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[2025] NSWCA 276
respondent. Time to file the judicial-review summons was extended to 10 February 2025; the summons was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs.
The Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s request for an advance assurance about human rights and considered her judicial-review case. It found that she had been given opportunities to present her case in the Local Court and District Court, including explanations about how to seek to rely on new evidence. The Court concluded that she had not shown jurisdictional error by the District Court. It extended the time for filing the summons, but dismissed it and ordered her to pay the respondent’s costs.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,589 words · generated 06/10/2026
Leslee-ann Bezzina was prosecuted in New South Wales for speeding. On 3 July 2023, Senior Constable Marsh was conducting speed enforcement on Ophir Road at Llanarth. The road was described as a residential built-up area, and a photograph tendered in the Local Court showed a 50 km/h sign. The officer said he tracked Ms Bezzina’s vehicle at 70 km/h, with its speed increasing to 80 km/h during the tracking period ([11]–[12]).
26 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
Ms Bezzina elected to contest the penalty notice. At the Local Court hearing on 18 January 2024, the prosecution tendered the officer’s statement and certificates for the speed-measurement devices. The certificates recorded that the devices had been tested within 12 months of the alleged offence ([14]–[17]). Ms Bezzina gave oral evidence. She accepted she was the driver and said she had been trying to drive around, or below, 60 km/h. The judgment records that the Magistrate convicted her and imposed a $660 fine ([22]–[28]).
Ms Bezzina appealed to the District Court under s 11 of the Crimes Appeal and Review Act 2001 (NSW). Judge Musgrave explained that material not before the Magistrate would be fresh evidence and that an application was needed to rely on it. Ms Bezzina did not make that application and agreed the appeal would proceed on the Local Court papers ([29]–[31]). She later sought to tender photographs, which the District Court declined to receive because no fresh-evidence application had been made ([38], [53]–[55]). The District Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the conviction and orders ([41]–[42]).
In the Court of Appeal, Ms Bezzina sought judicial review of the District Court decision. Her amended summons alleged abuse of process and that Judge Musgrave had perverted the course of justice and denied natural justice ([44]). Before the substantive hearing, she demanded a ruling that she would be guaranteed human rights under the Victorian Charter. The Court refused that request, finding no entitlement to an advance ruling and holding that the Victorian Charter did not apply to the NSW prosecution ([6]–[9]).
The Court then addressed the substance of the judicial-review case. It extended time to file the summons to 10 February 2025, dismissed the summons and ordered Ms Bezzina to pay the respondent’s costs ([66]).
The Court identified the legal boundary of the proceeding at the outset. There was no appeal from the District Court’s decision on the Local Court appeal. The case was instead an application for judicial review under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Because s 176 of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW) was a privative provision, the Court said its supervisory jurisdiction depended on establishing jurisdictional error ([46]). The applicant identified that error as abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness.
The Court rejected the complaint about the late delivery of the prosecution’s written submissions. Although the submissions were provided after the practice-note deadline, the District Court appeal was adjourned part heard to 22 October 2024. The Court accepted the District Court judge’s observation that the adjournment gave Ms Bezzina more time to respond than she would have had if the matter had finished on 12 September ([48]). It applied the principle that procedural fairness addresses practical injustice, not hypothetical injury. Because Ms Bezzina did not lose an opportunity to advance her case, the timing complaint did not establish unfairness or abuse of process ([49]).
The Court also rejected the claim that Judge Musgrave was biased by asking about Ms Bezzina’s evidence on speed. The Court noted that Ms Bezzina had testified in the Local Court that she was trying to keep below, or around, 60 km/h in a 50 km/h zone. Judge Musgrave was entitled to consider that evidence on the District Court appeal ([50]). The Court did not treat questioning about the evidence as proof of bias or procedural unfairness.
A central part of the reasoning concerned the applicant’s opportunity to challenge the evidence. In the Local Court, she could have questioned Constable Marsh or objected to the brief, but chose not to do so ([51]). In the District Court, Judge Musgrave explained how to apply to adduce evidence that had not been before the Magistrate. The applicant did not make such an application and agreed to proceed on the Local Court papers ([31], [52]–[55]). The Court therefore held that the later refusal to receive photographs was not suppression of evidence and did not establish jurisdictional error.
The Court also addressed the statutory framework for the speed-measurement devices. It recounted that s 137 of the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) makes qualifying certificates admissible as prima facie evidence of specified matters, including that a device was approved, tested and operating properly. Sections 140 and 141 concern when evidence about accuracy or reliability is required and what kind of evidence can raise doubt ([15], [19]). The Court stated that, taken together, those provisions meant that expert evidence was legally capable of raising the relevant doubt about a device. Ms Bezzina was not an expert, and her assertions about the devices and site conditions did not satisfy that requirement ([20], [58]).
The Court rejected the other identified grounds as well. It found that provisions about measuring distance did not apply to the measurement of speed in the way argued, and that no relevant inconsistency with s 38 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) arose ([56]). It accepted the District Court’s observation that police operating procedures did not have the force of law ([57]). It also rejected the contention that the National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth) displaced the NSW road-transport provisions, stating that s 10 of that Act had no bearing on the speed-safety measurement issue and that the asserted s 109 inconsistency was not made out ([60]–[61]).
Finally, the Court rejected the claim that the Victorian Charter applied in NSW. It said the legislation of other States did not apply to offences committed in NSW or to their prosecution in NSW courts. It also said Momcilovic v The Queen did not establish otherwise ([8]). On the grounds actually advanced, the Court concluded that no jurisdictional error had been shown ([65]).
The judgment applies, rather than announces a new general statutory framework. Before this decision, the relevant NSW legislation already provided for certificates relating to approved speed-measurement devices. The Court described s 137 as making a qualifying certificate admissible and prima facie evidence of matters including approval, testing, accuracy and proper operation ([15]–[18]). Sections 140 and 141 supplied the related rules about when device evidence is required and the kind of evidence capable of raising doubt ([19]).
