Incorporated association - Dispute regarding whether membership in an incorporated association ceased - Dispute regarding whether member resigned

Associations Incorporation Act 2015 (WA), s 28(2), s 46, s 182, s 182(1), Sch 1, Div 1

Associations Incorporation Regulations 2016 (WA), Sch 2, Pt 3, cl 10

Bejawn v The Sikh Association of Western Australia Inc [2023] WASC 152

Elisabetta Marrapodi and Mr Zane Charles Norman Trewin Norman & Co 2019 WAIRC 00877

Faamate & Ors v Congregational Christian Church in Samoa-Australia (Ipswich Congregation) ABN 90 103 392 182 [2019] QSC 194

Kavanagh and Pine Valley Pistol Club Incorporated [2020] WASAT 60

Lauri -v- Shwe [2020] WASC 471

O'Meara v Stanley Works Pty Ltd [2006] AIRC 496

1. Daniel John Jeater (Mr Jeater or the applicant) has given many years of voluntary service to the people of the Swan Land District as a member of the Swan Unit Western Australia State Emergency Service Incorporated (the Association or the respondent). In late 2024 and early 2025, however, he experienced some significant health and personal issues and on a small number of occasions during that time engaged in behaviour toward some other volunteers in a way that he now, quite properly, regrets.
2. In early 2025, as a result of his behaviour, the management committee of the Association (Committee) commenced a disciplinary process against him and at the conclusion of that process, in reliance on what they understood to be the rules of the Association, imposed some temporary sanctions on him.
3. Mr Jeater was not satisfied with the sanctions imposed on him and sought a review of the Committee's decision by the Professional Standards division of the Department of Fire and Emergency Services (DFES). The review conducted by DFES identified that the sanctions imposed on Mr Jeater were not permitted under the rules of the Association that were relied upon by the Committee and also identified that those rules were not the current rules of the Association.
4. On 4 July 2025, after receiving legal advice, the Committee rescinded the temporary sanctions it had imposed on Mr Jeater and on that same date it commenced a new disciplinary process against him under the proper rules of the Association, which it is not in dispute is the version titled Swan Unit Western Australian State Emergency Service Incorporated Constitution August 2017 v2.1 (Rules). These Rules also do not permit the Committee to impose any of the temporary sanctions it had previously thought proper to impose on Mr Jeater as they provide for but one sanction, which is expulsion from the Association.
5. In accordance with the disciplinary procedure set out in the Rules, the Committee met on 4 August 2025 to consider Mr Jeater's expulsion from the Association. Mr Jeater attended this meeting along with a mediator of his choice, Dianne Welch, but was told by the Committee that she could not act as a mediator at the meeting but could only provide support to him.
6. Mr Jeater at the time of the 4 August 2025 meeting was upset both that his application for the review of some temporary sanctions had now placed him at risk of expulsion from the Association and that contrary to his expectations Ms Welch could not act as a mediator at the meeting.[1]
7. At the 4 August 2025 meeting, after speaking to the Committee for about one hour, Mr Jeater said words which the Committee understood as him giving notice of his resignation from the Association and he then walked out of the meeting.
8. On 7 August 2025, a member of the Committee emailed Mr Jeater (copied to Ms Welch) asking him to confirm whether he had resigned from the Association. Mr Jeater did not reply to this email but later on that day Ms Welch replied (copied to Mr Jeater), to confirm that Mr Jeater had resigned from the Association at the meeting. Upon receiving Ms Welch's email, the Committee removed Mr Jeater from the membership of the Association. It then abandoned the expulsion process which it had commenced against Mr Jeater.
9. At a Directions Hearing on 21 October 2025, the Tribunal ordered the question as to whether or not the applicant resigned from the Association is to be determined by the Tribunal as a preliminary issue.
10. The preliminary issue was heard on 17 December 2025.

