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[2025] NSWCA 277
respondent. Amended summons filed on 6 May 2025 dismissed. Applicant to pay the costs of Transport for NSW.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms Bezzina's challenge to a District Court decision connected with her attempts to reopen proceedings about a speeding conviction. It said the summons was limited to the District Court's 8 November 2024 decision, while the allegations of serious misconduct were unsupported and partly outside that scope. The Court also recounted that Ms Bezzina had had a trial, appealed her conviction, and made applications to reopen the decision. It ordered her to pay Transport for NSW's costs.
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2,485 words · generated 06/10/2026
The judgment concerns an application for judicial review by Leslee-ann Bezzina, who was self-represented. The challenged decision was made by Everson SC DCJ in the District Court on 8 November 2024. The Court of Appeal identified that decision as the refusal of Ms Bezzina's application for further relief, including a further appeal hearing and the admission of fresh evidence ([13]-[15]).
16 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The underlying matter began with a speeding allegation. Ms Bezzina was alleged to have driven at 69 km/h in a 60 km/h zone at Mount Victoria on 11 May 2021. After a Local Court hearing extending over 28 March and 8 August 2023, the Magistrate found the charge proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Local Court convicted her and imposed a $123 fine ([8]-[9]).
Ms Bezzina appealed against the conviction, but not the fine, to the District Court. On 5 December 2023, David DCJ refused an application to adduce fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal after Ms Bezzina left the hearing. The judgment records that the District Court's reasons occupied about eight pages of transcript and proceeded on the basis that the prosecution bore the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt ([10]).
The next procedural step was an application under s 22 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) to revoke the order dismissing the appeal. Ms Bezzina was absent when that motion was heard on 26 July 2024 and it was dismissed. The judgment also records an earlier non-attendance on 26 April 2024, when the District Court had said there would be no further adjournments ([11]).
Ms Bezzina made a further application in November 2024, again relying on s 22, and sought to tender fresh evidence. Her application referred to a claimed right to appeal, the ICCPR, common law and an alleged increase in the fine. Everson SC DCJ rejected that application on 8 November 2024, describing it as misconceived on several grounds. His Honour said the ICCPR did not apply as domestic law and that the amount identified in a later payment notice included costs rather than an increased penalty ([12]-[14]).
The amended summons filed in the Court of Appeal alleged abuse of process and perversion of justice by people involved in the Local Court and District Court proceedings, and alleged that the refusal of a further appeal hearing denied natural justice ([15]). At the appeal hearing, Ms Bezzina also sought a guarantee from each judge that her human rights would be protected. The Court refused that application, for the same reasons it had refused an identical application two days earlier in separate proceedings ([1], [4]-[5]). The amended summons was ultimately dismissed, with costs ordered for Transport for NSW ([23]).
The Court's central concern was the fit between the judicial-review summons and the decision actually challenged. The summons identified Everson SC DCJ's 8 November 2024 decision. It did not give the Court a basis to determine every complaint about earlier proceedings or every person involved in them. The Court said allegations about prosecuting personnel travelled beyond the summons and noted those persons had not been joined ([15]-[17]).
The allegations were serious: the summons alleged that judicial officers and prosecutors had abused process and perverted justice. The Court said those allegations lacked a proper foundation. It also made clear that self-representation did not remove the obligation to establish the alleged misconduct: “Ms Bezzina is not a legal practitioner, but that does not relieve her of the obligation to establish the abuse of process and perversion of justice she alleges” ([16]). This was a case-specific assessment of the allegations before the Court, not a finding that self-represented litigants face a different substantive standard.
The Court also explained why it rejected the claimed denial of an appeal. It identified a sequence of procedures that Ms Bezzina had used: a Local Court trial, an appeal against conviction to the District Court, and applications to reopen the appeal decision under s 22 ([18]). The Court described the reopening right as qualified. It noted that Ms Bezzina had left the appeal hearing after not obtaining an adjournment and had missed two hearings of an application to reopen ([18]). These circumstances formed part of the Court's answer to the complaint that no appeal right had been provided.