The Court’s application of those provisions was direct: a non-expert assertion about accuracy, reliability or operation could not perform the statutory role assigned to specialised evidence. It relied on Roads & Maritime Services v Noble-Hiblen for the proposition that expert evidence, if accepted by the tribunal of fact, was legally capable of raising the relevant doubt ([20], [58]). The judgment does not purport to change the text of those provisions or establish a different evidentiary test.
The procedural-fairness reasoning likewise applies established principles. The Court cited Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Lam for the proposition that procedural fairness is designed to avoid practical injustice, and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH when finding no denial of fairness in the circumstances ([49]). Its contribution in this case is the application of those principles to a delayed written submission followed by an adjournment that gave the applicant additional time.
The decision also illustrates the review threshold stated for this particular proceeding. The applicant was not bringing a further merits appeal from the District Court. The Court treated the supervisory jurisdiction as dependent on jurisdictional error because of s 176 of the District Court Act ([46]). It did not reconsider the Local Court conviction as if deciding a fresh appeal. Instead, it asked whether the alleged procedural errors in the District Court decision were established.
On the territorial point, the Court’s conclusion was that the Victorian Charter did not apply to the NSW prosecution. It expressly said Momcilovic was not authority to the contrary ([8]). This is a conclusion in the context of the applicant’s argument and the NSW proceeding described in the judgment; the reasons do not purport to provide a comprehensive account of every possible cross-border operation of State legislation.
The orders did not alter the statutory framework. Time was extended, but the summons was dismissed and costs were ordered against the applicant ([66]). The judgment therefore resolves the application before it rather than announcing a prospective change to road-traffic or judicial-review law.
At [9], the Court said: “The applicant is not entitled to an upfront ‘ruling’ on any such issue, still less is she entitled to a ruling on such issue in her favour, as a condition of her prosecuting the proceedings she has commenced.”
In plain English, the Court would decide legal issues as they arose in the case, but the applicant could not require a preliminary assurance or favourable ruling before continuing with the proceeding.
At [49], the Court said: “There is no breach of procedural fairness by reason of a hypothetical injury. Procedural fairness is designed to avoid practical injustice.”
This means the Court looked for an actual lost opportunity or practical disadvantage, rather than deciding the issue on the possibility that unfairness might have occurred if the hearing had finished on the first day. The adjournment was important because it gave the applicant more time to respond.
At [52], the Court emphasised that Judge Musgrave had explained the steps required to rely on material that had not been before the Magistrate. The Court’s point was not simply that the photographs were new. It was that the applicant had been told how to seek to use them and had not made the required application.
At [58], the Court stated that only expert evidence could legally raise doubt about the devices’ accuracy, reliability or operation under the combined statutory provisions. In plain English, the Court treated general challenges or suspicions about how the devices worked as insufficient under the statutory scheme described in the reasons. The judgment says that the applicant’s assertions did not meet the specialised-evidence requirement.
At [65]–[66], the Court concluded that neither review ground had been established, then extended time, dismissed the summons and ordered costs. The extension resolved the timing issue, but did not change the result on the substance of the review application.
The judgment is most directly relevant to a judicial-review application alleging that a District Court decision on a Local Court appeal involved procedural unfairness because of late submissions, refused evidence, or the manner in which the hearing was conducted. The Court considered the actual hearing chronology, including whether the applicant had a chance to respond and whether a claimed disadvantage resulted in practical injustice ([48]–[55]).
It is also relevant where a party seeks to rely in a District Court appeal on material that was not before the Local Court. In this case, the judge explained the process for applying to adduce fresh evidence, the applicant did not make the application, and the appeal proceeded on the Local Court papers ([29]–[31]). The Court held that the later refusal to receive photographs did not establish reviewable error in those circumstances ([53]–[55]).
For road-speed prosecutions, the reasoning is relevant where the prosecution relies on certificates under ss 137, 140 and 141 of the Road Transport Act and the defendant disputes device accuracy or operation. The Court treated expert evidence as legally necessary to raise doubt on those matters under the statutory provisions it considered ([20], [58]). The judgment does not establish that every issue about a traffic device is resolved by a certificate: its discussion concerns the statutory matters and evidence identified in this case.
The territorial-law discussion is relevant to the applicant’s argument that a human-rights statute enacted by another State governed a prosecution in NSW. The Court rejected that argument for the Victorian Charter and this NSW prosecution ([8]). The decision should not be read as addressing every possible question about the application of interstate laws in different legal settings.
A matter that raises only dissatisfaction with the merits of a lower-court decision is distinct from the jurisdictional-error question addressed here. The Court repeatedly distinguished complaints about the underlying speeding case from proof of abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness by the District Court ([46], [58], [62]).
The judgment is dated 19 December 2025 and the supplied text contains no later judicial treatment of Bezzina v Director of Public Prosecutions. It is therefore not possible, from this source, to say how later courts have applied, followed or distinguished this decision.
The judgment itself discusses earlier authorities. It cites Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Lam and WZARH on procedural fairness and practical injustice ([49]). It refers to Noble-Hiblen in explaining the evidentiary effect of the NSW speed-device provisions ([20]). It distinguishes Chapoterera on the facts: in that case the Magistrate had refused to permit any evidence or submissions, whereas the applicant in Bezzina had opportunities to participate ([51]).
The Court also relied on Millington v Police in its discussion of the National Measurement Act and State law ([61]), and on Collis v Bank of Queensland when rejecting an argument about proof of lawyers’ oaths ([63]). These are authorities the Court used in its own reasoning; they are not later treatment of Bezzina.
The supplied judgment resolves the grounds and arguments before it. It does not provide a general account of every circumstance in which late submissions could cause practical injustice. Its conclusion depended on the adjournment and the finding that the applicant had more time to respond, rather than less ([48]–[49]). How a different timetable or a demonstrated lost opportunity would affect a future case is not decided in these reasons.
The decision also does not determine how a fresh-evidence application should be decided in every District Court appeal. It records that an application had not been made and that the applicant had been given repeated explanations of the procedure ([29]–[31], [53]–[55]). The judgment addresses the consequences of that procedural history, not the merits of an application that was never brought.