1. On 21 July 2025 Mr Jeater lodged an application under s 182(1) of the Associations Incorporation Act 2015 (WA) (AI Act). In the 'Application' document which Mr Jeater attached to his application Mr Jeater set out some fifteen orders and declarations he is seeking in the proceedings. It is not necessary to set out each of these orders and declarations in these reasons but it is important to note that they are in effect a request for declarations that he remain a member of the Association, for orders to rescind a decision of the Association to expel him from the Association and for orders to prevent the Association from making a decision to expel him.
2. This application is opposed by the Association for a number of reasons, the most relevant to this decision being its contention that Mr Jeater resigned from the Association on 4 August 2025.
3. In accordance with the programming orders of the Tribunal, the parties lodged the documents on which they intended to rely on in advance of the hearing of the preliminary issue. The parties were also given an opportunity at the hearing of the preliminary issue to make submissions, to give evidence, to call witnesses and to cross-examine witnesses.
4. In accordance with its usual practice the documents lodged by the parties have been compiled by the Tribunal into a hearing book (HB) comprising 789 pages. At the hearing the HB was admitted without objection into evidence and was received by the Tribunal as Exhibit 1.
5. Two audio recordings made by the Committee of the meeting on 4 August 2025 were admitted without objection into evidence and were received by the Tribunal as Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3. Both parties accept that each recording is not edited.

1. There is no dispute between the parties and the Tribunal finds that:

(1) The Association is an association incorporated under the AI Act;

(2) The proper rules of the Association as at 4 August 2025 are set out in the document titled 'Swan Unit Western Australian State Emergency Service Incorporated Constitution August 2017 v2.1';

(3) Immediately prior to the meeting on 4 August 2025 Mr Jeater was an ordinary member of the Association within the meaning of rule 8;

(4) A Committee meeting was held at the premises of the Association commencing on 4 August 2025 with a duration of about 1 hour and 20 minutes. This meeting was quorate and with the consent of Mr Jeater it was recorded (Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3).

(5) At the meeting Mr Jeater spoke the words: '[t]herefore I rescind my membership from the Swan State Emergency Service. Thank you very much for your time' (the words).

(6) At 9.40 am on 7 August 2025 the Committee emailed Mr Jeater (copied to Ms Welch) requesting him to confirm his resignation and at 2.22 pm on 7 August 2025 Ms Welch replied by email (copied to Mr Jeater) to say:[2]

Good Afternoon Mr Miles

Thank you for the inclusion in emails, as Mr Jeaters' Advocate. On behalf of Mr Jeater I would like to request a complete and full copy of the recording of the meeting in its entirety that was recorded as part of the proceedings - be supplied to Mr Jeater on USB as I suspect it will be a large file and not easily emailed. If that could be picked up either by myself; or posted by registered post to Mr Jeater it would be appreciated (including confirmation of which method will be taken).

In answer to your question, to clarify, Mr Jeater rescinded his membership of the Swan State Emergency Service on Monday evening during the meeting.

Kind Regards

Di Welch

1. While Mr Jeater accepts he said the words at the 4 August 2025 meeting, his position is that he has not resigned from the Association. This, he contends, is because:

(1) The Rules provide that a member may only resign from the Association by giving notice in writing to the Committee - which he has not done;

(2) Even if the Rules permit a member to resign from the Association by speaking words to the Committee, that when he spoke at the 4 August 2025 meeting:

1. he was clearly in such a disturbed emotional state that his words could not be understood by the Committee as manifesting a decision to cease being a member of the Association; and
2. the Committee engaged in coercive conduct such that his purported resignation was not voluntary and is a nullity; and

(3) Whatever the requirements as to resignation by a member under the Rules are and whatever the circumstances were in which he spoke the words, a resignation will only become effective when it is formally accepted by the Committee - which it has not done.

1. Accordingly, Mr Jeater says that he did not resign from the Association at the 4 August 2025 meeting.

(1) The Rules permit a member to resign from the Association by the member giving notice to the Committee of their decision to resign but they do not require that the notice be in writing, with the result that oral notice of resignation to the Committee is an effective resignation;

(2) A notice of resignation has immediate effect unless the notice states it is to take effect only on a certain date or after a certain period of time;

(3) The words spoken by Mr Jeater clearly manifested his decision to cease being a member of the Association with immediate effect;

(4) If there was any doubt about the meaning of Mr Jeater's words (which the Association denies), then this doubt was removed when Ms Welch (who copied Mr Jeater to her email) confirmed that Mr Jeater had resigned from the Association at the 4 August 2025 meeting; and

(5) It denies that the Committee engaged in any coercive conduct either at or before the 4 August 2025 meeting.

1. Accordingly, the Association says that Mr Jeater did, at the 4 August 2025 meeting, resign from the Association in accordance with the Rules with the consequence the Tribunal should dismiss his application.

1. The questions the Tribunal needs to determine in this proceeding are:

(1) Do the rules of the Association permit a member to give notice of resignation only in writing?

(2) Do the Rules provide that a resignation of a member will only have effect upon the Committee resolving to accept the resignation?

(3) Was Mr Jeater's resignation from the Association procured by coercive conduct on the part of the Committee?

(4) Did Mr Jeater at the 4 August 2025 meeting speak words to the Committee which clearly manifested his decision to immediately cease being a member of the Association?

The principles for the proper construction of the rules of an association

1. Senior Member Mr D Aitken of the Tribunal considered the principles for the proper construction of the rules of an incorporated association in Kavanagh and Pine Valley Pistol Club Incorporated [2020] WASAT 60, cited with approval by her Honour Justice Seaward in Bejawn v The Sikh Association of Western Australia Inc [2023] WASC 152 at [25]. In that decision, after considering certain authorities, the Senior Member stated the principles for the proper construction of the rules of an incorporated association to be:
   1. ....
      1. The rules of an incorporated association represent the terms of a statutory contract, firstly between the members of the association themselves and, secondly between the members and the association.
      2. The principles applicable to the construction of the rules of an incorporated association are an adaptation of the principles which govern the construction of commercial contracts.
      3. Those principles, however, must be modified, in the manner outlined below, when the Tribunal is construing the rules of an incorporated association, for two reasons. Firstly, the rules of an incorporated association have a public dimension. Secondly, an incorporated association is not a commercial operation established with a view to generating profits, but rather is what may be described as a non-profit making organisation.
      4. The Tribunal must approach the construction of a particular rule of an incorporated association, when read in the context of the rules as a whole, with a degree of flexibility. This means that the Tribunal should not make too much of infelicities of expression in the rules of an incorporated association, nor be too quick to identify absurdity, illogicality or apparent inconsistencies.
      5. The rules of an incorporated association are a deemed contract, created by statute, without the normal elements of a contract having to be established. The rules speak not only to the members of the incorporated association, but also to third parties who might consider becoming members. Accordingly, it is important that the rules are capable of being construed by third parties by reference to the text of the rules.
      6. Some 'surrounding circumstances', particularly those that are likely to be well-known, not just to the members of the incorporated association, but also to relevant third parties, are part of the contextual considerations which can be weighed by the Tribunal in construing the rules of an incorporated association, but restraint ought to be exercised in doing so.

The principles relevant to resignation from an association

1. The relevant rule is rule 15, which in its entirety is:[3]
   1. CESSATION OF MEMBERSHIP

A member shall cease to be a member of Swan SES:

15.2 If the member resigns from membership of Swan SES by giving notice thereof;

15.3 If the member is expelled by the Committee pursuant to clause 17 herein; or

15.4 If membership is revoked by the Local Manager by reason of absence for a period of two (2) consecutive calendar months without contact with the unit.

1. The common law principles relevant to resignation from an association are conveniently summarised by Wilson J of the Supreme Court of Queensland in Faamate & Ors v Congregational Christian Church in Samoa-Australia (Ipswich Congregation) ABN 90 103 392 182 [2019] QSC 194 at [224] to [228] (Faamate):

The relevant principles on resignation from an association

1. A member has a unilateral right to resign at any time.
2. Whether a member 'resigns' is a question of fact based on a member's expression of intention. That intention may be inferred from conduct. The relevant inquiry in determining whether a person has resigned requires evidence of resignation by words or conduct.
3. The existence of a clause in the constitution providing for resignation by way of notice to the secretary or to a general meeting does not preclude resignation on any other basis.
4. There is no right to withdraw a resignation.
5. The relevant principles relevant to the question of resignation of an association can be relevantly summarised as:

1. whether or not a person has 'resigned' is a question of fact based upon a member's intention; 2. the essence of the matter is whether the member has sufficiently manifested his or her decision to be a member no more. The only question is whether the member's decision has been adequately conveyed by words or deeds;

1. the intention to resign can be inferred from conduct including a long standing lack of involvement, a continuing failure to participate in the association's affairs, or a voluntary disregard of the obligations of membership over continuous period of years; and

1. a former member can only become a member again by re-joining the association in the usual way. (Footnotes omitted)
2. These common law principles are, of course, able to be modified by the rules of the Association or by legislation (in this case the AI Act).