The Court separately noted that the applicant's arguments concerning the ICCPR and the supposed increase in the fine had been rejected by Everson SC DCJ for the reasons given in the District Court. The Court of Appeal treated those asserted legal premises as incorrect in its summary of the history ([14], [18]). It did not set out a fresh, detailed analysis of the ICCPR or the calculation of the amount due, because those matters were not the central grounds properly before it.
Other constitutional and statutory submissions were also raised. The Court clarified that s 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) did not support the proposition that common law overrides statute. It said statute law can modify the common law, and that common law applies only insofar as it is not inconsistent with statute. It added that s 80 applies only where the Court is exercising federal jurisdiction ([2]). On the Bill of Rights 1689, the Court accepted that it is taken to be in force in New South Wales subject to relevant enactments. But it said the key question was whether s 12 was infringed by the process for administering traffic fines, not merely whether the provision was in force ([3]).
Those submissions did not alter the outcome. The Court said some arguments were outside the scope of the summons and that overlapping material had already been addressed in its reasons in the related Bezzina matter published the same day ([20]). The formal orders were dismissal of the amended summons and costs for Transport for NSW ([23]).
The judgment does not announce a new general test for judicial review or purport to change the law. The catchwords characterise the application as dismissed and state “no point of principle”. Its principal work is to apply the scope of the summons and the material before it to this particular dispute.
The judgment does, however, state several legal propositions relevant to the arguments raised. First, it rejects the proposition that s 80 of the Judiciary Act makes common law prevail over statute. The Court's explanation is that statute law may modify common law and common law applies only where it is not inconsistent with statute. The Court also limits its relevance to circumstances where it is exercising federal jurisdiction ([2]). This is the Court's explanation of the provision in response to Ms Bezzina's submission, not a broad treatment of every possible operation of s 80.
Second, the Court accepts the effect of s 6 of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW) and the Second Schedule as to the Bill of Rights 1689. It then distinguishes that question from whether s 12 is infringed by the process involved in administering traffic fines ([3]). The distinction is important: recognition that a provision is in force does not itself determine whether a particular process contravenes it.
Third, the Court describes the appeal and reopening opportunities in Ms Bezzina's case. It says she had a right to have the charge tried in the Local Court and a right of appeal against conviction in the District Court, both of which she invoked. It describes the right to apply to reopen a decision as qualified ([18]). The judgment does not set out the full statutory conditions governing s 22 applications, so it should not be read as a comprehensive account of reopening law.
After this decision, the outcome for this proceeding was that the summons had been dismissed and costs ordered. The text does not establish that the judgment changed the legal position for other litigants. Nor does it provide a general ruling that traffic fines can never infringe s 12 of the Bill of Rights. Instead, the Court identified that as the question requiring consideration and referred to earlier decisions where similar submissions had not succeeded ([3]).
At [16], the Court said that self-representation did not relieve Ms Bezzina of the obligation to establish the alleged abuse of process and perversion of justice. In plain English, serious accusations still required support in the case materials, even though the applicant was not a lawyer. The Court concluded that the allegations before it lacked a proper foundation ([16]-[17]).
At [17], the Court said that some of the allegations went beyond the summons, which was confined to the 8 November 2024 decision. Put simply, the Court was not treating the summons as a general inquiry into everything that had happened in earlier proceedings. The pleaded challenge identified a particular decision, and that boundary mattered.
At [18], the Court described the applicant's procedural history and rejected her view of a “human right of an appeal” as not representing the law in the jurisdiction. In plain English, the Court considered that the proceedings had included a trial, an appeal against conviction and applications to reopen the decision. It also stressed that the reopening opportunity was qualified rather than unlimited.
At [19], the Court referred to the time spent in three courts and to the applicant's refusal on two occasions to develop her summons without guarantees from each judge. This passage explains the Court's view that the assertion of no appeal opportunity did not fit the procedural history it had set out. It is not a general ruling about guarantees in all court proceedings.
At [3], the Court distinguished the status of s 12 of the Bill of Rights from whether traffic-fine administration infringed it. In plain English, the Court considered that the existence of a provision and its application to particular procedures are separate questions. It referred to Waddington and Topic as examples of similar submissions made without success, rather than undertaking a detailed review of those decisions.
