[2025] FedCFamC2F 1075
General information, not legal advice.
Federal Circuit and Family Court (Div 2)
2025-07-16
Original judgment source is linked above.
Bansal & Mathai [2023] FedCFamC2F 307
Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34;
Bunyon & Lewis (No 3) [2013] FamCA 888
Bellanger & Wemble [2024] FedCFamC2F 150
Bellanger & Wemble (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC2F 1139
Bellanger & Wemble (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC2F1606
Bellanger & Wemble (No 5) [2025] FedCFamC2F 783
Dobbs & Brayson [2007] FamCA 1261; (2007) FLC 93-346
DRJ v Commissioner of Victim Rights (No 2) [2020] NSWCA 242
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
Hatfield & Rivas [2024] FedCFamC1A 202
Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners' Association [1908] HCA 95
Oswin & Oswin [2019] FamCAFC 164; (2019) FLC 93-916
Re F: Litigant in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93 072
Trinh & Trinh [2023] FedCFamC2F 943
Whiting & Secretary, Department of Families, Fairness and Housing (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 245
Yaling & Tsen [2022] FedCFamC1F 347
28 April 2025 - 1 May 2025, 23 May 2025, 2 - 4 July 2025 & 7 - 9 July 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.
Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Oral reasons commenced, settled transcript & written reasons now delivered
HIS HONOUR: There is also running parallel with these proceedings or allegations against [Mr Wemble] and [Ms Paige] of breach of a court order an existing injunction that restrains [Ms Paige] from leaving Australia. And an order that has her name on a list conducted by the immigration authorities known as the Watchlist that would restrict her from leaving Australia, or prevent her from leaving Australia. And those orders that were previously made restraining [Ms Paige] from leaving Australia were interim orders, or what is sometimes called interlocutory, or can also be called "for the time being". And at the end of this hearing, I will hear submissions from the parties based on the evidence about whether or not that injunction should be continued or whether it should be lifted or removed.
"It is unnecessary that I detain the parties by reading out all of the five counts in the contravention application that were well and truly discussed upside, downside, inside and out during the 11 days of the hearing. The Grandmother denied all allegations against her in the contravention application."
The First Respondent without reasonable excuse forcibly removed the two children X born in 2011 and Y born in 2013 and refused the children to spend time with the Applicant mother.
Order 3 of the final orders of Judge O'Shannessy dated 16 August 2021.
Date, time and location of alleged act or omission
On or about early 2022, at around 2pm Country D local time in City B, outside City B Local Courts, C State, Country D
The Second Respondent without reasonable excuse aided and abetted the forceful removal of the two children X born in 2011 and Y born in 2013 and refused the children to spend time or live[9] with the with the Mother.
Order 3 of the final orders of Judge O'Shannessy dated 16 August 2021.
Date, time and location of alleged act or omission
On or about early 2022, at around 2pm Country D local time in City B, outside City B Local Courts, C State, Country D.
The First and Second Respondent without reasonable excuse refused to allow the children to spend time with the Applicant Mother.
Order 2 of the final orders of Judge O'Shannessy dated 16 August 2021.
Date, time and location of alleged act or omission
Early 2022 between 12pm to 3pm Country D local time, City B, C State, Country D (refer to the second respondent's affidavit
Count 4 was struck out at the start of the hearing
The Second Respondent gave instructions to aid and abet the contravention of the final orders of His Honour Judge O'Shannessy dated 16 August 2021
Order 3 of the final orders of Judge O'Shannessy dated 16 August 2021.
Date, time and location of alleged act or omission
December 2021, around 7pm following a lengthy family meeting in City AA suburb in City N, CC State, Country D.
The Grandmother, without reasonable excuse, aided and abetted the forceful removal of the two children, [X], born in 2011, and [Y], born in 2013, and refused the children to spend time or live with the mother.
Grandmother represented herself at final hearing
At the hearing of an application referred to in item 2, 3, 4 or 5 in Table 11.1, the court must:
(a) inform the respondent of the allegation; and
(b) ask the respondent whether the respondent wishes to admit or deny the allegation; and
(c) hear any evidence supporting the allegation; and
(d) ask the respondent to state the response to the allegation; and
(e) hear any evidence for the respondent; and
(f) determine the proceeding.
Father's right to not lead evidence respected
Presumption against extra territoriality of legislation: displaced
In the interpretation of general words in a Statute there is always a presumption that the legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction. Most Statutes, if their general words were taken literally in their widest sense, would apply the whole world, but they are always read as being prima facie restricted in their operation within territorial limits.
It will be relevant to have regard to the purpose of the statute, the likelihood that the statutory purpose will be evaded if made to depend upon something readily altered at the instance of the parties[24], and the need to avoid an unduly restrictive approach whereby more than one factum is required to bear a connection. [25]
...
If the application of the presumption would defeat the purpose of the legislation, it can be assumed that the intention was to override the assumption: Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 235.[26]
Section 69E & Division 4 of Part XIIIAA of the Act
Section 69E Child or parent to be present in Australia etc.
(1) Proceedings may be instituted under this Act in relation to a child only if:
(a) the child is present in Australia on the relevant day (as defined in subsection (2)); or
(b) the child is an Australian citizen, or is ordinarily resident in Australia, on the relevant day; or
(c) a parent of the child is an Australian citizen, is ordinarily resident in Australia, or is present in Australia, on the relevant day; or
(d) a party to the proceedings is an Australian citizen, is ordinarily resident in Australia, or is present in Australia, on the relevant day; or
(e) it would be in accordance with a treaty or arrangement in force between Australia and an overseas jurisdiction, or the common law rules of private international law, for the court to exercise jurisdiction in the proceedings.
(2) In this section:
"relevant day" , in relation to proceedings, means:
(a) if the application instituting the proceedings is filed in a court--the day on which the application is filed; or
(b) in any other case--the day on which the application instituting the proceedings is made.
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Section 111CA Definitions
(1) In this Division:
"another country" means a Convention country or a non - Convention country.
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"central authority" of a Convention country means:
(a) if there is one central authority of the Convention country under Article 29 of the Child Protection Convention--the Convention country's central authority; or
(b) otherwise--the central authority designated, under Article 29 of the Child Protection Convention, as the Convention country's central authority to which any communication may be addressed for transmission to the appropriate central authority of the Convention country.
"Child Protection Convention" means the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co - operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children signed at The Hague on 19 October 1996[27], a copy of the English text of which is set out in Schedule 1.
...
"Commonwealth personal protection measure" relating to a child means a measure (within the meaning of the Child Protection Convention) under this Act that is directed to the protection of the person of the child.
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"competent authority" :
...
(c) competent authority of a non - Convention country means an entity that has responsibility or authority under the law in force in the country to take measures or make decisions about:
(i) protecting the person of a child; or
(ii) appointing or deciding the powers of a guardian of a child's property.
"Convention country" means a country, other than Australia, for which the Child Protection Convention has entered into force.
...
"non-Convention country" means a country for which the Child Protection Convention has not entered into force.
"parental responsibility" has the same meaning as in the Child Protection Convention.
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Section 111CC Application of this Subdivision
This Subdivision applies only if an issue under this Act is whether a court, as opposed to any of the following authorities, has jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the person of a child:
(a) a central authority or competent authority of a Convention country;
(b) a competent authority of a non - Convention country.
Section 111CD Jurisdiction relating to the person of a child
(1) A court may exercise jurisdiction for a Commonwealth personal protection measure only in relation to:
(a) a child who is present and habitually resident in Australia; or
...
(e) a child who is present in a non - Convention country, if:
(i) the child is habitually resident in Australia; and
(ii) any of paragraphs 69E(1)(b) to (e) applies to the child;...
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(emphasis added)
(footnote added)
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19 Harper J reconciles those two authorities at [51] as follows:
- ...In Bunyon, Bennett J took the view that it was not necessary for there to be "duelling courts" or litigation in two or more jurisdictions before s 111CC applied. It was only necessary for there to exist two or more competent jurisdictions which could be used to resolve a dispute between parties in relation to the protection of the person of a child. In this sense, there existed a conflict of jurisdictions. The distinction is between two jurisdictions which have been invoked and two jurisdictions which could be invoked. The latter is sufficient to raise an "issue under the Act" as to jurisdiction....
...
- Further, I am assisted by the usual suspects in regard to statutory interpretation. In particular I pay regard to the High Court in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355 ('Blue Sky'), and the below ratio decidendi:
- Furthermore, a court construing a statutory provision must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision. In The Commonwealth v Baume Griffith CJ cited R v Berchet to support the proposition that it was "a known rule in the interpretation of Statutes that such a sense is to be made upon the whole as that no clause, sentence, or word shall prove superfluous, void, or insignificant, if by any other construction they may all be made useful and pertinent".
[Citations omitted]
- The way that I read section 111CC to more readily make sense of it is as follows:
This subdivision applies only if an issue under this Act is whether an Australian court has jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of a person of a child, as opposed to a central authority or competent authority of a Convention country, or a competent authority of a non-Convention country.
It is my understanding that marriage, divorce, child custody and other personal matters are handled through customary law as stipulated under the Code of Civil Procedure Act. In instances where the customary law court conflicts with the principles of justice, equality, or good conscience, the Code makes it clear that customary law should not prevail. The Code of Civil Procedure, The Child Act, and the Transitional Constitution also all stipulate that customary law should not prevail over the consideration of human rights. However, the way in which the Courts are required to put these stipulations into practice is unclear. No advice has been provided to the courts on how the provisions contained in the Transition Constitution requiring human rights considerations to be taken into account are to be put into effect.
Were the children habitually resident of Australia?