Is a member required to give notice in writing to the Association of their decision to resign from the Association?

1. Mr Jeater contends that the Rules and the AI Act permit a member of the Association to resign only by giving written notice of resignation to the Committee.
2. Rule 15.2 does not, however, expressly prescribe how a member is to give notice of resignation from the Association. That is, the expression in rule 15.2 'giving notice thereof' is not defined for the purpose of rule 15. However, some other rules do define how notice is to be given. These include but are not limited to:
3. Rule 17 which deals with the expulsion of a member from the Association:

...

17.1 Written notice of the proposal to expel the member(s) shall be served upon the member(s) not less than fourteen (14) days prior to a meeting of the Committee at which the proposal for expulsion is to be considered. The written notice shall contain particulars of the alleged detrimental conduct.'

...

17.4 In the event of the Committee resolving to expel the member, the member shall be given written notice of the Committee's resolution and shall cease to be a member of the Swan SES fourteen (14) days after confirmation of the committee's resolution has been served on the member.

...

1. Rule 23 which deals with casual vacancies in the Committee:

A casual vacancy occurs in the Committee if the Committee Member, including a permanent Office bearer:

...

23.2 Resigns their position by giving notice in writing delivered to the Local Manager or the Deputy Local Manager

1. Rule 29 which deals with calling the annual general meeting:

...

At least thirty (30) days' notice of any Annual General Meeting shall be given to members. The notice shall set out where and when the meeting will be held and the nature and order of the business to be transacted at the meeting.

...

Notice may be given to members by serving it on a member personally, sending it by post, email, text message/electronic page to the contact details appearing in the register of members. When a notice is sent by these methods, sending of the notice shall be deemed to be properly issued if the notice is sufficiently addressed to the member of intention.

1. Additionally, rule 25 read with rule 19, provides that there shall be a Committee member known as the 'Administration Officer (Secretary)' with the duty to keep an accurate record of all meetings and proceedings of the Committee, to attend to all correspondence and to have custody of the register of members. Given these duties, it seems appropriate that a notice of resignation by a member given in accordance with rule 15.2 should be given to the Administration Officer. In these proceedings, it is not in doubt that the Administration Officer as at 4 August 2025, Wendy Black, was present at the 4 August 2025 meeting.
2. Under the common law principles set out above, a notice of resignation may be given either orally or in writing. This common law principle may, of course, be modified by either the rules of the Association or by legislation such as the AI Act.
3. The Tribunal finds that on proper construction, when read both in the context of the Rules as a whole and in light of the common law principles set out above, that rule 15 does permit a member to resign from the Association by giving notice either orally or in writing to the Association's Administration Officer.
4. Mr Jeater next contends that rule 15 needs to be read in the light of Sch 1, Div 1 item 3 of the AI Act, which requires that the rules of an incorporated association must make provision 'for when membership commences and when it ceases'. In this case, Mr Jeater submits that rule 15 does not make any provision for when a member who has resigned will cease to be a member of the Association. This, he says, has the consequence that the model rule relating to resignation set out in Sch 2 of the Associations Incorporation Regulations 2016 (WA) (the Regulations) will, due to s 28(2) of the AI Act, become a proper rule of the Association.
5. Clause 10 of Pt 3 of Sch 2 of the Regulations provides that a member may resign 'by giving written notice of the resignation to the secretary' and that the resignation takes effect 'when the secretary receives the notice' or 'if a later time is stated in the notice, at that later time'.
6. Mr Jeater's submission on this point is, however, misconceived. This is because rule 15 is consistent with cl 10 of Pt 3 of Sch 2, as rule 15 provides that '[a] member shall cease to be a member ... if the member resigns from membership of Swan SES by notice thereof'. As observed by Hill J in Lauri -v- Shwe [2020] WASC 471 at [28] - [29] it is sufficient if an association's rules provides for the matters set out Sch 1, Div 1, item 3, with the result that a failure to adopt each of the terms of the model rules does not result in the model rules applying.
7. The Tribunal therefore finds that on proper construction of rule 15.2 the resignation of a member is effective immediately upon the giving of the notice of resignation by the member to the Administration Officer, which in the case of words of resignation spoken by a member to the Administration Officer, is immediately after those words are spoken.

Do the Rules provide that a resignation of a member will only have effect upon the Association accepting the resignation?

1. Mr Jeater contends that there is no recorded resolution of the Committee accepting his resignation or instructing his removal from the membership. Mr Jeater says that '[w]ithout formal acceptance, record, or notice of cessation, the committee's handling of the matter is incomplete and procedurally defective'.
2. However, rule 15.2 does not provide that the resignation of a member will only have effect upon the Committee resolving to accept the resignation. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that under both the proper construction of rule 15.2 and the common law principles set out above, a notice of resignation given under rule 15.2 which does not specify that it has a delayed effect will have effect immediately it is given without any need for the Committee to accept or record the resignation.
3. Further, whether the resignation is or is not later accepted or recorded by the Association cannot, as a matter of logic, affect whether a resignation given in accordance with Rules has been effective.
4. For completeness the Tribunal notes that, contrary to Mr Jeater's contention, the minutes of the 4 August 2025 meeting do record Mr Jeater's resignation from the Association.

Was Mr Jeater's resignation procured by coercive conduct on the part of the Committee?

1. Mr Jeater submits the Association procured his resignation through coercive conduct, which he summarised in his application for interim orders as being that:[4]

... the management committee's conduct has created a hostile environment and exposed the applicant to psychosocial hazards contrary to the Work Health and Safety Act 2020 (WA). This includes intimidation, procedural irregularities, and misuse of disciplinary powers in a manner that threatens not only governance integrity but the applicant's psychological health and safety.

1. As best as the Tribunal understands the submissions made by Mr Jeater, he particularises the alleged coercive conduct of the Association to be that by pursuing a second disciplinary process based on the same grounds as the first, the Committee has prolonged his uncertainty and stress, exacerbated his 'psychosocial hazards', and that as a consequence he had no other choice than to resign from the Association.
2. Mr Jeater relies on some authorities in the area of the law of employment, that he says indicate that where an employer has engaged in coercive conduct which results in the resignation of an employee, such a resignation is not voluntary and is a nullity: for example, O'Meara v Stanley Works Pty Ltd [2006] AIRC 496 (O'Meara).
3. However, the Tribunal finds that these employment decisions are not based on the law of commercial contracts but rather on an International Labour Organisation Convention (which has been incorporated into employment legislation in Australia), which provides an employee with a right to seek a remedy in circumstances where the employee did not voluntarily leave the employment: O'Meara [12]. Consequently, these employment decisions cannot be applied to the issues in these proceedings.
4. In any event, for the reasons set out at [54] and [55] the Tribunal is satisfied that the Committee did not engage in any conduct toward Mr Jeater which could be described as coercive conduct.

Did Mr Jeater at the 4 August 2025 meeting say words which clearly manifested his decision to immediately cease being a member of the Association?

1. Mr Jeater does not dispute that at the 4 August 2025 meeting he said the words. This is confirmed by the audio recording (Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3). However, he does contend that he said the words when in a highly emotional state (being 'visibly distressed, choking up, and in tears') such that the Association cannot rely on his words to indicate that he was clearly manifesting his intention to resign.
2. In considering this issue the Tribunal first considered the meaning of the words spoken by Mr Jeater, which were: '[t]herefore I rescind my membership from the Swan State Emergency Service. Thank you very much for your time'.
3. While the words Mr Jeater spoke did not contain the word 'resign', the authorities indicate that it is not necessary that this word must be used in order to effect a resignation. What is important is not which words are used or are not used, but whether as a question of fact 'the member's decision has been adequately conveyed by [the] words ...': Faamate.
4. The Macquarie Dictionary Online gives the following meaning of the words 'rescind' and 'resign':

rescind

...

verb (t) 1. to abrogate; annul, revoke; repeal.

2. to invalidate (an act, measure, etc.) by a later action or a higher authority.

[Latin rescindere cut off, annul]

-rescindable, adjective

-rescinder, noun

verb (i) 1. (sometimes followed by from) to give up an office or position.

2. to submit; yield.

-verb (t) 3. to give up (an office, position, etc.) formally.

4. to relinquish, as a right or claim.

5. to submit (oneself, one's mind, etc.) without resistance.

6. to hand or sign over; surrender, as to the care or control of another: to resign a child to foster-parents.

-phrase 7. resign oneself to, to come reluctantly to an acceptance of.

[Middle English resignen, from Old French resigner, from Latin resignāre unseal, annul]

1. Strictly speaking, Mr Jeater is not himself able to 'rescind' or to 'revoke' his own membership of the Association. However, the Tribunal finds when Mr Jeater spoke, he intended to convey not the strict meaning of the word, but the related meaning which is that he is giving up or yielding his membership in the Association. That is, that he is resigning from the Association.
2. In support of his contention that he was in a highly emotional state such that the Association cannot rely on his words to indicate that he was clearly manifesting his intention to resign, Mr Jeater again relies on some authorities in the area of the law of employment that he says indicates that notice of resignation given by an employee in the heat of the moment should not be relied upon: for example, Elisabetta Marrapodi and Mr Zane Charles Norman Trewin Norman & Co 2019 WAIRC 00877 at [12].
3. However, for the reasons given above at [45], the Tribunal finds that such decisions cannot be applied to the issues in this proceeding.
4. In accordance with the common law principles set out above, the Tribunal must now determine whether the words spoken by Mr Jeater at the 4 August 2025 meeting clearly manifested his decision to immediately cease being a member of the Association. To this end, the Tribunal has carefully listened to the recordings of this meeting and finds:

(1) The Committee acted professionally during the meeting and displayed appropriate courtesy to Mr Jeater;

(2) The Committee provided Mr Jeater every opportunity to explain his position to them (which he did for about an hour) and it also gave him opportunities to take breaks during the meeting;

(3) Mr Jeater had Ms Welch to support him throughout the meeting;

(4) The Committee did not prompt Mr Jeater to resign; and

(5) The recordings of the meeting (Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3) do not support Mr Jeater's contention that when he spoke the words that he was 'choking up' and 'in tears', although his voice did tremble thereby showing that this was indeed an emotionally significant time for him.

1. After considering the recording, the documents within the HB, the evidence of Mr Jeater and the submissions of each of the parties the Tribunal finds:

(1) Mr Jeater's words were spoken voluntarily and were unambiguous, that is, they clearly manifested his intention to immediately resign from the Association; and

(2) While Mr Jeater did become emotionally affected towards the end of the meeting he was not overcome to the point where the words he spoke could not be understood as manifesting his decision to resign.

1. In the context of rule 15.2 the Tribunal therefore finds that Mr Jeater, when speaking at the Committee meeting on 4 August 2025 did, in accordance with the Rules of the Association, resign his membership of the Association with immediate effect.
2. While it is clear these matters have caused considerable distress to both Mr Jeater and to the members of the Committee, who are all volunteers providing valuable services to their community, these reasons should not be seen as a criticism of either Mr Jeater, the members of the Committee or the staff of DFES who have been involved in the matter.
3. This is because it is clear to the Tribunal that all involved have done their best to discharge their duties and to selflessly serve their communities and they are to be commended for doing this. If there is any lesson to be learned from this matter, it is that the Rules should be reviewed to ensure that they better meet the needs of the Association and its members.

1. The Tribunal finds that Mr Jeater at the 4 August 2025 meeting did properly resign from the Association. The Tribunal therefore also finds that Mr Jeater is no longer a member of the Association. Accordingly, this proceeding, which in substance is an application for declarations that Mr Jeater remains a member of the Association, for orders to rescind a decision of the Association to expel him from the Association and for orders to prevent the Association from making a decision to expel him, must be dismissed as it is misconceived or lacking in substance.

1. Pursuant to s 47(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) the proceeding is dismissed, as it is misconceived or lacking in substance.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] It is clear that Mr Jeater's belief that Ms Welch could act as a mediator at the meeting was a genuine belief based on a poorly drafted rule: rule 17.3.