Bennett v Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer

(1) Is the plaintiff entitled to an award of damages for future commercially provided domestic assistance, if he is entitled to compensation for medical and related treatment under the 1942 Act?

(2) What is the revised figure in [279] PJ, after consideration of the claims for future out-of-pocket expenses and deducting the correct figure for the unused amount of the statutory caps in [176]-[182] PWS?

1. For the reasons in this judgment, I have come to the following conclusions, adopting the issue numbers:

(1) The posed question should be answered "No". The plaintiff is not entitled to an award of future commercially provided domestic assistance because such assistance comes within the definition of "medical and related treatment" under the 1942 Act, and for the same reasons set out when dealing with Issue 3 of the primary judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to make a claim for those expenses from the DDA under the 1942 Act and is required to do so to mitigate his loss. If I am wrong on this conclusion, the appropriate award of damages for future commercially provided domestic assistance and the supply of medical aids is $610,811, which has not been reduced for the unused portion of the statutory caps or the empty chair exposure.

(2) The figure of $610,540 referred to at [297] PJ for the cost of the plaintiff's bilateral lung transplant is correct. To that should be added the sum of $132,610 for the future medical and related treatment expenses referred to at [94]-[100] below, that comes to a figure of $743,150, which has not been reduced for the unused portion of the statutory caps or the empty chair exposure.

Issue 1 The plaintiff's claim for future commercially provided domestic assistance

1. The plaintiff's claim for future domestic assistance is put on the basis that when the need arises for him to require assistance, that he will pay a commercial service provider for it. He does not make any claim for gratuitous domestic assistance presumably because, if consistent with my findings in the primary judgment, the DDA will pay for the provision of commercial domestic assistance in the future as and when the plaintiff needs it, he cannot demonstrate a future need for gratuitous domestic assistance.
2. The plaintiff accepts that his claim falls within the definition of "medical and related treatment" as defined by s 59 of the 1987 Act set out in [254] PJ.
3. The plaintiff understands that consistent with my decision in the primary judgment, that for the same reasons set out when dealing with Issue 3 in the primary judgment that:

(a) if the domestic assistance sought becomes necessary that the plaintiff will be able to seek compensation from the DDA for that assistance;

(b) the likelihood of the DDA paying reasonable domestic assistance expenses is very high, if not certain;

(c) it is reasonable that the plaintiff should mitigate his loss by pursuing the payment of domestic assistance expenses to which he is entitled under the 1942 Act from the DDA; and

(d) for these reasons, I will not make an award for this head of damage.

1. In the event that I am wrong on my construction of the 1942 Act, I will assess the cost of future commercially provided domestic assistance.

Assessment of future commercially provided domestic assistance

1. At the outset it should be noted that the calculation of this head of damage is difficult because it requires some prediction of the future progress of the plaintiff's disease. Having been satisfied that the plaintiff's disease will progress in line with my findings in the primary judgment, and that the plaintiff will suffer loss, the Tribunal's task is to assess damages on the information available, doing the best it can and not to arrive at a perfect assessment. In coming to an assessment, I have applied the same legal principles set out in the primary judgment.
2. The defendants sought to lead further evidence from A/Prof McKenzie of possible scenarios for the plaintiff's decline. Whilst that evidence was potentially relevant, A/Prof McKenzie's scenarios do not fit within my findings as to the plaintiff's decline and it is difficult to reconcile how I could use it to decide the only remaining issue, which is the need for domestic assistance within the confines of my findings. In the circumstances, I reject A/Prof Mckenzie's report because its probative value is outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be misleading or confusing or result in an undue waste of time: s 135 Evidence Act 1995.

1. Where the defendant's tort creates a reasonable need for services to be provided to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to elect to have them performed gratuitously or to pay for similar services: Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327 at 338.
2. Damages can include compensation for the provision of passive care, which includes forms of protective attention, such as constant supervision and the availability to step in, in the case of an emergency: Van Gervan and Amaca Pty Ltd v Raines [2018] NSWCA 216 at [67]- [70] and [160]-[163].