... when considering where a child is habitually resident, attention cannot be confined to the intentions of the parent who in fact has the day-to-day care of the child. It will usually be necessary to consider what each parent intends for the child. When parents are living together, young children will have the same habitual residence as their parents. No less importantly, it may be accepted that the general rule is that neither parent can unilaterally change that place of habitual residence. The assent of the other parent (or a court order) would be necessary. But again, if it becomes necessary to examine the intentions of the parents, the possibility of ambiguity or uncertainty on the part of one or both of them must be acknowledged.
(1) The orders of December 2019, made when the Mother visited Country D for divorce proceedings that recited the children were to live with the Mother; and
(2) The final consent orders of this court made on 16 August 2021 that said the children were to live with the Mother; and
(3) The orders made, in early 2022, in Country D, were, I infer to the effect that the children live with the Mother. I so infer from the Mother's assertion, not disputed, that on that day the Court ordered the children to return her; and
(4) I am satisfied that the Mother's unequivocal and settled intention was to reside in Australia where she had resided since 2012, where she had accommodation and employment and that she intended to reside there with the children; and
(5) The Mother and children were and are Australian citizens; and
(6) In this case, it is not disputed that the Mother took the children to Country D for a holiday. That is, temporarily for a visit; and
(7) The children have been enrolled all their school lives at the local school in Suburb Z and, I infer, remained at that local school at the time the Mother took them to Country D; and
(8) The modern essential accoutrement[31] or thing of any child in the Western world, a laptop belonging to the eldest child, did not remain with the children in Country D, after early 2022; and
(9) Whilst the children had some understanding of the Local language, their first language was the most common language of the city of Suburb Z: English;[32] and
(10) I do not accept the assertion, and the case of the Grandmother, that the children were voluntarily and permanently handed over by her family, in early 2022 at a religious ceremony;[33] and
(11) The actual words of the religious ceremony when looked at do not specify or suggest that the children were to live permanently in Country D with the Father, and not see or have any contact with the Mother; and
(12) In the circumstances where I do not accept the assertion that the Mother agreed for the children to live in Country D with the Father, and I accept the Mother's evidence of the children being forcefully removed from her, the evidence is overwhelming that at all material times, and until today, the Mother continued to hold the intention that the children would continue to live in the Commonwealth of Australia as they had done all their lives, save for about five months or so in the case of X, when he was a baby. And that is so notwithstanding the substantial time the Father has retained the children in Country D.
Section 70NAA Simplified Outline of Division
(1) This Division deals with the powers that a court with jurisdiction under this Act has to make orders to enforce compliance with orders under this Act affecting children.
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Section 70NAC Meaning of contravene a child - related order
(1) A person contravenes a child - related order only if:
(a) the person is a person (other than a child) to whom the order applies and:
(i) the person intentionally fails to comply with the order; or
(ii) the person makes no reasonable attempt to comply with the order; or
(b) the person is not a person to whom the order applies, and the person is not a child, but:
(i) the person intentionally prevents compliance with the order by a person to whom the order applies; or
(ii) the person aids or abets a contravention of the order by a person to whom the order applies.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the following table sets out circumstances in which a person contravenes a child - related order.
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Section 70NAD Requirements taken to be included in certain orders
1. For the purpose of this division:
(a) a parenting order that deals with whom a child is to live with is taken to include a requirement that people act in accordance with section 65M[35] in relation to the order; and
(b) a parenting order that deals with whom a child is to spend time with is taken to include a requirement that people act in accordance with section 65N[36] in relation to the order; and
(c) a parenting order that deals with whom a child is to communicate with is taken to include a requirement that people act in accordance with section 65NA in relation to the order; and
(d) a parenting order to which section 65P[37] applies is taken to include a requirement that people act in accordance with that section in relation to the order.
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Section 65M General obligations created by parenting order...
- This section applies to a parenting order that is in force in relation to a child to the extent to which the order deals with whom the child is to live with
- A person must not, contrary to the order:
(a) remove the child from the care of a person; or
(b) refuse or fail to deliver or return the child to a person; or
(c) interfere with the exercise or performance of any of the powers, duties or responsibilities that a person has under the order.
Section 65N General obligations created by parenting order that deals with whom a child spends time with
(1) This section applies to a parenting order that is in force in relation to a child to the extent to which the order deals with whom the child is to spend time with.
(2) A person must not:
(a) hinder or prevent a person and the child from spending time together in accordance with the order; or
(b) interfere with a person and the child benefiting from spending time with each other under the order.
Section 65P General obligations created by parenting order that allocates parental responsibility
(1) This section applies to a parenting order that is in force in relation to a child to the extent to which the order allocates parental responsibility for the child to a person (the carer).
(2) A person must not hinder the carer in, or prevent the carer from, discharging that responsibility.
Section 70NAE Meaning of reasonable excuse for contravening an order
(1) The circumstances in which a person may be taken to have had, for the purposes of this Division, a reasonable excuse for contravening an order under this Act affecting children include, but are not limited to, the circumstances set out in subsections (2), (4), (5), (6) and (7).
(2) A person (the respondent) is taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening an order under this Act affecting children if:
(a) the respondent contravened the order because, or substantially because, he or she did not, at the time of the contravention, understand the obligations imposed by the order on the person who was bound by it; and
(b) the court is satisfied that the respondent ought to be excused in respect of the contravention.
(3) If a court decides that a person had a reasonable excuse for contravening an order under this Act for the reason referred to in paragraph (2)(a), it is the duty of the court to explain to the person, in language likely to be readily understood by the person, the obligations imposed on him or her by the order and the consequences that may follow if he or she again contravenes the order.
(4) A person (the respondent) is taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening a parenting order to the extent to which it deals with whom a child is to live with in a way that resulted in the child not living with a person in whose favour the order was made if:
(a) the respondent believed on reasonable grounds that the actions constituting the contravention were necessary to protect the health or safety of a person (including the respondent or the child); and
(b) the period during which, because of the contravention, the child did not live with the person in whose favour the order was made was not longer than was necessary to protect the health or safety of the person referred to in paragraph (a).
(5) A person (the respondent) is taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening a parenting order to the extent to which it deals with whom a child is to spend time with in a way that resulted in a person and a child not spending time together as provided for in the order if:
(a) the respondent believed on reasonable grounds that not allowing the child and the person to spend time together was necessary to protect the health or safety of a person (including the respondent or the child); and
(b) the period during which, because of the contravention, the child and the person did not spend time together was not longer than was necessary to protect the health or safety of the person referred to in paragraph (a).
(6) A person (the respondent) is taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening a parenting order to the extent to which it deals with whom a child is to communicate with in a way that resulted in a person and a child not having the communication provided for under the order if:
(a) the respondent believed on reasonable grounds that not allowing the child and the person to communicate together was necessary to protect the health or safety of a person (including the respondent or the child); and
(b) the period during which, because of the contravention, the child and the person did not communicate was not longer than was necessary to protect the health or safety of the person referred to in paragraph (a).
(7) A person (the respondent) is taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening a parenting order to which section 65P applies by acting contrary to section 65P if:
(a) the respondent believed on reasonable grounds that the action constituting the contravention was necessary to protect the health or safety of a person (including the respondent or the child); and
(b) the period during which, because of that action, a person in whose favour the order was made was hindered in or prevented from discharging responsibilities under the order was not for longer than was necessary to protect the health or safety of the person referred to in paragraph (a).
(1) Subject to subsection (3), the standard of proof to be applied in determining matters in proceedings under this Division is proof on the balance of probabilities.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), that subsection applies to the determination of whether a person who contravened an order under this Act affecting children had a reasonable excuse for the contravention.
(aa) 70NEB(1)(da) (does not apply in this case)[38]; or
(ab) 70NECA(3)(a)(does not apply in this case)[39]; or
(a) paragraph 70NFB(2)(a) [a community service order], (d) [a fine] or (e) [a sentence of imprisonment]; or
(b) paragraph 70NFF(3)(a)[40] (does not apply in this case);
if the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the grounds for making the order exist.
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Subdivision F - Contravention without reasonable excuse (more serious contravention)
Section 70NFA Application of subdivision
(1) Subject to subsection (2), this Subdivision applies if:
(a) a primary order has been made, whether before or after the commencement of this Division; and
(b) a court having jurisdiction under this Act is satisfied that a person has, whether before or after that commencement, committed a contravention (the current contravention) of the primary order; and
(c) the person does not prove that he or she had a reasonable excuse for the current contravention; and
(d) either subsection (2) or (3) applies.
Note: omitted
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(d), this subsection applies if:
(a) no court has previously:
(i) made an order imposing a sanction or taking an action in respect of a contravention by the person of the primary order; or
(ii) under paragraph 70NEB(1)(c), adjourned proceedings in respect of a contravention by the person of the primary order; and[42]
(b) the court dealing with the current contravention is satisfied that the person has behaved in a way that showed a serious disregard of his or her obligations under the primary order.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(d), this subsection applies if a court has previously:
(a) made an order imposing a sanction or taking an action in respect of a contravention by the person of the primary order; or
(b) under paragraph 70NEB(1)(c), adjourned proceedings in respect of a contravention by the person of the primary order.
(4) This Subdivision does not apply if the court dealing with the current contravention is satisfied that it is more appropriate for that contravention to be dealt with under Subdivision E.
(5) This Subdivision applies whether the primary order was made, and whether the current contravention occurred, before or after the commencement of this Division.
(1) If this Subdivision applies, the court must, in relation to the person who committed the current contravention:
(a) make an order under paragraph (2)(g)[43], unless the court is satisfied that it would not be in the best interests of the child concerned to make that order; and
(b) if the court makes an order under paragraph (2)(g) - consider making another order (or other orders) under subsection (2) that the court considers to be the most appropriate of the orders under subsection (2) in the circumstances; and
(c) if the court does not make an order under paragraph (2)(g) - make at least one order under subsection (2), being the order (or orders) that the court considers to be the most appropriate of the orders under subsection (2) in the circumstances.
