Beckett & Wicks (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 90 (28 January 2026)

AND THE COURT NOTES this order does not permit the father to communicate with the mother other than for the purpose of providing his views in writing relevant to the decision to be made in relation to the children and does not permit him to engage in family violence when providing his views.

(a) By telephone or electronic means between 5.00 pm and 5.30 pm on:

(i) Each Sunday;

(ii) Each of their birthdays; and

(iii) Christmas Day;

with the father to initiate the call and the mother to ensure the children are made available for the call;

(b) By telephone or electronic means at other reasonable times as may be requested by the children and initiated by them; and

(c) As may otherwise be agreed by the parties in writing.

1. If the children will not be available for the communication required by order 5(a)(i) on any particular occasion, the mother notify the father in advance, in writing, notifying him of an alternate day that week for the communication to occur at the same time.
2. The father be permitted to send the children letters, cards and gifts, to a postal address to be nominated by the mother within seven days from the date of these orders and as may be updated by her.
3. The mother be permitted to read the communications and view the gifts sent by the father pursuant to order 7 to ensure they are appropriate, including that they do not offend the injunctions made by these orders or any family violence order, before passing them onto the children.
4. The mother be permitted to end any calls between the children and the father and not to pass on any letters or gifts to them from the father if those communications do not comply with the injunctions provided by these orders or any family violence order in place to protect her and/or the children.

1. Upon the father providing confirmation of his completion of a Men's Behaviour Change Program in accordance with order 14, the children spend time with the father on four occasions each year, professionally supervised by B Contact Service or such other children's contact service ("children's contact service") as may be agreed by the parties in writing, and for the purpose of this order:

(a) Time occur on days and times nominated by the children's contact service in consultation with the parties (and in consultation with the children if the children's contact service considers that appropriate), to occur in each of December (proximate to Christmas), ... (proximate to X's birthday), ... (proximate to Y's birthday) and September, unless otherwise agreed in writing;

(b) The father is at liberty to have his mother (the children's paternal grandmother) accompany him when the children spend time with him;

(c) The father be responsible for the costs (if any) of supervised time, to be paid in advance of time occurring;

(d) The parties each forthwith do all things required by the children's contact service to facilitate the children spending time in accordance with these orders;

(e) The parties provide to the children's contact service a copy of these orders, the reasons accompanying these orders and the child impact report prepared by court child expert Ms C dated 9 October 2025 and any family violence order affecting the parties and/or the children; and

(f) If the father is observed to breach the injunctions in order 13 or any family violence order in place protecting the children while the children are spending time with him, the children's contact service is requested to cease time on that occasion and return the children to the mother's care.

1. If, once the children begin spending supervised time with the father, the father fails to organise or attend for the children to spend time with him on two consecutive occasions of time or the children's contact service declines to continue exercising time due to the father not adhering to their terms of service, the children's time with him pursuant to order 10 be suspended pending further order unless otherwise agreed in writing.

1. All communication between the parties be by email unless otherwise agreed in writing and for the purpose of this order each party forthwith notify the other in the event of any anticipated change and/or change in their email address.

1. Each of the mother and the father be restrained from:

(a) Denigrating, abusing, rebuking, belittling or demeaning the other parent in the presence or hearing of the children or permitting others to do so;

(b) Discussing their views or the children's views about the future parenting arrangements with or in the presence or hearing of the children; and

(c) Discussing matters raised in these proceedings, including allegations raised in court material by the other parent, with or in the presence or hearing of the children.

1. The father forthwith do all acts and things necessary to enrol in and complete a Men's Behaviour Change Program and provide confirmation of his successful completion of that program to the mother and to the children's contact service.
2. The mother forthwith do all acts and things necessary to obtain a referral for and attend family violence counselling.
3. Each of the parties may provide a copy of these orders, the reasons for these orders and the child impact report to the organisations they attend upon for the purpose of orders 14 and 15 and to any other psychologist or counsellor they may each attend for treatment, counselling or support.

1. Pursuant to section 11 of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth), the mother, MS BECKETT, be authorised to apply for and receive an Australian Passport for the children X born in 2014 and Y born in 2017 ("the children"), and to then renew the children's passport as required, at her expense, without the consent of the children's father, MR WICKS.
2. For the purposes of order 17, the mother be permitted to provide a copy of these orders to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
3. The children's passports be held by the mother at all times.
4. The mother be at liberty to travel internationally with the children, without the consent of the father.

1. The parties are each permitted to provide a copy of these orders to any:

(a) School and provider of childcare;

(b) Provider of extra-curricular or other activities;

(c) Medical or allied health professional or service, including counsellor or support worker; and

(d) Government agency, community or other support service,

attended by or involved with the children and to the children's grandparents.

Obligations, consequences of contravention and assistance with orders

1. Pursuant to sections 65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist the parties to adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached and these particulars are included in these orders.

1. The independent children's lawyer be discharged.

1. Each of the applicant and the respondent forthwith do all acts and things and sign all documents required to authorise and direct the applicant's solicitors to distribute the balance of the net proceeds from the sale of the real property at D Street, Suburb E in the state of Victoria held in their trust account, in the sum of $123,199.50 plus any interest accrued on that balance (if any), as follows:

(a) To the respondent, the sum of $34,453; and

(b) To the applicant, the balance.

1. Unless otherwise specified in these orders and save for the purposes of enforcing any moneys due under these orders or any subsequent orders:

(a) Each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property (including choses-in-action) in the possession of each party as at the date of these orders;

(b) If Motor Vehicle 1 and camper trailer in the possession of the respondent are not already registered in his name, the parties forthwith do all such acts and things and sign all documents required to transfer the registration of those vehicles to the respondent at the expense of the respondent;

(c) The parties do all such acts and things and sign all documents as are required to close all joint bank accounts forthwith and monies standing to the credit of the parties therein be paid to the applicant;

(d) Each party forego any claims they may have to any superannuation benefits belonging to or earned by the other;

(e) Insurance policies remain the sole property of the owner named thereon;

(f) Each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders; and

(g) Any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is hereby expressly severed.

1. In the event the respondent refuses to or neglects to sign a deed or instrument in compliance with these orders, a Registrar of this court be appointed pursuant to section 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") to execute all deeds and/or instruments in the name of the respondent as required and to do all acts and things necessary to give validity to the operation to the deed or instrument.

1. The applicant, via her lawyers if they continue to be engaged, forthwith effect service of a copy of these orders and the accompanying reasons upon the respondent by email and file an affidavit of service confirming compliance with this order.

1. Pursuant to section 90ST of the Act it is intended these orders shall, as far as practicable, finally determine the financial relationships between the parties and avoid further proceedings between them.
2. Section 114Q of the Act provides that it is an offence punishable by imprisonment for up to one year to publish or disseminate to the public or a section of the public any account of family law proceedings which identifies the parties, witnesses or other people concerned with the proceedings, unless specifically authorised by the court.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. Before the court is an application for parenting orders in relation to the children, X (aged 10) and Y (aged 8). Also before the court is an application for the alteration of property interests pursuant to section 90SM of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act").
2. The applicant is the mother of the children, and the respondent is their father. I will refer to the parties as the mother and the father, including when referring to financial matters. I do so without intending any disrespect to them.
3. The matter has been allocated to the Evatt list. An independent children's lawyer has been appointed to represent the interests of the children.
4. The proceeding was commenced by the mother, in December 2024. Save for a Notice of Address for Service filed on 17 June 2025, the father has failed to file any documents in the proceeding notwithstanding numerous orders requiring him to do so. He has however consistently attended court events since 20 March 2025[1] and participated electronically in interviews for a child impact report.
5. On 15 December 2025, when the matter was before me for an adjourned interim hearing in respect of parenting matters and for directions in relation to property matters, I granted the mother leave to proceed with the hearing of her application for final orders on the basis of her filed material given the father had again failed to file court documents in response to her application as ordered.
6. These are my reasons for final parenting and property orders following that hearing.

1. The mother alleges the father has subjected her to very serious forms of family violence, including coercive and controlling family violence, including verbal abuse, denigration, threats of physical violence, physical violence, threats to prevent the children from seeing her, and systems abuse by his conduct in this proceeding. She says she is fearful for her own safety and the children's safety, including that the father will abduct the children, despite a final intervention order currently in place to protect them. The mother seeks final orders providing for the children to live with her and to spend no time with the father and communicate with him in accordance with their wishes. In the alternative, she does not oppose the making of orders as recommended by the independent children's lawyer providing for the children to spend professionally supervised time with the father, on four occasions per year for the purpose of maintaining a connection with him. She supports an order providing for the children to communicate with the father on a weekly basis as well as on some special occasions.
2. To the court child expert, the father denied he has engaged in family violence against the mother. By way of submission, the father asserts the mother has "stolen" the children, that her evidence is "all lies", that all of the information she has put before the court is "false and misleading" and that she is "the perpetrator pretending to be the victim". These allegations were made by the father by way of submission. He did not file any evidence on affidavit or seek to tender any documents in support of these allegations. He submits the mother should be required to undertake a mental health assessment and the children should live with him and each speak with the mother by phone once a week. He otherwise submits the children should be allowed full contact with him, "unguided and unlimited".
3. The mother seeks an order providing for her to have sole responsibility for making decisions about major long-term issues relating to the children, with a requirement for her to consult with the father when making such decisions. Such an order was supported by the independent children's lawyer. The father submitted only that he would like to be a part of the children's schooling as well as any medical and welfare issues.
4. The mother also seeks orders to facilitate the children travelling with her overseas, including that she be authorised to obtain passports for the children without the father's consent. That application is supported by the independent children's lawyer in the absence of any evidence of risk the mother will retain the children overseas. The father opposes any order providing for the children to travel overseas with the mother, submitting he has "grave concerns" the children would not be returned to Australia in circumstances where the mother has already "taken" the children from him.
5. The independent children's lawyer recommends some further orders aligning with the recommendation made in the family report, including injunctions to protect the children from family violence and conflict between their parents, for the father to attend a men's behaviour change program and for the mother to attend family violence counselling. Those recommendations were not addressed in the parties' submissions.