1. The plaintiff qualified Natala Cogger and the defendants qualified Dawn Piebenga, as expert occupational therapists. It is useful to set out their evidence comparatively by reference to the stages proposed by Ms Cogger and commented on by Ms Piebenga.
2. There was some minor dispute over which expert had superior experience of patients suffering from dust diseases, but I have made my decision on the basis of the reasonableness of the needs in the various stages rather than by reference to the expertise issue.
3. There were multiple figures in Ms Piebenga's latest report that were hard to reconcile and she could not do so in the course of her evidence.
4. Both experts gave evidence about the cost of medical aids. Ms Cogger came to a figure (after discount) of $13,817 and Ms Piebenga came to a figure of $14,753. The plaintiff invited me to adopt the robust approach of finding that the appropriate figure is $14,000 and I agree that is an appropriate course.

1. There was a dispute over the cost of the commercial services to be provided that can be dealt with as a preliminary matter.
2. Ms Cogger provided a schedule of fees from Anglicare for the provision of relevant services in south-east Queensland, under a government "Support at Home" quarterly budget from 1 November 2025.
3. Ms Piebenga provided a schedule of fees from Anglicare's Fee for Service Fess Schedule in south-east Queensland dated 1 January 2025.
4. The Support at Home Program is a specified means of delivery of funded aged care services by registered providers under the Aged Care Act 2024 (Cth) that came into force on 1 November 2025. Under the Support at Home Program, an applicant is assessed on function and then allocated to a level which provides for a maximum quarterly budget for services that the government will pay to a registered provider.[1] Fees for services provided under the Support at Home Program are higher than those charged under the Home Care Package scheme (its predecessor) because they incorporate administrative costs such as package management and transport costs.[2]
5. The Support at Home Program is not relevant to the provision of commercial care services outside of the aged care system, such as on a user pay basis.
6. I am satisfied that the applicable rates are those provided by Ms Piebenga, which are:

(a) showering assistance must be provided for by a qualified carer and that the minimum charge for that assistance is one hour at the higher rate of $79.20 per hour; and

(b) the Anglicare FFS rates are charged for a minimum of 30 minutes, increasing in 15 minute increments, but most providers charge for a minimum of one hour.

1. Ms Piebenga assessed the plaintiff's case by reference to the domestic assistance being provided commercially or gratuitously. Having regard to the limitation of the plaintiff's case, it is not necessary to refer to the latter.

1. Ms Cogger opined that it was unlikely that the plaintiff would require any domestic assistance before his 60th birthday on 23 February 2032.
2. Ms Piebenga agreed with this assessment.

1. Ms Cogger opined that the plaintiff would require domestic assistance of 4 hours per week between the ages of 60 and 65, which coincided with my finding that he would have a 50% capacity for work in that period. Ms Cogger opined that the plaintiff would continue to be fit to drive in this period, but would require assistance with heavier domestic tasks, tasks involving the use of chemicals which may be considered to be respiratory irritants, shopping and gardening.
2. Ms Piebenga opined that the plaintiff would not require any domestic assistance in Stage 2, stating that a lack of capacity for work did not equate to a lack of capacity for domestic tasks. She opined that the plaintiff would remain fit to undertake such tasks but it would take longer to complete them. Ms Piebenga disputed Ms Cogger's reliance on population data and stated that there was no medical evidence to support a deterioration of the plaintiff's domestic capacity by age 60.
3. I prefer the evidence of Ms Cogger for Stage 2 for the following reasons. I accept that it is reasonable for the plaintiff to have the need for the services referred to by Ms Cogger for Stage 2. The evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff is already having trouble with gardening and changing bed linen. He has moved into his sister's house to reduce the burden of domestic tasks on him, suggesting that he already has some need. Consistent with my findings of a progressive disease, I am satisfied that it is likely that his domestic capacity will deteriorate further by his 60th birthday. It is likely that between age 60 and age 65 that his condition will deteriorate further and that during that period there may be weeks where he requires more or less than 4 hours per week of domestic assistance.
4. I am satisfied that Ms Cogger's reliance on population data was entirely appropriate where the course of the plaintiff's condition is difficult to plot. Further, Ms Piebenga's reliance on the medical evidence was selective. The predominant references in her latest report were to the defendants' medico-legal reports which did not adequately reflect my rejection of the defendants' case.
5. The resulting award for Stage 2 is $293 per week[3], for 5 years[4] and deferred for 10 years and 10 months[5], which amounts to $51,406.

