doubts about the applicant's competency. It is possible to imagine other circumstances which might also give the Tribunal pause. On reflection, I do not think it is helpful or necessary to focus on those lest doing so might inhibit a future Tribunal in the proper exercise of the power under s 106.
6. The enquiry contemplated in s 106(3)(c) is expressed in general terms for good reason. The obligation on the Tribunal to satisfy itself that "the issues...can be adequately determined" in the absence of the parties appears to be a specific application of the general principles governing the Tribunal's procedures. Those principles are evident in the provisions found in Part 4 Division 5 Subdivision A of the ART Act, but they show up in other procedural provisions. Section 49 makes clear the procedure of the Tribunal is within the discretion of the Tribunal. Section 79 says the Tribunal may give directions that regulate the conduct of a proceeding. The Tribunal also has the power to determine whether proceedings will take place in person or remotely using the telephone or a video platform like Microsoft Teams. These and other procedural powers conferring a discretion are available so the Tribunal can manage proceedings in a way that achieves the Tribunal's objective in s 9 of the ART Act. In each case, the discretion to exercise a procedural power is expressly or implicitly shaped by the circumstances of the particular proceeding, and it is subject to the provisions of the ART Act and the Administrative Review Tribunal Rules 2024 (Cth). The discretion is also informed by the objectives and any applicable provisions of the enactment under which the reviewable decision was made.
7. The discretion to accede to a request under s 106 must be understood in this context. The proviso in s 106(3)(c) is clearly designed to preserve the Tribunal's ability to make a prudential judgment about whether the review should proceed on the papers as requested. While that power must be exercised reasonably, it is intended to give the Tribunal the flexibility it needs to do its job: see BYI25 at [190]-[191].

1. That brings me to the second question which potentially arises in relation to s 106 of the ART Act in the circumstances of this case. The question arises out of the Tribunal's hearing invitation where the applicant was told:

The decision made by the department should set out the reasons for the decision, and you should have regard to these, and any changes in your circumstances, in providing documents and preparing for the hearing.

1. In LLR24, Judge Johns referred to an identical passage in the hearing invitation issued by the Tribunal in that case (at [25]). His Honour found the reference to the delegate's decision assumed particular significance because the Tribunal's ultimate decision on the papers turned on an issue that was not considered by the delegate or notified to the applicant. After reviewing the statutory framework and considering changes that have been made following the relocation of the relevant provisions from the Migration Act into the ART Act, his Honour concluded the procedural fairness obligations referred to in decisions like SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63 continued to apply. Judge Johns summarised those obligations at [56]. His Honour explained (at [56]-[57]):

56. The procedural fairness requirements arising out of SZBEL include that,

(a) An applicant is entitled to put information:

(i) in support of their interests, and

(ii) to rebut adverse material.

(b) The "issues arising in relation to the decision under review" have central importance.

(c) It is not enough to identify the issues broadly as (for example) an "entitlement to a protection visa". Issues are to be articulated with some particularity.

(d) A Tribunal must advise of any potential adverse conclusions.

(e) Although the Tribunal is not confined to the issues before the Delegate, the issues in the Delegate's decision are the starting point for understanding the issues to be determined. This is so because the legislation tasks the Tribunal with a "review" function.

(f) If the Tribunal has not identified new issues, the applicant is entitled to assume the issues that were before the Delegate are the relevant issues to be determined.

1. Absent the above an applicant will have been denied the opportunity to be heard.

1. The advice in the letter from the Tribunal which draws attention to the delegate's decision is consistent with what was said in SZBEL.
2. In EES25 and BYI25, other judges of this Court have taken a different view of the applicability of the reasoning in SZBEL following the introduction of the ART Act. The ART Act has attempted to subject migration reviews to some of the procedures and approaches that apply to reviews in the Tribunal's non-migration caseloads. The implications of that change emerge from a careful comparison of the operative provisions in the Migration Act and the new provisions in the ART Act. The former s 425 of the Migration Act required that the applicant must (subject to the exceptions in s 425(2)) be invited "to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review" (emphasis added). SZBEL had pointed out (at [33]-[35]):
   1. ...The reference to "the issues arising in relation to the decision under review" is important.
   2. Those issues will not be sufficiently identified in every case by describing them simply as whether the applicant is entitled to a protection visa. The statutory language "arising in relation to the decision under review" is more particular. The issues arising in relation to a decision under review are to be identified having regard not only to the fact that the Tribunal may exercise (s 415) all the powers and discretions conferred by the [Migration] Act on the original decision-maker (here, the Minister's delegate), but also to the fact that the Tribunal is to review that particular decision, for which the decision-maker will have given reasons [emphasis in original].
   3. The Tribunal is not confined to whatever may have been the issues that the delegate considered. The issues that arise in relation to the decision are to be identified by the Tribunal. But if the Tribunal takes no step to identify some issue other than those that the delegate considered dispositive, and does not tell the applicant what that other issue is, the applicant is entitled to assume that the issues the delegate considered dispositive are "the issues arising in relation to the decision under review". That is why the point at which to begin the identification of issues arising in relation to the decision under review will usually be the reasons given for that decision. And unless some other additional issues are identified by the Tribunal (as they may be), it would ordinarily follow that, on review by the Tribunal, the issues arising in relation to the decision under review would be those which the original decision-maker identified as determinative against the applicant.
3. The equivalent provisions in the ART Act do not refer back to "the issues arising in relation to the decision under review". Section 55, a generally applicable provision, refers instead to the parties being given a reasonable opportunity to:

(b) access any information or documents to which the Tribunal proposes to have regard in reaching a decision in the proceeding; and

1. Section 106 does not refer back to "the issues arising in relation to the decision under review" either. It is a generally applicable provision which embraces the (almost) Tribunal-wide concept of de novo merits review in which the Tribunal steps into the shoes of the original decision-maker so it can remake the reviewable decision afresh having regard to the material and submissions before the Tribunal. In doing so, it exercises the same powers and is subject to the same formal limitations as the primary decision-maker. While the existence of a reviewable decision is a precondition to the exercise of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, the Tribunal is not ordinarily interested in the reasoning, findings, or failings of what occurred previously. Everything is potentially on the table in the Tribunal's review: such is the nature of a de novo review on the merits.
2. Having said that, it is often the case that parties in Tribunal proceedings will agree (or the respondent decision-maker will concede) some issues which potentially arise out of the primary decision are not in contention before the Tribunal. Alternatively, it might be agreed those issues should be understood or approached in a particular way. Those points of agreement, concession or contention would ordinarily be spelled out in the statement of facts, issues and contentions in the caseloads where that immensely useful document is filed. If the parties conduct their respective cases on the basis of such an understanding, the Tribunal should not, as a matter of fairness, proceed to address different issues, arguments or evidence without reverting to the parties to expose the Tribunal's thinking and invite them to comment.
3. There is no respondent and no statement of facts, issues and contentions in this case, but there is a letter from the Tribunal which suggests the applicant can rely on the delegate's decision for some insight into the issues before the Tribunal. The question is whether that letter - addressed to a person who may be unrepresented and is ignorant of the process, and who may not speak English - amounts to a representation by the Tribunal that it would limit itself to the issues and arguments before the delegate. If the applicant relied on a representation to that effect when preparing their case before the Tribunal and was prejudiced by a Tribunal-induced misunderstanding of the scope of the review, there may be cause for complaint about the fairness of the proceedings.
4. Judge Kaur-Bains in EES25 (at [69]) was sceptical that anyone who read the letter in question in the wider context would be led into the error identified by Judge Johns in LLR24. Without questioning the correctness of her Honour's finding on the facts of EES25, I am conscious applicants in many other cases are poorly advised or unrepresented. They may have a limited command of English and experience a sense of confusion about the review process. They may be inclined to fasten onto what appears to be (and what was almost certainly intended to be) general guidance from the Tribunal concerning the review that a more knowledgeable person would disregard. But much turns on the circumstances of each case.
5. In this case, the applicant was a passive participant in the decision-making process before the delegate and the Tribunal. After submitting his application form containing a brief description of his claims for protection, he did not thereafter take advantage of the opportunities to make out his case. There is no evidence before me as to how the applicant understood the relevant passage in the letter from the Tribunal dated 19 December 2024 that purported to offer guidance about how to approach the issues in the review. In particular, there is no evidence or submission to the effect the applicant disadvantaged himself by relying on the guidance contained in the letter when considering whether to opt for a hearing on the papers, or when deciding what submissions or evidence he should place before the Tribunal. The applicant did not raise any grounds contending jurisdictional error on that point and the question has only arisen for discussion in these reasons because I raised it with the parties and invited their submissions - an invitation the applicant did not take up. In those circumstances, I have no sufficient basis for finding there was any procedural unfairness in this case.

1. None of the applicant's grounds of review are made out. I am also not satisfied there is any jurisdictional error arising out of the fact the Tribunal's decision on the papers was made on a different basis to the delegate's decision. In reaching that view, I have carefully considered the implications of the guidance contained in the Tribunal's letter to the applicant of 19 December 2024 which may have invited an applicant to believe there would be a degree of continuity between the issues (and perhaps the approach to those issues) articulated by the delegate in their statement of reasons and the issues to be addressed by the Tribunal on its review. To the extent the letter conveys such a representation, it potentially undermines the Tribunal's de novo review and may create an obligation to revert to the applicant to seek further material where the Tribunal does what it is otherwise entitled to do: make a fresh decision on the merits having regard to the law, material and submissions before it. But there is no basis for finding that unhelpful attempt to be helpful had any impact on the conduct of the applicant in this case.
2. The application for judicial review is refused. That means the applicant is unsuccessful. I will hear from the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge McCabe.

[1] The application for review was directed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. That body was subsequently replaced by the Administrative Review Tribunal (the ART). The ART is referred to as "the Tribunal" throughout these reasons.