At [23], the orders were concise: the amended summons was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay Transport for NSW's costs. This is the operative disposition of the appeal-court proceeding.
The judgment is most closely relevant to a judicial-review application that challenges a specifically identified decision but includes broader allegations about other stages of litigation or people not joined as parties. The Court emphasised that Ms Bezzina's summons was confined to Everson SC DCJ's 8 November 2024 decision, while some claims reached beyond it ([15]-[17]).
It is also relevant where a litigant alleges serious misconduct, such as abuse of process or perversion of justice, without a foundation in the material before the court. The judgment's point is that the allegation must be established, and self-representation does not remove that obligation ([16]-[17]).
A further relevant fact pattern is one in which a litigant says there has been no appeal opportunity despite having participated in a trial and an appeal process and having sought to reopen a decision. The Court assessed the asserted denial against the procedural history in this case, including non-attendance at two reopening hearings and leaving the appeal hearing ([18]-[19]). Those facts are central to the Court's reasoning and should not be detached from the result.
Finally, the judgment may be relevant when submissions conflate the existence of an enactment with whether a particular procedure infringes it. The Court drew that distinction in relation to s 12 of the Bill of Rights 1689 and the administration of traffic fines ([3]). It also directly addresses an argument that common law overrides statutes, rejecting that characterisation of s 80 ([2]).
The judgment is dated 19 December 2025, and the supplied text contains no later judicial treatment. It would therefore be unsupported to state whether later courts have followed, distinguished or criticised it.
The judgment itself refers to several earlier decisions. It refers to Bezzina v Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] NSWCA 276 for reasons concerning an identical application for a guarantee from each member of the Court and overlapping affidavit submissions ([1], [5], [20]). It also refers to Bezzina v Transport for NSW [2025] NSWCA 216 as an earlier interlocutory stage in the same broader dispute ([4]). These are contemporaneous procedural references in the judgment, not later treatment.
For the Bill of Rights argument, the Court points to Waddington v State of Victoria [2018] VSC 746 at [32]-[34] and Topic v DPP [2024] ACTSC 398 at [42]-[46] as examples of similar submissions made without success ([3]). The judgment does not provide a full account of their reasoning, so its citation should not be treated as adopting every proposition in those cases.
Momcilovic v The Queen and Port of Portland Pty Ltd v Victoria appear in the judgment as materials on which Ms Bezzina relied ([1]). The Court does not give them a substantive analysis in this judgment. It records the applicant's use of them while addressing the resulting submission about the Bill of Rights and the New South Wales legislation ([1]-[3]).
The judgment does not determine, in a full merits analysis, whether s 12 of the Bill of Rights 1689 is infringed by any particular method of administering traffic fines. It expressly identifies that as the real question, but does not resolve it in detail in these reasons ([3]). It refers to Waddington and Topic as examples of unsuccessful similar arguments, without setting out their full analysis.
The judgment also does not comprehensively determine the scope of s 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in all contexts. It says that common law does not override statute and that s 80 applies only if the Court is exercising federal jurisdiction ([2]). Questions about the application of that provision in other proceedings are beyond what the text addresses.
Nor does the judgment set out a general test for every application to reopen an appeal under s 22 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW). It characterises the relevant reopening opportunity as qualified, but does not reproduce or analyse the full statutory requirements ([18]). It also does not develop a general account of the domestic legal status of the ICCPR. On that issue, it reports the District Court's conclusion that the Covenant did not apply as domestic law and describes Ms Bezzina's view as incorrect ([14], [18]).
Finally, the Court does not decide any claim about the conduct of all earlier judicial officers or prosecutors on its merits. It says those allegations lacked a proper foundation in the application before it and that some were outside the summons' scope ([16]-[17]). Those limits are important when describing what the decision establishes.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Bezzina v Transport for NSW [2025] NSWCA 277
Hearing dates: 18 December 2025
Date of orders: 18, 19 December 2025
Decision date: 19 December 2025
Before: Leeming JA, Payne JA, Kirk JA
Decision: 1. Amended summons filed on 6 May 2025
dismissed.