(2) The orders that are available to be made by the court are:
(a) if the court is empowered under section 70NFC to make a community service order - to make such an order; or
(b) to make an order requiring the person to enter into a bond in accordance with section 70NFE[44]; or
(c) if the current contravention is a contravention of a parenting order in relation to a child - to make a further parenting order that compensates a person for time the person did not spend with the child (or the time the child did not live with the person) as a result of the current contravention, unless it would not be in the best interests of the child concerned to make that order; or
(d) to fine the person not more than 60 penalty units; or
(e) subject to subsection (7), to impose a sentence of imprisonment on the person in accordance with section 70NFG[45]; or
(f) if:
(i) the current contravention is a contravention of a parenting order in relation to a child; and
(ii) the current contravention resulted in a person not spending time with the child (or the child not living with a person for a particular period); and
(iii) the person referred to in subparagraph (ii) reasonably incurs expenses as a result of the contravention;
to make an order requiring the person who committed the current contravention to compensate the person referred to in subparagraph (ii) for some or all of the expenses referred to in subparagraph (iii); or
(g) to make an order that the person who committed the current contravention pay all of the costs of another party, or other parties, to the proceedings under this Division; or
(h) to make an order that the person who committed the current contravention pay some of the costs of another party, or other parties, to the proceedings under this Division.
(4) The court must not make an order imposing a sentence of imprisonment on a person under this section in respect of a contravention of a child maintenance order made under this Act unless the court is satisfied that the contravention was intentional or fraudulent.
(6) An order under this section may be expressed to take effect immediately, at the end of a specified period or on the occurrence of a specified event.
(7) When a court makes an order under this section, the court may make any other orders that the court considers necessary to ensure compliance with the order that was contravened.
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Section 70NFG Sentences of imprisonment
(1) A sentence of imprisonment imposed on a person under paragraph 70NFB(2)(e) is to be expressed to be:
(a) for a specified period of 12 months or less; or
(b) for a period ending when the person:
(i) complies with the order concerned; or
(ii) has been imprisoned under the sentence for 12 months or such lesser period as is specified by the court;
whichever happens first.
(2) A court must not sentence a person to imprisonment under paragraph 70NFB(2)(e) unless the court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances of the case, it would not be appropriate for the court to deal with the contravention under any of the other paragraphs of subsection 70NFB(2).
(3) If a court sentences a person to imprisonment under paragraph 70NFB(2)(e), the court must:
(a) state the reasons why it is satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2); and
(b) cause those reasons to be entered in the records of the court.
(4) The failure of a court to comply with subsection (3) does not invalidate a sentence.
(5) A court that sentences a person to imprisonment under paragraph 70NFB(2)(e) may:
(a) suspend the sentence upon the terms and conditions determined by the court; and
(b) terminate a suspension made under paragraph (a).
(6) A court, when sentencing a person to imprisonment under paragraph 70NFB(2)(e), may, if it considers it appropriate to do so, direct that the person be released upon the person entering into a bond described in subsection (7) after he or she has served a specified part of the term of imprisonment.
(7) A bond for the purposes of subsection (6) is a bond (with or without surety or security) that the person will be of good behaviour for a specified period of up to 2 years.
(8) A court that has sentenced a person to imprisonment for a period expressed as provided by paragraph (1)(b) may order the release of the person if it is satisfied that the person will, if he or she is released, comply with the order concerned.
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Section 70NAF - Standard of proof
Section 70NAF replaces section 70NEA in the existing Act. It provides clarification of the standard of proof to be applied by the court in considering enforcement applications. The current test provided by section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 is the civil standard of proof, the balance of probabilities, with the court to take account of the gravity of matters. Section 70NAF aims to assist practitioners and self-represented litigants by clarifying the circumstances in which the court will apply a different standard of proof.
New subsection 70NAF(1) specifies that the court should generally apply the civil standard of proof, the balance of probabilities, in considering matters in proceedings under Division 13A of Part VII of the Act. This is subject to subsection 70NAF(3), which provides that a stricter standard applies to orders being considered under the more serious contravention applications that may incur a criminal penalty under provisions in Subdivision F.
New subsection 70NAF(2) clarifies that the court should also apply the civil standard when determining whether a person had a reasonable excuse for having contravened an order affecting a child under this Act. This approach should mean that it is easier for many less serious contraventions to be dealt with by the court as they will not need to be treated as a quasi-criminal proceeding.
New subsection 70NAF(3) provides that a stricter standard of proof, requiring the court to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, applies to matters to which Subdivision F applies when a court is considering a criminal consequence for the contravention of an order (for example, imposing a bond, a fine, or a sentence of imprisonment). This is appropriate given the consequences for the individual of orders that impose criminal sanctions.
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Subdivision F - Contravention without reasonable excuse (more serious contravention)
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Subsection 70NFA(1) sets out that Subdivision F applies if a person has committed a contravention of a primary order (defined in the dictionary in section 4 of the Act) with no reasonable excuse and the contravention is of a more serious nature. Section 70NAE explains what constitutes a reasonable excuse for contravening an order. The note to subsection 70NFA(1) refers the reader to section 70NAF, which sets out the applicable standard of proof in determining matters under Division 13A.
Subsections 70NFA(2) and (3) clarify when a contravention is of a more serious nature such that Subdivision F applies. Under subsection 70NFA(2), this will be the case even if no court has previously imposed a sanction, taken action, or adjourned proceedings under paragraph 70NEB(1)(c) in respect of a contravention by the person, yet the court is satisfied that the person has behaved in a way that showed a serious disregard of his or her obligations under the primary order. Thus a person who only commits one contravention can be immediately dealt with under this Subdivision if they show serious disregard for their obligations. What amounts to a serious disregard will depend on the circumstances of the case but, by way of example, could include the removal of a child to another place despite orders of the court or harassment despite repeated warnings and the terms of the parenting order. In such cases, the court will deal with the matter under Subdivision F, which requires the court to consider imposing more serious penalties ranging from community service orders to fines and imprisonment.
...
Where Subdivision F applies and there is a more serious contravention, the court has the powers set out in section 70NFB. These powers expand on those in the existing Act in order to strengthen the existing enforcement regime.
...
Where the court does not make an order for costs under paragraph 70NFB(2)(g), the court must make at least one other order under subsection 70NFB(2) that the court considers to be the most appropriate. This ensures that the court must impose some kind of sanction to more serious contraventions.
...
Section 70NFG provides for sentences of imprisonment that may be imposed by the court under paragraph 70NFB(2)(e)...
...
(emphasis added)
(3) In determining whether consideration should be given to any material in accordance with subsection (1), or in considering the weight to be given to any such material, regard shall be had, in addition to any other relevant matters, to:
(a) the desirability of persons being able to rely on the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the Act and the purpose or object underlying the Act; and
(b) the need to avoid prolonging legal or other proceedings without compensating advantage.
Section 140 Civil proceedings: standard of proof
(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:
(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and
(b) the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and
(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.
Section 141 Criminal proceedings standard of proof
(1) In a criminal proceeding, the court is not to find the case of the prosecution proved unless it is satisfied that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) In a criminal proceeding, the court is to find the case of a defendant proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
The High Court made it clear in R v Dookheed (2017) 262 CLR 402; 91 ALJR 960; [2017] HCA 36 that, even though a reasonable doubt "is not just any doubt",
...[I]t is generally speaking undesirable for a trial judge to contrast reasonable doubt with any doubt. ...[I]t is generally speaking unwise for a trial judge to attempt any explication of the concept of reasonable doubt beyond observing that the expression means what is says and that it is for the jury to decide whether they are left with a reasonable doubt (and in certain circumstances explaining that a reasonable doubt does not include fanciful possibilities)...
Matters to be proven in Contravention Proceedings
(2) To assist in the commission of a crime without actually participating in the offence itself. An accused who aids and abets must be shown to have been in some way linked in purpose with the person who actually committed the principal offence, and the words or conduct of the accused must have encouraged or knowingly rendered more likely the commission of the crime by the principal.
It is also defined as "to encourage another to commit a contravention resulting in ancillary liability for a contravention of legislation."
i) That the principal offense was committed;
That the accused knew the essential circumstances that establish the principal offence; and
That the accused intentionally assisted or encouraged the principal offender to commit that offence (Giorgianni v R [1985] HCA 29; (1985 156 CLR 473).
The second and third elements may overlap. A person generally cannot intentionally assist or encourage a person to commit an offence unless s/he is aware of the essential facts that constitute the offence (Giorgianni v R [1985] HCA 29; (1985) 156 CLR 473)
The judge must clearly explain all of the principles involved in proving this form of liability, and relate them to the evidence. It is not sufficient to simply direct the jury that the accused must have intentionally aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of the offence (R v Abbouchi & Allouche [2008] VSCA 171).
Where breaches are acknowledged to be "less serious" rather than "more serious", or if the complainant is not seeking a community service order, a fine or a sentence of imprisonment, the distinction will not be significant. If a complainant wants an order envisaged by s 70NAF(3) to be made, however, the question arises: Which facts must then be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and which on the balance of probability?
This issue was considered by the Full Court in the case of Dobbs and Brayson [2007] FamCA 1261; (2007) FLC 93-346. The appeal related to a custodial sentence imposed in accordance with Subdiv[ision] F of Div 13A. After setting out the two different standards of proof which apply in Div 13A proceedings by operation of s 70NAF, the Full Court at [31] identified four categories of fact to which the issue of which standard of proof relates, namely:
1. whether the contravention occurred
2. whether a reasonable excuse for the contravention existed
- whether a contravention without reasonable excuse was more or less serious, and
- what order should be made, including an order to which s 70NAF(3) would apply (ie, requiring the application of the criminal standard of proof).