1. The parties have assets of modest value, consisting predominantly of the net proceeds for the sale of their former family home (held in trust), a joint savings account, motor vehicles, a caravan and superannuation.
2. The mother seeks orders by way of property adjustment after the breakdown of their de facto relationship of approximately 21 years. In particular, she seeks orders providing for her to receive all of the remaining joint savings of the parties and the funds held on trust on their behalf, and for the parties to each otherwise retain their respective assets, liabilities and superannuation. She submits this would be a just and equitable outcome taking into account the father's non-disclosure of his financial position, the parties' contributions and what is known to her and the court of their current and future circumstances.
3. Whilst the father has not filed any court documents, he contends for an equal division of property between the parties, alleging the mother "stole" monies from the parties' joint savings after separation. The mother acknowledges she has applied monies from joint savings to meet legal costs and agrees to that use of funds being taken into account pursuant to section 90SM(5) of the Act but submits it is just and equitable for her to receive all of the remaining available funds even taking that into account.

1. The issues requiring determination are therefore as follows:

(a) Is it in the best interests of the children to live with the mother as sought by her or with the father as sought by him? In either case, what orders for the children to spend time and communicate with the other parent are in their best interests?

(b) How should parental responsibility for making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the children be allocated?

(c) Should orders be made to facilitate the children travelling overseas with the mother, and for her to obtain and renew the children's Australian passports without the father's consent?

(d) Should orders be made requiring the parties to undertake education and counselling as recommended by the court child expert?

(e) Is it appropriate for the welfare of the children, for injunctions to be made as recommended by the independent children's lawyer?

(f) How should the monies expended by the mother on legal costs from joint savings be treated?

(g) How should monies received by each party by way of partial property settlement be treated?

(h) How should those assets retained by the father, including a vehicle, caravan and superannuation, be taken into account where there is no evidence of their value?

(i) How should the father's failure to disclose his financial circumstances, including by failing to file a financial statement, be taken into account?

(j) How should the parties' contributions be assessed over their relationship with 21 years of cohabitation and approximately 16 months of separation?

(k) What, if any, adjustment should be made to that contribution-based assessment by virtue of matters relevant pursuant to section 90SM(5) of the Act, relating to the parties' current and future circumstances, and pursuant to sub-section 90SM(5)(w) by virtue of those matters in (f) to (i) above if determined appropriate.

1. I determined to hear the mother's application for final orders at the hearing on 15 December 2025, finding the father was "in default" as contemplated by rule 10.26 of the Federal Circuit & Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules"). In particular, the father was in default pursuant to rule 10.26(2) because he failed to:

(a) File and serve documents in response to the mother's Initiating Application as required by the Rules and numerous orders made by the court;

(b) Make full and frank disclosure of his financial position as required by rules 6.01 and 6.06, including by his failure to file a financial statement; and

(c) Defend the mother's application with due diligence.

1. Rule 10.27(1) of the Rules provides the court may do a number of things when a party is in default, including:

[...]

(g) proceed on the non‑defaulting party's evidence together with:

(i) if considered appropriate by the court - such evidence as the defaulting party has filed; and

(ii) such evidence as tendered during cross‑examination by the defaulting party; and

(iii) submissions by either party limited to the matters that are the subject of evidence;

1. Rule 10.27(2) provides the court may make an order of the kind referred to in subrule (1), or any other order, or may give any directions, and specify any consequences for non‑compliance with the order, that the court thinks just.
2. In applying these rules when considering the mother's application that she be permitted to proceed with her application for final orders, in the absence of material filed by the father, I had regard to the overarching purpose of the family law practice and procedure provisions applying in this court, as set out in section 95(1) of the Act, which is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes:

(a) in a way that ensures the safety of families and children; and

(b) in relation to proceedings under this Act in which the best interests of a child are the paramount consideration--in a way that promotes the best interests of the child; and

(c) according to law; and

(d) as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.

and the objectives of that overarching purpose in section 95(2), which includes:

(a) the just determination of all such proceedings;

(b)the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of courts exercising jurisdiction in such proceedings;

(c) the efficient disposal of the overall caseload of courts exercising jurisdiction in such proceedings;

(d) the disposal of all such proceedings in a timely manner;

(e) the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.

1. I also gave particular consideration to the principles for conducting child-related proceedings, as set out in section 69ZN of the Act, including the impact the proceedings may have on the children (noting from the child impact report the children are aware of and impacted by the their knowledge of the dispute between their parents and this proceeding), and that proceedings are to be conducted in a way that safeguard children and parties against family violence and without undue delay.
2. I took into account that the father was not permitted to cross-examine the mother in respect of her evidence as the mandatory provisions of section 102NA of the Act apply, there being a final intervention order in place between the parties and the father having been charged with family violence offences (namely, contravention of a family violence intervention order). Notations had been made to orders since at least 29 April 2025 recording that the provisions of section 102NA of the Act applied and providing the father with information to access legal representation pursuant to the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross Examination of Parties Scheme ("the scheme"). As recorded in a notation to orders made on 13 June 2025, the father had been informed of the impact of the prohibition of personal cross-examination on his rights and of the importance of engaging a lawyer pursuant to the scheme if he sought to cross-examine the mother. He nevertheless failed to engage a lawyer pursuant to the scheme.
3. Having regard to all of these matters, I determined it was just to hear the mother's application for parenting and property orders on a final basis, on the mother's evidence untested by cross-examination, the child impact report, tendered documents and submissions.

1. The mother relied on the following documents, including previously filed affidavits and late-filed documents with leave of the court:

(a) Amended Initiating Application filed on 15 May 2025;

(b) Her affidavits filed on 20 December 2024, 28 February 2025, 15 May 2025, 12 December 2025;

(c) Her financial statement filed on 20 December 2024;

(d) Notice of child abuse, family violence or risk ("notice of risk") filed on 20 December 2024;

(e) Her outline of case document (interim hearing) ("case outline") filed on 14 December 2025, which set out the orders she sought on a final basis;

(f) Child impact report prepared by court child expert, Ms C ("court child expert"), dated 9 October 2025 ("child impact report");

(g) Updated costs notice filed 15 December 2025, as directed by the court;

(h) The final family violence order made in mid-2025, filed in mid-2026; and

(i) Tendered exhibits.

1. The independent children's lawyer relied on the following documents:

(a) Case outline, filed 10 December 2025, which set out the final orders recommended by the independent children's lawyer;

(b) The child impact report;

(c) Department of Fairness, Families and Housing (DFFH) response to a request for information made pursuant to section 67ZBD of the Act, dated 30 January 2025; and

(d) Victoria Police response to a request for information made pursuant to section 67ZBD of the Act, dated 3 February 2025.

1. The father did not seek to tender any relevant documents, including when invited to tender financial records relevant to his submissions in relation to property matters.

1. Section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) provides as follows:

(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.

(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:

(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and

(b) the nature of the subject‑matter of the proceeding; and

(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.

1. In assessing the evidence, I have applied the balance of probabilities as the standard of proof. In making my findings I have given careful consideration to all of the evidence, the nature of the proceedings, the seriousness of the allegations made and the consequences that flow from those findings. I have taken into account in particular the serious allegations made by the parties of family violence, and the significance of the orders sought by the mother and recommended by the independent children's lawyer that would see aspects of the father's parental responsibility removed and the children spend either no time with the father or only limited supervised time with him.
2. I have read and considered all of the evidence adduced by the mother and the independent children's lawyer and the submissions made by their counsel and the father. If I have not mentioned a piece of evidence or an argument presented at the hearing that does not mean I have not considered it. As the High Court said in Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon:[2]

A judge's reasons are not required to mention every fact or argument relied on by the losing party as relevant to an issue. Judgments of trial judges would soon become longer than they already are if a judge's failure to mention such facts and arguments would be evidence that he or she had not properly considered the losing party's case.