On speed-device evidence, the Court states its view of the combined operation of ss 137, 140 and 141 and applies it to the evidence before it ([58]). The reasons do not examine every possible expert challenge, nor do they decide what conclusion a tribunal must reach if specialised evidence is tendered and accepted. The Court’s statement is about what evidence is legally capable of raising doubt, not a finding that expert evidence invariably succeeds.
The reasons reject the asserted application of the Victorian Charter and Queensland Human Rights Act to this prosecution ([8], [50]). They do not undertake a broad comparative analysis of human-rights legislation across Australian jurisdictions. Nor do they decide how a different statutory text or materially different proceeding would be treated.
Finally, the judgment records that the summons was dismissed and costs ordered after an extension of time ([66]). It does not discuss the assessment or amount of those costs. Those matters are outside the questions resolved in the reasons provided.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on it, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Bezzina v Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] NSWCA 276
Hearing dates: 16 December 2025
Date of orders: 16, 19 December 2025
Decision date: 19 December 2025
Before: Leeming JA, Payne JA, Kirk JA
Decision: (1) Extend time to file the summons seeking judicial review to 10 February 2025.
(2) Summons dismissed.
(3) Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs.
Catchwords: JUDICAL REVIEW – application for judicial review of a decision of the District Court – application dismissed – no point of principle
Legislation Cited: Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Schedule 2, s 40
Crimes Appeal and Review Act 2001 (NSW), s 11
District Court Act 1973 (NSW), s 176
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 33
Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)
Imperial Acts Application Act 1922 (Vic)
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 38
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 78B, 80
National Measurements Act 1960 (Cth), s 10
Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), ss 135, 137, 140, 141
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 69
Road Transport (General) Regulation 2021, cl 29
Cases Cited: Collis v Bank of Queensland [2021] VSCA 17
Millington v Police [2015] SASC 52
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326
Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1; [2011] HCA 34
Port of Portland Pty Ltd v Victoria (2010) 242 CLR 348; [2010] HCA 44
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Lam (2003) CLR 1
Roads & Maritime Services v Noble-Hiblen [2019] NSWSC 1230
Transport for NSW v Chapoterera (2022) 300 A Crim R 327
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Leslee-ann Bezzina (applicant)
Director of Public Prosecutions (first respondent)
Judge P Musgrave (second respondent, submitting appearance)
District Court of New South Wales (third respondent, submitting appearance)
Representation: Counsel:
Self-represented (applicant)
J Davidson SC (first respondent)
Solicitors:
Self-represented (applicant)
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (first respondent)
File Number(s): 2025/53297
Publication restriction: None
THE COURT: At the commencement of the hearing of this judicial review application on 16 December 2025, in the order of 300 pages of material was tendered, comprising the two folders assembled by each side. The applicant, Ms Leslee-ann Bezzina, confirmed that her affidavit sworn 4 December 2025 should be treated as her submissions in reply supplied in accordance with the Court’s directions. However, immediately before oral address, the applicant asserted an entitlement to a “ruling”, without which she said she was not prepared to proceed. No prior notice had been given of the application either to the Court or to the first respondent, the Director of Public Prosecutions (the “DPP”).
The form of the “ruling” sought by the applicant fluctuated during the course of her application. At various stages, she sought confirmation that each member of the Court agreed that he was bound by stare decisis, or was bound by the High Court of Australia, or “stood under” the Australian Constitution or the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). The presiding judge indicated, expressly speaking for himself, that he regarded himself as bound by stare decisis, and by decisions of the High Court of Australia and the Constitution, but that the Victorian legislation did not apply in New South Wales. However, he also advised that so far as he was concerned a litigant had no entitlement to any “ruling” such as was sought, and that the applicant would be well advised to seek to develop her submissions that the decision of the District Court was affected by jurisdictional error. The applicant had the benefit of a short adjournment to reflect on the course she would take.
After that adjournment, the applicant pressed her application, indicating that in its absence, she was unwilling to proceed. Ultimately, the formulation relied upon was “I need a ruling that I am going to be guaranteed my human rights under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006”. The applicant was given an opportunity to advance submissions in support of her application. She relied upon Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1; [2011] HCA 34 and contended that the Victorian legislation applied in New South Wales because it had been upheld by the High Court.
In response, the DPP submitted that the Victorian legislation had no application in New South Wales, and that there was no authority to the contrary. The applicant reiterated her position in reply.
At the conclusion of submissions, the Court announced that the applicant’s application for a ruling was refused, and that reasons would be published in due course. These are our reasons.
First, the applicant invoked the jurisdiction of this Court when she filed her summons. She has no entitlement to qualify the exercise of the jurisdiction she has chosen to invoke by any “ruling” that the members of the Court guaranteed or abided by or “stood under” any of the documents or legislative instruments she invoked.
As evidence had been tendered and extensive written submissions exchanged, the Court indicated that it would deal with the substance of the applicant's case. The following are our reasons for dismissing that case.
On 3 July 2023, New South Wales police officer Senior Constable Marsh was conducting speed enforcement duties at 8:30 am on Ophir Road at Llanarth in western New South Wales. His vehicle was equipped with traffic enforcement devices for the measurement of speed.
Constable Marsh observed a white utility vehicle driven by the applicant, Ms Bezzina, at the top of the hill of Ophir Road, a residential “built-up” area. A photograph tendered in the Local Court showed a 50-kilometre speed sign on the road. Constable Marsh commenced tracking the vehicle using his traffic enforcement devices for the measurement of speed. The vehicle was travelling at 70 kilometres per hour. He tracked it for eight seconds during which time the vehicle speed increased to 80 kilometres per hour. There were no other vehicles present. Constable Marsh activated his in-car video and started his warning lights to stop the vehicle. Once stopped, he ordered a registration check of the applicant. He had a conversation with the applicant:
[Constable Marsh] Good Morning
[Ms Bezzina] Good morning how you going?
[Constable Marsh] Good thanks. Senior Constable MARSH is my name from Bathurst Highway, our conversations are just being recorded. Your speed there was checked on radar at 80 in the 50 zone, have you got your driver's licence there?
[Ms Bezzina] I don't think I have actually, I think I took it out.
[Constable Marsh] ls the car in your name?
[Ms Bezzina] Yeah.
[Constable Marsh] Just count to ten… I 'II just be back in a minute.
