2. The employer has leave to file and serve a report by Dr Daniels provided that it substantially accords with Dr Daniels' report dated 8 July 2025 and to adduce evidence from Dr Daniels at the hearing of the worker's section 42 referral.

3. Subject to (4) the employer has leave to adduce evidence from Dr Peter Gan and Dr Sandra Gongora at the hearing of the worker's section 42 referral including medical records served prior to these orders other than reference to and comment on Dr Daniels' report.

4. On the filing and service of Dr Daniels' report in accordance with (2) the employer has leave to adduce evidence from Dr Gan and Dr Gongora referring to and commenting on Dr Daniels' report as proofed in Dr Gan's report of 14 August 2025 and Dr Gongora's report of 3 September 2025 as if Dr Daniels' report dated 8 July 2025 is the report filed and served in accordance with (2).

5. The worker has leave to file and serve expert reports responding to the reports of Dr Daniels, Dr Gan and Dr Gongora and has leave to adduce evidence from the makers of those reports at the hearing of the worker's section 42 referral.

6. Any right to object to the admissibility of evidence adduced in accordance with these orders on grounds other than grounds arising under section 42G and section 49(1A) is reserved.

8. Within 14 days the parties are to file a consent memorandum for proposed agreed orders in respect to the costs arising in connection with the referrals and application determined by these orders.

9. If the parties are unable to agree proposed orders for the purposes of (8) then within 21 days the parties are to file and serve submissions in respect to costs.

10. The worker's section 42 referral is referred for a conciliation conference to be conducted by the Deputy Registrar or his delegate pursuant to Division 2 of Part 5 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 on a date to be determined by the Deputy Registrar or his delegate.

11. The worker's section 42 referral is to be listed for hearing in Launceston on 10-14 November inclusive.

12. The worker is to file a statement of facts issues and contentions by 10 October 2025.

13. The employer is to file and serve an answering statement of facts issues and contentions by 17 October 2025.

(a) File and serve statements of any lay witnesses that the party intends to call at the hearing.

(b) File and serve an indexed bundle of documents to be tendered at the hearing other than expert reports and proofs and statements of witnesses.

15. The worker is to file and serve any additional expert report or proof within 3 business days of receipt and not later than 3 November 2025.

16. The worker is to file and serve an indexed and paginated hearing book containing the referral, statements of facts issues and contentions, expert reports, statements of evidence and all other documents to be tendered at the hearing by 3 November 2025 and is to file one hard copy of the hearing book by 6 November 2025.

17. Filing and service in accordance with these directions is to be in electronic form except where otherwise provided.

18. The worker has liberty to apply to adjourn the hearing and any such application is to be filed together with written submissions.

19. The parties have liberty to apply in respect to the timetable.

Workers compensation - Application pursuant to s 49(1A) for leave to adduce medical evidence not served during the conciliation process - Referral pursuant to s 90C for worker to be medically reviewed - Review by consideration of radiology - Referral pursuant to s 60A for interim orders

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988;

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020

V v Caterpillar Underground Mining Pty Ltd (Ref No 843/2015) [2015] TASWRCT 44

Taxi Apps Pty Ltd v Uber Technologies Inc & Ors [2024] VSC 63;

Sales & Anor v Transport for NSW [2020] NSWLEC 145;

Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 16;

Body Corporate Strata Plan No. 57963 v Gunn [2025] TASCAT 15;

B. v The State of Tasmania (Department of Education) [2019] TASWRCT 28

The decision has been anonymised for the purpose of publication.

1. The parties have filed the following referrals and application:
   • A referral by the employer pursuant to s 90C of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the Act) to require the worker's consent to review of the worker's radiology by Dr Katie Daniels.
   • An application by the employer pursuant to s 49(1A) for leave to adduce evidence from Dr Daniels, Dr Peter Gan and Dr Sandra Gongora at the hearing.
   • A referral by the worker pursuant to s 60A seeking an interim order for weekly payments and costs thrown away.