The Full Court found that, despite what is described throughout the relevant section of the judgment as the "oddities" of such an interpretation, whenever the court proposes to make an order to which s 70NAF(3) applies (ie a community service order, a fine or a sentence of imprisonment) it must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to (at [51]):
"all the factual matters that relate to the finding of contravention, to the treatment of the contravention as one to which Subdivision F of Division 13A applies, and ... if imprisonment is imposed, the inappropriateness of other available orders".
FOX v PERCY: RELIABILITY OF THE PARTIES' EVIDENCE
...in recent years, judges have become more aware of scientific research that has cast doubt on the ability of judges (or anyone else) to tell truth from falsehood accurately on the basis of such appearances. Considerations such as these have encouraged judges, both at trial and on appeal, to limit their reliance on the appearance of witnesses and to reason to their conclusions, as far as possible, on the basis of contemporary materials, objectively established facts and the apparent logic of events.
8. [...] the maternal Grandmother and the father abducted the children.
- I sustained injuries during the process. The father and the maternal Grandmother struck me in the face with the people whom he incited to cause violence. They also arrested and used the traditional laws and bribery to harass me.
MR COMBES: [...] What you say at paragraph 9 is:
I sustained injuries during the process.
...
The father and maternal Grandmother struck me in the face with the people whom he incited to cause violence.
Now, is it fair to say that neither the first or second respondent struck you in the face?
THE MOTHER: The scenario was happening. There was so many people.
...
---What I remember, to my recollection, the father grabbed one of my younger son and they have their relatives that were there. She was present. She was just saying words but I saw her hand raised but she did not reach out to me because the people who blocked her and she was saying words.
...
MR COMBES: What words was she saying?
THE MOTHER: "Grab the kids. Take them away." And, "We have the opportunity to take them away from her now."
MR COMBES: You said she raised her hand to you?
THE MOTHER: Yes. But she couldn't reach because there were so many people blocking her. She was using words.
MR COMBES: How far away from you was she?
THE MOTHER: To my recollection about one point something metres. About - - -
MR COMBES: Very close?
THE MOTHER: Yes.
MR COMBES: Did she, in your hearing, direct anyone to slap or hold you?
...
HIS HONOUR: In words, you mean?
MR COMBES: In words.
THE MOTHER: --- The person that who actually slapped me on the face, I later learnt is her brother.
MR COMBES: Was it just because you recognised the dress that someone was wearing and you were - that allowed you to identify the second respondent being in court?
THE MOTHER: No. It wasn't because of the dress.
MR COMBES: Okay. Did you actually see her face?
THE MOTHER: I could see her face in there.
MR COMBES: Because not only you say now that you saw her in court but you saw her outside of court as well. Is that correct?
THE MOTHER: The in court mean in the area. That's what I meant in the context. Outside where we were waiting.
MR COMBES: What you told before, you didn't mention that the second respondent grabbed your oldest son and put him on a motorcycle?
THE MOTHER: She did not grab. The son did.
...
[Ms Paige]'s son, the father, grabbed one of my kids.
MR COMBES: And what happened to your other son?
THE MOTHER: The accomplice, or one of their relatives, they had two motorbikes. One he - the father grabbed my younger ones.
...
And the second accomplice, or the relatives, grabbed my older son. And she[58] was just giving words.
MR COMBES: So when you say [X] was then grabbed there and then by the second accomplice, he was put on a motorbike and they rode off, so - - -
...
--- so the second respondent was not involved in the actual putting your oldest son onto a motorcycle?
THE MOTHER: I believe, your Honour, she cannot ride a motorbike. Her work was giving instructions and she was just walking on her foot. So she did not grab one of my kids.
MR COMBES: It was - how many people were there?
THE MOTHER: Roughly more than 30 people.
MR COMBES: And was it a lot of shouting and screaming?
THE MOTHER: Yes.
MR COMBES: And are you sure that it was the second respondent that was shouting and screaming for your children to be taken away? Or could it have been some other woman?
THE MOTHER: They came for the intention of taking the kids. And she[59] was giving instruction.
MR COMBES: You personally heard her giving instructions?
THE MOTHER: Yes.
MR COMBES: I think it's important - it's hard to remember but when you say you're giving instructions, can you recall the actual words that were said?
THE MOTHER: It - they echoed in my head. I can say them in [Local language] and translate them.
MR COMBES: Yes, please?
THE MOTHER: This girl of [Mr R], the daughter of [Mr R], has destroyed my house. And all my properties. And ..... meaning our wealth or bride wealth have been - I don't know how to put it directly in English, but he can understand properly...
[At this point the Mother spoke in [Local language] and the interpreter then interpreted as follows]
THE INTERPRETER: That my wealth had just been poured into the river so just lost into the river, literally...
[At this point the Mother continued to speak in [Local language] but spoke in "chunks" or parts of sentences and paused while the interpreter translated to the Grandmother and then continued to speak in [Local language]]
HIS HONOUR: Thank you, Mr Interpreter [my acknowledgement of the interpreter interpreting the Mother's [Local language] sentence/s to English to the court]
[At this point the interpreter continued to interpret the next chunk or part of the Mother's evidence to the Grandmother while the Mother paused]
THE MOTHER: ..and we have the opportunity - [at this point the Mother spoke apparently in [Local language] and then returned to English, effectively interpreting the [Local language] to English]- meaning we have the opportunity to grab these kids away from her so that they can no longer be in her care. To use enemies.
MR COMBES: The other matter that actually should be perhaps concerning to your Honour is the initial description of the [...] the first respondent, and the second respondent, striking the mother in a[n] early affidavit.
HIS HONOUR: Compared with the witness box, where she attempted to strike?
MR COMBES: Well, no, it was then modified the next affidavit, and then again modified in the witness box. How much weight would be put on that, it's a matter for your Honour. But clearly, language has always been and instructions given, becomes an issue for all parties in this case. Otherwise, I would be submitting that her evidence was credible in the witness box. And there was no indication that she was deliberately attempting to mislead the court.
MR COMBES: ...the evidence is clear that not only was the paternal Grandmother present on the 15th, she was shouting encouragement for the removal of the children. And she, in fact, raised her hand against the mother, though not forcefully striking her. Your Honour, it is a balancing act, and one would know from the general approach of the courts that word against word rarely[63] [gets] to beyond reasonable doubt findings in situations such as that. I would be submitting that, perhaps, as a result of that conclusion, if you're satisfied with the credibility of the mother, you would be satisfied on the balance of probabilities.
(emphasis added)
Evidence in regard to the December 2021 family meeting
THE MOTHER: Yes. In the earlier affidavit, I admit I said we met, but it was in [EE State], meaning I met with the son, and it was not - - -
...
... it didn't mean, like, I saw her with my own eyes.
THE MOTHER: ... allegation about her being in [City B] or on the telephone, they are the truth and there is nothing I can say about that.
HIS HONOUR: ... so how do you say you could hear what [Ms Paige] said on the telephone?
THE MOTHER: It was not the first time, your Honour, [Ms Paige] was placed on the phone call by the son.
...
HIS HONOUR: It was on loud speaker?
THE MOTHER: Yes.
HIS HONOUR: On his telephone?
THE MOTHER: Yes. On his telephone.
HIS HONOUR: And when you say he put her on ... he put her on the phone call, how did that happen? Did she ring him, did he ring her? How did that happen? Do you know how it happened? Did you hear how ... that happened?
THE MOTHER: According to my understanding, the family ..... talk was going on between two families of - [Wemble] family or the extended family of [Ms Paige] family, maternal and paternal uncles were - [Mr Wemble] brought them in my brother's compound and demanded that the kids were to be hand over to him.
HIS HONOUR: He demanded the kids what?
THE MOTHER: To be handed over to him. [Mr Wemble], he's the one who demanded...he came with the families.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. ... what did you see or hear that ... meant [Ms Paige] was on the telephone to speak to him?
THE MOTHER: During the talk, there was a concern of the children not to be hand over to [Mr Wemble] by both family members because they were too young and the environment would not be good for them. The family decide from both side. So as the pressure in the - [Mr Wemble] was being told by everybody that what he is demanding was not right or best for the children welfare. [Mr Wemble] request to call his mother. And when he called, [Ms Paige] [67] was placed on a loudspeaker. And that's how I heard her, on loudspeaker.
Though I tried to battled the case in court and I was tricked by customary police and laws orders to only give the kids to him for few weeks and he might return them to me since the environment was not conducive or children he might compromised they situations and returned the kids to better environments because they kids might not get to adapt to the harsh and unpredictable weather they were exposed too. I knew he wouldn't do that's but no one knew him better than I do, kids were also excited to see their dad for first time after almost 8 years. So I gave it a chance but that's how they kids ended up at his care till now.
HIS HONOUR: So what was the, "I was tricked by customary police and laws orders"? What did you mean by that and when did that happen?
THE MOTHER: What I meant, during the time the children were forcefully removed when - on the 15th.
...
---So my family were about to retaliate. And also my dad - - -
..... And my Dad yelled, saying there could be crossfire and anything could go wrong. The police nearby were involved, and they said that they would follow it through a smoother and a better way to bring the kids back.
HIS HONOUR: I see. And when you say:
Customary police and laws to only give the kids to him for a few weeks, and he might return them to me since the environment was not conducive for children.
Why did you say that and what did that mean?
THE MOTHER: What I meant is because any father who knows they thought that, because I know who he - I know how - I studied with him, I've stayed with him and the people there were saying even there is - was no fight and the police were - seemed to be bright. They were not very cooperative. They were just telling my family to calm down, and they would follow it smoothly and bring the kids back. And maybe the father would just give up after a few days or a few weeks, because the kids would not adapt.
Inconsistencies and demeanour taken into account
(1) on the day of the religious ceremony;[72] or
(2) on or about the day the children came into the Father's care; or
(3) that the Grandmother had ascertained from the Father that the children were present but not the Mother, at the religious ceremony, and that she had then told her son that he should not retain the children, and that this was because she was a Mother and understood that the children should remain with their Mother.
THE INTERPRETER: this court, by the time when the kids were taken, I was outside. I was in [City O]. Then he called me that the kids were returned back home. Then I asked him about the children, who brought the kids. Then he told me that it was the father and the brother and uncle. Then I ask, "how about your mother?" Then he says the mother didn't come. So then I told him that if the mother hasn't come, then they should not be given. Sorry. Okay. I do not get ..... either you should accept or you should have not accepted. So that he should not - yes. That he should have not accepted them to be left there. Then you say that, yes, I should have accepted them. Then I told him, yes, he should have not accepted it. As the father was arrested, then he should have just let the kids and the father to all just go. And he said, "the kids are mine." Then he told me that yes, there is - it would have not happened like that because the kids are mine. And also, she doesn't allow me to talk to my children. Then I told him that he should have just let them go. And it will be possible later when they are able to be mature enough to know things, and they will be able to talk to you. So that is - he told me like, yes, it will not happen because if the kids have been brought here and they are with me here, then I should not just let them. And even with you, if I have just ..... if I have been asked to go now, will you be able to let me just go? And I told him that if ..... is there, then he should have just let them just go with him because they will later know much about you. Then you say, I will not accept - you know, I will not accept that. And at the moment, the person that had actually took the children. And now I have just been the one now that is being held accountable, and the person that had taken the children with his partner, no one is dealing with them. And because he is the one refusing to give back the children, and his wife is the one that is saying that I'm the one refusing to let the kids be allowed. And if they are not listening to me, all of them, then I will just remain as quiet as I am. So and then I just thought, like, it would have been good for me just to come over to the authority and just listen to the authority, but those that have - actually have the power to hold the kids are now being allowed just to be free. But I, myself, that person who has not done anything, I'm now being the one being held accountable. So - and as both of them - the father and the mother have not actually listened, but I, myself, have just given myself just to come to the authority and come to let myself be ..... by they - by the authority.
(a) being party to the Father's scheme or intention at the between-two-families meeting held in Country D on or about December 2021, where it was alleged he attempted, unsuccessfully, to have the community support and act on his demand to have the children permanently removed from the Mother's care, to be placed to live with him; and
(b) participating in the December 2021 meeting at all, and/or by telephone call broadcast to the meeting on speakerphone; and
(c) I infer, in substance, doing anything at all that would support the Father in him keeping the children in his care and away from the Mother's care or interfering with her making the day-to-day decisions about the children in the period of early 2022 (when the Mother was arrested and detained for some days on a warrant issued at the Father's behest, and the children were delivered to the Father by the police); and
(d) being present or involved in the alleged forceful and violent incident in early 2022 when the Mother alleges the children were, by force and/or intimidation, removed from her care outside or near a courtroom in Country D and driven off on motorcycles by the Father and his associates. The effect of this incident is that the children have not lived with or spent time with or even seen their Mother again.
(1) the culture of the Local ethnic group was patriarchal and a woman such as her would not ever be permitted to have any say or role in such matters; and
(2) the dispute and the events of Country D when the children went into the Father's care was between two adults, the Father and the Mother and that she had no influence in the matter.
20. I spoke to the children in [early] 2024.
I understand the [Ms Bellanger] and [Ms Bellanger] relatives speak to the children; however, I am not sure as to the last time they spoke or details of the conversation.
(emphasis added)
MR MONOAH: Do you communicate with your brother, [Mr Wemble], in [City O]?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: Yes.
MR MONOAH: I mean in - wherever he is in [Country D]..... at the moment?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: No, I don't communicate with him now.
MR MONOAH: When was the last time you communicated with him?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: Probably last year.
MR MONOAH: Do you have your phone with you?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: Yes, I have my phone.
MR MONOAH: Can you open it?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: Yes.
MR MONOAH: Can you open the WhatsApp messages. Can you open [Mr Wemble]'s number?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: Yes, I have open it.
MR MONOAH: Hang on. Don't touch. Can... [my Associate] approach so that I can have a look. Just don't - - -?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: Yes.
MR MONOAH: - - - touch the screen. If you don't mind, [my Associate], approaching. Your Honour, is it okay if I examine the phone?
HIS HONOUR: Well, first, do you have any objection to Mr Monoah looking at your telephone?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: No.
HIS HONOUR: Thank you.
MR MONOAH: It shows here you had contact with him on 18 June?[78]-
[MS P WEMBLE]: --Yes.
MR MONOAH: This year?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: But not regarding - - -
MR MONOAH: Is this year?---
[MS P WEMBLE] - - - the children.
MR MONOAH: Well, I'm coming. You call him. You say:
[MS P WEMBLE]: I was asleep by that time.
MR MONOAH: That was Monday 23 June?[79]--
[MS P WEMBLE]: Yes.
MR MONOAH: On Sunday, you had a contact with him:
Who is the [man] pouring the water?[80]
Asking him a question?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: Yes, I was asking him who - who was pouring the water.
MR MONOAH: On Monday, which was yesterday of this week - - -?-
[MS P WEMBLE]: --Yes.
MR MONOAH: Today is Friday?[81]---
[MS P WEMBLE]: I always text him. I don't talk by - by the phone.
HIS HONOUR: Hang on. Just - I'm just trying to take notes, so - to hear what you're saying?
On Sunday - that was Sunday the 22nd.[82]
MR MONOAH: 22nd.
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
MR MONOAH: You send him a video, which is the ... [ceremony] video?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: Same video, yes.
MR MONOAH: And you ask him:
Who is the (person or elder) pouring the water?
[MS P WEMBLE]: --Yes.
MR MONOAH: On Monday, he answered shortly at 4.41 am?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: Yes.
MR MONOAH: You said "okay" at 7.29 am. You answered back?
[MS P WEMBLE]: Yes.
MR MONOAH: Today, he call you at 7.50 am?---
[MS P WEMBLE]: Yes, I didn't answer.
MR MONOAH: Yes. But he called you?---
MS P WEMBLE: And no answer either.
MR MONOAH: Yes. Then you call back at 7.56 am?---
MS P WEMBLE: And no answer.
MR MONOAH: Six minutes later. He did not answer. Probably went back to bed?---
MS P WEMBLE: He - no, he was talking with my mum.
(emphasis added)
Grandmother's application to restrain Mother's solicitor
Section 41 Improper questions
(1) The court must disallow a question put to a witness in cross - examination, or inform the witness that it need not be answered, if the court is of the opinion that the question (referred to as a disallowable question ):
(a) is misleading or confusing; or
(b) is unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, humiliating or repetitive; or
(c) is put to the witness in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise inappropriate; or
(d) has no basis other than a stereotype (for example, a stereotype based on the witness's sex, race, culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical disability).
(2) Without limiting the matters the court may take into account for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to take into account:
(a) any relevant condition or characteristic of the witness of which the court is, or is made , aware, including age, education, ethnic and cultural background, gender, language background and skills, level of maturity and understanding and personality; and
(b) any mental, intellectual or physical disability of which the court is, or is made, aware and to which the witness is, or appears to be, subject; and
(c) the context in which the question is put, including:
(i) the nature of the proceeding; and
(ii) in a criminal proceeding--the nature of the offence to which the proceeding relates; and
(iii) the relationship (if any) between the witness and any other party to the proceeding.
(3) A question is not a disallowable question merely because:
(a) the question challenges the truthfulness of the witness or the consistency or accuracy of any statement made by the witness; or
(b) the question requires the witness to discuss a subject that could be considered distasteful to, or private by, the witness.
(4) A party may object to a question put to a witness on the ground that it is a disallowable question.
(5) However, the duty imposed on the court by this section applies whether or not an objection is raised to a particular question.
(6) A failure by the court to disallow a question under this section, or to inform the witness that it need not be answered, does not affect the admissibility in evidence of any answer given by the witness in response to the question.
Section 101 Protection of witnesses
(1) The court shall forbid the asking of, or excuse a witness from answering, a question that it regards as offensive, scandalous, insulting, abusive or humiliating, unless the court is satisfied that it is essential in the interests of justice that the question be answered.
(2) The court must forbid an examination of a witness that it regards as oppressive, repetitive or hectoring, or excuse a witness from answering questions asked during such an examination, unless the court is satisfied that it is essential in the interests of justice for the examination to continue or for the questions to be answered.
76 The foregoing authorities establish the following:-
...
- However, the court always has inherent jurisdiction to restrain solicitors from acting in a particular case, as an incident of its inherent jurisdiction over its officers and to control its process in aid of the administration of justice (citations omitted)...
- ...
- The jurisdiction is to be regarded as exceptional and is to be exercised with caution (citations omitted).
- Due weight should be given to the public interest in a litigant not being deprived of the lawyer of his or her choice without due cause (citations omitted).
- ...
Grandmother's alleges Mother had abused her in 2023
b) Dowry: The term 'dowry' is not well understood by many professionals. It is very important to shed light onto its definition because I will be using 'bride wealth' instead of 'dowry'; according to the Cambridge dictionary, 'dowry' is defined as an amount of money or property that a woman's parents give to the man she marries. With [Local] and many other ethnic groups in [Country D], it is the opposite, as it is the wealth (cattle or property) given to the girl's family by a man (husband) and his family, as such it is locally known as 'bride wealth'. Local legal professionals, and scholars such as I, do use the term 'bride wealth' as it is also used in the said legislation. It is my understanding that a [Local] man and his family pay a significant number of head of cattle as bride wealth to the girl's family and her relatives. Payment of bride wealth seals the validity of married and when a marriage dissolves ('falls apart), it is expected that all the cattle will be returned when a marriage produces no children except the cattle for [compensation], (which is the redemption of the girl's virginity) and [payment]
d) Living arrangements of children following separation or divorce; It is my understanding that the issue of living arrangement for the children is unique, according to [Local] customary law and the [Region HH] Act S41(5) it takes a patriarchal approach. It is the right of the husband to take full custody of the children, unless [compensation] has not yet been paid. When [...] payment is not yet settled, the maternal family have the right to live with the child or children until all dues are settled. The man has the right to recover some of his 'bride wealth' or property depending on the number of children from the marriage. He is allowed to take full custody of the children after the settlement is completed. [Local] customary law scrutinises the rights granted by the custom patriarchy, giving males rights to full custody in the event of divorce...
b) It is my understanding that marriage, divorce, child custody and other personal matters are handled through customary law as stipulated under the Code of Civil Procedure Act. In instances where the customary law court conflicts with the principles of justice, equality, or good conscience, the Code makes it clear that customary law should not prevail. The Code of Civil Procedure, The Child Act, and the Transitional Constitution also all stipulate that customary law should not prevail over the consideration of human rights. However, the way in which the Courts are required to put these stipulations into practice is unclear. No advice has been provided to the courts on how the provisions contained in the Transition Constitution requiring human rights considerations to be taken into account are to be put into effect. > > c) Dowry (Bride Wealth); Statutory law is silent in the details of bride wealth. It is my understanding that return of dowry (bride wealth) following separation or divorce are adjudicated at the customary law courts, however, appeals against any decision made at the customary law courts are taken to the statutory courts at the county courts. It is my understanding that it is uncommon for such cases to move pas[t] the customary courts unless an unprecedented decision contrary to customary law is made.
MR MONOAH: could you kindly assist the court as to the current political situation in [Country D]. Is it volatile as of, let's say, [early] this year 2025? What is the political climate currently, as you understand?---
[DR DD]: It's extremely volatile.
MR MONOAH: When you say "extremely volatile", war is just on the verge of erupting any moments we speak. People in diaspora, that is what we know, and it could result in harm. Do you agree with that?---
[DR DD]: That is a perception, and that is what is the evidence in the ground, especially in the [Region JJ].
MR MONOAH: And not only that, including [C State], some of those that are bordering [Region JJ] as well?---
[DR DD]: Yes, of course. There have been a lot of sectional fighting in the [C State] - and in every section of [Country D], for that matter.
HIS HONOUR: I think, as I understand what Mr Monoah is saying, the groom's family will ask for the number of cows that were paid in the first place, but less [compensation], and then less [payment] as well. And I think you both agree. Am I right in that's what you're saying?---
[DR DD]: Yes. I agree with that proposition.
MR MONOAH: Let me ask the question again. Do you agree that there is no customary court that will return all the dowry wealth without subtracting [payment]
[DR DD]: That is what I stated earlier
...
MR MONOAH: All right. In marriage, among the [Local] people, it involves many families, not just one. It involves the father, mother, uncles, both maternal and paternal. On the groom's side, contributing equal number of cows allocated to each to the girl's family. Do you agree with that?
[DR DD]: Yes, I do.
...
MR MONOAH: Let's say, for the purpose of an example, if I were the groom, and I want to marry, my maternal uncle will contribute 10 cows to the bride's maternal uncles in that number. Do you agree with that?---
[DR DD]: Yes, depends on the section of the [Local] that
...
MR MONOAH: If the marriage fails, my maternal family that contributed, say, five cows to the bride's maternal uncles will go and recover that number of cows through the maternal side of the bride. Do you agree with that?
[DR DD]: That is my understanding...
...
MR MONOAH: The bridewealth has been returned to the groom, does it also mean that he can take the children along with the bridewealth as well without paying at all?---
...
[DR DD]: And - and that is no - it has never occurred that you will take the [bride]wealth and take the children. That never happens.
...
MR MONOAH: Looking, [Dr DD], at marriage as an institution among the [Local] people, is it possible for a groom to make certain decisions alone without involving his family members, whether immediate or extended?---
[DR DD]: Well, in some cases, they can make a decision, but that decision will be brought down by the family
...
MR MONOAH: And it is very rare for anybody to take those decisions on their own without family involvement because they will be isolated and disowned, and it will be a public knowledge?---
[DR DD]: Yes...
...
MR MONOAH: And I agree, the decision is made because he's the father of the family, and he can not take things in his own hand and claim that he's acting alone. It has always to be in unison with family members?---
[DR DD]: That's my understanding.
...
MR MONOAH: Can a bride be detained to be responsible to return the bridewealth, or does that fall to the father, mother, maternal uncles, paternal uncles and elder brothers that are responsible to return it?---
[DR DD]: My understanding is that wealth is paid to the family, and in the matter of reclaiming the - the - the - the wealth back, it is reclaimed from the person who actually took it, not the - the couples, yes.
MR MONOAH: So your answer to the court is that the bride cannot be arrested to recover a bride from her?---
[DR DD]: That's my understanding, because she's not the one who had the - [retain] the wealth.
...
MR MONOAH: And the customary court [as in this case where] also decides that the children will reside with the mother until they are 18 years of age. Is it possible to then agitate holding children as a ransom for the recovery of the bridewealth when the customary court has made the decision that the children will reside with the mother? Is it [legally] possible to agitate that?
...
DR DD: ...I haven't came across any - any evidence that the children will be held ransom for the bridewealth, but I do know if the bride - if the bridewealth is not returned, that person who is responsible for the wealth will be answerable and may be arrested.
...
MR MONOAH: Thank you, [Dr DD]. So the spreading of water symbolises a number of things, and it is partly restorative in that way, that if an elder has been angered or pressed or annoyed, it is perceived that they will bring curse and misfortune to that family or the children of people, and, therefore, he can be persuaded to perform that as one of the method, among many ways that you describe to the court, to bless people; do you agree with that?---
[DR DD]: That's my understanding
...
HIS HONOUR: And for my purposes, I'm moving to the position that the consultative process between families and traditional law, when there is a divorce or a marriage that has failed, that there is not, in traditional law, the right of one parent to unilaterally - sorry - there is not the right of a father to unilaterally take the children because they're male. There would have to be a consultative process, and if not agreed, there would need to be a court hearing about it. Am I right on that?
[DR DD]: In - in most cases with the [Local] families, the case has to be settled within ..... family...you call [that] - the larger extended family.
...
HIS HONOUR: So the father can't just get up one morning and say, "I'm taking the children because they're male, and I'm [Local]," and take the children? That's the question that I want to know. Without any other consultation, without any other divorce, without any other court case, you can't just get up in the morning and say, "They're male, therefore I can take them"? Or if he did, that would not be in accordance with [Local] customary law?---
[DR DD]: That - that is correct, your Honour
Yes. In most cases, either it is a negotiation of dowry or whether a dissolution of marriage, it is, in majority of cases, led by the male member of the family. Even if the male member of the family - like, if the - unless if there is no relative or a close relative of that particular family, that is in a rare circumstance that a woman can sit, but it is very rare. It is very rare. It doesn't happen unless there is no relative - a male relative in that family. But if there is male relative in that family, that is not a woman business. It is a man business. And they - they can - they can sit behind in the court, but they're not allowed to sit in front and be able to - to be the one championing the discussion. But it may happen, but it - it is very rare.
Mother a single parent from 2014 & no involvement from Father or his family
2017 Father visits Australia & Mother applies for FVIO
In Country D the Father changes his mind about children's passports
Conundrum: the 2021 proceedings & Father opposes travel to Country D
Father, Grandmother & Ms P Wemble aware of Final Orders
The Father is aware of the Mother & children travelling to Country D
Late 2021: Grandmother and Ms P Wemble book tickets to Country D
December 2021: The Mother & children arrive in Country D
...Now, this Mike was the dad of the ten-year-old lad.
Plump, healthy, and stoutly conditioned, he was as strong as the best.
...
- [In] December 2021, the first respondent called a family meeting. He attended with his relatives and my relatives also gathered to listen to him at that meeting. In that meeting, the first respondent said that he wanted to be handed over the children under the [Local] customary laws. This was in [City N] in [Country D].
- All the relatives on both sides responded by saying that the children were too young to be handed to him. The relatives on both sides expressed to the first respondent that the children cannot live in [Country D] because the environment was hostile for them.
- The first respondent was also told that there were court orders [in early] 2019 in [Country D] stating that the children should leave with the mother until they turn 18. He was also told that there were court orders in Australia dated 16 August 2021 that the mother should live with the children.
- The first respondent then made a request to telephone the second respondent at that meeting [in] December 2021 whilst we were in [City N], [Country D]. The second respondent was contacted by phone. The second respondent was then put on a phone loud-speaker. The second respondent was then briefed by all the family on both sides and told that the children cannot be removed.
- The second respondent got upset and clearly stated that the children must be removed from me. 24. She stated that it was a customary practice and therefore they must be given to the first respondent to raise them. The second respondent was told that the children were too young, and the court orders now allow the children to live with the mother.
- The second respondent insisted that the children must be removed from me. Soon after this and when the parties could not agree with the second respondent's opinion, the first respondent stormed out of the family meeting and walked out. He never returned inside. He never came back to the meeting.
- Shortly after, the first respondent went to [City N] after he got concrete information that I was going to proceed to [City B] to visit my family and relatives.
- At this meeting, we all thought the second respondent was talking somewhere in [Country D] around [City N]. I did not know that she was still in Australia. This is why I mistook in my earlier affidavit that she was in [City N], [Country D]. At the time, I thought she was in [City N] or giving instructions to her son at that [...] December 2021 meeting in [City N] instructing her son to contravene the court orders in Australia.
(1) The Mother's evidence was clear. Her demeanour in oral evidence was as described. She answered any questions responsively. I found her evidence compelling.
(2) The denial of participation by the Grandmother was unconvincing. At times I observed some insouciance or indifference by her to the gravity of the allegations against her and the gravity of the situation of the children.
(3) Paragraph [18] of the Grandmother's affidavit filed 30 April 2024 showed a belief on her part that the children, being Local, should live with their Father, not their Mother. What she is alleged to have said to the December 2021 meeting is consistent with her belief stated in [18] (recited in these reasons).
(4) The Mother's account of the December 2021 meeting is consistent with the apparent logic of events, particularly the Father taking out the arrest warrant in early 2022.
(5) The Grandmother's involvement in the events of early 2022 (recited in these reasons).
Grandmother's involvement with the children in the Father household
The Grandmother's justification of the children living with the Father
The compelling nature of the Mother's evidence
The Grandmother and Ms P Wemble arrive in Country D
The mother tries to flee Country D in Early 2022
Early 2022: Mother is arrested & children placed with Father
Maybe the Grandmother's intention influenced by the Police action
Grandmother participates in Father's retention of the children
(1) the Grandmother's statements to the December 2021 meeting; and
(2) the shared knowledge of the warrant in early 2022; and
(3) the later events of the absence of any disagreement about the children being placed with the Father on or about early 2022, and the Grandmother's interaction with children while staying in the same dwelling as them in early 2022 being participation in the events; and
(4) the later circumstance of the absence of any suggestion the children should either see their Mother during that time and the absence of any suggestion the Mother should be informed as to how the children were doing.
Not beyond reasonable doubt because of Police involvement
Country D court hearing in early 2022: children returned
Then Mother's father arrested about Bridewealth
(1) the Father's agitation at the December 2021 meeting; and
(2) the Father's obtaining the warrant for the Mother's arrest soon after that meeting in early 2022; and
(3) his retention of the children in early 2022 until the court order of in early 2022, and without communication to the Mother; and
(4) there is no evidence of the bridewealth issue being agitated until early 2022 despite separation of the parents in 2014 and the divorce being in 2019 and then the Mother's father being arrested said to be over the bridewealth within a couple of weeks of the court ordered return of the children in early 2022; and
(5) the Father's knowledge of the Mother's apparent affection for her father demonstrated by her trouble and efforts (including contested court proceedings) to visit him; and
(6) the Father's conduct of retaining the children in Country D, despite their illness and the severe illness of X, since early 2022; and
(7) the apparent logic of events including those described above.
Since they[106] are here - we have entrusted them to their father, so that they can stay peacefully and move freely between [...][107] and [...].[108] This instrument of the ceremony[109] is dedicated as a token to bring calm[110] (peace/blessings) to stay healthy and peaceful. This cock will bring a blessing. So that [Mr Wemble], the father, and [Ms Bellenger], the mother, can be healthy together with our daughter's children.[111]
(1) the arrest of the Mother,
(2) the removal of the children from her care by the police on the Father's application; and
(3) following the children being returned to her in early 2022, the arrest and imprisonment of her father on the Father's application
managed or combined to so intimidate the Mother, and perhaps her family, that she was coerced into permitting the children to be with the Father for a time, or for the time being. That would be the opposite of voluntarily. However no party contended that occurred and because of that and my findings about what occurred a couple of days later, I do not so find.
To Whom it may concern
SUBJECT HANDING OVER OF TWO CHILDREN TO THEIR FATHER
This is to certify that the two children [X] and [Y] are handed over to their father, [Mr Wemble] by [Mr R] and his daughter [Ms Bellenger], the mother of the two children.
Therefore, that handing over of the two children to their father is done before me county court judge this Day [early] 2022
The relationship between the Father, Ms P Wemble the Grandmother
The children become very sick in the Father's care
"That is unfortunate. Why not [City O][117] instead of [City N]? [City N] is quite far."
"Boys are all sick. Need more attention now. They had been refusing to eat foods."
"[X] from 36.3 kg to 36 kg. [Y], yes, 30 kilos."
"[X] is underweight. [Y]'s weight seems to be within the average weight."
"Yes. Need attention now. In the last two[118] [X] has been having difficulty."
"I think you should let [X] and [Y] travel with [...] and [...]."
"They can miss school for the time being, when you come back they return with you. Health is more important than school."
"Please don't give a closed statement. Being the head of the family, I need to listen and give every issue because time heals things."
The "meeting" attempt to remove children was unsuccessful
(a) the contraventions proven occurred very shortly after the Final orders were made; and
(b) the agitation of the demand for the children to live with the Father in Country D commenced in a planned and prepared manner with the involvement of the Father and the Grandmother in the December 2021 meeting in complete disregard to the Final orders; and
(c) the absence of any communication or information to the Mother as to the children's welfare in early 2022; and
(d) the nature of the manner in which the children were removed from the Mother's care in early 2022 and the manner they have thereafter been retained by the Father and with the Grandmother's support; and
(e) the serious impact of the children's welfare including the forced separation of the children from the parent who had cared for them all their lives until their removal and retention on and after early 2022, the serious impact on their health caused by the detention, the impact on their education and the incalculable detriment of being prevented from living in the country where they are citizens and had lived all[127] their lives until the holiday to Country D.
I certify that the preceding three hundred and sixty-two (362) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge O'Shannessy.
Final parenting orders made 16 August 2021
- The parties have equal shared parental responsibility for all long term decisions in relation to the children X born in 2011 and Y born in 2013 ("the children").
- The Mother have sole parental responsibility for the day to day decision making of the children.
3. The children live with the Mother.
The Mother shall facilitate contact between the children and the Father by video or voice call on two occasions per week on days and time as may be agreed between the parties and failing agreement, with the Father to place the call to the Mother's phone, as follows:
(a) Each Wednesday between 7.30pm and 8.00pm Australian Eastern Standard Time ("AEST"); and
(b) Each Saturday between 5.00pm and 6.00pm AEST.
The Father be permitted to send gifts, cards, letters and emails to the children and the Mother shall provide them to the children.
When the Father travels to Australia, he spend time with the children as follows:
(a) As agreed between the parties in writing, and for no less than two occasions of five hours per week; and
(b) That the Father provide the Mother with at least 14 days' notice of the dates he will be present in Australia; and
(c) That the Father be permitted to take the children to visit the Paternal Grandmother, Paternal Aunts and Paternal Uncle when the children are in his care.
- Each parent shall advise the other of any change to their telephone number, residential address or email address within 7 days of such change.
- In the event members of the extended paternal family request to spend time with the children, the Mother shall facilitate such spend time arrangements as may be agreed between the Mother and the extended paternal family.
- Each party immediately inform the other of any serious illness or medical emergency that the children may suffer and authorise the other parent to immediately speak to any treating health practitioners.
- Both parties communicate directly by text message or email (or in urgent circumstances by telephone) in relation to any issues relating to the care, welfare and development of the children.
- By 1 September 2021, the Mother cause the Father's original Australian Citizenship Certificate and Change of Name documentation to be returned to the paternal Grandmother's address at M Street, Suburb G in the State of Victoria ....
- Pursuant to s11(b)(i) Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth), the Mother is permitted to do all acts and things and sign all necessary documents to herself obtain and maintain passports for the children Y born in 2011 and Y born in 2013, at her sole expense, and without requiring the Father's signature notwithstanding Order 1 herein.
13. The Mother is permitted to travel overseas with the children as follows:
(a) The Mother provide the Father with 30 days' written notice of her intention to travel, including proposed destination, copies of return flight itineraries when available and details of where the children will be staying during the proposed trip; and
(b) The Mother continue to facilitate the children communicating with the Father via video or voice call on two occasions per week at times to be agreed during her period of travel; and
(c) The Mother provide the Father with written confirmation of landing at each destination (including upon the children's return home).
(1) Monday 28 April 2025;
(2) Tuesday 29 April 2025;
(3) Wednesday 30 April 2025;
(4) Thursday 1 May 2025;
(5) Friday 23 May 2025;
(6) Wednesday 2 July 2025;
(7) Thursday 3 July 2025;
(8) Friday 4 July 2025;
(9) Monday 7 July 2025;
(10) Tuesday 8 July 2025; and
(11) Wednesday 9 July 2025 (when decision and reasons reserved).
(1) Affidavit of Ms Bellanger of 23 May 2023;
(2) Affidavit of Ms Bellanger of 15 August 2023;
(3) Amended Application for Final Orders dated 16 August 2023;
(4) Affidavit of Ms Bellanger dated 12 September 2023;
(5) Affidavit of Ms Bellanger dated 18 September 2023;
(6) Affidavit of Ms Bellanger dated 2 May 2024;
(7) Affidavit of Ms Bellanger dated 19 August 2024;
(8) Outline of Case (Final Hearing) dated 26 April 2025.
The Grandmother relied upon the following documents:
(1) The Affidavit of Ms Paige of 8 April 2024; and
(2) The Affidavit of Ms Paige of 30 April 2024.
The measures referred to in Article 1 may deal in particular with -
a) the attribution, exercise, termination or restriction of parental responsibility, as well as its delegation;
b) rights of custody, including rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence, as well as rights of access including the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child's habitual residence;
c) guardianship, curatorship and analogous institutions;
d) the designation and functions of any person or body having charge of the child's person or property, representing or assisting the child;
e) the placement of the child in a foster family or in institutional care, or the provision of care by ... or an analogous institution;
f) the supervision by a public authority of the care of a child by any person having charge of the child;
g) the administration, conservation or disposal of the child's property.