[Constable Marsh returned to his police vehicle where he concluded registration and licence checks and entered the infringement information into a mobile device]
[Constable Marsh] Okay yeah so I wrote the speed down a category okay, because your 30 over the speed limit.
[Ms Bezzina] 30?
[Constable Marsh] Yeah, because it's a 50 zone. The 100 zone starts at the bottom but you were doing 70 at the very top of the hill there.
[Ms Bezzina] [Response not audible]
[Constable Marsh] On radar, got a device that tells me your speed.
[Ms Bezzina] How did you check that, did you follow the instructions?
[Constable Marsh] Of course yeah. So your speed was 70 at the top of the hill then increased up to 80 before Campbell Close here, which is the tum off there.
[Ms Bezzina] I couldn't have been doing 70, I'm pretty careful.
[Constable Marsh] Yeah, it was 70. So l wrote the speed down and it'll come in the mail in a week or so okay, any questions?
[Ms Bezzina] Uh, I don't think I was doing that. I'm pretty sure I wasn't doing that.
[Constable Marsh] Okay, there will be some options for you if you would like to dispute that which will be explained to you on the penally notice when it comes.
[Ms Bezzina] I do know my licence number.
[Constable Marsh] That's okay l've located your driver's licence, yeah okay, alright then thank you.
On 18 January 2024, the applicant appeared in the Local Court at Bathurst. The prosecutor gave a short opening address and tendered a statement from Constable Marsh which included the account at paragraph [12] above and accompanying documents in the brief. Those documents included certificates made under s 137 of the R**oad T**ransport A**ct 2013 (NSW) which certified that each of two traffic enforcement devices used by Constable Marsh on 3 July 2023 were “approved for speed measurement” and had been tested, sealed, and on the day in question were tested and operating correctly.
Section 137 of the Road Transport Act provides:
137 Certificates concerning reliability of speed measurement devices
In proceedings for a speeding offence in which evidence is given of a measurement of speed obtained from an approved traffic enforcement device that is approved for speed measurement, a certificate purporting to be signed by an appropriate inspection officer for the device certifying the following matters is admissible and is prima facie evidence of those matters—
(a) that the device is an approved traffic enforcement device that is approved for speed measurement,
(b) that on a day specified in the certificate (being within the period prescribed by the statutory rules before the alleged time of the offence) the device was tested in accordance with the statutory rules and sealed by an appropriate inspection officer for the device,
(c) that on that day the device was accurate and operating properly.
The definition of an “appropriate inspection officer” relevantly includes a police officer: s 135(1)(a)(i). Speed measurement devices are subject to calibration and accuracy certification procedures for the approved traffic enforcement device, at least every 12 months: s 137 of the Road Transport Act and cl 29(1) of the Road Transport (General) Regulation 2021.
As already noted, two certificates were tendered confirming that the devices were tested on 29 November 2022 (radar) and 5 June 2023 (calibrated digital speedometer), each within 12-months on the date of the offence, 3 July 2023.
The effect of s 137 is that the valid certification of an approved speed testing device, tested by an appropriate inspection officer, is admissible prima facie evidence that the device was working correctly and recording accurately. To rebut this evidence that the device was working accurately and operating properly, the defendant is required to prove by their own expert evidence that the device in question was inaccurate or not working properly.
Sections 140 and 141 of the Road Transport Act provide:
140 Evidence of accuracy and reliability not required if certificate tendered
If a certificate under this Division is tendered in proceedings for a detectable traffic offence, evidence—
(a) of the accuracy or reliability of the approved traffic enforcement device concerned, or
(b) as to whether or not the device operated correctly or operates correctly (generally or at a particular time or date or during a particular period),
is not required in those proceedings unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt that, at the time of the alleged offence, the device was accurate, reliable and operating correctly is adduced.
141 Rebuttal of evidence concerning operation of approved traffic enforcement devices
(1) This section applies to the determination of whether evidence is sufficient to rebut prima facie evidence or a presumption, or to raise doubt about a matter, as referred to in section 137, 137A, 138, 140 or 164 and for the purposes of proceedings to which those sections apply.
(2) An assertion that contradicts or challenges—
(a) the accuracy or reliability, or the correct or proper operation, of an approved traffic enforcement device, or
(b) the accuracy or reliability of information (including a photograph) derived from such a device,
is capable of being sufficient, in proceedings to which this section applies, to rebut such evidence or such a presumption, or to raise such doubt, only if it is evidence adduced from a person who has relevant specialised knowledge (based wholly or substantially on the person’s training, study or experience).
The combined effect of ss 137, 140 and 141 is that only expert evidence, if accepted by the tribunal of fact, is legally capable of raising doubt that the radar used on 3 July 2023 was not reliable, or accurate, or operating correctly: *Roads & Maritime Services v Noble-*Hiblen [2019] NSWSC 1230 at [16]-[25] per Campbell J.
The police prosecutor said that he had spoken to the applicant and that “I’m sure she will correct me if I’m wrong, [but] that the conversation that was relayed in Senior Constable Marsh’s statement is accurate”. Accordingly, the prosecutor did not tender the videos taken by Constable Marsh. The prosecution case was closed without any witness being called.
Magistrate Stapleton carefully explained to the applicant the elements of the offence, the onus of proof on the prosecution and explained that the applicant could give evidence if she wished but did not need to do so. The applicant said, “I’ve written… an affidavit Your Honour to hand in…”. The Magistrate explained that “you have to do things on your- the basis of your best recollection today”. The applicant chose to give oral evidence and was sworn as a witness.
In her evidence in chief, elicited by open ended questions from the Magistrate, the applicant said that the speed limit applicable was 50 kilometres per hour and that she was the driver of the vehicle. As to the speed she was driving, the applicant said, “I thought it was 60 but its actually 50… so it was-would have been somewhere between...”
The applicant said in her evidence in chief that she had driven in excess of 50 kilometres per hour by mistake and that she was “trying to stick to around the 60… sort of below-ish 60, yeah”.
At the close of the applicant’s evidence, Magistrate Stapleton told the applicant she was excused from the witness box and that “we’ll get on to the legal points of the case”. After the submissions from the prosecutor, the applicant commenced her submissions.