1. The relevant facts are largely not contentious. The worker claims to have suffered a low back injury on 4 March 2024 while working for the employer. On 4 April 2024 she made a workers compensation claim. The claim was disputed, and on 9 July 2025 consent orders were made pursuant to s 81A of the Act that the employer not pay compensation.
2. On 4 February 2025 the worker filed a referral pursuant to s 42 of the Act seeking a determination that the employer is liable to pay workers compensation.
3. The referral proceeded to a conciliation conference on 25 June 2025, but did not settle. The conciliation process ended and the referral was referred by the conciliator for hearing.
4. To that point the employer's case was that the incident alleged by the worker to have caused her injury did not occur. The employer proposed to rely only on lay witnesses, despite having had the worker assessed for independent medical reviews by Dr Gan, a neurosurgeon, and Dr Gongora, an occupational physician. Dr Gan had provided reports dated 17 April 2025 and 17 June 2025, and Dr Gongora a report dated 4 June 2024. Those reports were not served during the conciliation process.
5. On 27 June 2025 the employer's solicitors briefed counsel, Mr Dockray SC. On 2 July 2025 Mr Dockray provided a memorandum of advice. As a result of Mr Dockray's advice the employer began to investigate a further ground of defence, being that if an injury did occur as alleged it fell within the extended definition of injury in the Act and that the relevant test of causation was not satisfied.
6. On 4 July 2025 the employer's practitioner sought a report from Dr Daniels, who is a radiologist. Dr Daniels provided a report to the employer's practitioners on 7 July 2025. Dr Daniels did not examine the worker. Her opinion was based on radiological reports properly obtained by the employer through legal process, and the scans for those reports which she accessed from online imaging databases.
7. Shortly prior to the initial directions hearing the parties provided agreed proposed directions for a timetable. The appointment for the directions hearing was vacated and the agreed directions were made on 21 July 2025. They included a direction that the s 42 referral be listed for hearing on dates to be determined by the Registry in consultation with the parties.
8. Various dates, firstly in September and then in November, were proposed, but the referral was not formally listed before events overtook this process.
9. Dr Daniels' report was filed and served on 31 July 2025.
10. On 4 August 2025 the employer sought supplementary reports from Dr Gan and Dr Gongora to address the proposed defence identified by Mr Dockray, and for comment on Dr Daniels' report.
11. At the employer's request a directions hearing was held on 6 August 2025. At the directions hearing Mr Dockray explained that the employer's case was not in fact ready for hearing, that the employer would seek to rely on Dr Daniels' report and that supplementary reports had been sought from Dr Gongora and Dr Gan. Counsel for the worker observed that the employer would require leave pursuant to s 42G and s 49(1A) to rely on the medical reports it had obtained, and that leave would be opposed. I vacated the directions previously made and did not list the s 42 referral for hearing, but advised the parties that the Registry would reserve the dates from 10-14 November in Launceston for a hearing. The directions hearing was adjourned until 22 August in anticipation of the referrals and application that were subsequently filed.
12. On 12 August 2025 the worker emailed Dr Daniels directly advising that she had not provided her consent to Dr Daniels reviewing her medical imaging files. In this respect, in the medical authority at Part 4 of the workers compensation claim the worker had indicated that she did not consent to her medical information being released. On 18 August 2025 Dr Daniels withdraw her report on the basis that she did not have the worker's authority to view the radiology on which she had based the report.
13. Dr Gan provided a report to the employer dated 14 August 2025, and Dr Gongora provided a report dated 3 September 2025. On 25 August the employer served the reports of Dr Gan and Dr Gongora, other than Dr Gongora's report of 3 September 2025 which was served on a date prior to 11 September 2025.
14. On 19 August 2025 the worker, through her practitioners, refused to consent to the review of her radiological records by Dr Daniels.
15. The employer then undertook the necessary preliminary requirements set out in s 90A(3) for the worker to be required to submit to an independent medical review, taking the view that the requirements in s 90A of the Act concerning submission by a worker to independent medical review included a review of diagnostic test results and medical records.
16. That history culminated in the hearing together of the s 90C and s 60A referrals and the application for leave.

1. Section 90A sets out the obligations and threshold requirements for a worker to submit to an independent medical review. The provisions relevant to this matter are s 90A(1)-(4), which provide:

90A. Workers may be required to submit to independent medical reviews > > (1) For the purposes of this Act, an independent medical review of a worker is a review, conducted by a single medical practitioner (other than a medical practitioner chosen by the worker) who has expertise in a field, or a part of a field, relevant to the worker's injury, and may include - > > (a) one or more examinations of the worker; and > > (b) a review of any diagnostic test results, or other medical records, in respect of the worker. > > (2) If a worker claims compensation or is receiving weekly payments, the worker's employer, or the employer's insurer, may require the worker to submit to an independent medical review of the worker by a medical practitioner. > > (3) A worker may only be required under subsection (2) to submit to an independent medical review if the employer or the employer's insurer - > > (a) has discussed with the worker's primary treating medical practitioner the reasons why it is intended to have the review conducted; and > > (b) has informed the worker, in writing, of the reasons why it is intended to have the review conducted. > > (4) A worker who is required under subsection (2) to submit to an independent medical review by a medical practitioner - > > (a) is to - > > (i) submit, at a reasonable time, and at a reasonable place, of which the worker has been given reasonable notice in writing, to the review, including any examination conducted by the medical practitioner as part of the review; and > > (ii) be taken to have given consent to the provision, to a medical practitioner nominated by the worker's employer, of any medical reports or records that relate to the injury to which the worker's claim for compensation relates; or > > (b) is to, within 30 days, refer the matter under section 90C(2) to the Tribunal.

2. The parties have approached this case on the basis that s 90A(1)(b) applies to the circumstances of Dr Daniels' report. I will accepted that as being so without interrogating that issue further.
3. Section 90A(3) sets out two threshold requirements to a worker's obligation to submit to an independent medical review, being a requirement that the employer or the employer's insurer discuss the reasons for the medical review with the worker's primary treating medical practitioner and that they inform the worker of the reason for the review. Those steps were not taken prior to the preparation of Dr Daniels' report. They have been taken subsequently. The employer's expectation is that Dr Daniels would provide a second report essentially in identical terms to the initial report, but in compliance with s 90A.
4. The worker has refused to provide her consent to Dr Daniels' use of her radiology. Disagreements concerning medical assessments are dealt with by s 90C, which provides:

90C. Disagreements, &c., about reviews > > (1) Subsections (2) and (3) apply in relation to a worker if the worker - > > (a) refuses without reasonable excuse to submit to an independent medical review or examination when required under section 90A to do so; or > > (b) in any way obstructs such a review or examination; or > > (c) refuses to submit to, or undertake, any treatment required in accordance with section 90A(7) . > > (2) If this subsection applies to a worker, the worker, the worker's employer or the employer's insurer may refer the matter of the worker's refusal or obstruction to the Tribunal. > > (3) If this subsection applies to a worker, the worker's right to compensation and to take any proceedings under this Act in relation to compensation is, except if the treatment to which the worker has refused to submit is surgical treatment, suspended until the matter has been determined by the Tribunal. > > (4) If - > > (a) a copy of a report is served under this Division on a worker's primary treating medical practitioner, the worker's employer, or the employer's insurer; and > > (b) the worker, employer or employer's insurer are unable to agree as to - > > (i) whether, or to what extent, the worker's incapacity is due to the injury in respect of which the worker is claiming or receiving compensation; or > > (ii) the worker's condition or fitness for employment - > > the worker, the employer or the employer's insurer may refer the matter to the Tribunal. > > (5) In determining whether an independent medical review, or an examination of a worker, ought to be conducted, the Tribunal must have regard to the following matters: > > (a) whether the reviewer has the appropriate expertise to properly assess the worker's injury; > > (b) whether, in the circumstances, an excessive number of reviews or examinations have been conducted in respect of the worker; > > (c) whether the worker has previously made a complaint, on reasonable grounds, to the worker's employer or the employer's insurer about the conduct of the medical practitioner who it is proposed will conduct the review; > > (d) the location and timing of the review - > > and may have regard to any other matter that the Tribunal thinks fit. > > (6) In determining any matter referred to it under subsection (2) , the Tribunal may, if the payment of compensation has been suspended under subsection (3) , specify - > > (a) whether compensation may be paid to the worker in respect of that period of suspension; and > > (b) the period of that suspension in respect of which the worker is entitled to be paid compensation.

5. The employer contends that the worker has refused without reasonable excuse to permit Dr Daniels to prepare a report based on her radiological records. The worker contends that it is unreasonable for her to do so given the late timing of the review, which has been sought after the completion of the conciliation process.
6. This issue overlaps with the s 49(1A) application.

1. The employer's application is for leave to adduce evidence from Dr Daniels, Dr Gongora and Dr Gan. Leave is required because the reports were not provided to the worker during the conciliation process.
2. Division 2 of Pt V of the Act requires the parties to undertake a conciliation process. Section 42G(1) and (2) provide:

42G. Evidence during conciliation process > > (1) During a conciliation process, a party to the process must provide the other parties to the process with any report or proof of evidence from a medical practitioner or other expert witness on whom the party intends to rely should the claim proceed to an arbitrated hearing before the Tribunal. > > (2) If a party fails to provide the report or proof of evidence referred to in subsection (1) during the conciliation process, the party may not adduce evidence from the medical practitioner or other expert witness at an arbitrated hearing before the Tribunal, unless the Tribunal otherwise allows.

3. It is clear that the Act requires each party to put their cards on the table in terms of medical evidence during the conciliation process, to maximise the possibility of settlement and to avoid parties subsequently being taken by surprise.
4. Although the reports were not served during the conciliation process, under s 90B of the Act they would have been provided to the worker's primary treating medical practitioner within seven days, who in turn would have provided copies to the worker. The worker did not assert otherwise. The reports retained privilege, which was not waived by compliance with s 90B: V v Caterpillar Underground Mining Pty Ltd (Ref No 843/2015) [2015] TASWRCT 44. The worker would have been aware of their contents, but not aware that the employer would seek to rely on them in the Tribunal, and presumably prepared her case and engaged in the conciliation conference accordingly.
5. Section 49(1A) provides:

(1A) A party may not adduce expert evidence at a hearing to which this Act relates, other than a hearing under section 81A, unless - > > (a) the evidence has been disclosed to the other parties to the hearing during the conciliation process in accordance with section 42G; or > > (b) the Tribunal otherwise allows.

6. The conciliation process concluded with the unsuccessful conciliation conference and the referral for hearing. The employer therefore needs leave under s 49(1A)(b) to be able to adduce evidence from the doctors.
7. The discretion to grant leave in s 49(1A) is unfettered, except insofar as it should be exercised judicially having regard to relevant matters and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The Act provides no direction in respect to the exercise of the discretion, except the apparent purpose served by s 42G.
8. The principal consideration in exercise of the discretion to admit evidence where leave is required is the interests of justice: Taxi Apps Pty Ltd v Uber Technologies Inc & Ors [2024] VSC 63 [29]. In considering an application to admit late expert evidence in that case Nichols J found some guidance from considerations relating to the amendment of pleadings in Aon Risk Services Australia v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27, observing at [29]-[30]:

29 As the Court of Appeal observed in Northern Health v Robert Kuipers [2015] VSCA 172, the well‑understood principles in Aon, as summarised in Ultra Thoroughbred Racing Pty Ltd v Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London & Ors [2011] VSC 370, are applicable in a general sense to the late service of an expert report. While the primary question on the service of a late report remains what do the interests of justice dictate, those principles are often expressed in the following questions: > > (a) whether there will be a substantial delay caused by the amendments; > > (b) what is the extent of any wasted costs; > > (c) is there any irreparable element of unfair prejudice caused by the amendments? > > (d) what are the concerns of case management arising from the stage in the proceeding at which the amendment is sought; will the grant of leave lessen public confidence in the administration of justice? And > > (e) has a satisfactory explanation been given for seeking the amendment at the stage at which it is sought? > > 30 Furthermore, interests wider than those of the moving party - the expenditure of time, costs and limited judicial resources - are relevant considerations in the determination of whether to allow interlocutory processes.

9. In Sales & Anor v Transport for NSW [2020] NSWLEC 145 at [9]- [15] Robson J considered an application to rely on an expert report produced on the first day of the hearing. His Honour observed that the rules of evidence did not apply to the particular type of proceeding before him, but that matters of fairness and justice and principles of case management must be considered. In particular His Honour had regard to whether there was an explanation for the late provision of the report and the likely consequence that the evidence if admitted would result in extending the time of the hearing and result in additional evidence being led.
10. To those matters I would add consideration of whether the evidence is on its face relevant, probative and admissible, as there is little point in granting leave otherwise, although Robson J noted that relevance and admissibility are not sufficient alone. These identified considerations are not exhaustive.

1. The employer contended that by reason of the radiological reports having been disclosed by the worker in discovery, and the reports including links to the radiological films, the worker thereby gave consent to consideration by the employer of those materials, extending to Dr Daniels' assessment, and that Dr Daniels' conclusion that consent was not provided was misconceived. It does seem peculiar that an employer would be required to follow the 90A procedure in order to obtain expert opinion on material properly disclosed to it during litigation. The further step taken by Dr Daniels to access the radiological scans may be the trigger. However, I do not need to determine that issue as I am satisfied that orders pursuant to s 90C should be made. I am also satisfied that and leave should be granted.
2. Section 90(5) sets out four matters that I must have regard to in determining whether an independent medical review ought be conducted. In the context of the section requiring a worker to undergo the intrusive circumstance of a medical examination, those matters must be taken into account and given weight as central considerations in making the decision: Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 16 [82]. I do not see the list of matters to be had regard to as exhaustive of the relevant consideration.
3. No issue arises under s 90C(5)(a), (b) or (c). Dr Daniels' expertise was not in issue. The worker has not been the subject of excessive reviews or examinations, having seen Dr Gongora once, on 28 My 2024, and Dr Gan once, on 7 April 2025. She will not be required to be examined by Dr Daniels. Doctors Daniels, Gan and Gongora each have a different area of medical specialty. Although the worker asserted that Dr Daniels did not have her consent to prepare a report she raised no complaint about her conduct.
4. In respect to the location and timing of the review for the purposes of par (d), location is not relevant as the worker will not be examined. As to timing, again no appointment for examination is required. However, the review will be undertaken when s 42G and s 49(1A) would operate to require leave for the employer to rely on the report in the hearing of a referral. Leaving aside the fact that a review might be undertaken for a reason other than litigation, given that the review in this case is clearly for the purposes of the proceedings in the Tribunal, the question of timing turns on the same considerations as the application for leave, which I have considered below.
5. Additional considerations are that the radiological reports have been discovered, that the reports and scans would be held by medical practitioners or practices and would be liable for production under summons, and that the purpose for the review by Dr Daniels is directly relevant to the issue of liability. The purpose of s 90C is to protect a worker from the imposition of unreasonable examination. That apparently extends to the intrusion of disclosure of medical records for consideration. Neither circumstance applies in this situation. No examination is required and the records have been disclosed, albeit that Dr Daniels was required to take a further step to view the scans that were reported on.
6. The worker submitted that Dr Daniels' withdrawal of her report supported the conclusion that she resiled from the opinions expressed in the report. I do not consider that any such inference may reasonably be drawn. Clearly the exchange of correspondence between Dr Daniels and the worker and between Dr Daniels and the employer's practitioner shows that Dr Daniels' expression of withdrawal of her report related to the issue of the absence of the worker's consent, not a change in her opinion.
7. I am satisfied that the review ought to be conducted.
8. Turning to s 49(1A), for the reasons set out below I will grant leave for the employer to adduce evidence from Dr Gan, Dr Gongora and, given my conclusion concerning s 90C, from Dr Daniels.
9. The main objectives of the Tribunal, as set out in s 10(1) of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020, include to ensure that referrals are processed and resolved as quickly as possible while achieving a just outcome, to act with as little formality and technicality as possible and to be to be flexible in the way in which the Tribunal conducts its business. There are no pleadings in the Tribunal to define the justiciable issues raised, although as a matter of procedural fairness they may be restricted to matters identified in referrals, statements of facts issues and contentions and witness statements, where expanding the issues would unfairly prejudice the other party by taking them by surprise or where circumstances would prevent or make unreasonably onerous that party advancing contradicting material. The purpose of s 42G is consistent with that approach.
10. The employer has explained the reason for the application for leave and the steps taken to address the failure to perceive the issue identified by Mr Dockray. The employer may properly be criticised for not having identified the issue before the conclusion of the conciliation process. As I have noted below, it should have been apparent from the material filed with the referral. It would also have been apparent from the reports obtained by the employer before the conciliation conference. However, the material before me does not indicate that the employer made a forensic decision not to pursue the issue, rather it appears that it took a somewhat blinkered approach to its contention that an injury simply did not occur as alleged by the worker. It was not in fact aware of the issue until after the conciliation process finished. Insofar as the employer erred in this regard, for the reasons set out below it is an error capable of remedy, and the employer has pursued remediation appropriately and with proper expedition.
11. The worker carries the onus of proving her entitlement to compensation: s 49. That will inevitably include causation, a question in issue even on the employer's initial formulation of its case. The initial workers compensation certificate describes the injury as a recurrence. A medical report by Dr Ananthababu Sadasivan filed with the referral refers to the injury as an aggravation of a pre-existing degenerative condition. Dr Sadasivan expresses the view that the worker's employment is the major or most significant contributing factor to the aggravation. These matters bring the injury within the extended definition in s 3 of the Act, and are the basis of the causation issue identified by Mr Dockray. The reports sought to be relied on by the employer address that issue. The reports are relevant and, adopting the meaning described in s 3 of the Evidence Act 2001 are probative in the sense that the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of the facts of injury and causation. Tribunal will be assisted by that evidence in reaching the correct decision.
12. The worker pointed to matters of opinion expressed in the reports of Dr Gan and Dr Gongora that respond to questions and assumptions raised by their letters of instruction that might be said to stray outside their areas of professional expertise and go to ultimate conclusions that are matters for the Tribunal. Those elements of the reports may be the subject of particular objection if the reports are tendered, or submissions as to weight, but those are considerations best left to the Tribunal at the hearing.
13. It is not immediately apparent that granting leave would result in substantial delay. The employer is ready to proceed on the reserved dates. Granting leave may result in the reserved dates being lost if the worker requires greater time to obtain responding opinion, if she chooses to seek that opinion, and it cannot be obtained from her existing experts. If a substantial delay ensues that may be addressed by future applications.
14. The interests of justice include consideration of the public interest in the efficient use of the publicly funded resources of the Tribunal and inefficiencies in the application of those resources: Body Corporate Strata Plan No. 57963 v Gunn [2025] TASCAT 15 [6]. Hearing dates have been reserved, if not formally directed, however they are over six weeks hence and if the worker is unable to be properly and fairly prepared to respond to the additional evidence those dates may, with sufficient notice, become available for allocation to other matters.
15. The worker is aware of the contents of the reports and has been for some time. She has been aware that the employer proposes to rely on them at the hearing for about three weeks. Although she will have framed her case on the reports not being served, this is not a situation where she is taken by surprise at the last moment. There is sufficient time for her to prepare her case in response, subject to any delay in obtaining further expert opinion. Any prejudice may be reasonably addressed by the opportunity to obtain further opinion and possibly by costs orders. There is no irreparable element of unfair prejudice that will be caused by granting leave.
16. I am satisfied, for these reasons, that the interests of justice favour granting leave.

1. Section 60A establishes a power to make interim determinations. It provides (with ss (2A), which is not relevant to this case, omitted):

60A. Power of Tribunal to make interim determinations, &c. > > (1) The Tribunal may make an interim determination, ruling or direction in respect of a claim for compensation referred to it, whether or not liability for the claim has been accepted or disputed. > > (1A) The Tribunal may make an interim determination, ruling or direction in the following circumstances: > > (a) where a delay by one side of the proceedings substantially prejudices the other side; > > (b) where a party fails to comply with a direction of the Tribunal or a conciliator; > > (c) where the Tribunal is otherwise satisfied that the interests of justice require it. > > (2) Where the Tribunal makes an interim determination, ruling or direction it must make an order which gives effect to that interim determination, ruling or direction. > > (2A) ... > > (2B) It is not a requirement for the making of an interim order that the applicant might otherwise suffer serious or irreparable harm. > > (2C) In determining a rate of weekly payments for the purposes of an order under this section, the Tribunal may have regard to the basic salary if a rate cannot be reasonably determined by reference to section 69 . > > (3) An order made under subsection (2) is to specify the period for which the interim determination, ruling or direction applies.

2. The worker relies on s 60A(1A)(a), alleging delay by the employer.
3. The worker did not identify any particular prejudice beyond an asserted delay in determination of the worker's claim, observing that she is not in receipt of workers compensation. The worker did not provide any evidence of her circumstances or matters beyond the history of the proceedings and the material filed by the employer, but did tender certificates establishing her ongoing incapacity.
4. In respect to its referral and application the employer made observations concerning the expedition with which the worker had conducted her case, pointing to the period that had lapsed between the making of s 81A orders and the filing of the s 42 referral, being some seven months, and in taking over eleven weeks to make discovery of documents, and delay arising from her refusal to consent to Dr Daniels preparing a report. I do not see that those matters have particular relevance for the employer's referral and application, but they are relevant to the s 60A referral. I am not critical of the worker in respect of those periods, as there may be valid reasons for the delay in instituting proceedings and in making discovery, but in the absence of any explanation they do not indicate any particular urgency by the worker in resolving her claim. There is no suggestion of delay by the employer during the conciliation process. Any relevant delay has arisen following the conciliation conference.
5. The employer has acted expeditiously to pursue the second defence since Mr Dockray identified it. It is possible that earlier dates for hearing may have been available if the estimated hearing time were shorter based on the employer's original defence. However, there has been no adjournment or vacation of hearing dates.
6. It is not unusual for parties to retain counsel after conciliation has been unsuccessful. No doubt, if Mr Dockray had been instructed prior to the conciliation conference the second defence would have been identified before the conference, and the only difference in process subsequently would have been that leave would not have been required for the additional evidence.
7. In B. v The State of Tasmania (Department of Education) [2019] TASWRCT 28 Chief Commissioner Webster dealt with an application for interim orders The Chief Commission was considering and application under s 60A(1)(c) rather than (a), but made comments at [60] relevant to this case:

60. The making of interim awards under s60A is designed to apply to those circumstances which fall outside the ordinary nature of a contested claim before the Tribunal. Although finding the worker has established, in this case, there is a serious issue to be tried, this is not an unusual situation in a contested claim for compensation which the Tribunal deals with on a daily basis. In this case it appears all the medical evidence that needs to be obtained has been obtained and all that is left for the employer to do is to clarify its instructions by speaking to the worker's former Principal and to finalise its views on the construction of s87. ... The issue of prejudice to the worker in this case is not significant given her financial resources. The possible prejudice, however, to the employer may not be capable of being addressed if the worker was successful on this application but unsuccessful on her s42and/or s_87_ referral. I say this because I know of no mechanism by which the employer could recover any interim compensation paid in circumstances where the worker is ultimately found not to have an ongoing entitlement to weekly payments.

1. I am not satisfied that there has been any, or sufficient, relevant delay by the employer following conclusion of the conciliation process to take this matter outside the ordinary nature of a contested claim before the Tribunal and to warrant an interim order.
2. The s 60A application also seeks costs. I will provide for that below.