2. Applicant to pay the costs of Transport for NSW.
Catchwords: JUDICAL REVIEW – application for judicial review of a decision of District Court – application dismissed – no point of principle
Legislation Cited: Bill of Rights Act 1689, s 12
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)
Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW), s 22
Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW), s 6
Imperial Acts Application Act 1980 (Vic)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 80
Legal Profession Uniform Law, s 10
Cases Cited: Bezzina v Transport for NSW [2025] NSWCA 216
Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1; [2011] HCA 34
Port of Portland Pty Ltd v Victoria (2010) 242 CLR 348; [2010] HCA 44
Topic v DPP [2024] ACTSC 398
Waddington v State of Victoria [2018] VSC 746
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Leslee-ann Bezzina (applicant)
Transport for NSW (first respondent)
District Court of New South Wales (second respondent, submitting)
Representation: Counsel:
Self-represented (applicant)
G Lewer (first respondent)
Solicitors:
Self-represented (applicant)
Hunt & Hunt Lawyers (first respondent)
File Number(s): 2025/53366
Publication restriction: None
THE COURT: At the commencement of the hearing on 18 December 2025, the applicant, Ms Leslee-ann Bezzina, reiterated the substance of an application she had made at the commencement of her separate summons which had been listed before this Court identically constituted on 16 December 2025, and which is described in our reasons in another matter brought by Ms Bezzina published today: Bezzina v Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] NSWCA 276. Ms Bezzina also relied on a small bundle of documents which became MFI A. They comprised the following:
First, various statements from United States courts to the effect that once challenged, a court had to be satisfied of jurisdiction. At one stage we understood that Ms Bezzina was challenging the jurisdiction of this Court which she had herself invoked, but she subsequently made it clear that she instead insisted on receiving a guarantee from each member of the Court before she was prepared to proceed.
Secondly, a copy of s 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), which according to Ms Bezzina provided that common law overrode statutes.
Thirdly, extracts from Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1; [2011] HCA 34, from which Ms Bezzina contended that the High Court had held that the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) applied throughout Australia.
Fourthly, an extract from Port of Portland Pty Ltd v Victoria (2010) 242 CLR 348; [2010] HCA 44 together with clause 12 of the “Transcribed enactments” which are attached to the Imperial Acts Application Act 1980 (Vic). Ms Bezzina relied on these to assert that s 12 of the Bill of Rights Act 1689 was in force in New South Wales.
Two points should be made about the statutes relied upon by Ms Bezzina. The first is that s 80 itself provides that statute law can and does modify common law, and that common law only applies to the extent it is not inconsistent with statutes, and in any event s 80 only applies if the Court were exercising federal jurisdiction. Ms Bezzina’s view that common law overrides statute is wrong.
Secondly, it may be accepted that s 6 of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW) read with the Second Schedule produces the result that the Bill of Rights 1689 is taken to be in force in New South Wales except so far as affected by any Imperial enactments or State Acts from time to time in force in New South Wales. The fact that much the same is true of Victoria, by reason of the matters to which Ms Bezzina has drawn attention, is not greatly to the point. The real difficulty faced by Ms Bezzina, as was pointed out during the hearing, is not whether or not s 12 of the Bill of Rights is in force, but whether it is infringed by the process involved in administering fines for traffic offences. Submissions similar to those sought to be made by Ms Bezzina have been made by other unrepresented litigants, without success. One example is the decision mentioned during the hearing, Waddington v State of Victoria [2018] VSC 746 at [32]-[34]. Another is Topic v DPP [2024] ACTSC 398 at [42]-[46].
Aside from her reliance on those materials, Ms Bezzina’s application was materially identical to that made on 16 December. She maintained that she was entitled to a “guarantee” from each member of the Court that her human rights would be protected, and that if she did not receive such a guarantee, she was not prepared to move on her summons. She pointed to no instance where any court had acceded to such an application. When it was pointed out that she had not, so far as the transcript recorded, sought any such guarantee in the Local Court or the District Court, or indeed three months ago in an interlocutory application in this proceeding in this Court (Bezzina v Transport for NSW [2025] NSWCA 216) she said that that was because she had only recently learned of this.