The applicant argued she was not speeding because the “Road Rules guidelines, they have never been properly enacted”. The applicant said she wanted to tender more evidence. She outlined that evidence as being:
That the prosecution had not shown there was a properly enacted law to convict the applicant under and therefore she was “not speeding” but was “driving faster, okay”. That is, there was no properly enacted law that forbids driving faster than 50 km/hour in a 50 km/hour zone;
A “Notice of Objection” sent to Senior Constable Marsh to which the applicant had not received a response. The applicant asserted that the legal effect of a failure to reply to what the applicant styled as a “Notice of Objection” was, “if there’s no reply, he who does not deny, admits”. The applicant apparently wished to submit that the absence of a response was an “admission” by Senior Constable Marsh that there is not “a properly enacted law [the applicant] can be convicted under” and in the lack of response there was a failure to show “these [speed measurement] devices meet Australian Standards and meet the conditions of the National Measurement Act 1960” and that they were working properly;
The applicant appealed her conviction to the District Court pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes Appeal and Review Act 2001 (NSW) (“CAR Act”). On 3 May 2024, the applicant’s District Court appeal was listed for mention before Musgrave DCJ. Her Honour explained the procedure for hearing the appeal and asked the applicant if she wanted to put on fresh evidence, to which the applicant responded that she had been denied the opportunity to put on evidence in the Local Court but that the evidence she wished to rely on was not “fresh”. Musgrave DCJ carefully and patiently advised the applicant that her written submissions did not contain an application to adduce fresh evidence. If the applicant wanted to adduce fresh evidence which was not before the Local Court, she would need to give a copy to the DPP, tell the DPP why she believed it should be before the Court, and would need to file it. Her Honour set out a timetable for the filing of written submissions on the appeal.
On 12 September 2024, the applicant’s appeal came on for hearing. At the outset of the hearing, Musgrave DCJ asked the applicant if she wanted the opportunity to obtain legal advice. The applicant declined. Her Honour asked if the applicant had made or intended to make an application for fresh evidence to be adduced. The applicant responded, as she had in May 2024, that she did not think that the additional evidence which was not before the Local Court was fresh. Her Honour, twice, carefully and patiently explained to the applicant that if material was not before the Magistrate, it was fresh evidence. Her Honour again explained to the applicant the steps she must take if she wished to rely on fresh evidence. The applicant advanced a number of reasons to the contrary, seemingly in the belief that s 80 of the J**udiciary Act 1903 (Cth) was somehow relevant and that it had “overruled” the CAR Act.
The following exchange then took place:
HER HONOUR: So there’s no application to adduce fresh evidence?
APPELLANT: No, No. At the moment, no.
HER HONOUR: So we’ll be proceeding on the papers in the Local Court.
APPELLANT: Yes.
APPELLANT: I object strongly, your Honour. I object strongly. I have not been given a fair deal. Honestly, I have not. I have been treated very rudely by the local magistrate.
The Prosecutor explained that her submissions were sent the day before the hearing but that the bundle being tendered were sent to applicant “weeks ago”. The bundle was admitted and marked Exhibit A.
The applicant’s “affidavit” of 27 August 2024 was treated as a submission and marked MFI 1. The applicant’s written submissions dated 20 August 2024 were marked MFI 2. The applicant was invited to clarify or emphasise anything she had said in writing.
After informing Musgrave DCJ that she had made complaints to the Judicial Commission and the Independent Commission Against Corruption about the non-provision of the recording of the proceedings on 3 May 2024, the applicant made a number of oral submissions. The essence of those submissions was that by reason of Senior Constable Marsh’s non-response to three letters allegedly sent by the applicant, (a notice of discovery, a notice of objection and a notice to produce) “we would agree to a contract that I was not guilty and that he could not prove my guilt, that I’d committed an offence, and that his devices were not correct, and the laws were not valid… and apparently he sought advice from his superiors but his superiors told him to ignore those letters and they are a legally binding contract”.
The applicant next outlined her submission that Senior Constable Marsh had “disobeyed” the Commonwealth and NSW Interpretation Acts by measuring her speed not “on a level flat plane”.
The applicant next asserted that Senior Constable Marsh had failed to follow NSW Police Site Operation Procedure guidelines and the NSW Police Code of Conduct and Ethics.
The appeal was adjourned part heard to 22 October 2024. On 22 October 2024, the applicant sought to tender photographs that had not been before the Local Court. Musgrave DCJ refused the tender on the basis that there had been no application to adduce new evidence.
The applicant complained of abuse of process by the late submission of documents by the prosecution. Musgrave DCJ noted that the matter had been adjourned since 12 September and that the applicant had more time that she would have had, had the documents been filed on time and heard in one day.
The prosecution relied on their submissions. The applicant made further, lengthy oral submissions responding to those written submissions.
In an e**x tempore judgment, her Honour said each submission made by the applicant had been closely reviewed and carefully considered. Her Honour said relevantly:
In broad terms, the appellant submits that she should not be convicted as:
- The fine issued by the officer was unlawful. The proceedings now before this Court arise however from an election by the appellant to have the matter heard by a magistrate and not dealt with by way of a traffic infringement notice. The fine now repayable is that ordered by the magistrate following a hearing, conviction and then fine.
- The magistrate's conviction was in some way estopped by the officer's constructive agreement to an offer of private settlement. This was argued to be the case by operation of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. The civil rules are limited in their application and do not apply to the proceedings before the magistrate.
- The argument was that Officer Marsh's measurement of her speed was in contravention of s 35 of the Commonwealth Acts Interpretation Act as it was on a hill. The appellant is here relying on a provision which governs the measurement of distance. Her speed was measured by an approved traffic device. It was not based solely on the officer's subjective estimation, and a certificate was provided that the device had been tested in accordance with the statutory rules.
- The argument that the radar device was not shown to be in accordance with the relevant legislation. The certificate before the magistrate was prepared in accordance with s 137 of the Road Transport Act.
- It was argued that the road rules do not apply because they are inconsistent with the Commonwealth National Transport Commission Act 2003. This is based on a misreading of s 7 of that Act. The model rules attached to the legislation do not have force of law as they are simply that: a model. The legislation duly enacted in each State does have force of law. The Road Rules and Road Transport Act as enacted in New South Wales are not, therefore, pretend and have the force of law.
- The argument was that the prosecution bore the onus to prove its case and to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. This is correct, and the magistrate directed herself accordingly.
- The argument was that the officer acted improperly. First, as the speed measurement device was not set up in accordance with the New South Wales Police Code of Conduct. The Code was not before the Court, and further the inconsistencies identified by Ms Bezzina in the officer's statement do not give rise to the alleged breach. Second, as her name was spelt incorrectly. Ms Bezzina has appeared in answer to the charge. She elected to bring this matter before the Court. She accepts she was driving the car. The misspelling of her name is not of any significance in the determination of the issues.
- That the magistrate did not follow due process. These are matters that may be raised elsewhere and are not matters for consideration of this Court on the determination of the appeal which, as I have said repeatedly to Ms Bezzina, is a rehearing on the Local Court papers, and no application was made by her, despite it being raised at the commencement of these proceedings, for the adoption in this Court of fresh evidence. In relation otherwise to matters raised in regards to the magistrate's conduct:
a. It was suggested that the magistrate did not allow Ms Bezzina an opportunity to give her version. Ms Bezzina's evidence was given orally. It was before the magistrate in lieu of her affidavit. Ms Bezzina was asked an open-ended question by the magistrate.
b. The magistrate did not increase the amount of the fine stated in the penalty notice. The fine imposed by the magistrate followed conviction in the Local Court and was in accordance with the process for election and disposition of the matter. It is not higher than that which could have been imposed.
Ms Bezzina has been given a further opportunity today to respond to the arguments of the prosecution (although that officer did not make any oral submissions over and above the written submissions that had been filed).
Very briefly, in reply, Ms Bezzina submitted or queried whether this was a criminal matter and that it could not be considered to be as such because there was no victim. No victim is required for a matter to be criminal. This matter is not a civil proceeding and these remarks reflect that. Ms Bezzina says she is not guilty. That is a matter for me. She submits that there was no prima facie case. I have already briefly addressed that. There was. There was before the Local Court magistrate a statement from the police officer, the photo of the recorded speed, the photo of the relevant speed limit, a description of the built up residential area, which was the area in which the vehicle was recorded at the given speed, and there was the certification of the device.
Ms Bezzina has come before the Court for an alleged breach of road rule 20. She, on her own admission, has travelled in excess of the posted speed limit. On the evidence before the Court she has breached road rule 20 and the offence of exceeding the speed limit has been made out. She was travelling at less than 30 kilometres over the limit, being the speed tier in subrule (6) of the penalty provision in rule 10-2 of the Road Rules.
By notice of motion filed 10 February 2025, the applicant sought an extension of the three-month time limit to commence judicial review proceedings. A summons seeking judicial review of Musgrave DCJ’s orders was filed on 10 February 2025.
By a second amended summons filed on 6 May 2025, the applicant advanced the following grounds of review:
- Judge P Musgrave has abused the court process herself, and ignored the abuse of process by another judicial officer and a police officer.
- Judge P Musgrave has perverted the course of justice and denied Leslee-ann Bezzina natural justice.
1. Dismiss the unlawful speeding conviction by Magistrate L Stapleton upheld by Judge P Musgrave.
- Return any points lost from the driver's licence of Leslee-ann Bezzina.
- Cancel the fine enforcement order from REVENUE NSW Reference number 451274544.
- Each party shall bear their own costs.
- Allow Leslee-ann Bezzina access to order copies of the CD recordings of her hearings before Judge Musgrave on 12th September 2024 and 22nd October 2024.
- Extend the application period due to the amendments for the summons.
There is no appeal from a judgment of the District Court on an appeal from the Local Court. The present proceedings were brought by way of judicial review of the District Court judgment, pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Because of the privative provision in s 176 of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW), the exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction depends upon a finding of jurisdictional error. The jurisdictional error identified by the applicant was an alleged abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness by Musgrave DCJ.
Although the applicant’s written submissions were somewhat opaque, and she declined to make any oral submissions, we have attempted to identify and address each of the separate complaints which may be discerned.
The applicant’s first complaint is that Musgrave DCJ ignored an alleged abuse of process by the solicitor for the first respondent who provided her written submissions on 11 September 2024, after the date they should have been filed in compliance with the relevant practice note. This complaint is without merit. As is clear from the above chronology, the appeal was adjourned part heard to 22 October 2024. Her Honour was correct in recording that the applicant had “more time than [she] would have had had the submissions been filed in accordance with the practice note prior to the first time the matter was listed”.
The applicant’s real complaint appears to be that there would have been a breach of procedural fairness if the matter had been completed on 12 September 2024. There is no breach of procedural fairness by reason of a hypothetical injury. Procedural fairness is designed to avoid practical injustice: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Lam (2003) CLR 1; [2003] HCA 6 at [37] per Gleeson CJ. The applicant did not lose any opportunity to advance her case. There was no abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326; [2015] HCA 40 at [57] per Gageler and Gordon JJ.
Secondly, the applicant submitted that Musgrave DCJ was biased by “try[ing] to get me to say I was exceeding the speed limit”. This complaint is without merit. The applicant admitted in her evidence before the Local Court that she was exceeding the 50 kilometre per hour speed limit. The applicant’s evidence in the Local Court was that upon being told by Senior Constable Marsh that she had been recorded travelling between 70 and 80 kms per hour, she was “in shock” and said she was trying to stick “sort of below-ish 60”, to which her Honour responded, “Are you able to be more accurate about sort of below-ish 60?”. The applicant replied, “Well I mean the needle was, it looks just below, you cant tell exactly”. Musgrave DCJ was entitled to have regard to the evidence the applicant had given in the Local Court. No breach of procedural fairness has been shown in her Honour doing so. The applicant’s assertion that the (Qld) applies in this case must also be rejected.
The applicant accepted in her evidence in the Local Court that she was travelling above 50 kilometres per hour in a 50 kilometres per hour zone on 3 July 2023. The applicant had an extensive hearing in the Local Court. The applicant had an appeal hearing over two separate days in the District Court.
Neither of the grounds seeking judicial review advanced by the applicant have been established.
The Court makes the following orders:
Extend time to file the summons seeking judicial review to 10 February 2025.
Summons dismissed.
Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs.
**********
Bezzina
Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] NSWCA 276
(2015) 256 CLR 326
(2011) 245 CLR 1
(2010) 242 CLR 348
Time to file the judicial-review summons was extended to 10 February 2025; the summons was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs.
Secondly, although the applicant styled her application as being for a “ruling”, there is no existing dispute between the parties on this point which requires resolution. In substance the applicant claims an entitlement to a further acknowledgement by the members of the Court as to a poorly formulated proposition of law. She identified no principle, or authority, or statute, giving her any such entitlement. There is none.
Thirdly, the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) does not apply in New South Wales, and Momcilovic is not authority that it does. The applicant was plainly aware that Victoria and Queensland have enacted legislation which in, different forms, is protective of certain human rights. New South Wales has not enacted such legislation. The legislation of other States does not apply to offences committed in New South Wales (the applicant was prosecuted for her driving in regional New South Wales). Nor does other States’ legislation apply to the prosecution of offences committed in New South Wales in the courts of New South Wales.
This Court’s function is to administer the law. That function includes resolving disputed questions of law, such as whether a Victorian statute is applicable. To the extent necessary, the Court will resolve that issue. The applicant is not entitled to an upfront “ruling” on any such issue, still less is she entitled to a ruling on such issue in her favour, as a condition of her prosecuting the proceedings she has commenced.
The applicant asserted that Senior Constable Marsh did not follow the “guidelines for site criteria selection” to measure speed and also submitted, “I wonder whether there was interference by the sewer station… and the tall telegraph poles”.
The Magistrate informed the applicant that it was “too late to tender any photographs and there’s no relevance in what you’ve put, in any event”. Her Honour explained that the applicant had been given an opportunity to test the prosecution case and “[y]ou didn’t cross-examine the officer to suggest that he didn’t use his device accurately or anything like that. You accepted Mr Prosecutor could tender the statement and you didn’t require the officer for cross-examination”.
The Magistrate said to the applicant “I’ve given you a fair opportunity to make submissions. Please sit down, I’m about to give [a] decision and reasons for the decision”. The Magistrate then gave an ex tempore judgment and found the applicant guilty of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. In the penalty phase the applicant stated, of her capacity to pay a fine, “I object to the whole process your Honour”. A fine of $660 was imposed. The sheriff was called as apparently the applicant would not leave the Court. Before the recording ceased the applicant repeatedly demanded to be provided with a “written copy of the judge’s oath of office”.
Thirdly, the applicant submitted there was a breach of procedural fairness in the solicitor appearing for the first respondent submitting that the applicant failed to challenge evidence tendered in the Local Court. We have set out the history above. The applicant’s complaint that she was denied the opportunity to question Constable Marsh and submit photos in the Local Court is without merit. The applicant was given a reasonable opportunity at the beginning of the hearing on 18 January 2024 to decide whether or not to question Constable Marsh or object to the brief of evidence. The applicant chose not to do either thing. The reference to T**ransport for NSW v Cha**poterera (2022) 300 A Crim R 327; [2022] NSWSC 976 does not assist the applicant. In Cha**poterera the Magistrate refused to allow any evidence or submissions at all as the Magistrate in that case thought it was a waste of the Court’s time. Nothing like that occurred here.
More importantly, Musgrave DCJ clearly and carefully explained to the applicant the steps she would need to take if she wished to rely on evidence which was not before the Magistrate. The applicant, having heard and understood that explanation, did not seek to tender any evidence which had not been before the Magistrate. Both grounds of the summons seeking judicial review are addressed, correctly, to the decision of Musgrave DCJ. No abuse of process or breach of procedural fairness has been shown in her Honour's decision.
Fourthly, the applicant asserted that Musgrave DCJ “supressed evidence” by refusing the applicant’s tender of photos. That assertion must be rejected. Musgrave DCJ carefully, patiently and correctly explained to the applicant what she must do if she wanted to rely on any evidence in the District Court appeal which had not been before the Magistrate. On 23 May 2024, well in advance of the hearing, her Honour explained to the applicant the procedure for making an application to call fresh evidence. On 12 September 2024, at the beginning of the appeal, her Honour again carefully and patiently repeated that explanation.
The applicant’s response was a non sequitur, namely, that the CAR A**ct (of New South Wales) did not apply as it was “overruled” in some unidentified way by the Judiciary Act of the Commonwealth. Musgrave DCJ cannot be held responsible for fundamental legal misunderstandings held by the applicant.
On 22 October 2024, her Honour correctly declined to have regard to the applicant’s proffered photographs. There had been no application (let alone a successful application) by the applicant to adduce fresh evidence. Her Honour had explained the necessity of such an application if the applicant wished to rely on evidence not before the Magistrate on numerous prior occasions. No error has been shown. There was no abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness.
Fifthly, the applicant submitted that Musgrave DCJ ignored matters concerning s 38 of the I**nterpretation A**ct 1987 (NSW) and the measurement of speed on a hill. Musgrave DCJ did not ignore the applicant’s arguments about interpretation statutes. As her Honour pointed out, the applicant relied on provisions relating to measures of distance. What was measured in this case was speed, on a device tested according to statutory rules and certified to comply with the standards set out by those rules. The suggested inconsistency with s 38(b) of the I**nterpretation A**ct does not arise. Even if it did, there was compliance with the clear terms of the R**oad T**ransport A**ct. No error has been shown, let alone an abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness.
Sixthly, the applicant submitted that Musgrave DCJ ignored her contentions regarding police standard operating procedures. The complaint is without merit. Her Honour observed, correctly, that police standard operating procedures did not have the force of law. No error has been shown.
Seventhly, the applicant submitted that Musgrave DCJ ignored her arguments about the accuracy of the speed measurement devices used by Senior Constable Marsh. We disagree. Her Honour addressed the applicant’s argument concerning the accuracy of the speed measurement devices engaged in this case by reference to the relevant provisions of the R**oad Transport A**ct. Her Honour was correct in doing so. As we have earlier noted, two certificates were tendered pursuant to the Road Transport Act. The combined effect of ss 137, 140 and 141 of the Road Transport Act is that only expert evidence, if accepted by the tribunal of fact, is legally capable of raising doubt that the speed measurement devices used on 3 July 2023 were not reliable, or accurate, or operating correctly. The applicant was not an expert. The various assertions made in her submissions do not raise any doubt or question for the purposes of Road Transport Act. The applicant’s submissions that the evidence was insufficient to establish the offence do not establish any error, let alone any jurisdictional error.
Eighthly, the applicant submitted that Musgrave DCJ ignored the applicant’s allegation of “intimidation” by the Magistrate. This is not correct. Musgrave DCJ explicitly addressed the allegation made regarding the Magistrate’s conduct including an allegation that the Magistrate failed to allow the applicant the opportunity to give her version of events. The incident referred to by the applicant was one in which the applicant asked the Magistrate to provide her oath of office and occurred after the judgment had been delivered. It did not involve any “intimidation” on behalf of Magistrate Stapleton. No error on the part of Musgrave DCJ has been shown, much less was it shown there was an abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness.
Ninthly, the applicant submitted that the radar used by Senior Constable Marsh did not comply with the National Measurement A**ct 1960 (Cth) and that this somehow gave rise to an inconsistency within the meaning of s 109 of the Constitution. That argument is plainly colourable and does not given rise to a constitutional question that may otherwise preclude this Court from hearing the matter and despite the absence of s 78B Notices that would otherwise need to be issued pursuant to s 78B of the Judiciary Act.
Section 10 of the N**ational Measurement Act has nothing whatever to do with the measurement of speed for road safety purposes. Section 10 does not affect the admissibility of certificates pursuant to s 137 of the R**oad T**ransport A**ct or the operation of the Road T**ransport A**ct more generally. Section 4(2) of the N**ational M**easurements A**ct makes clear that the Act and the regulations do not apply to the exclusion of any law of a State or Territory except in so far as that law is inconsistent with an express provision of this Act or of the regulation: Millington v P**olice [2015] SASC 52 at [24]. There is no s 109 inconsistency by reason of the operation of the National Measurements Act*.* No error has been shown.
Tenthly, the applicant also submitted that there was an inconsistency between the order of events recorded in the statement of Senior Constable Marsh and the events on the video recording (which was not in evidence before the Local Court). No error has been shown. The video recording was not in evidence before the Local Court and no application was made to adduce that evidence in the District Court. In any event, the applicant’s complaints address the merits of the claim and do not, on any view, establish jurisdictional error. No abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness has been shown.
In an affidavit filed on 5 December 2025, which contained the applicant’s submissions in reply, addressed a number of issues, all of which fell outside the grounds of review in the second amended summons. Those issues may be addressed shortly:
(paragraph 1) the applicant’s submission that “this affidavit is now a question of fact, and if not rebutted will require a jury trial in a Chapter III Court” is legally incoherent and does not raise any arguable error by Musgrave DCJ;
(paragraph 2) the applicant’s submission that the applicant is “under the protection” of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) must be rejected. The Victorian statute does not apply to the construction of NSW statutes. The complaint does not raise any arguable error by Musgrave DCJ;
(paragraph 3) the applicant’s suggestion that the imposition of a penalty notice for speeding infringed any principle recognised by the High Court in Port of Portland Pty Ltd v Victoria (2010) 242 CLR 348; [2010] HCA 44 cannot be accepted and does not raise any arguable error by Musgrave DCJ;
(paragraph 4) the applicant’s suggestion that the NSW Police Force have acted judicially in causing a penalty notice for speeding to be issued is legally unsustainable. The allegation is colourable and no s 78B Judiciary Act notice is required before we reject the claim;
(paragraph 5) the applicant’s suggestion that the penalty notice sent to the applicant was a “payment for unsolicited services” in contravention of s 40 of Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) is without foundation and does not raise any arguable error by Musgrave DCJ;
(paragraph 6) the applicant’s observation that Australia is a constitutional monarchy is correct but irrelevant. The applicant repeats her submission that by reason of Senior Constable Marsh’s non-response to three letters allegedly sent by her, (a notice of discovery, a notice of objection and a notice to produce) an “admission” was made that the applicant was not guilty, that his devices were not correct, and the laws were not valid. This submission cannot be accepted;
(paragraph 7) the applicant’s submission that the Imperial Acts Application Act 1922 (Vic) requires “proof from the ODPP NSW that the oaths of the solicitors, lawyers and barristers involved in my case were sworn to the Monarch” must be rejected. A litigant, such as the applicant, is not in a position to demand proof of any such thing. In Collis v Bank of Queensland [2021] VSCA 17, the Victorian Court of Appeal said of a similar argument, “The judge held that whether or not counsel for the First Respondent has taken an oath of allegiance is not relevant to the case. The judge commented that it was not clear how s 88 of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1922 is relevant to the case and commented that the provision had been repealed”, adding that the primary judge was correct (at [66]-[67]). The same conclusion should be reached here. No arguable error by Musgrave DCJ has been identified by this complaint;
(paragraph 8) the applicant’s submission that the Local Court of New South Wales is a “commercial business” is baseless. No arguable error by Musgrave DCJ has been identified by this complaint;
(paragraph 9) the applicant’s complaint about the election writ for Senators for NSW in 2022 is irrelevant to any issue before the Local Court, Musgrave DCJ or this Court on judicial review;
(paragraph 10) the applicant’s complaint about the application of s 33 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) to Senior Constable Marsh’s statement is misconceived. That section had no application in the present case where the statement was tendered without objection. The complaints about the speed measurement devices must be rejected for the reasons given at [58] above;
(paragraph 11) the applicant’s submission that Senior Constable Marsh has made a “false claim” is completely without foundation and must be rejected. No abuse of process or denial of procedural fairness has been shown;
(paragraph 12) the applicant’s invocation of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) has been rejected at the outset of these reasons. No error in the decision of Musgrave DCJ has been shown.