1. I am satisfied that the employer should succeed on the s 90C referral and the application for leave, and that the s 60A referral should be dismissed insofar as it seeks an interim order in respect to weekly payments.
2. In respect to costs, the employer has been successful, but has been so in the context of seeking an indulgence. I indicated that I would give the parties the opportunity to deal with the matter of costs following my determination of the substantive issues on the referrals and application.
3. Given that the timetable to prepare for hearing was vacated I will make further directions for a timetable. The timetable will permit the worker to obtain further medical opinion in response to that delivered by the employer if she so choses, and provide liberty to the worker to apply to adjourn the hearing if she is unable to obtain such evidence in time to maintain the reserved dates of 10-14 November.
4. In addition, the parties agreed that if the employer's referral and application were successful a further conciliation conference on the s 42 referral should be convened.
5. Accordingly I make the following orders and directions:

1. The worker is to submit to an independent medical review by Dr Katie Daniels by way of review of the medical imaging scans and reports referred to in Dr Daniels' report dated 8 July 2025 and is to be taken to have given consent to Dr Daniels accessing the medical imaging scans and reports. 2. The employer has leave to file and serve a report by Dr Daniels provided that it substantially accords with Dr Daniels' report dated 8 July 2025 and to adduce evidence from Dr Daniels at the hearing of the worker's section 42 referral. 3. Subject to (4) the employer has leave to adduce evidence from Dr Peter Gan and Dr Sandra Gongora at the hearing of the worker's section 42 referral including medical records served prior to these orders other than reference to and comment on Dr Daniels' report. 4. On the filing and service of Dr Daniels' report in accordance with (2) the employer has leave to adduce evidence from Dr Gan and Dr Gongora referring to and commenting on Dr Daniels' report as proofed in Dr Gan's report of 14 August 2025 and Dr Gongora's report of 3 September 2025 as if Dr Daniels' report dated 8 July 2025 is the report filed and served in accordance with (2). 5. The worker has leave to file and serve expert reports responding to the reports of Dr Daniels, Dr Gan and Dr Gongora and has leave to adduce evidence from the makers of those reports at the hearing of the worker's section 42 referral. 6. Any right to object to the admissibility of evidence adduced in accordance with these orders on grounds other than grounds arising under section 42G and section 49(1A) is reserved. 7. The worker's s 60A referral is dismissed. 8. Within 14 days the parties are to file a consent memorandum for proposed agreed orders in respect to the costs arising in connection with the referrals and application determined by these orders. 9. If the parties are unable to agree proposed orders for the purposes of (8) then within 21 days the parties are to file and serve submissions in respect to costs. 10. The worker's section 42 referral is referred for a conciliation conference to be conducted by the Deputy Registrar or his delegate pursuant to Division 2 of Part 5 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 on a date to be determined by the Deputy Registrar or his delegate. 11. The worker's section 42 referral is to be listed for hearing in Launceston on 10-14 November inclusive. 12. The worker is to file a statement of facts issues and contentions by 10 October 2025. 13. The employer is to file and serve an answering statement of facts issues and contentions by 17 October 2025. 14. By 24 October 2025 each party is to:

(a) File and serve statements of any lay witnesses that the party intends to call at the hearing. > > (b) File and serve an indexed bundle of documents to be tendered at the hearing other than expert reports and proofs and statements of witnesses.

1. The worker is to file and serve any additional expert report or proof within 3 business days of receipt and not later than 3 November 2025. 2. The worker is to file and serve an indexed and paginated hearing book containing the referral, statements of facts issues and contentions, expert reports, statements of evidence and all other documents to be tendered at the hearing by 3 November 2025 and is to file one hard copy of the hearing book by 6 November 2025. 3. Filing and service in accordance with these directions is to be in electronic form except where otherwise provided. 4. The worker has liberty to apply to adjourn the hearing and any such application is to be filed together with written submissions. 5. The parties have liberty to apply in respect to the timetable.