1. Ms Cogger opined that from age 65 and up to three months before his lung transplant, that the plaintiff would require domestic assistance of 20.25 hours per week, made up of 1 hour per day for personal care including showering, dressing, making the bed and changing linen and fetching, 1 hour per day for meal preparation, 2.75 hours per week for cleaning tasks, 0.5 hours per week for gardening, 2 hours per week for shopping and 1 hour per week for transport.
2. Ms Piebenga opined that in Stage 3 the plaintiff would require 1 hour domestic assistance per week for cleaning floors, the bathroom and the kitchen.
3. I prefer the evidence of Ms Cogger for Stage 3 for the following reasons.
4. Having accepted Ms Cogger's assessment for Stage 2, I am satisfied that the 4 hours per week would continue to be reasonable and I would reject Ms Piebenga's evidence that 1 hour per week was reasonable. I would also continue to reject Ms Piebenga's opinion based on her selective view of the medical evidence.
5. My findings were that the plaintiff would be totally incapacitated for work from the beginning of Stage 3 and that he would become very ill over these years. In my view, the provision of personal care for 1 hour per day in this period is modest and reasonable. If he were to engage a carer to assist him with daily showering, then on Ms Piebenga's evidence about minimum rates, this would equate to 1 hour per day or 7 hours per week.
6. I also accept the provision of one hour per day for meal preparation to be modest and reasonable. Both experts received an initial history from the plaintiff that after working long hours he consumed frozen meals from the supermarket. I accept Ms Cogger's evidence that she understood that his preference for frozen meals was a result of fatigue after work. Having reached the point of being very ill and needing to maintain as much health as possible leading into a bilateral lung transplant, I am satisfied that it is reasonable for the plaintiff to have his meals prepared to ensure that he ate, and that he was receiving adequate nutrition for his condition.
7. The increases to his need for cleaning and laundry are modest and in keeping with his expected decline. The increase in the allowance for shopping is to respond to his increased needs, particularly for medications. The introduction of the need for transport at 1 hour per week is also reasonable when it is anticipated that he will have to cease driving.
8. Overall, I accept Ms Cogger's allowance of 20.25 hours per week is reasonable for the expected needs of the plaintiff.
9. The resulting award for Stage 3 is $1,735 per week[6], for 4.75 years[7] and deferred for 15 years and 7 months[8] which amounts to $262,660.

1. Stage 4 represents the three months leading into the plaintiff's lung transplant.
2. Ms Cogger opined that in Stage 4 that the plaintiff would be at his sickest (reaching respiratory failure) and would require 24-hour per day support and supervision because his needs would fluctuate. She expected that he would be on supplemental oxygen and be unfit to drive.
3. Ms Piebenga opined that the plaintiff would require 7 hours per week domestic assistance, on the basis that he would experience significant breathlessness on exertion, on supplemental oxygen, housebound and unable to drive, but with some capacity for light sedentary tasks. She considered that a transplant would likely take place before he was at complete respiratory failure, while he had some residual strength to undergo the procedure.
4. I prefer the evidence of Ms Cogger for Stage 4 for the following reasons.
5. Having accepted Ms Cogger's assessment for Stage 3, I am satisfied that the 20.25 hours per week would continue to be reasonable and I would reject Ms Piebenga's evidence that 7 hours per week was reasonable. I would also continue to reject Ms Piebenga's opinion based on her selective view of the medical evidence.
6. Both experts proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff would be very ill in Stage 4. In my view, Ms Piebenga's estimate is extremely inadequate.
7. I am satisfied that the plaintiff would require someone to be available to meet his needs 24 hours per day and that he would require all of his cooking, cleaning, laundry, personal care and gardening done for him. He will require assistance with medication, toileting and fetching.
8. Ms Cogger's calculations at p 5 of her report of 24 December 2025 are incorrect. The day rate for Monday to Friday should be applied for 10 hours (7.00am to 5.00pm) and the night rate for 14 hours (5.00pm to 7.00am).
9. Using Ms Piebenga's rates, the calculation should be 50 hours at $79.20 plus 70 hours at $87.68 plus 24 hours at $106.92 (Saturday) plus 24 hours at $134.73 (Sunday) which comes to a weekly figure of $15,897 - rounded down.
10. This figure would drop dramatically if a sleep-over rate for commercial care was used for the period of 5.00pm to 7.00am, where a carer was present with the plaintiff but could sleep if not required to be attending to the plaintiff's needs. There is no evidence as to what a sleep-over rate would be, but I am satisfied that it would result in a substantially lower figure and that a weekly figure of $11,000 would be more reasonable.
11. The resulting award for Stage 4 is $11,000 per week, for 13 weeks, deferred for 15 years and 10 months[9], which amounts to $89,089.

1. Stage 5 represents the three weeks that the plaintiff will be in hospital for a bilateral lung transplant.
2. Ms Cogger did not allow any domestic assistance for the time that the plaintiff would be in hospital and Ms Piebenga agreed with this approach, and that the period of three weeks was reasonable.

1. Stage 6 represents the two-month period following his discharge from the bilateral lung transplant.
2. Ms Cogger opined that the plaintiff would require constant supervision and spontaneous assistance for Stage 6 amounting to 24-hour per day care, in the period immediately following his discharge from hospital.
3. Ms Piebenga opined that the plaintiff would require 7 hours per week of commercial assistance (or 15.44 hours per week of gratuitous assistance), on the basis that domestic tasks should only be funded for "an incremental burden on the shared household routine".
4. I prefer the evidence of Ms Cogger for Stage 6 for the following reasons.
5. Stage 6 will also be a period of high dependency where the plaintiff will be recovering from major surgery, experiencing pain and limited mobility and adapting to the anti-rejection medications and the regime accompanying that. I am satisfied that the plaintiff will require constant supervision and spontaneous assistance with his personal care and all other cooking, cleaning, laundry, shopping and transportation.
6. Ms Piebenga's approach is contrary to the way in which compensation is awarded for the need for domestic assistance arising from an injury. If the injury gives rise to a need, the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for the provision of the service to fulfil the need, irrespective of whether or not the provision of the service also benefits others in the household in which he resides.
7. It is reasonable to allow damages on the same basis as for Stage 4.
8. The resulting award for Stage 6 is $11,000 per week for 9 weeks, deferred for 16 years, which amounts to $61,677.

1. Stage 7 represents the 6 months following the first 2 months of at-home recovery from a bilateral lung transplant.
2. Ms Cogger opined that for Stage 7 the plaintiff would need 20.25 hours per week, on the basis that the periods in Stages 5, 6 and 7 would amount to a 9-month recovery period following major surgery. Ms Cogger relied on my finding based on Prof Chambers' evidence, that most patients would take between 6-12 months to recover their physical function through blood loss, the anti-rejection medications and lack of physical activity leading to a loss of muscle mass. Ms Cogger opined that the plaintiff's needs in Stages 3 and 7 would be the same.
3. Ms Piebenga opined that for the first 3 months of Stage 7 that the plaintiff would need 1.5 hours per week in personal care and 5 hours per week in cleaning, property maintenance and transport. For the second three months of Stage 7, Ms Piebenga allowed 1.5 hours per week for cleaning and property maintenance and nothing for personal care or transport.
4. I prefer the evidence of Ms Cogger for Stage 7 for the following reasons.
5. In my view the allowance for transport costs in Stage 7 are significantly underestimated at 1 hour per week. In Stage 7, I would expect that the plaintiff would have to attend a large number of medical appointments with the transplant team and that each would occupy between 2-3 hour attendances for a carer from the time of collecting the plaintiff to the time of returning him home.
6. I am satisfied that the plaintiff would still require 1 hour per day personal care and 1 hour per day for meal preparation and assistance with medication. I am also satisfied that the plaintiff would still require assistance with cleaning, laundry and gardening.
7. It is reasonable to allow the same basis as for Stage 3.
8. The resulting award for Stage 7 is $1,735 per week, for 13 weeks deferred for 16 years and 7 months[10], which amounts to $13,646.

1. Stage 8 represents the 6.5 year period, referred to by Prof Chambers as the "honeymoon period", where the plaintiff can expect a return to good health and to resume driving.
2. Ms Cogger opined that the plaintiff would require 4 hours per week assistance with heavier cleaning tasks and gardening on the same basis as Stage 2.
3. Ms Piebenga opined that the plaintiff would require 1 hour per week of domestic assistance in Stage 8 because he would be able to complete light to moderate domestic tasks by pacing himself but remain unfit for cleaning activities involving exposure to dust, mould or chemicals.
4. I prefer the evidence of Ms Cogger for Stage 7 for the following reasons.
5. In Stage 8, the plaintiff would still have difficulty with exerting himself to full capacity and would continue to be immuno-compromised and would be unfit for tasks involving exposure to dust, mould or chemicals, and accordingly I am satisfied that he would have a need for domestic assistance in accordance with the opinion of Ms Cogger.
6. The resulting award for Stage 8 is $293 per week, for 6.5 years[11], deferred for 19 years[12], which amounts to $55,113.

1. Stage 9 represents the period of 4 months of decline leading to the second experience of respiratory failure. I found that this period of the plaintiff's life will be unpleasant, involving multiple medical interventions and functional decline.
2. Ms Cogger opined that the plaintiff will require 20.25 hours of domestic assistance on the same basis as Stages 3 and 7.
3. Ms Piebenga opined that the plaintiff would require 7 hours per week domestic assistance on the same basis as her opinion related to Stage 6. Later, she states that the allowance should be 15.44 hours per week, but she could not reconcile the difference when asked to do so in her evidence. Ms Piebenga opined that the plaintiff may experience marked fatigue and breathlessness and require personal care and that he will have no capacity for domestic tasks. She expects that he would spend more time in bed or a chair, with transfers becoming more difficult.
4. I prefer the evidence of Ms Cogger for Stage 9 for the following reasons.
5. I am not satisfied that 7 hours per week or 15.44 hours per week would satisfy the plaintiff's needs in Stage 9 as set out by Ms Piebenga. I am satisfied that the opinion of Ms Cogger better reflects the time that a carer would need to spend with the plaintiff to perform the necessary tasks. For the reasons given, in relation to Stage 7 the allowance for transportation to medical appointments in this period is underestimated.
6. The resulting award for Stage 9 is $1,735 per week, for 17 weeks deferred for 23 years and 7 months[13], which amounts to $14,512.

1. Stage 10 represents the final stage of the plaintiff's life when he will die of respiratory failure following the rejection of the allograft.
2. Ms Cogger opined that in Stage 10 the plaintiff would be highly dependent on others for care and would require constant supervision and spontaneous assistance, resulting in a need for 24 hour care.
3. Ms Piebenga agreed about the level of function for Stage 10 but opined that the plaintiff would most likely be cared for in a hospital or aged care facility and that no domestic assistance would be required.
4. For stage 10, I would allow 2 months home care on the same basis as for Stage 6 and 1 month hospital care, with no domestic assistance in that period.
5. The resulting award for Stage 10 is $11,000 per week, for 9 weeks and deferred for 23 years and 10 months[14], which amounts to $48,708.

1. The awards for each stage and the total loss is set out in the following table:

1. I would therefore assess the damages for future commercially provided domestic assistance and the provision of medical aids at $610,811, which has not been reduced for the empty chair exposure.

Issue 2 What is the revised figure in [279] PJ, after consideration of the claims for future out-of-pocket expenses in [176]-[182] PWS?

1. The calculation required by Issue 2 is made on the basis that the plaintiff's entitlement under the 1942 Act for the cost of medical and related treatment and hospital treatment is the subject of a statutory cap of $100,000. For the reasons given in the primary judgment, the DDA has the power to make a direction to pay more than the statutory caps and it will exercise that power reasonably and in accordance with the scheme of the 1942 Act.
2. The plaintiff claims 10 sessions of supportive psychotherapy at $250 per session, based on the opinion of Dr Lotz, which I accepted. This claim is a modest one and does not adequately reflect my findings that the plaintiff will require indefinite support from Dr Leas for the remainder of his life. There will be periods where the plaintiff will require more support and times when he will require less. It is appropriate to allow half of the claimed amount on a yearly basis, which amounts to about $25.00 per week for 25 years at the 3% multiplier (922) which comes to $23,050.
3. In his report dated 26 October 2022, Dr Edwards opined that the plaintiff should try antifibrotic treatment for a five year trial period at a cost of $203,880 and if it was successful, continue that treatment for "up to 10 years", which I infer meant a further five years after the trial at the same cost, amounting to an undiscounted total of $410,760. Dr Edwards stated that the plaintiff would have to be reviewed twice yearly by a thoracic physician with a high resolution CT scan, to monitor the progress of the antifibrotic treatment in the first five years at an annual cost of $3,400 (which is incorrectly stated as $8,400 in the report).
4. Since Dr Edwards' report in late 2022, the plaintiff has not been commenced on antifibrotic treatment. Prof Chambers' evidence was that it would not assist him. For these reasons, I reject the claim for the cost of antifibrotic medication.
5. However, the plaintiff will require ongoing monitoring by a thoracic physician with access to regular high resolution CT scans to monitor his progress and this part of the claim should be allowed for the rest of the plaintiff's life. It is appropriate to allow the claim of $65 per week for 25 years at the 3% multiplier (922) which comes to $59,930.
6. Dr Edwards further opined that the plaintiff may require hospitalisation for one week every year in the last 5 years of his life to treat respiratory infections at a cost of $14,000 per admission. I do not accept that it is likely that the plaintiff will require this type of hospital admission in the last five years of his life. I am satisfied that it is likely that he will require those types of hospital admission in the latter part of Stage 3 and up to the lung transplant, Stage 7 and the latter part of Stage 8 and Stage 9. I will allow the amount provided for by Dr Edwards in the last five years to make the discounting aspect of the calculation easier and to take into account that less than five admissions will be necessary. I allow the amount of $70,000 discounted for 24 years on the 3% tables (0.492), which comes to $34,440.
7. Dr Edwards also allowed for antibiotics ($1,600) and supplemental oxygen in the last six months of the plaintiff's life at a cost of $1,500. These claims are so modest and in my view, underestimated, that they should be allowed in full in the sum of $3,100.
8. Dr Edwards also allowed for two weeks of end-of-life hospice care at a cost of $20,000. Consistent with my earlier finding, that allowance should be for four weeks, that is, $40,000 but discounted for 25 years on the 3% tables (0.478) which comes to $19,120.
9. The total of these allowances comes to $139,640, which has not been reduced for the empty chair exposure.
10. The result is that the figure at [279] PJ should be $610,540 plus $139,640, less the unused portion of the statutory caps ($95,840) which comes to a figure of $654,340, which has not been reduced for the empty chair exposure.

1. Taking into account the matters in this judgment, my final award of damages is set out in the following table:

Provisional assessment of future out-of-pocket expenses and commercially provided domestic assistance

1. The total amount of damages for "medical and related treatment" and "hospital treatment" assessed but not awarded because of the plaintiff's entitlement under the 1942 Act are:

Cost of commercially provided domestic assistance and medical aids

1. I direct the parties to bring in Short Minutes of Order by no later than 5.00pm on 23 April 2026, specifying the verdict and judgment to be entered against each of the defendants, for provisional damages pursuant to s11A Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989, so that the orders can be entered in chambers.
2. I confirm my earlier costs order of 29 November 2023.
3. Further to that order, I order that the defendants are to pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings on the ordinary basis, as agreed or assessed.
4. In the event that any party is instructed to apply to vary these costs orders (the application), and the parties cannot agree on the appropriate order or orders:

(a) the applicant(s) is to notify all other parties and to serve any evidence in support of the application together with written submissions (limited to no more than five pages in length) in support of the application within 14 days of the entry of final orders;

(b) the respondent(s) to the application is to serve any evidence in response to the application together with written submissions (limited to no more than five pages in length) in support of the response within a further 14 days;

(c) The applicant(s) and the respondent(s) are to provide the documents referred to in (a) and (b) to my Associate at the same time as serving them; and

(d) The application will be dealt with on the papers.

[1] Support at Home Manual: A guide for registered providers, Department of Health, Disability and Ageing, Canberra, December 2025.

[2] https://www.myagedcare.gov.au/news-and-updates/support-home-pricing-changes.

[3] 3.5 hours x $71.21 (domestic assistance) 0.5 x $87.68 (gardening) - with some rounding.

[6] 5 hours at $79.20 (M-F am), 5 hours at $80.24 (M-F pm), 2 hours at $106.92 (Sat) 2 hours at $134.13 (Sun), 4.75 hours at 71.61 (cleaning), 0.5 hours at 87.98 (gardening), 1 hour $71.61 (transport) - with some rounding.