After hearing from Ms Lewer and Ms Bezzina in reply, and a short adjournment, we refused the application. Our reasons for doing so are the same as those for refusing the identical application two days earlier.
Thereupon, Ms Lewer appearing for Transport for NSW applied to have the summons heard on its merits, and tendered the white folders which had been prepared by each side. Ms Bezzina remained in the Court while this occurred, and was given an opportunity to be heard if she wished.
In order to address the grounds of the summons seeking judicial review of orders made by the District Court, it is necessary to provide some background to the litigation.
These proceedings arise from a Court Attendance Notice issued on 9 December 2021 following Ms Bezzina having contested her exceeding the speed limit in Mount Victoria on 11 May 2021 by driving at 69 km/h in a 60 km/h zone. There was a hearing in the Local Court extending over most of 28 March and 8 August 2023, at the conclusion of which the Magistrate delivered reasons (transcript 8 August 2023 pp 38-46) and recorded:
I AM SATISFIED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT SHE WAS SPEEDING AND TRAVELLING 69 KILOMETRES AN HOUR IN HER VEHICLE AS SHE WENT THROUGH THAT SPEED CAMERA ON THE 11 MAY 2021.
The Court convicted Ms Bezzina and imposed a fine of $123.
Ms Bezzina exercised her right to appeal against conviction to the District Court. She did not appeal against the fine. On 5 December 2023, that Court constituted by David DCJ refused an application to adduce fresh evidence, and then proceeded, after Ms Bezzina had left the Court, to dismiss the appeal, doing so on a full consideration of the evidence. Her Honour’s reasons for dismissing the appeal occupy some eight pages of transcript. They make it plain that she proceeded on the basis that the onus rested on the prosecutor to make out its case beyond reasonable doubt.
Ms Bezzina applied by motion for a revocation of the order dismissing her appeal under s 22 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW). Ms Bezzina was not present when the motion was listed on 26 July 2024 before the District Court constituted by Mendes DCJ, and her Honour recited the history of Ms Bezzina not attending the previous hearing (on 26 April 2024), when she was told that there would be no further adjournments. The motion was dismissed in her absence.
By a further notice of motion dated 5 November 2024, Ms Bezzina made another application under s 22, as well as seeking to tender fresh evidence, in the following terms:
1. Under Section 22 of NSW Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001
Set aside the Coram non judice order made by Judge Mendes on the 26th July 2024, which violated two Articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by; making the order against Leslee-ann Bezzina in her absence, denying her right to an appeal, and by increasing the value of the original fine issued for an alleged speeding offence.
2 Accept the submission of fresh evidence to ensure due process is followed in allowing natural justice for the appellant Leslee-ann Bezzina, as supported by Section 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 Cth, and the 1948 HCA ruling Orr v Holmes.
That motion came on before the District Court constituted by Everson SC DCJ on 8 November 2024. This time Ms Bezzina appeared. Her affidavit in support had referred, repeatedly, to “my human right to an appeal”, to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to the proposition that “Common Law, that allows fresh evidence to be submitted that couldn’t be discovered before, will prevail over the NSW Crimes Appeal and Review Act 2001”, and maintained that there would be an abuse of process if her application were refused. She also maintained that the fine had been increased because, following the dismissal of her application before Mendes DCJ, she had received a notice saying she had to pay $5,289, rather than $123.
Everson SC DCJ delivered an ex tempore judgment, stating that her application was misconceived at a number of levels, including that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights did not apply as domestic law, and that the penalty was not increased by reason of the fact that the notice included an order for the payment of costs.
By her amended summons in this Court, Ms Bezzina identifies the decision maker as Everson SC DCJ and the decision of which she seeks judicial review as his decision not to grant an appeal hearing to her on 8 November 2024. The summons identified two grounds:
1 In the Local Court at Katoomba, and Penrith District Court, a Magistrate, three District Court judges and two prosecutors have abused the process of the court, and perverted justice.
2 By ignoring the abusive behaviour of the previous judicial officers and prosecutors, and refusing an appeal hearing, Judge C Everson, has denied the right of Leslee-ann Bezzina to have natural justice.