Whereas the civil suit has been submitted before me I, Mr MM judge, between Mr Wemble plaintiff and 1. Mr R 2. Ms Bellanger Defendants, for judgement do hereby issue this orders:
1. The Court issues consent decree according to the [settlement] of the parties.
The Plaintiff is divorced [from] the second defendant with effect from today early 2019.
The two boys X and Y are to be handed over to the plaintiff when they at adult years
4. The Plaintiff have the right to recover the dowr[ies]
5. The defendants shall bear the Court fees and expenses.
6. Both parties should be serves with [a] copy of [the] decree
(emphasis added)
[1] Count 4 had been previously struck out.
[2] Against the Father but, subject to hearing any further submission from the parties appearing should be dismissed against the Grandmother.
[3] By order in chambers the sanction hearing was subsequently adjourned to 25 August 2025.
[4] The reasons for the orders made that day are contained in Bellanger & Wemble [2024] FedCFamC2F 150.
[5] Exhibit 2R1tendered on 7 November 2024.
[6] See Bellanger & Wemble (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC2F 1606.
[7] The matter was originally listed for 5 May 2025, however Chambers received notice of the unavailability of counsel for the ICL on that date
[9] As amended on oral application on 28 April 2025 and translated to the Grandmother.
[10] When those solicitors filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act.
[11] See Bellanger & Wemble (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC2F 1606.
[13] This date was later rescheduled to 28 April 2025 due to the availability of the Independent Children's Lawyer.
[14] See Bellanger & Wemble (No 5) [2025] FedCFamC2F 783.
[15] At that time I observed: "That's not an unreasonable position to have. In those circumstances, I will only briefly describe the substance of the further settled written reasons that would otherwise have taken at least an hour or so to conclude... However, I will recite and repeat paragraph 18 of Ms Paige's affidavit of 30 April 2024, and affirmed by her:
[19] The youngest sister of the Father and daughter of the Grandmother and aunty to the children, Ms P Wemble, aged 27 years.
[20] Ms P Wemble sat to one side of the Grandmother and the interpreter sat to the other side at the bar table.
[21] In these reasons 'the Hague Convention' means the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co - operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children signed at The Hague on 19 October 1996.22
[23] At [5.15] page 257 and the oral reasons simply observed "and the settled reasons will recite the observation of the 10th edition by Dennis Pearce of the LexisNexis publication of Statutory Interpretation in Australia..."
[24] Because of the frequency of, or not unusual significant extent of, overseas travel for the residents and citizens of Australia with their children, it is clear that the place of residence or possibility of retention of children overseas is something that could be "readily altered at the instance" of one party and that it is unlikely that Parliament intended that parenting orders only applied and could only be enforced if the children were situated in Australia.
[27] To be referred to these reasons as 'the 1996 Hague Convention'.
[29] In Alfasi Foster J proceeded on the basis that evidence of a competent authority was required for a conflict to exist and that there was no evidence of a competent authority before him.
[31] At this point of the oral reasons the interpreter asked for clarification of the meaning of accoutrement.
[34] Also see Bellanger & Wemble (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC2F 1139.
[38] Paragraph 70NEB(1)(da) relates to the "less serious" contraventions of subdivision E and a person failing to enter a bond s ordered.
[39] Paragraph 70NECA(3)(a) relates to the "less serious" contraventions of subdivision E and relates enforcing a bond and fining a person.
[40] Paragraph 70NFF(3)(a)41 relates to when enforcing a bond or community service order and fining a person.
[42] 70NFA(2)(i) & (ii) do not apply in this case.
[43] 2(g) provides that the person who committed the current contravention pay the costs of the other parties.
[44] Section 70NFC, as it was, provides that a bond can be for up to 2 years and include conditions. Section 70NFF deals with persons who fail to enter a bond as ordered.
[45] Section 70NFG provides for a sentence of imprisonment of up to 12 months.
[47] I note this phrase is repeated six times in the Explanatory Memorandum in this context.
[48] The contravention of parenting orders.
[49] In the context of when the contravention occurred.
[52] The 20th edition is identical on this point.
[53] And, with respect, I again refer to and rely on the observations in Odgers at EA.141.90 at page 1466.
[55] This footnote was in relation to Dobbs.
[63] The transcript incorrectly records "really" but my clear recollection is counsel used the word "rarely".
[70] This is the email addressed to the Australian Consulate discussed above.
[71] The quoted passage came form a letter marked as annexure 3 in the Mother' affidavit of 14 September 2023.
[73] In the oral reasons it was stated the settled reasons will recite the passage at page 265 of the transcript and the following is from page 265 of the transcript ('TP 265').
[74] The Grandmother's affidavit of 8 April 2024 annexed a scene shot of the recording of the religious ceremony in support of that contention.
[75] At or about this point of the oral reasons I observed: The settled reasons will go on to recite the further reasons why I do not accept Ms Paige's evidence, including what I found to be her demeanour as a witness whereby she was defensive and often unresponsive to the question asked.
[76] This can also be broadly described as apparent believability or apparent creditability.
[77] The evidence was transcribed by my Associates and is Exhibit C7 9 July 2025 and is consistent
[78] Of 2025. The hearing was adjourned part heard, during the Grandmother's cross examination, from Friday 23 May 2025 until Wednesday 2 July 2025.
[80] This was a reference to the religious ceremony discussed later in these reasons.
[81] Ms P Wemble had been present during the hearing in the court room and at the bar table, being permitted to assist her mother, the Grandmother, as a McKenzie Friend, until the morning of Wednesday 2 July 2025, when the Grandmother announced she wished to rely on an affidavit from Ms P Wemble. Thereafter Ms P Wemble was requested to, and did, remain outside the court room.
[82] Of June 2025, that is while the Grandmother was being cross examined.
[85] Although sometimes described as "dowry", the Country D traditions relating to exchange of wealth upon marriage, as explained by Dr DD is actually the opposite of what I other cultures is a "dowry" and so the exchange of wealth upon marriage will be described as bridewealth in these reasons to distinguish it from "dowry" of other cultures and places.
[86] That is training, study and experience.
[88] See annexure MSB-1 at page 16 of 32 of the Mother's affidavit of 8 August 2021 which was annexed to the Mother's affidavit of 2 May 2024.
[89] Being annexure MSB3 to the Mother's affidavit filed 19 August 2024 and recited as Appendix 6 to these reasons.
[90] MSB2 of the Mother's affidavit of 19 August 2024. The allegations were not made by the Mother and when made were denied by the Father.
[92] Issued on 30 April 2021, where the Mother was the applicant.
[95] The photos were in the WhatsApp communication between Ms P Wemble and the Father.
[98] And accept beyond reasonable doubt.
[101] For convenience and intended to be respectful.
[102] Annexure MSP6 of the Grandmothers affidavit of 8 April 2024.
[104] The Grandmother had annexed a screen shot of a recording of that ceremony to her affidavit of 8 April 2024, as MSP6 to support the "handed over" contention. During the hearing the whole of the recording was provided by Ms P Wemble (before she had given evidence) to the court and the parties and is Exhibit GM 2 and played in evidence. The Mother' solicitors then arranged for a professional interpretation of the GM 2 recording and it was not disputed that the transcript was accurate. The transcript is Exhibit C6 2 July 2025.
[105] It appears most expeditiously and humanely because of the speed with which it happens.
[106] Referring to the children X and Y.
[107] Being an area where the Father and his side of the family reside.
[108] Being an area where the Mother and her side of the family reside.
[109] Referring to the chicken/cock that was being held by the Chief.
[110] The desire for "calm" or "peace" or "blessings" can be readily understood as at that time in the then recent past, the children had lived all (or almost all) their lives in Australia with the Mother, had been removed from the care of the Mother, and she arrested, in early 2022, the Mother detained in gaol, the children returned to Mother's care in early 2022, the paternal grandfather arrested and detained in custody soon after early 2022 on the Father's application and then the paternal grandfather was released.
[111] This was said to mean the maternal cultural bloodline in reference to the children.
[112] This was said to mean the maternal cultural bloodline in reference to the children.
[113] Later explained to be intended to convey nearby to the court but not "in" a court building.
[114] I note that some care has been taken during the hearing not to put in evidence or refer to any communications between Ms P Wemble and the Father that might disclose or reveal any communication where the Father would have client legal privilege pursuant to the Evidence Act 1995.
[115] A larger city with better facilities.
[116] From that frank description by the Father to Ms P Wemble, I infer that the child was very, very sick.
[117] Another city that is closer than City BB.
[119] The previous text message correspondence prior to Ms P Wemble's text did not discuss the children's health.
[121] It was apparent during the hearing that "[...]" is a medicine administered in Country D when children are ill.
[122] The Grandmother alleges in her affidavit filed 8 April 2024 that the Father commenced the case about the bridewealth against the Mother's father in early 2022 and this assertion was not challenged.
[123] A person cannot attempt to aid and abet an offence that did not occur but can aid and abet an attempt of an offence, the offence being the attempt itself.
[124] To the extent that the orders as recited on 16 July refer to Count 3 being proven against the Father and the Grandmother on the balance of probabilities it is a slip and an error on my part that can be rectified and see Rule 10.13(e), it does not reflect the intention of the Court or there is an error arising from an accidental slip or omission and Rule 10.14, "an error arising in reason for judgment from any accidental slip or omission".
[125] See section 70NEA(4) of the Act.
[127] Save for the first few months after birth in the case of X.
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(1985) 156 CLR 473
(2003) 214 CLR 118
(2009) 237 CLR 582
(2017) 262 CLR 402