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The payments began on 26 July 2019. Jo-Anne Wills paid $250,000 into the appellants’ bank accounts. Of that, $200,000 went into an account used to reduce David Berg’s bank debt from $270,000 to $70,000. The remaining $50,000 went into another account belonging to Tessa Wills ([3]). The parties then emailed Berg’s solicitor on 30 July 2019, instructing the solicitor to “draft a deed of trust as you explained” and asking for confirmation that there was no other deed of trust or encumbrance on the property ([3]).

Further payments followed. Jo-Anne Wills paid $20,000 to David Berg’s account between 20 and 30 August 2019, and $41,250 between 4 September and 20 November 2019. She also paid $39,856.46 to third parties at the appellants’ request, including amounts for a shed, solar equipment and a payment to Steve Vella ([3]). The first appellant repaid $1,250 in two instalments. The judgment records that the balance of the amounts paid to the appellants or others at their request was $361,856.46. It also notes that $15,000 of that total was agreed to be a loan from the respondent to the second appellant, accounting for the different principal amounts in the judgments against each appellant ([3] and footnote 3).

The respondent moved into the property in September 2019 and left in November ([3]). The appellants’ case at trial was that the arrangement was initially a loan to the second appellant, without an agreed sum limit or terms, and was later varied so that repayment would not be required for three years, with the loan due around 1 July 2024 ([4]). By 5 November 2021, however, the respondent referred to “the $362K I loaned you”, and the second appellant replied that the appellants had said the money would be repaid and were selling the property so the respondent could get her money ([5]).

The District Court entered judgment for $472,616.63, including interest, against the first appellant and $493,055.21, including interest, against the second appellant, and ordered the appellants to pay the respondent’s costs ([1]). On appeal, the appellants raised two grounds. The Court of Appeal, with Bradley JA giving the reasons and Mullins P and Freeburn J agreeing, dismissed the appeal with costs ([18]–[21]).

Why the court decided this way

The first ground concerned s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974, or the relevant section of the Property Law Act 2023. The appellants argued that the respondent could not bring an action based on an oral agreement concerning the money because it was an agreement to dispose of an interest in land. They also disputed whether the payments and the email to the solicitor were acts unequivocally consistent only with such an agreement ([7]–[8]).

The Court did not decide the appeal by resolving every aspect of the alleged original arrangement. Instead, it focused on the claim the respondent had actually brought. Bradley JA explained that, whatever the oral agreement’s nature when made, the parties shortly afterwards agreed to treat the respondent’s payments as a loan. The respondent sought damages for breach of that loan agreement, which the judgment calls the “Agreement as varied”. She was not seeking specific performance of, or damages for breach of, a contract to dispose of an interest in land ([10]).

That distinction was decisive for Ground 1. The Court stated that the loan agreement did not raise the s 59 issues, and that the alternative claim for money had and received did not raise them either. Accordingly, even if the appellants’ statutory argument had force in relation to a different kind of claim, it would not result in this judgment being set aside ([11]). The Court therefore did not need to determine whether the original arrangement was an oral agreement to dispose of an interest in land or whether the payments and email satisfied the appellants’ proposed test concerning unequivocal acts.

Ground 2 challenged the alternative finding that the advances were recoverable as money had and received. The appellants said that the respondent had not pleaded the “precise basis” on which they were allegedly unjustly enriched ([12]–[13]). The Court was unpersuaded. It identified the pleaded factual basis: funds had been advanced, they had not been repaid, the appellants had retained the benefit, and the respondent remained out of pocket ([14]).

The Court also described how the payments benefited the appellants. They reduced the first appellant’s liability to the bank secured over the property and provided funds for the appellants’ use and expenses, including improvements to the property. Most of the money had not been repaid ([15]). On that basis, the Court accepted the trial judge’s alternative finding that the respondent could recover the money advanced as money had and received ([15]).

Finally, the Court noted that the appellants’ trial defence had been that the payments were gifts. The trial judge rejected that contention, and the appellants did not pursue or challenge it on appeal ([17]). After both appeal grounds failed, the Court concluded that there was no remaining defence and dismissed the appeal with costs ([17]–[18], [21]).

Before and after state of the law

The judgment does not describe a change in the law, announce a new general test, or review a line of earlier authorities. It is best read as a fact-specific application of the distinction between the claim pleaded and an asserted agreement concerning an interest in land.

Before the appeal, the respondent’s District Court case had produced judgments based on repayment of the amounts advanced, with an alternative basis of money had and received. The appellants’ appeal raised a statutory writing argument by characterising the arrangement as an oral agreement to dispose of an interest in land ([7]–[12]). The Court treated the respondent’s loan claim as analytically distinct from such a land-disposition claim. Its stated reason was that the respondent sought repayment under the loan agreement, not performance of or damages for breach of a land-disposition contract ([10]–[11]).

The judgment’s treatment of the alternative claim is similarly confined. It confirms that, on the facts and pleading before it, identifying the advances, non-repayment, retained benefit and the respondent’s loss was enough for the appellants to understand the claim ([14]). The Court did not set out a comprehensive test for all money had and received claims, nor did it discuss other possible elements, defences or circumstances.

The decision therefore does not establish from its text that every loan claim involving a property, or every claim for money had and received, falls outside statutory rules concerning land interests. Its reasoning depends on the form and substance of the claim in this case. The judgment does not determine the contested character of every aspect of the original arrangement; it says that the respondent’s claim for repayment under the loan agreement did not raise the s 59 issue ([10]–[11]).

Key passages with plain-English translation

At [10], Bradley JA said that the respondent “did not seek specific performance of or damages for breach of a contract to dispose of an interest in land.” In plain English, the Court looked at what remedy the respondent was asking for. She wanted repayment under a loan arrangement, rather than an order enforcing a supposed transfer of an interest in the property or compensation for breach of such a transfer agreement.

At [11], the Court stated: “The loan agreement does not raise the s 59 issues.” This was the central answer to Ground 1. The Court did not need to determine whether the original arrangement might have involved land. It concluded that the statutory argument did not defeat the judgment on the loan claim actually advanced.

At [14], Bradley JA said that the pleaded facts meant “[n]o other fact would be required for the appellants to comprehend the respondent’s alternative claim.” In plain English, the claim gave the appellants enough information to understand why the respondent said the money should be repaid: she had paid it, it remained unpaid, they had received or retained its benefit, and she was still out of pocket.

At [15], the Court linked the payments to identifiable benefits: reducing the secured bank liability, providing funds for the appellants’ use and paying expenses, including property improvements. This explains why the alternative claim was not treated as an abstract assertion that the appellants had benefited. The judgment identified ways the payments had been applied.

At [17], the Court noted that the gift defence was rejected at trial and was not pursued or challenged on appeal. In plain English, the appeal did not require the Court to reconsider whether the money had been given as gifts. That issue was not an active ground of challenge before it.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

The judgment is most relevant to a dispute where a claimant seeks repayment of money advanced to another person, but the recipient argues that the arrangement involved an oral agreement concerning an interest in land. The key analytical question illustrated by the case is what claim the claimant actually advances and what remedy is sought. Here, the Court relied on the respondent’s claim under a loan agreement, rather than a claim to enforce a transfer of an interest in land ([10]–[11]).

The decision may also be relevant where the claimant pleads an alternative money had and received claim. The pleading issue arose because the appellants argued that the respondent had not identified the precise basis of unjust enrichment. The Court regarded the identified facts as sufficient in this case: advances, non-repayment, retained benefit and the respondent remaining out of pocket ([13]–[15]).

The facts that mattered included how the money was used. Some payments reduced a debt secured over the first appellant’s property, while others funded the appellants’ use or expenses, including improvements ([3], [15]). The respondent also made payments directly to third parties at the appellants’ request ([3]). Those circumstances helped explain the benefit allegedly retained by the appellants.

The decision should not be treated as resolving every dispute involving money paid between relatives, property, or informal arrangements. In this case, the gift defence had been rejected at trial and was not pursued on appeal. The Court also recorded evidence of later communications referring to the money as a loan and to repayment through a property sale ([5], [17]). Those features form part of the particular record, but the judgment does not set out a general rule that any one of them alone determines whether money is a loan or a gift.

How later courts have treated it

The supplied judgment contains no citations to earlier cases and gives no information about decisions issued after it. It was delivered on 11 March 2026, so the judgment itself cannot establish how later courts have treated it. No later judicial treatment can be stated on the basis of this source alone.

For research purposes, the propositions available from the judgment are limited to its express reasoning: the loan claim did not raise the s 59 issue on these facts, and the alternative pleading was sufficient because it identified the advances, non-repayment, benefit retained and the respondent’s loss ([11], [14]–[15]). Any assessment of whether later courts have followed, distinguished or otherwise treated Berg v Wills would require later judgments not included in the source provided here.

Still-open questions

The judgment does not determine whether the parties’ original arrangement was itself an oral agreement to dispose of an interest in land. It records that the appellants denied there was such an agreement, while also describing their case as one in which the funds were a gift ([8]–[9]). The Court resolved Ground 1 by focusing on the loan agreement and the relief sought, rather than deciding the disputed character of the original arrangement ([10]–[11]).

The Court also does not explain the detailed legal basis or formation of the asserted variation to a loan arrangement. It records the appellants’ account of an agreement involving no repayment for three years and a due date around 1 July 2024 ([4]), and the respondent’s later reference to the money as a loan alongside the second appellant’s repayment assurance ([5]). The reasons do not separately analyse the evidence or legal requirements for formation, variation, or maturity of that loan.

The judgment does not formulate a general test for money had and received, nor does it canvass possible defences to such a claim. Its pleading conclusion is tied to the facts pleaded in this proceeding ([14]–[15]). It also does not explain the calculation of the interest awards beyond setting out the principal and interest amounts in footnotes 1 and 2.

Finally, the reasons are concise and do not discuss any authorities or the relationship between the 1974 and 2023 Queensland property legislation beyond referring to the relevant statutory provisions as raised by the appellants ([7]). Questions outside those stated conclusions cannot be answered from this judgment alone.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.