The allegations are serious. They lack any proper foundation. Had they been made by a legal practitioner, there would have been a breach of the professional conduct rules. Ms Bezzina is not a legal practitioner, but that does not relieve her of the obligation to establish the abuse of process and perversion of justice she alleges.
The allegations also travel well beyond the summons, which is confined to the decision of the District Court constituted by Everson SC DCJ on 8 November 2024. For example, insofar as it is said that there has been an abuse of process by those persons who prosecuted in the lower courts, they have not even been joined. But the real difficulty with the summons in its entirety is that there is no foundation for the allegations of serious misconduct.
The simple fact of the matter is that Ms Bezzina holds views about her “human right of an appeal” which do not represent the law in this jurisdiction. She had a right to have her case tried in the Local Court, which she exercised and which found against her. She had a right of appeal against that conviction in the District Court, which she invoked, but walked out of the hearing when she failed to obtain an adjournment of her appeal (David DCJ, 5 December 2023). She has a qualified right to apply to reopen a decision, which she exercised, but once again, she did not attend the hearing at which her application was listed, on two occasions (Mendes DCJ, 26 April 2024 and 26 July 2024). She holds an incorrect view of the law concerning the applicability of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and whether her fine was increased, for the reasons identified by Everson SC DCJ in the District Court on 8 November 2024.
Indeed, given the days of time that have been spent in three courts now entertaining Ms Bezzina’s applications to challenge her speeding fine, it is very difficult to see a basis for any complaint that there is no right of appeal. She has had an opportunity twice now fully to develop the arguments in support of her summonses in this Court, but on both occasions she has said she is not prepared to do so in the absence of a “guarantee” from each member of the Court, despite being unable to point to any basis for such an entitlement or any decision in which a litigant had sought and obtained such a guarantee.
The foregoing does not address a variety of submissions advanced by Ms Bezzina in the Local Court and the District Court. They are well outside the scope of her summons. However, we would add that some of those submissions overlap with the submissions summarised in the other reasons for judgment delivered today. Indeed, the affidavit filed on 5 December in this proceeding is markedly similar to the affidavit which constituted her submissions in reply in the earlier matter, and our reasons for rejecting every aspect of that affidavit apply equally to the present proceedings.
It is possible that Ms Bezzina formulated some or all of her submissions herself. However, at one stage before the Registrar on 20 October 2025, where there had been discussion concerning whether both of her summonses could be listed on the same day, Ms Bezzina is recorded as saying that “I have been talking with my constitutional expert” (transcript, 20 October 2025, p 6 line 28). If there is a “constitutional expert” advising Ms Bezzina who is a natural person, it may be as well to say, with no disrespect whatsoever to Ms Bezzina, that the constitutional submissions she has been prevailed upon to advance are legal nonsense. If he or she is charging a fee and is not a legal practitioner, he or she is committing a serious offence. Section 10 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law makes it an offence for someone other than a “qualified entity” to engage in legal practice in his jurisdiction, and imposes a maximum penalty of 250 penalty units and imprisonment for 2 years. If the “constitutional expert” is a legal practitioner, there is a sound basis for reporting him or her to the appropriate regulatory body. Alternatively, if the “constitutional expert” is a large language model such as ChatGPT, then Ms Bezzina would be well advised to ask a lawyer, including at a community legal centre, for a second opinion.
1. Amended summons filed on 6 May 2025 dismissed.
2. Applicant to pay the costs of Transport for NSW.
**********
Bezzina
Transport for NSW [2025] NSWCA 277
(2011) 245 CLR 1
(2010) 242 CLR 348
Amended summons filed on 6 May 2025 dismissed. Applicant to pay the costs of Transport for NSW.
Finally, Ms Bezzina referred repeatedly to her intention to apply to the High Court. She is free to exercise her right to apply for special leave to appeal from either or both of our judgments. Once again, we would respectfully suggest that before taking that course, she ask a lawyer for advice on the merits of her case and the likely consequences of making a further application in a dispute which commenced with a speeding fine for $123.
The Court makes the following orders: