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[2025] QCA 158
respondent. Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused; the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
The Court of Appeal refused Mr Behrens permission to appeal his sentence and related orders again. It accepted that the Magistrates Court's sentencing process had irregularities, including proceeding without inviting sentencing submissions, but considered that the District Court had addressed those matters and would have imposed the same sentence. The Court also noted that no convictions were recorded, the probation and animal-keeping prohibition orders had expired, and the District Court had already reduced the veterinary-cost contribution. It said brief reasons should have been given for the District Court costs order, but found the order was open on the information before it. Mr Behrens was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the leave proceeding.
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2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
Behrens v Deeks [2025] QCA 158 concerned an application for leave to appeal against sentence, not a fresh appeal on the merits of the animal-care convictions. The applicant, Andrew James Behrens, had initially sought leave to appeal his convictions and the other orders made against him, but the proposed conviction appeal was later abandoned ([9]). The remaining application concerned sentence and associated orders.
After a two-day trial in the Caboolture Magistrates Court, Mr Behrens was found guilty on 22 June 2021 of eight offences under s 17(3)(ii) of the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld). The offences were described as failures to take reasonable steps to provide for animals' care needs ([5]). He had initially faced 19 further like charges; 17 were discontinued before trial, and the remaining two before the prosecution closed its case ([5]).
The Magistrate imposed a two-year probation order, a three-year prohibition on keeping animals, $2,375 in prosecution costs, $101.80 in summons costs, and a $2,000 contribution towards veterinary fees under s 189 of the Act. The Magistrate recorded no convictions ([6]–[7]). The financial sums were referred to the State Penalties Enforcement Registry for collection ([6]).
Mr Behrens appealed to the District Court against his convictions, sentence and financial orders. That appeal succeeded only to the extent that the veterinary-cost contribution was reduced to $1,784.04. The District Court otherwise dismissed the appeal and ordered him to pay $2,730 in appeal costs ([8]). He then sought leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal under s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld). The Court allowed an unopposed application to amend and an unopposed application to adduce further evidence about his finances, but those procedural rulings did not determine the leave question ([3]–[4]).
The Court's account included his personal and financial circumstances. The material indicated medical conditions including ADHD, autism spectrum disorder, moderate anxiety and depressive disorders, and an impaired ability to conduct his defence or appeal. Further evidence stated that he had no savings or valuable personal property, and that disability support and rental assistance met his known and modest living expenses ([11]). Those circumstances formed part of the arguments about the aggregate burden of the orders and costs.
The Court of Appeal refused leave. It also ordered Mr Behrens to pay the respondent's costs of the leave proceeding ([29]–[30]).
The governing provision was s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), under which a party dissatisfied with a District Court judgment, including one made in its appellate jurisdiction, could appeal to the Court of Appeal only with leave ([17]). The Court said the discretion was unfettered and described its task as deciding whether sufficient grounds for leave had been made out, with the applicant having already had contested hearings before two courts ([20]).
The respondent relied on guidance in Williamson v Betterlay Brick and Block Laying Pty Ltd (2020) 3 QR 594. The quoted passage says that leave from a District Court decision in its appellate jurisdiction will not be given lightly, and that more than mere error is ordinarily required. It refers to the need to demonstrate an appeal necessary to correct substantial injustice and a reasonable argument of error, and identifies public or community importance, a generally important principle, or an important point of law as matters generally considered when assessing substantial injustice ([18]). However, Doyle JA expressly reserved for another case whether that formulation, beyond the statement that the discretion is unfettered, represents the correct approach, particularly where a specific sentencing-process error is identified ([19]). The judgment therefore does not finally endorse every part of the quoted Williamson formulation as the governing test.
Doyle JA then gave several reasons why leave was not warranted in this particular case. First, no convictions had been recorded. The Court considered that feature relevant to assessing the cumulative impact of the orders ([23]). Second, both the probation order and the prohibition order had expired. The Court considered there was no remaining injustice to correct, apart from the possible value of affirming that those orders had originally been made in irregular circumstances ([24]).
Third, the Court was not persuaded that the Magistrates Court costs award was excessive. Although most of the original charges did not proceed, the case involved a two-day trial that resulted in eight convictions. The respondent also pointed out that costs had not been ordered for 11 pre-trial mentions, each of which could have attracted costs of $250 ([25]). The Court characterised the outcome as at least a middle ground.
Fourth, the veterinary contribution had a distinct statutory basis. The Court said s 189(2) of the Animal Care and Protection Act enabled recovery of certain necessary and reasonable costs of veterinary care. It accepted the respondent's characterisation of the order as reimbursement, not punishment. The District Court had already reduced the sum to $1,784.04, and no issue was taken with that modified figure in the Court of Appeal ([15], [26]).
Fifth, the District Court costs order was not shown to justify leave. The District Court judge had received written submissions from both sides and ordered less than the respondent had sought. Doyle JA considered that the judge should have given reasons, even if only brief ones, but concluded that the order was open on the material available to the Court of Appeal ([27]). That is a qualified criticism, not a finding that the costs order was invalid or beyond the District Court's power.
Finally, the Court considered the sentencing-process irregularities. The Magistrate had sentenced Mr Behrens immediately after announcing guilt findings, without inviting submissions about sentence. The Magistrate asked about employment and whether Mr Behrens would prefer probation or community service, but did not explain probation or obtain his agreement in the manner identified by the judgment under ss 95 and 96 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ([12]–[13]). The District Court judge accepted that this was an irregular way to proceed. She nevertheless concluded that the Magistrate already knew of Mr Behrens' history and medical conditions, and that further submissions were unlikely to have changed the result. She also considered an extensive psychiatric report on the District Court appeal and concluded she would have imposed the same sentence ([14]). The Court of Appeal treated that assessment as significant to materiality ([28]).
The judgment did not announce a new general rule changing the law of leave applications or sentencing. It applied s 118(3) to the particular circumstances before the Court and refused leave. Its account of the statutory framework was that an appeal from a District Court judgment in its appellate jurisdiction requires leave, and the leave discretion is unfettered ([17], [20]).
Before this decision, the Court had the guidance quoted from Williamson. That guidance says that more than mere error is ordinarily needed following two judicial hearings and describes substantial injustice and a reasonable argument of error as relevant considerations. It also identifies public or community importance, a generally important principle, or an important point of law as matters generally relevant to substantial injustice ([18]). The present Court did not resolve the status or precise application of that formulation. Doyle JA specifically reserved that question ([19]). It would therefore overstate the judgment to say that it adopted, rejected, or reformulated the Williamson approach.
For sentencing process, the decision illustrates an assessment of whether an acknowledged irregularity had material consequences in the later appeal. The District Court had identified the irregularity, considered the available personal and psychiatric material, and concluded that it would have imposed the same sentence. The Court of Appeal relied on that conclusion in deciding that the identified procedural defect did not warrant leave in this case ([14], [28]). The judgment does not state that sentencing irregularities are generally harmless, nor that a later appellate court's agreement invariably cures an earlier procedural defect. Its reasoning is tied to this record and the District Court judge's assessment.
On costs, the Court reiterated the appellate restraint described in Smith v Woodward [2009] QCA 119 at [20]: appellate courts are generally very slow to interfere with costs orders made below ([21]). It also said reasons should have been given for the District Court's costs decision, even if only briefly ([27]). Despite that criticism, it found the order open on the available material. The practical distinction is important: the absence of reasons was criticised, but did not lead to leave being granted on this record.
The judgment also explains the role of the veterinary-cost contribution under s 189(2) of the Animal Care and Protection Act. The Court treated the contribution as reimbursement for qualifying care costs, rather than as a punitive component of sentence ([26]). This was an application of the provision as described in the judgment, not a broader ruling on every possible dispute about ownership, custody, or recoverable expenses. The footnote notes that ownership or mere custody had been in issue at trial, but that no point about it was taken in the present application ([26] n 3).
At [20], Doyle JA stated: “The task of this Court is to determine if some sufficient ground has been made out for its grant recognising that the applicant has already had contested hearings before two courts.” In plain English, the applicant had already had two hearings in which the dispute was contested. The Court needed a sufficient reason to let the case proceed to another appeal. The judgment did not treat leave as automatic merely because a party alleged error.
At [19], Doyle JA said he would “reserve for some more appropriate case” whether the Williamson formulation represented the correct approach, especially where a particular sentencing error was identified. In plain English, the Court did not settle the precise legal test for every future leave application. It used the unfettered-discretion formulation for this case but left a wider question open.
At [24], the Court observed that the probation and prohibition orders had expired and that there was “no residual injustice required to be corrected”, apart from the possible value of affirming that they had been made in irregular circumstances. In plain English, those orders were no longer operating. The Court therefore saw limited practical effect in reopening them, while recognising that the procedural concern could still have some significance.
At [27], Doyle JA said of the District Court's lack of reasons: “They should have been, even if only brief.” He then held that, on the material available, the costs order was open. In plain English, the judge should have explained the costs decision, but the Court of Appeal did not consider that omission sufficient to justify leave in this case.
At [28], the Court said the Magistrates Court irregularities had been identified as “not material”. The stated reasons were that the Magistrate knew the applicant's circumstances and the District Court judge concluded that the same sentence would have been imposed after considering the appeal material. In plain English, the Court considered whether the procedural problem would have affected the sentencing outcome, rather than treating the existence of an irregularity as automatically decisive.
The decision is most directly relevant to applications for leave under s 118(3) following an appeal to the District Court. Its factual setting involved a criminal sentence, an applicant who had already had hearings in two courts, a challenge to the combined effect of several orders, and an alleged defect in the original sentencing process ([10], [17], [20]).
It may be useful where the District Court has identified an irregularity below but has itself considered whether that irregularity affected the sentence. In this case, the District Court had information about the applicant's personal and medical circumstances and considered a psychiatric report. It concluded that further submissions would not have changed the outcome and that it would have imposed the same sentence ([14]). The Court of Appeal relied on those case-specific findings when refusing leave ([28]).
The decision also concerns arguments that financial penalties and costs are cumulatively onerous. Mr Behrens relied on his limited financial resources and health circumstances, but the Court considered each component according to its character and context: the Magistrates Court costs followed a trial resulting in eight convictions; the veterinary contribution was reimbursement under s 189(2); and the District Court costs order was open despite the absence of reasons ([25]–[27]). The decision does not establish that hardship is irrelevant to costs or sentence. It records that the asserted hardship did not establish sufficient grounds for leave on this record.
Another relevant factual feature is that the substantive orders had expired by the time of the leave application. The Court treated expiry as reducing the residual injustice to be corrected, while acknowledging a possible interest in addressing the irregularity ([24]). That reasoning may be less directly applicable where an order remains in force, where ongoing consequences are identified, or where the alleged error has consequences not resolved by the later appeal. The judgment does not decide those situations.
The judgment's reach should also be kept within its procedural posture. Mr Behrens abandoned his conviction appeal, and the Court considered leave against sentence and related orders ([9]–[10]). The decision therefore does not determine the merits of the convictions or resolve a contested question about whether he was an owner or merely had custody of the animals. The judgment records that no ownership or custody point was taken in the Court of Appeal application ([26] n 3).
The judgment was delivered on 29 August 2025 and the supplied text contains no account of later judicial consideration. On this source alone, it is not possible to say whether a later court has followed, applied, distinguished, or otherwise treated Behrens v Deeks. The judgment itself refers to Williamson v Betterlay Brick and Block Laying Pty Ltd and Smith v Woodward, and to the District Court decision in the same proceedings, Behrens v Deeks [2024] QDC 87 ([14], [18], [21]).
A notable point for any later treatment is Doyle JA's express reservation about the Williamson formulation. Later courts may need to decide whether that guidance is the correct approach to s 118(3), and how it operates when an applicant identifies a specific sentencing-process error ([19]). This judgment does not answer that question. A later judgment's use of Behrens should therefore be checked in context, especially if it presents the decision as approving a definitive test that Doyle JA expressly left open.
The costs discussion may also be relevant in later cases, but its content is limited. The Court invoked Smith v Woodward for appellate restraint, criticised the absence of reasons, and nevertheless found the District Court's costs order open on the materials before it ([21], [27]). The judgment does not say that reasons are unnecessary, nor does it explain a comprehensive test for deciding when a failure to give reasons itself warrants appellate intervention.
The clearest unresolved issue is the precise operation of the Williamson guidance under s 118(3). Doyle JA reserved whether the quoted formulation, beyond the unfettered nature of the discretion, represents the correct approach, and how it should be understood where a specific sentencing-process error is identified ([19]). The judgment therefore supplies no final answer about whether the substantial-injustice formulation is a threshold, a guide, or one consideration within the discretion in every case.
A further open question is how a court should assess materiality where a sentencing process is irregular but the later appellate court considers the relevant personal circumstances and concludes that it would impose the same sentence. Here, the District Court had considered the applicant's psychiatric report and reached that view ([14]). The Court of Appeal accepted the materiality assessment in refusing leave ([28]), but did not formulate a general rule for other cases, such as cases with different evidence, a different kind of procedural defect, or continuing consequences.
The judgment also leaves open the weight to be given to financial hardship in a combined challenge to costs and other monetary orders. It records the applicant's limited means and medical circumstances, but assesses the costs and veterinary contribution in light of their respective contexts and statutory basis ([11], [25]–[27]). It does not establish a general rule that hardship can never justify intervention, or specify when it might do so.
Finally, the Court did not address a contested question about ownership or custody of the animals. Although the judgment notes that this issue had arisen at trial, it also says no point about it was taken in the leave application ([26] n 3). The decision should not be read as determining that issue or the limits of recovery under s 189(2) beyond the description of that provision given in [26].
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Behrens v Deeks [2025] QCA 158
PARTIES: BEHRENS, Andrew James / (applicant) / v / RUTH DEEKS / (respondent)
FILE NO/S: CA No 150 of 2024 / DC No 1810 of 2021
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Brisbane – [2024] QDC 87 (Sheridan DCJ)
DELIVERED ON: 29 August 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 26 August 2025
JUDGES: Bradley and Doyle JJA and Martin SJA
ORDERS: **1.****Application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.****2.**The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
CATCHWORDS: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW – where the applicant was found guilty of eight offences of failing to take reasonable steps to provide for the care needs of animals following a two day trial in the Caboolture Magistrates Court – where irregularities occurred in the sentencing process in that Court – where the applicant appealed his conviction, sentence and prohibition order to the District Court – where that appeal was allowed in part to reduce the contribution towards veterinary fees – where the primary judge made an order as to costs in favour of the respondent but otherwise confirmed the sentencing of the Magistrates Court – where the applicant applies for leave to appeal from the District Court pursuant to s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) – where the applicant contends that the sentencing discretion miscarried because of irregularities in the Magistrates Court and on the basis that the individual components of his sentence were onerous and that in aggregate they were excessive – whether the applicant has demonstrated that the primary judge erred / Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld), s 17(3)(ii) / District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118(3) / Smith v Woodward [2009] QCA 119, cited / Williamson v Betterlay Brick and Block Laying Pty Ltd (2020) 3 QR 594; [2020] QCA 52, cited
COUNSEL: S J Cartledge for the applicant / D M Caruana for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Gnech and Associates for the applicant / Jasper Fogerty Lawyers for the respondent
BRADLEY JA: I agree with the orders proposed by Doyle JA and with his Honour’s reasons.
DOYLE JA: The primary application before the Court is an application for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed on the applicant in the Magistrates Court as subsequently modified by order of the District Court. The application is opposed.
Additionally, the applicant (Mr Behrens) has applied for leave to adduce further evidence on the hearing of his application in the form of an affidavit of his solicitor providing information relating to the state of his finances. That leave is not opposed. The application for leave to appeal has recently been amended and leave, if required, is not opposed.
The applications to amend and to admit further evidence are allowed. These reasons will address only the application for leave to appeal.
Background
After a two-day trial in the Caboolture Magistrates Court, on 22 June 2021 Mr Behrens was found guilty of eight offences of failing to take reasonable steps to provide for the care needs of animals, contrary to s 17(3)(ii) of the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld). He had initially been charged with a further 19 like offences, 17 of which were discontinued prior to the trial and the remaining two discontinued prior to the close of the prosecution’s case.
He was sentenced to a probation order for a duration of two years, an order prohibiting him from keeping animals for a period of three years, he was ordered to pay $2,375.00 in prosecution costs; $101.80 costs of the issue of the summons; and pursuant to s 189 of the Animal Care and Protection Act, a sum of $2,000.00 as a contribution towards veterinary fees which had been incurred in respect of the animals. All of the financial sums have been referred to the State Penalties Enforcement Registry (SPER) for collection.
The Magistrate ordered that no convictions be recorded.
Mr Behrens appealed against his convictions, the sentence and the financial orders to the District Court. In that court, the appeal was allowed in part to reduce the contribution towards veterinary fees to an amount of $1,784.04 but was otherwise dismissed with an order that Mr Behrens pay the costs of the appeal in a further sum of $2,730.00.
On 5 July 2024 he filed an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against his convictions and all other orders that had been made. The application for leave to appeal against his convictions has since been abandoned.
Nature of issues raised
The substance of the case which the applicant seeks to make out is that the individual components of the sentence imposed were onerous and that in aggregate they were excessive. Further, it is contended the sentencing process was flawed such that this Court should exercise the sentencing power again and more favourably to the applicant.
The material available in the courts below shows he did not have a history of secure employment. It also identified his medical conditions as including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, autism spectrum disorder, moderate anxiety and depressive disorders. It was accepted that he would have an impaired ability to conduct his defence (or appeal) as a consequence. The further material establishes that Mr Behrens has no savings and no personal property of value. He now receives disability support and rental assistance payments of a sum which just meets his known expenses and modest living expenses.
It is common ground that the Magistrate proceeded to sentence Mr Behrens immediately following announcing the findings of guilt without inviting any submissions from him in respect of the sentencing. Matters of his prior good conduct and his financial and personal circumstances might have been addressed if such submissions had been sought.
The Magistrate, however, merely asked him to confirm that he was not in employment and then asked whether he thought he would benefit from probation or whether he was willing to do community service. The applicant indicated a preference for the former. The Magistrate did not explain the nature of probation orders to the applicant or have him agree to the making of that order, as provided for in ss 95 and 96 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld).
The District Court judge concluded (correctly) that this was an irregular means of proceeding, but her Honour concluded that the Magistrate already knew of Mr Behrens’ history and medical conditions and that it was unlikely anything further might have been said that would make any difference to the result. Moreover, on the appeal to the District Court the applicant relied on an extensive psychiatric report which detailed his medical conditions and some of the impact of this on his engagement in employment. The judge concluded that, having regard to those matters, she would not have arrived at any different order to that imposed by the Magistrate.1 That is, the finding of the court below is that had her Honour exercised the sentencing discretion herself the outcome would have been no different.
It was accepted on the appeal in the District Court that the amount of $2,000.00 contribution towards veterinary costs which was ordered by the Magistrate, while something of an estimate, overstated the correct sum and this was corrected by the orders made in the District Court.
Principles applicable to leave application
By s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), a party dissatisfied with a judgment of that court, including in its appellate jurisdiction, may only appeal to this Court with leave of the Court of Appeal.
The respondent referred to the guidance provided in Williamson v Betterlay Brick and Block Laying Pty Ltd (2020) 3 QR 594 as to the exercise of the court’s power to grant that leave. Philippides JA (with whom Morrison JA and Applegarth J agreed) said of the operation of s 118(3):
“[25] While the Court’s discretion to grant leave pursuant to s 118(3) [of the] DC Act is unfettered, leave to appeal against a decision of the District Court in its appellate jurisdiction will not be given lightly. Given that the applicant has already had the benefit of two judicial hearings, more than mere error is ordinarily required to justify the granting of leave to appeal. Accordingly, the applicant must demonstrate that an appeal is ‘necessary to correct a substantial injustice and there [is] a reasonable argument that there was an error to be corrected’. Furthermore, in determining whether there is substantial injustice, the Court will generally consider ‘whether the issue is a matter of public or community importance; whether the case involves a question or principle of general importance; or whether the matter considers an important point of law’.”
It was not submitted that some other approach should inform the grant or refusal of leave in this case. That said, I would reserve for some more appropriate case determination of whether the formulation of the guidance provided in the above passage (beyond noting the discretion is unfettered) represents the correct approach and in particular how it is to be understood where some specific error in the sentencing process is identified.
In the end, the discretion is unfettered. The task of this Court is to determine if some sufficient ground has been made out for its grant recognising that the applicant has already had contested hearings before two courts.
There is a further aspect to this application that should be mentioned which bears upon the discretion whether or not to grant leave. Aspects of the proposed grounds of appeal concern the award of costs which have been made, both in the Magistrates Court and in the District Court. Appellate courts are generally very slow to interfere with costs orders made by lower courts: Smith v Woodward [2009] QCA 119 at [20] per Keane JA (as his Honour then was).
Discussion
For the following reasons leave is not warranted in this case.
First, no convictions were recorded. Any assessment of the cumulative impact of the orders made must take account of this feature.
Second, the period of currency of each of the probation and prohibition orders has expired. There is no residual injustice required to be corrected, except the possible satisfaction of affirming that they were initially made, in the Magistrates Court, in irregular circumstances.
Thirdly, it cannot be concluded that the award of costs in the Magistrates Court was excessive, even having regard to Mr Behrens’ personal health and financial circumstances. Whilst most of the initial charges were not proceeded with against him, a two-day trial was conducted leading to his conviction of eight offences. The respondent points out that no costs were ordered in respect of the numerous pre-trial mentions (identified before the Magistrate as 11 such mentions in respect of which costs could be awarded at $250 each).2 The resultant order represents the striking of some middle ground at least.
Fourthly, the order for the payment of veterinary expenses arose pursuant to s 189(2) of the Animal Care and Protection Act. That section enables the RSPCA Queensland to recover from an animal’s “owner” certain costs incurred by it or an inspector engaged by it, being those necessary and reasonable for that animal to receive veterinary care.3 It is, as counsel for the respondent submits, an order imposed not to punish Mr Behrens, but to reimburse the costs of the care of the animals. No issue is taken as to the modified amount of these costs ordered by the District Court.
Fifthly, as to the costs of the appeal to the District Court, the primary judge received written submissions on behalf of Mr Behrens and the respondent, with Mr Behrens seeking an order that each party bear their own costs of the appeal and the respondent seeking an order for costs in the sum of $3,510.00. The figure ultimately ordered was less than that. No reasons were given. They should have been, even if only brief. On the material available to this Court, the order made was open, taking into account the various matters raised in those submissions and her Honour’s knowledge of the conduct of the appeal itself.
Finally, irregularities in the sentencing process which took place in the Magistrates Court have been identified by the District Court judge as not material. This is first in the sense that the Magistrate was aware of the applicant’s personal and financial conditions and concluded little else could have been advanced on his behalf. Further, any irregularity in the Magistrates Court’s sentencing process did not persuade the District Court judge that the sentence imposed was excessive, and indeed her Honour would have imposed the same sentence.
Behrens
Deeks [2025] QCA 158
Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused; the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
The costs order which was made in the District Court is said to have been unwarranted because of the partial success which Mr Behrens enjoyed in his appeal to that court and otherwise because of the hardship to him of the combination of those costs and all of the other financial sums he had been ordered to pay. No reasons have been given for the costs order made by the District Court judge.
For these reasons, the application is refused.
The applicant has been wholly unsuccessful. It was submitted on his behalf that no order for costs should be made because of his financial circumstances, and his medical conditions and because irregularities occurred in the conduct of the sentencing in the Magistrates Court. None of those is a sufficient reason why costs should not follow the event in this application, which he has brought. Accordingly, there should be an order that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
MARTIN SJA: I agree with Doyle JA.