1. The mother's evidence was not challenged. As mentioned, the father elected not to file affidavits or tender documents, in response to the evidence adduced by her, or take up the opportunity to engage a lawyer pursuant to the scheme to challenge the mother's evidence by cross-examination. The independent children's lawyer did not seek to cross-examine the mother. That being said, given the nature of the hearing and the absence of cross-examination, I have considered the mother's evidence carefully in respect of each of the issues requiring my determination.
2. I have been assisted by the child impact report and will refer to aspects of what the court child expert reported was told to her by the parties and the children, her observations of the parties and children and her preliminary recommendations. However, I am mindful of the limitations of that report, as stated in the report, including in the following terms:

The Child Impact Report provides preliminary expert advice about the needs and experiences of children, to support decision making through Dispute Resolution processes and/or Interim Hearings. Any views expressed, or professional recommendations made, by the Court Child Expert in a Child Impact Report need to be considered within the limited nature and focus of this type of assessment.

1. I also take into account the parties were interviewed by video and not in person, observations were not undertaken of the children with each of the parties, and that the court child expert's evidence was not tested by cross-examination. I also bear in mind the court child expert reported the children expressed some trepidation about their views being shared and she therefore only summarised the information provided by them rather than providing a detailed account of what they shared with her.

1. The parties began living together in a de facto relationship in or around March 2002 and separated in August 2024.
2. X was born in 2014. Y was born in 2017.
3. I accept the mother was primarily responsible for the children's care during their relationship. Having regard to the court child expert's assessment of her interviews with the children and the father as reported in the child impact report, I find the father was likely also significantly involved in the children's care.
4. The parties purchased the former family home in 2005. Pursuant to interim orders made on 20 June 2025, the former family home was sold and, after a partial distribution to each of the parties (20% each), the balance of the net sale proceeds is held in trust by the mother's lawyers.
5. From July 2024, the parties and children took an extended vacation, travelling with their caravan from Victoria to Queensland, intending to travel to Region F. I accept the mother's evidence they planned to return to Victoria by October 2024 for her work commitments and for the children to resume school. In August 2024, there was an argument between the parties while they were staying at a caravan park in Town G. The mother alleges the father required her to sleep outside of the caravan that night. The following day, the father drove away with the children, leaving the mother stranded at the caravan park. The mother returned to Victoria by air and to the family home.
6. The father continued travelling with the children. He facilitated limited communication between the children and the mother. I accept the mother's evidence he sent a text message to her saying "you would be lucky to see them in the next 10 years as I am not returning to Victoria". Whilst she did not tender a copy of that message, it is consistent with other messages she did tender and it is supported by records of what she reported to Victoria Police in November 2024. The father exited the children from their school in Victoria and enrolled them to attend a school in Town J, a rural town in Queensland, which they attended for three weeks.
7. In September 2025, the mother travelled to Queensland to spend time with the children. She describes in her affidavit that the following night, she "fled in the middle of the night, fearful for our safety from [the father]" and returned with the children to Victoria.
8. The mother applied for an intervention order in late 2024 and an interim order was granted at a hearing on 20 September 2024.

1. The children live with the mother at an undisclosed address. The father was informed during the hearing the children live with the mother within the council of City H, as they did prior to separation.
2. The children continue to attend the primary school they attended before the family's extended travel in 2024. X is due to start high school in 2027.
3. The children have not spent time with the father since the mother took them into her care in September 2024. They have seen him twice, on occasions he approached them while they were walking home from school with the mother notwithstanding the family violence intervention order then in place, which I will return to. The mother deposed that she has facilitated the children speaking with the father by phone but provided little detail in respect of those calls.

1. The mother is employed as a community worker. She lives in rental accommodation with the children. Her financial statement records she does not live with any other person.
2. There is no evidence before the court of the father's current circumstances. The child impact report records the father informed the court child expert he was at that time (early October 2025) living with a friend in Queensland. That friend was not named. It appears the father lives in Queensland and travels regularly to Victoria. The mother deposed that she was informed by the children in or around October 2024 that the father informed them he sleeps in his car when he travels to Victoria.

1. Part VII of the Act contains the statutory provisions applying to the making of parenting orders. The objects of Part VII, as amended, are set out in section 60B of the Act, as follows:

(a) to ensure that the best interests of children are met, including by ensuring their safety; and

(b) to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child done at New York on 20 November 1989.

1. Those objects provide context and assist with interpretation of Part VII, and I have had regard to them. In particular, I have regard to Parliament's intention when amending the Act in 2023[3] that "[s]afety is a fundamental consideration when considering the best interests of the child" or in this case, the children.
2. As to the best interests of the children, section 65D provides the court with power to make such parenting order as it thinks proper, subject to some other provisions of the Act. Section 60CA makes it clear that in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order, the court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. In determining the best interests of a child, section 60CC(1)(a) provides the court must consider the matters set out in section 60CC(2), under the heading General considerations.
3. Section 43(1)(ca) of the Act requires the court to have regard to the need to ensure protection from family violence. Section 60CG(1) provides that in considering what order to make, the court must, to the extent that it is possible to do so consistently with the child's best interests being the paramount consideration, ensure the order is consistent with any family violence order and does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence.
4. In making my decision, I have considered all of the relevant sections of the Act. I am not required to specifically address each provision in my reasons and just because I have not mentioned a specific provision does not mean I have not considered it.

1. I now turn to the general considerations set out in section 60CC(2) as relevant to determine what is in the best interests of the children in this matter.

What arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of the children and each person who has care of the children (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the children): section 60CC(2)(a)

1. Parker J recently discussed the meaning of "safety" in Nassou & Rassach (No 2)[4] including by reference to decisions of Gill J and Altobelli J as follows:

The word "safety" is not defined in the Act. It is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as "the state of being protected from or guarded against hurt or injury and freedom from danger."

In Oyama & Oyama,[1] Gill J held that safety in this context is a term that is wired in nature and bounded only by its object being to keep children and those who care for them from harm, and that should not be taken to have a fixed content or standard. The paragraph requires the court to consider the risk of harm that accompanies the relationship in whatever form it may take, and does not contemplate consideration of the benefits of a relationship where such relationship is not safe.

In Denton & Denton (No 3),[2] Altobelli J expressed the view that safety is a state in which hazards or conditions leading to physical, psychological or material harm are controlled in order to preserve the health and well-being of an individual and that it is not the complete elimination of risk of harm but rather making such orders affords the child the most optimal protection from harm.

In Melounis & Melounis (No 4),[3] Altobelli J again held that to promote safety for the purposes of subsection 60CC(2)(a) means "to advance the interests of and move to a stronger or more prominent position the safety (ie to be free from hurt, damage, harm or danger) of children and those who care for them" and that the statutory requirement to promote safety involves advancing a positive outcome which would necessarily include protection from harm but would not be limited to this.

[1] [2024] FedCFamC1F 738.

[2] [2024] FedCFamC1F 476.

[3] [2024] FedCFamC1F 778.

1. When considering those matters in section 60CC(2)(a), the court is required to consider the matters set out in section 60CC(2A) as follows:

(a) any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child (whether or not the person had parental responsibility for the child); and

(b) any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child's family.

Any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the children or a person caring for the children (whether or not the person had parental responsibility for the children): section 60CC(2A)(a)

1. The mother alleges the father has subjected her to family violence, including conduct to coerce and control her.
2. Family violence" is defined in s 4AB(1) of the Act as follows:

(1) For the purposes of this Act, family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful.

1. A non-exhaustive list of examples of behaviour that may constitute family violence is set out in section 4AB(2).
2. In relation to behaviour that coerces or controls a family member, the consideration of these terms by the Full Court in Pickford & Pickford[5] is informative and the following guidance can be taken from the judgments in that decision:

(a) Coercion or control essentially captures one family member's domination of another family member. That the victim may subjectively feel coerced or controlled is not enough. The coercion or control must be an objective actuality;[6]

(b) 'Coercion' will often involve a pattern of acts including, for example, assault, intimidation, humiliation and threats, designed to harm, punish or frighten the victim;[7]

(c) 'Controlling behaviour' involves a range of acts designed to make a person subordinate and to corrode their sense of personal autonomy;[8]

(d) The focus is on the impact of the behaviour of the alleged perpetrator of family violence rather than the intention of that person. Whilst the intention of the alleged perpetrator will very often be a decisive factor, it is not an essential element for a finding that a party has been the subject of coercive or controlling behaviour; [9]

(e) McClelland DCJ emphasised, "the key to determining whether a person has been the subject of such behaviours is an appreciation of a pattern or a series of acts, the impact of which will usually be both intersecting and cumulative, rather than incident specific"[10] An evaluation of the alleged conduct and the context in which it occurred is required.[11] The assessment requires consideration of the totality of the evidence;[12]

(f) However, whilst patterns of behaviour may be particularly illuminative, they are not essential, and whilst a single act is unlikely to be coercive or controlling it may be.[13]

1. Section 4AB(3) provides that a child is exposed to family violence, as defined above, if the child sees or hears family violence or otherwise experiences the effects of family violence.
2. With these definitions in mind, I am satisfied the father has subjected the mother to family violence which has made her fearful and which has coerced and controlled her. In particular, I accept the mother's evidence the father:

(a) Denigrated and demeaned her, including by referring to her as fat and calling her names, in or around 2013 while pregnant with X. I do so taking into account the court child expert's account in the child impact report that "[the father] provided evasive information about body shaming the mother, instead explaining they had mutual conversations about her increasing weight and leading an active and healthier lifestyle."

(b) Threatened to take the children and prevent her from seeing them;

(c) In August 2024, while they were travelling around Australia with the children, refused the mother access to their caravan, leaving her to sleep on the ground in a tent without bedding;

(d) In August 2024, drove away with the children, leaving the mother isolated at Town G alone and then retained the children in his care, implementing his earlier threats to take the children and prevent the mother from seeing them;

(e) Refused to provide the mother with keys for their home and car, meaning she was required to gain access to the home upon her return to Victoria using spare keys held by a neighbour;

(f) In August or September 2024, threatened she would be lucky to see the children in the next ten years;

(g) On 28 September 2024, sent the mother a series of harassing and threatening text messages, including messages reading[14] [as typed]:

Do you know I can be in Victoria so soon,

Do you know I've learnt how to get there with no cameras

Do you know that you have brought the courts into our family life

Do you know that the police and courts can't touch me

Do you know that I don't care about your wellbeing

I suggest you have a conversation with me.

Orrrr, poor you, got a headache

Bitch you are my headache.

Feel free to call the cops,

You have my location, that can change in an instant...

I can also fuck over every one you care about..

Screan shot this shit..

Because your never going to catch a gost...

Or am I in Victoria right now?????

(h) Harassed the mother with multiple voicemail messages on 1 October 2024;

(i) On 4 November 2024, wrote about the mother in a disparaging and demeaning manner, in a threatening email he sent to a real estate agent the mother had engaged with,[15] reading:

[...] I don't know what bullshit [the mother] has been feeding you.. there will be a caveat taken out on the property soon as it is not for sale.. and if it was, it will be sold by someone named [Mr K], or [Mr L], not [agent's name]...

Do you understand what you are being told. Perhaps you should not listen to and unstable, suicidal woman.. you touch anything on my property and there will be ramifcations..

Get the hint..

I find this email was sent to discourage the real estate agent from assisting the mother to sell the former family home, as part of his campaign of coercive and controlling conduct against the mother;

(j) On 13 December 2024, approached her and the children while they were walking home from school and asked X, "Do you want to go hunting and shoot a gun for the first time?". I find this comment was made to indicate he had access to guns, to frighten the mother. The interim family violence order that was in place at the time prevented the father from approaching the mother and the children;

(k) On 17 December 2024, again approached the mother and the children while they were walking home from school and spoke to them. Consistent with this evidence, the court child expert wrote in the child impact report that the father reported he received a fine of $200 without conviction for breaching the interim order, for approaching the children on two occasions in 2024;

(l) Harassed the mother by bombarding her with repetitive emails asking to see the children, including more than 85 emails sent between 11 January 2025 and 27 February 2025 and more than 85 emails sent between 10 April 2025 and 15 May 2025, reading over and over again, "What date and time I am speaking with my children?" and "What date and time am I seeing my children?" These messages were often sent multiple times a day and late at night. I find these messages were sent to coerce the mother to make the children available to speak and spend time with him and to harass her for not doing so;

(m) On 17 February 2025, shortly after service of orders made at a hearing on 13 February 2025, sent an email to the mother reading:

Call me in regards to my children. Are you aware of what you are doing to the kids? You have now put their future in the hands of a stranger. Are you trying to have them placed in the care of the state? Rather than the custody arrangements made by the mediation of their parents. Your (sic) a genius and it's going to be my children who suffer from your choices.

(n) On 18 February 2025, sent an email to the mother reading:

What date and time am I seeing my children? I would like to confirm that there (sic) welfare under your so called care is being attended to. I worry with your fragile mental state that you will do something to [X] like you have previously. So what date and time am I seeing my children?

(o) On 13 April 2025, sent a series of numerous emails to the mother sent late at night,[16] including emails reading (in part) [as typed]:

If you need me to pick the kids up, just let me know. I know how fragile you are.

If I was you and did what you did, I could not live with myself.

It will be a cold day in hell when I care about your problems. Return my children to me. You clearly can't look after them letterlone yourself. Are you still suicidal or are you just putting your shit on my children.

I find these and like messages were sent to make the mother (or others who may read them) doubt her mental health and capacity to care for the children, often referred to as "gaslighting", and to cause her to be fearful the father would act to seek to have the children removed from her care. I find he did so to coerce her to make the children available to him; and

(p) On 20 April 2025, sent her an email[17] reading [as typed]:

Just a heads up, I will be going to the bank on Tuesday and requesting that they forclose on [address of the former family home].

I find this constitutes economic abuse, threatening the mother's housing with the children and to diminish the value of assets available to the mother by way of property settlement. I make this finding noting the mother sought interim orders in her Initiating Application filed on 20 December 2024 seeking the sale of the home and the father had not engaged with the mother's application by filing documents in response to it.

1. I accept the mother's evidence in respect of these allegations which are consistent with:

(a) The tendered records of the father's communications to her and to third parties;

(b) The father's proprietorial attitude towards the children (as displayed by him repeatedly referring to them as "my children" in his communications to the mother, to his "rights" in respect of the children and to them being "stolen" from him in his submissions); and

(c) The father's attitude towards the mother (as evident from his communications to her, to third parties and his submissions to the court) and his conduct in this proceeding.

1. I find the father has deliberately failed to engage with this proceeding and to file court documents to coerce and control the mother, being a form of family violence often referred to as "systems abuse". A notation was made to orders made on 29 April 2025 that the presiding registrar had formed the view the father used the hearings on 20 March and 29 April 2025 to make allegations and complaints about the mother and the court process. This accorded with my own experience of the father's attendance at the court hearings before me on 20 June 2025[18] and 15 December 2025.
2. I find the father has engaged in a course of conduct as described in Pickford to coerce and control the mother, including by intimidating and threatening her, by taking steps to punish and frighten her, and by attempting to subordinate her and pressure her to comply with his demands.
3. The mother also gave evidence the father subjected her to physical assaults and threatened her with physical harm, including that he:

(a) In September 2019, punched her legs and threatened her with physical harm; and

(b) In June 2024, threw kitchen knives at her which landed on a blanket covering her, hit the wall beside the bed she was lying on, punched the wall, ripped the bedroom door off its hinges, and threw an ottoman. The mother deposed the children were in a neighbouring room and heard what occurred.

1. These are particularly serious allegations and I have considered them carefully.
2. In relation to the incident in September 2019, the mother said she "took a video of what was happening" but she did not adduce the video. In relation to the incident in June 2024, the mother annexed photographs of what she said was damage caused to the wall beside the parties' bedhead from a knife thrown by the father and of the doorway with a door removed. She did not depose as to the date the photographs were taken. The knives and door were not pictured. She deposed that she stayed nearby at a hotel for four nights following the incident but did not identify the hotel or provide proof of payment or other documentary evidence to support this evidence. The mother gave very detailed evidence on affidavit about what she said the father said to her on both occasions, providing quotes of what was said, but did not explain how she was able to do so - for example, she did not say she had taken notes at the time or from recordings. She did not adduce any notes or recordings. It is well settled that a party does not require his or her evidence to be corroborated before evidence of family violence can be accepted.[19] However, in the absence of corroboration by evidence that appears may have been available to the mother, inconsistencies with other evidence cause me to question the reliability of her evidence in relation to these allegations, including the following:

(a) The section 67ZBD response from Victoria Police records only that "In 2024, it was reported that [the parties] engaged in a verbal dispute. [The children] were present during the incident." Physical violence was not mentioned;

(b) The section 67ZBD response from DFFH reports, "[the mother] was noted to have disclosed vague assaults by [the father] over the years saying that he had previously hit her in the head and thrown knives at her (September 2024)". This was not consistent with her affidavit evidence;

(c) The mother's report provided in support of her application for an intervention order (as recorded by Victoria Police)[20] did not refer to these allegations or any other incident of physical family violence; and

(d) In the child impact report, the court child expert reported:

[...] [The mother] alleged that on four to five occasions [the father] was physically abusive to her by hitting the back of her head with an open palm as he walked past her and the children sitting on the couch, throwing a knife towards her and it hitting the wall approximately 30cms away, pushing her off the bed by lifting the mattress causing significant bruising to her leg, and strangling her causing scratches and bruises. [The mother] further alleged that [the father] damaged her mobile phone, deleted photos she had taken of the injuries from his abuse [...]

Aside from the allegation the father threw knives at her, one of which hit the wall, these allegations were not the subject of the mother's affidavit evidence. I would have expected this to be the case given the serious nature of these further allegations, including of strangulation. I am not prepared to make findings in respect of those allegations in those circumstances.

1. Faced with these inconsistencies and omissions from the mother's evidence, I am not persuaded to the requisite standard on the evidence before me that the father acted as the mother described on these occasions, including physically assaulting her, threatening her with physical harm, throwing knives at her and damaging property.
2. In her notice of risk the mother asserted, "[...]9/24 [X] and [Y] told me about [Mr Wicks] physically assaulting [X] while they were in QLD with him". In that notice, she reported that after the father left her in Town G:

[The father] punched [X] in his upper back with a closed fist. Then [the father] hit [X] over the head with [Y]'s fishing net. [Y] said it was so hard it made a swishing sound. [The father] then pushed [X] up the stairs of the Camper trailer causing brusing on [X]'s legs. [X] was told to stay in the Camper trailer all night and that he had already got rid of one [whinging] bitch he didn't need another [whinging] bitch.

1. However, the mother did not give evidence on affidavit about this alleged assault against X or of what the children told her about it. The notice of risk says a statement was made to the Suburb M Police, but the statement was not provided. I cannot be sure if it relates to the same incident, but the court child expert reported:

[X] and [Y] confidently reported that their parents have not used physical means to discipline them, however, there was one occasion in QLD in August/September 2025 when [the father] hit [X] with the handle of [Y]'s fishing net. Both children presented somewhat guarded about this incident, and the effects it had on them. [The mother's] version of that event was more detailed in comparison, reportedly based on the children's disclosure to her which is that [the father] hit [X] with the handle of a fishing net and kicked/pushed him up the stairs to the bedroom in the campervan.

1. In the absence of clear evidence of the children's account of this incident and evidence, from the mother of their report to her, I am not persuaded to the requisite standard the father assaulted or abused X. However, that this allegation has been made and the children were reluctant to discuss it with the court child expert is a matter I take into account when assessing the children's safety and the risk of them being subjected to physical abuse and family violence.
2. The mother alleges the father attended the family home on 13 April 2025 and tapped on Y's bedroom window. She alleges that on two occasions in August 2025 a man affixed a bike chain to the front gate, preventing access for a sale inspection and then jammed a key (identified by the mother as a key taken by the father upon the parties' separation) in a lock securing the gate. I am unable to identify if the person shown in the still shots from the security footage tendered by the mother is the father or someone acting at his direction. She did not adduce evidence that anybody saw or identified the person in attendance on any of these occasions. Accordingly, I am not persuaded on the evidence before me that the father acted as the mother described on these occasions.
3. I add by way of explanation for the parties, the fact I am not persuaded of these further allegations does not mean I find they did not occur, only that I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities, on the available evidence before me, that they did.

Any family violence order that applies or has applied to the children or a member of the children's family: section 60CC(2A)(b)

1. In late 2024, an interim family violence intervention order was made protecting the mother and children from family violence by the father.[21] A further interim family violence order was made in late 2024, with more extensive protections for the mother and the children, including restraining the father from contacting or communicating with them by any means, from coming within 200 metres of any address where they live, work or attend school or childcare and coming within 5 metres of them, unless falling within one of the permitted exceptions in the order.[22] A final family violence intervention order was made in mid-2025, which provides for the protection of the mother and children in like terms until mid-2026.[23]
2. Charges are currently pending against the father in respect of alleged breaches of the family violence intervention order. The court child expert reported the father informed her there is a police warrant for his arrest for breaches of the intervention order and that he planned to return to Victoria in late 2025 to address the warrant and the breaches. The mother deposed to seeing a social media post in late 2025 reporting an outstanding warrant for the father.[24] The father did not adduce evidence in respect of the allegations he has breached the intervention order, the criminal charges pending against him and of what steps (if any) he had taken in respect of the warrant by the time of the hearing on 15 December 2025. Whilst those charges will be a matter for another court, it appears on the evidence before me the father has acted in contravention of the intervention order protections.

Consideration of section 60CC(2)(a) - arrangements that would promote the safety of the children and each person who has care of the children

1. Given the allegations made by the mother and the orders sought by her for the children to spend no time with the father, I am required to undertake an assessment of the children's safety and of the potential risk of harm to the children if they were to spend time with the father and determine if it is an unacceptable risk or if they would be otherwise unsafe in his care.
2. The test of "unacceptable risk" was explained by the High Court in M v M.[25] In short, the court is required to balance the risk of detriment to a child from the harm of abuse and the possibility of benefit to the child of living with or spending time with a parent.[26] It is now well established that this assessment applies to allegations of children being at risk of physical and emotional harm for reasons other than abuse.[27] The approach to be taken by the court to considering if there is an unacceptable risk of harm to children was clarified in Isles & Nelissen.[28] In that case, the appeal court explained the distinction between fact finding, applying the civil standard of proof, on the balance of probabilities, and the assessment of risk which is not required to be proven on the balance of probabilities but is to be "postulated from known historical facts and present circumstance".[29] The evidence-based finding made about the existence of any unacceptable risk of harm is then just one consideration to be taken into account when the court exercises its overall discretionary judgment to make orders in the children's best interests, influenced by the various considerations required by section 60CC.[30]

What, if any, risk does the father pose to the children's safety?

1. As stated, I am satisfied the father has subjected the mother to family violence, including coercive and controlling family violence.
2. I find there is a high risk of the father continuing to perpetrate family violence against the mother, including in light of the following evidence:

(a) The father's apparent repeated and persistent contravention of the intervention orders in place to protect the mother and the children;

(b) The father's denial of using family violence, insisting the mother has lied to the court;

(c) The court child expert's assessment the father "demonstrated no insight into the potential impact on the mother and children of his sudden appearances and not abiding by the conditions of the IVO";

(d) The court child expert's assessment the father "presented as dismissive of the IVO and allegations and suggested that police and the courts held a similar view as him about the relevance, or not, of the IVO and veracity of the allegations made by [the mother]";

(e) The father's negative view of and attitude towards the mother as evident from the child impact report, his communications to her and to others, and his submissions made to the court;

(f) The father's proprietorial attitude towards the children;

(g) An absence of evidence the father has undertaken any steps to address his use of family violence, including to attend a men's behaviour change program as recommended by the court child expert in the child impact report; and

(h) The father's lack of respect for police and the courts and his failure to properly engage in this proceeding and to comply with orders of this court and of the Magistrates Court.

1. I find there is a risk of harm to the mother and to the children of a very serious magnitude if the father continues to engage in further family violence against the mother, including:

(a) The risk of physical harm. Whilst I have not been persuaded of the mother's allegations of physical family violence against her and X, I find the father has made threats of harm against the mother. I accept the mother is genuinely fearful for her physical safety and that her fear is reasonably based;

(b) Whist the father denied access to firearms and Victoria Police reported in the section 67ZBD response he does not have a firearms licence, it was reported in the child impact report that the father informed the court child expert he suggested he can use crossbows and traps when hunting which he said he and X have enjoyed doing together for some time. I also accept he asked X on 13 December 2024 "do you want to go hunting and shoot a gun for the first time?", indicating he has access to guns. I find the father's experience with and access to weapons means there is a risk of serious injury and lethal harm to the mother and the children if the father continues to use family violence. Even a low risk of a harm of this magnitude is unacceptable; and

(c) Psychological and emotional harm. I accept the children would likely experience significant psychological and emotional harm if they were to be exposed to the father subjecting the mother to family violence.

1. The mother is concerned the father will remove the children from her care and prevent them from seeing her. I find there is a high risk of this occurring given:

(a) The father's ongoing use of coercion and control towards the mother;

(b) The threats made by him, to prevent the children from seeing her;

(c) The father's previous conduct, abandoning the mother at Town G, taking the children with him, enrolling them in school in Queensland and withholding them from the mother's care;

(d) The father's attitude towards the mother and his proprietary attitude towards the children, including his repeated assertion the mother has taken the children from him; and

(e) His non-compliance with court orders as already canvassed.

1. Should the father remove the children from the mother's care, I find recovering the children is likely to prove difficult in light of the above matters and given:

(a) The father's text messages sent to the mother expressly stating his location "can change in an instant" and "your never going to catch a gost" (sic);

(b) The absence of evidence before the court of the father's current circumstances, including a fixed address, employment and other ties to a particular location or community;

(c) The court child expert's assessment of the father's derogatory and critical views of authority, such as police and the courts, and his interest in learning bushcraft skills and hunting, and ability to live off grid with the campervan which is set up for this purpose; and

(d) My assessment of the father's attitude towards court orders and police.

1. I find the magnitude of harm to the children should they be removed from the mother's care would be high, given their expressed fear of this occurring as reported by them to the court child expert.

1. In her notice of risk, the mother alleges the father "has been an alcoholic for most of our 23 relationship" and refers to incidents during which she asserted he was drunk or intoxicated, including an occasion she said he assaulted X in Queensland and that he has driven with the children in the car while drinking. However, she did not give evidence on affidavit to support these claims. She alleged the father was "intoxicated" during the incident she described in June 2024 but did not give evidence of what caused her to form that view.
2. The mother recorded in her notice of risk that the father "had an interlock on his car for over 4 year due to being caught drink driving". Records provided by Victoria Police record that in 2016 the father was convicted for refusing to undergo a breath test but a charge for driving with a BAC above 0.05 was struck out. There was no evidence of alcohol related charges aside from those historical charges.
3. I nevertheless find there is a risk to the children's safety associated with the father's attitude towards and potential misuse of alcohol, having regard to the following matters in particular:

(a) The absence of evidence from him about his alcohol use;

(b) The absence of evidence of hair follicle testing for alcohol use which was recommended by the court child expert;

(c) The court child expert's report that the children provided descriptions of his intoxicated state and angry and mean behaviour during their interview with her;

(d) The children's discussion with the independent children's lawyer in May 2025 referring to their recollection of the father's drinking; and

(e) The court child expert's report that the father presented as evasive about his alcohol consumption, saying to her that he consumes alcohol "no more than the next person" and that he minimised his 2016 conviction, claiming police harassed him.

1. Risks to the children's safety arising from misuse of alcohol by the father include increased risk of being subjected to or exposed to family violence, neglect of their needs and physical harm in the event of a motor vehicle accident, if he is impaired by alcohol while they are in his care.

1. In her notice of risk, the mother asserts a risk to the children relating to the father smoking tobacco in the car while driving with the children but she did not give evidence about this on affidavit.

1. The child impact report identified a further risk to the children, related to the father's views, attitudes and lifestyle, expressed in the following way:

There were some concerns raised about [the father's] derogatory and critical views of authority, such as police and the courts, and his interest in learning bushcraft skills and hunting, and his ability to live off grid with the campervan which is set up for this purpose. [The father] stated that he votes each year, claims government benefits, and holds a driver's license and birth certificate, although he reportedly held certain political views which he considered the norm for any individual. Combining this with [the father's] evasive presentation about his current and future living arrangements and use of firearms, his apparent disregard of the IVO conditions, and his limited participation in these Court proceedings, may raise concerns about [X] and [Y]'s safety and exposure to a potentially harmful lifestyle thus affecting their positive developmental trajectory.

1. I do not have evidence before me of the "certain political views" referenced by the court child expert. However, the father's disrespectful attitude towards authority, police and the courts was apparent from the evidence before me, including tendered communications, the father's contravention of the family violence order and his conduct in this proceeding. His email to the real estate agent engaged by the mother also indicates he holds racist views.[31] I find the children being exposed to these views is unsafe for them, including by causing them not to trust people and organisations whose role it is to protect children.

1. Where a court finds a parent poses an unacceptable risk of harm to a child in a parenting proceeding, the court is also required to consider the means which might be adequate to sufficiently mitigate the risk to an acceptable risk.[32]
2. In Chiles & Petrenko,[33] Tree J, neatly explained the purpose of conditions to mitigate identified risks of harm to children as follows:

The purpose of ameliorative conditions is to mitigate a risk of harm from unacceptable to acceptable, such that when the risk analysis is repeated with the ameliorative condition in place, the relevant risk is assessed as acceptable.

1. The Full Court explained the relationship between the assessment of risk and consideration of ameliorating measures in Blinko & Blinko:[34]

A consideration of risk, and factors which impact upon or ameliorate the risk, will in most cases be inextricably linked. That is because "[t]he object of safeguards is to convert an unacceptable situation to an acceptable one where that is feasible and is of 'benefit to the child'".

1. I find the identified risks to the children, of being subjected to or exposed to family violence, being removed from the mother's care, and being exposed to the father's problematic attitudes towards the mother and others and related to the misuse of alcohol, can adequately be ameliorated to a level that they will not be unacceptable and the children will be safe, by requiring the father to complete a men's behaviour change program and providing for the children's time to be professionally supervised by a children's contact service as recommended by the independent children's lawyer.
2. My finding accords with the recommendations made by the court child expert in the child impact report, including:

(a) Only professionally supervised time with [the father] can be supported at the current time; and

(b) The father engage in a behaviour change program in the state he is mostly resident in, being Queensland at the time the report was undertaken.

1. Whilst I cannot be confident the father undertaking a men's behaviour change program will be effective in achieving meaningful change in the father's attitudes about and use of family violence, he will at least be educated as to the nature of family violence behaviour and the impact of family violence on children. Professional supervision will then ensure the children are safeguarded from family violence behaviour and denigration of the mother, and that the father does not withhold the children from her care after they spend time with him.
2. Whilst the mother's primary position is that the children spend no time with the father, in her notice of risk she proposed supervised visits to protect the children from harm and the risk of abduction, she proposed likewise to the court child expert (subject to practical considerations given the father appears to be living interstate), and she adopted the independent children's lawyer's recommendation for supervised time as her alternate position. I therefore find it likely the mother will support the children to spend supervised time with the father if such an order is made.

What, if any, risk of harm does the mother pose to the children?

1. To the court, the father alleged the mother is a perpetrator of family violence pretending to be the victim, and that her allegations of family violence are lies. To the court child expert, the father alleged the mother has behaved the way she has alleged he has behaved, including that she has damaged walls, kicked doors and made threats to kill him. However, the father did not adduce evidence in support of these allegations, and they were not supported by the information sharing reports before the court from Victoria Police and DFFH or by the children's accounts provided to the court child expert.
2. The father alleged by way of submission the mother kicked X out of the caravan while they were holidaying in Queensland. To the court child expert, both parties alleged the other was verbally and physically aggressive to X during this trip and each denied they behaved in this way. The father did not adduce evidence of what he alleged occurred with X giving rise to his allegation against the mother. The court child expert reported only generally, "[X] and [Y] also provided descriptions of their QLD trip and events that occurred, which corroborated [the mother's] version of events, although the children's accounts were less detailed."
3. In his emails sent to the mother on 13 April 2025, the father refers to the children being scared of her. However, the children both reported to the court child expert feeling safe in the mother's care.
4. The child impact report records the father alleged the mother consumed alcohol to excess and became aggressive and highly emotional and that she is mentally unstable. It was reported the mother denied these allegations, although the court child expert said she was evasive about her own alcohol use. To the court child expert, the mother denied she has expressed suicidal thoughts or self-harmed. The father did not adduce evidence to support these allegations and they were not supported by the children's experience of their mother's care, as reported in the child impact report which I will come to shortly.
5. I am not persuaded on the evidence before me that the mother has perpetrated family violence towards the children or that they have been exposed to her subjecting the father to family violence. I am not persuaded she misuses alcohol or that her mental health impacts her capacity to adequately care for the children. I do not find the children to be unsafe in the care of the mother.

Any views expressed by the children: section 60CC(2)(b)

1. The court child expert reported in the child impact report that the children described feeling safe in the care of the mother, a predictable home environment and parenting approach in her care and that they both wanted the judge to know they want to live with her.
2. The mother deposed in her affidavit filed on 20 December 2024 that the children have told her they do not want to see the father.
3. In relation to the children's views about being in the care of the father, the court child expert reported they each expressed some fear of being alone with him. In relation to their views about being in his care, she reported:

[X] and [Y] presented as ambivalent about the relationships with their father, providing descriptions of his intoxicated state and associated angry and mean behaviour. [X] and [Y] provided sufficient information to indicate that they have been exposed to their father's behaviours on a regular and consistent basis. Both children seemed protective of their mother, and provided examples of [the father's] critical and derogatory comments to [the mother] which corroborated allegations she has made against him. [...] [X] and [Y] indicated that they had no choice about which parent they lived with at that time, and it seems from their statements that they preferred to live with their mother than with their father.

1. About spending time with the father, the court child expert reported the children's views as expressed to her and the independent children's lawyer, as follows:

[X] and [Y] met with the ICL recently, and they mentioned the possibility of spending time with their father in a supervised setting. Each child seemed amenable to this possible arrangement, though they still expressed some trepidation about their father's behaviours and fear of him taking them away from their mother. They indicated reduced confidence in their father allowing them to see their mother if they were to live with him.

1. The children's views were also obtained by the independent children's lawyer during a meeting on 19 May 2025, as reported in the independent children's lawyer's case outline, including:
   • Both children had a recollection of the Father's drinking and conflict between the parents.
   • Both children reported feeling scared when the Father left the Mother and kept them from her for 4 weeks and expressed fear that they would not see their Mother again.
   • Both children expressed an awareness that the Mother was fearful of the Father and that he had done the wrong thing and breached Orders.
   • Both children expressed fears that the Father may take them again. This fear appears to have been exacerbated by him approaching them after school and attending at their home in breach of the Intervention Order.
2. Those views were taken into account by the court child expert.
3. I place some weight on the children's views as expressed to the court child expert and the independent children's lawyer given their ages and level of maturity as described by the parties to the court child expert and as assessed by the court child expert. However, I also keep in mind it is evident from the child impact report the children have been exposed by the parties to information about the dispute between them. I note in particular the court child expert's opinion that it is possible the children's views are aligned with those of the mother because of their experience of the father but also potentially due to exposure to her views. I will return to this issue when considering the parties' parenting capacity, including the capacity of each of them to support a positive relationship between the children and the other parent.

The developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the children: section 60CC(2)(c)

1. The mother deposed the children do not have any medical problems or special needs. The child impact report reported that both parents described X as highly academic and intelligent, sporty and aspirational. They were reported as describing Y as happy, caring, bright, that she loves school, is social and has leadership qualities.
2. The court child expert assessed the children presented as polite, well-spoken children who were able to articulate their experiences using sophisticated language which they confidently explained the meaning of, consistent with their parents' description of them being academically strong and bright.

The capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the children to provide for the children's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs: section 60CC(2)(d)

1. I am not satisfied the father has the required capacity to provide for the children's developmental, psychological and emotional needs given his use of family violence and his views and attitudes, in particular towards the mother. I find there is a high risk of the father exposing the children to those views and attitudes given his apparent lack of insight into the inappropriateness of doing so, as evident from the child impact report and the attitude conveyed during his submissions made to the court.
2. I accept the court child expert's explanation as to the potential impact on the children of the father's views about the mother on their parenting relationship with both parents, as follows:

Neither child appeared to have confidence in their father's capacity to refrain from embroiling them in his views and the parental conflict, and this corresponds with comments made by [the father] that he has behaved in this way and views the children as being able to make decisions about their future parenting arrangements. For [X] and [Y] to have safe, trusting, and emotionally secure relationships with their father, he will need to make shifts in his attitudes about their mother and sharing such with the children, and be consistent and predictable in his positive behaviour around and towards them.

[The father's] critical and derogatory views about [the mother] could potentially undermine her parenting role, and she should be safeguarded in her parenting of [X] and [Y].

1. I accept the children's relationship with the mother should be safeguarded, as the parent upon whom they rely upon for their care and support, including emotional support.
2. Additionally, I am not satisfied the father currently has the required physical capacity to care for the children in the absence of evidence he has appropriate housing for them or of his current circumstances.
3. I am satisfied the mother has the required capacity to provide for the children's needs, having regard in particular to the assessment of the court child expert (including that the mother had a sound understanding of the children's needs and her detailed descriptions of her involvement in their day to day activities) and the children's experience of her care as reported by them to the court child expert. The mother has acted protectively in seeking intervention orders to protect her and the children from family violence, initiating these proceedings to seek orders in relation to the children and reporting to police the conduct which contravenes the family violence orders.
4. I do have some reservations about the mother's capacity to safeguard the children from information about the dispute between the parties and her apparent reliance on them for emotional support, which was identified as a potential issue in the child impact report. In light of those concerns, I find the injunctions to safeguard the children from that conduct by both parents and order requiring the mother to attend family violence counselling are appropriate and in the children's best interests, as recommended by the independent children's lawyer.

The benefit to the children of being able to have a relationship with their parents, and other people who are significant to them, where it is safe to do so: section 60CC(2)(e)

1. In relation to sub-section 60CC(2)(e), the explanatory memorandum to the Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 explains:[35]

This consideration recognises the importance of parental relationships, and relationships with other people who are significant to the child (such as grandparents or members of a broader kinship group) to a child's wellbeing. Where appropriate and safe, parenting orders that ensure children benefit from a close and nurturing relationship with their parents should be made.

1. I find the children would benefit from a relationship with the father, relying on my findings that he was previously involved in their care and the court child expert's report that the children provided information about positive experiences with the father, such as his cooking and being involved in fun activities including playing sports in the back yard of their home. However, my priority is to ensure the children's safety and I find it is not currently safe for the children to spend time with the father other than on a limited supervised basis.
2. The court child expert reported the children spoke positively about relationships with their maternal family members who they see regularly. They also spoke positively about relationships with their paternal grandmother but indicated feeling uncomfortable and awkward when pressured to speak with their father on the phone and to share their views about the parenting arrangements when they last spent time with the paternal grandmother earlier in 2025. It is possible this communication constitutes a breach of the intervention order then in place but I cannot be certain of that in the absence of any evidence as to whether the phone call had been agreed with the mother.
3. It is positive the mother has supported the children spending time with the paternal grandmother independently from the father. To encourage her to continue to do so, I will include provision in the orders I make for the mother to provide a copy of the final parenting orders and any family violence order in place to the children's grandparents, so they are each aware of the injunctions and protections in place. I will also make provision for the paternal grandmother to accompany the father when he spends supervised time with the children, at his election, to assist to support the children's relationship with her.

Children's care, time and communication arrangements

1. I find it is in the children's best interests to live with the mother and to spend time with the father, professionally supervised by a children's contact service, on four occasions a year. I make this determination having regard to the following matters in particular:

(a) My assessment of arrangements that will protect the children from an unacceptable risk of harm and promote their safety;

(b) The court child expert's recommendation that:

Only professionally supervised time with [the father] can be supported at the current time. However, without a fixed abode and uncertainty about his future living arrangements, it may be challenging for [the father] to commit to regular time with the children thus affecting the quality of those relationships moving forward.

(c) The children's expressed views; and

(d) It is likely the children spending time with the father on four occasions a year can be supported by a children's contact service on an ongoing basis pursuant to final orders and will be achievable for the father if he remains living interstate.

1. I accept ongoing supervision of the children's time with the father is not ideal. However, as the Full Court explained with reference to key authorities in Lainhart & Ellinson (citations omitted):[36]

While orders for long-term or indefinite supervision are generally discouraged as being undesirable, such orders have never been prohibited when the only unpalatable alternative is the complete elimination of a parent from a child's life. Every case must be decided on its own facts.

1. I accept the submission that it would not be in the children's best interest to set up an expectation for them to spend time with the father which then does not occur. Accordingly, I will require the father to meet any costs of supervision in advance (to show his bona fides in attending) and provide for time to be suspended if the father fails to attend two consecutive occasions of time provided for the children to spend time with him.
2. I will make orders requiring the parties to provide to the children's contact service a copy of the final parenting orders I make, my reasons, the child impact report and any family violence order affecting the parties and/or the children. This will allow the children's contact service to provide informed supervision and support for the children. To make it clear the children's contact service is entitled to do so, I will also include specific provision in the orders requesting the children's contact service to interrupt any occasion of time the children spend with the father (and return the children to the mother's care) if the father is observed to breach the injunctions I make or any family violence order in place protecting the children.
3. I find it is in the children's best interests for their periodic time spent with the father to be supplemented by regular communication by phone or electronic means, on a weekly basis, on each of their birthdays, on Christmas Day and upon the reasonable request of the children. I will make an order in the terms recommended by the independent children's lawyer providing for the children's regular calls with the father to take place at a fixed time so they form part of the children's regular routine and are prioritised by both parties. I will provide for those calls to take place on Sunday as ultimately proposed by the mother, when she submits the children are more likely to be available. I will make provision for the mother to notify the father of an alternate time for the calls to be facilitated if the children will not be available on any particular Sunday.
4. I also find it is in the children's best interests for an order to be made providing for the father to send appropriate letters and gifts to the children even though the court child expert reported the father did not offer to reciprocate phone calls and letters from the children. I will provide for any gifts and letters to be sent by the father to an address to be provided by the mother, which may be a third party address or post office box to protect her safety. The father will of course be required to comply with any family violence order in place when communicating with the children and with the other injunctions provided by the orders I make. I will make provision for the mother to end any call or not to pass on any communication that does not comply with those requirements, to protect children's safety and alcohol safety.

1. Relevant to my determination of the matter of decision-making responsibility for the children, the provisions of Part VII of the Act provide:

(a) In the absence of a court order, each of the parents of a child has parental responsibility for the child.[37] This is the case despite any changes in the parents' relationship, including their separation;[38]

(b) Subject to any court orders, parents of a child are encouraged, where it is safe to do so, to consult each other about major long-term issues in relation to a child;[39]

(c) The power of the court to make parenting orders, includes the power to make an order that deals with the allocation of parental responsibility,[40] and specifically, the allocation of responsibility for making major long-term issues in relation to a child;[41]

(d) If a parenting order deals with the allocation of responsibility for making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to a child, that order may provide for joint or sole decision-making in relation to all or specified major long-term issues;[42] and

(e) If a parenting order provides for joint decision-making in relation to all or specified major long-term issues in relation to a child, then, except to the extent the order otherwise specifies, the order is taken to require each of the persons with decision-making responsibility to consult with one another in relation to each such decision and to make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision.[43]

1. There is no longer any presumption in relation to the allocation of parental responsibility by the court and the court's focus is to be on the needs and best interests of the individual child.
2. Having considered all of the evidence, I am satisfied it is in the children's best interests for the mother to have sole decision-making responsibility for the children, placing weight on the following matters in particular:

(a) The father's use of family violence, including to coerce and control the mother;

(b) The evidence adduced by the mother of the father's communications sent to her;

(c) The importance of making orders that promote the safety of the mother and the children, including by protecting the mother from being subjected to further family violence by the father and the children being exposed to his use of violence;

(d) The father's failure to file court documents and properly participate in these proceedings, indicating an unwillingness or incapacity to undertake work required to address the children's best interests; and

(e) On the evidence before me, I am not persuaded the mother has made decisions about major long-term issues for the children which are contrary to their best interests.

1. The mother has proposed an order requiring her to inform the father of decisions she proposes to make and to consider his "comments" about those proposed decisions. Such an order has the benefit of affording the father an opportunity to have input in decisions to be made in relation to the children, which I find is in their best interests provided the mother and children are protected from being subjected to or exposed to family violence during that consultation process. I will therefore make this order but providing for the father to provide his "views" about the proposed decision in writing rather than his "comments" as proposed by the mother and requiring the mother to consider his views, only as are relevant to the decision to be made. I include provision for the mother only to consider views provided by the father within the timeframe requested by her, including because of information previously provided by the father to the court that when he is working regionally, he is often "out of service for a long time."[44] This will ensure the mother is not prevented from making timely decisions for the children if the father is uncontactable and will safeguard the mother from the father using the consultation requirement as an opportunity to coerce and control her, by delaying his response.
2. I will make a notation to the order providing for consultation, making it clear the father may not engage in family violence when communicating his views to the mother. This will sit comfortably with the family violence order currently in place to protect the mother from family violence. With those changes, I am satisfied the order proposed by the mother will aide to protect her from coercive and controlling conduct by the father because she will not be required to seek his consent before making decisions about major long-term issues for the children, only to consult with him as provided in the order.
3. I will make an order providing for the parties to communicate by email for the purpose of the final orders, unless otherwise ordered or agreed in writing.

1. To make an injunction pursuant to section 68B of the Act in relation to the children, I am required to be satisfied that it is appropriate for their welfare. Section 68B is informed by the best interests of the child but not governed by the paramountcy principle.[45] The Full Court in Bielen & Kozma[46] observed there is no definition of the "welfare" of the child in the Act and expressed the view that consideration of matters impacting upon the welfare of a child "necessarily involves focusing upon the immediate, medium and long-term impact of proposed orders upon the child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being."
2. I find the injunctions proposed by the independent children's lawyer are appropriate for the welfare of the children, to safeguard them from denigration of their parents and exposure to parental conflict and the disputes between their parents and to support their relationship with both parents. The benefit to the children of such injunctions is evident from my reasons so far and the following assessments of the court child expert in the child impact report:

[X] and [Y]'s home life and parental separation experiences seems to have exposed them to parental views, conflict, financial matters, and alleged family violence. They gave examples of such exposure. [X] and [Y] seem to have information shared to them by one or both parents, and they had considerable insight into family violence matters such as conditions of court orders, reporting breaches, outcomes of reported breaches, and their father's alleged criminal offending behaviour.

[The father] will need to refrain from discussing his views and seeking the children's views about the future parenting arrangements, otherwise he may find that the children are less likely to want to engage in conversation with him and this may distance the connections between them.

[The mother] should refrain from sharing her views with the children and exposing them to her experiences in the relationship with the father and police/court interventions regarding the family violence orders and allegations and breaches.

1. The court child expert recommended a hair follicle test for each parent's alcohol consumption may be of benefit. Where there is no evidence (save for the father's allegations) that the mother's parenting has been impacted by the use of alcohol and I have determined the children's time with the father is to be professionally supervised, the children's safety does not currently require alcohol testing be undertaken. Professional supervision will adequately safeguard the children from the risks associated with the possibility of the father misusing alcohol.

1. As explained earlier in my reasons, I will make orders providing for the father to attend a men's behaviour change program and for the mother to attend family violence counselling, as recommended by the court child expert and the independent children's lawyer. The order I make for the children to spend supervised time with the father will be conditional upon him having provided confirmation of completion of that program to the mother and to the children's contact service.
2. To support that education and counselling and any other counselling, treatment or support the parties may seek, I will make an order permitting the parties to each provide copies of the orders I make, these reasons and the child impact report to those organisations and professionals providing that support.
3. I am satisfied I have jurisdiction and power to make these orders, which provide for the parties to participate in an appropriate course, program or other service, to support their care of the children and the children's welfare[47] and do not compel them to undertake therapeutic treatment.[48]

1. The mother seeks orders to facilitate her travelling internationally with the children. She did not give evidence of any current plans to travel but submitted it would be in the children's best interests for orders to be made now to facilitate future overseas travel (including if they wished to travel for a school trip for example) without the need to return to court.
2. Although he did not file any court documents, the father opposes this aspect of the mother's application "100%", submitting the children have only recently undertaken travel in Australia (referring to the family's campervan trip to Queensland), he has concerns relating to the mother's mental health and the children's welfare and he would have "grave concerns" the children would not be returned to Australia, particularly given the mother has already "taken" the children from him.
3. In Kuebler v Kuebler, Asche SJ sitting in the court's appellate jurisdiction provided the following guidance for the consideration of matters where parents seek to travel overseas with children:[49]

In my view, the considerations that should be given to an application which involves the custodial parent taking a child out of the jurisdiction, without being exhaustive, would be these:

(a) The length of the proposed stay out of the jurisdiction;

(b) The bona fides of the application;

(c) The effect on the child of any deprivation of access;

(d) Any threats to the welfare of the child by the circumstances of the proposed environment;

(e) The degree of satisfaction in which the Court based its assessment of the parties that a promise of a return to the jurisdiction would be honoured.

1. In Line & Line ,[50] the Full Court set out the matters to be taken into account when assessing the risk of children being retained overseas.
2. Having assessed the evidence in respect of those considerations, I am not persuaded the children's safety would be compromised by travelling overseas with the mother or as approved by her in future for a school trip, without the consent of the father. I am not persuaded there is an unacceptable risk of the mother retaining the children overseas as asserted by the father. Her ties are in Australia. She has been employed with her current employer for some 20 years. She is an Australian citizen. There is no evidence she has family in or ties with another country.
3. As already explained, I do not find the mother's mental health poses a risk to the children's safety.
4. In the absence of evidence of such a risk, I find it is in the children's best interest to have the opportunity to benefit from overseas travel and the learning, cultural and life experiences travel has to offer. This is clearly something the parties valued prior to separation, given their decision to take the children on an extended trip in Queensland during term 3 of 2024.
5. An order for the mother to have authority to obtain passports for the children and to travel with them overseas without the father's consent is consistent with the order for her to have sole decision-making responsibility about major long-term issues for the children with requirement for her to consult with the father. It removes another opportunity for the father to coerce and control the mother (by refusing his consent or attaching conditions to his consent), it avoids the children being exposed to conflict between their parents about this issue and it will assist to avoid further court proceedings, all of which I find to be in the children's best interests. I will therefore make such an order but adopting an alternate form of order to refer to section 11 of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) and expressly providing the mother may provide a copy of the final orders to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australian Passport Office).

1. The mother seeks an order that if either party seeks to vary or change these orders, the parties first attend family dispute resolution before commencing court proceedings. I will not make such an order given the parties are required (subject to exceptions) to comply with the statutory and regulatory pre-action procedures, including requirements for family dispute resolution, before commencing further court proceedings in relation to the children. They will also be required to satisfy the provisions of section 65DAAA of the Act, which sets out when the court may reconsider a final parenting order.
2. In making my determination for the children to spend only limited supervised time with the father, I have taken into account that this outcome entails the potential for further court proceedings if the father addresses the risks and deficiencies in his parenting identified in these reasons. However, it is not possible for me to make orders now that contemplate alternate forms of supervision or supervision ceasing in the future. This is because it is not known if the father will, for example, make full and frank disclosure of his living and personal circumstances and engage meaningfully in the required men's behaviour change program or any further recommended counselling or support to address his attitudes and use of family violence. Being a judicial function, I cannot delegate the responsibility to make that assessment to another person or professional.[51] It will be a matter for a court to assess in the future if the requirements of section 65DAAA of the Act are satisfied and the parties are unable to reach an agreement on alternate orders after engaging with the required pre-action procedures.

1. I therefore make the final parenting orders as set out at the commencement of these reasons, finding them to be in the best interests of the children.

1. Part VIIIAB of the Act contains the statutory provisions applying to the alteration of property interests between parties in a de facto relationship, including section 90SM.
2. Significant amendments to Part VIIIAB of the Act, made by the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) ("Amendment Act") commenced operation on 10 June 2025. Those amendments apply to the determination of this proceeding, being a proceeding instituted before 10 June 2025, in respect of which a final hearing had not commenced before that date.[52]
3. Subject to some other provisions of the Act, section 90SM(1) empowers the court to make such order altering the interests of parties to a marriage in their property as the court considers appropriate. In particular, section 90SM(2) requires that a court must not make an order under section 90SM unless satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order. This requirement is intended to permeate the entire property decision-making process codified by the new subsections 90SM(2) and (3).[53]
4. Section 90SM(3) of the Act sets out the property decision-making framework and the approach the court is to take when considering what order to make under section 90SM (if any), including that the court:

(a) is to identify:

(i) the existing legal and equitable rights and interests in any property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; and

(ii) the existing liabilities of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; and

(b) is to take into account (except for the purpose of making an order with respect to the ownership of property that is a companion animal):

(i) the considerations set out in subsection (4) (considerations relating to contributions); and

(ii) the considerations set out in subsection (5) (considerations relating to current and future circumstances).

1. The Full Court has emphasised the nature of the task required by section 90SM[54] is "in essence, a broad discretionary assessment, which is neither an accounting nor mathematical exercise and which, effectively as a corollary, requires a "broad-brush approach"."[55]

Existing legal and equitable interests in property

1. For the reasons that follow, I find the parties had the following legal and equitable interests in property at the time of the hearing (rounded to the nearest dollar):

Balance of net proceeds from the sale of former family home, held by mother's lawyers in trust for the parties pursuant to orders made on 20 June 2025 ("net sale proceeds")

1. I have accepted the estimates given by the mother in her affidavit filed on 15 May 2025 of the value of the vehicles registered in her name where the father did not adduce any evidence to challenge these estimates.
2. Where the father did not challenge the values attributed to the mother's bank accounts and superannuation, I accept those values. I use the estimate provided for the mother's bank account in her affidavit filed on 15 May 2025 where she did not provide an updated balance for that account.
3. The mother estimated the value of the camper trailer at $15,000 but did not explain that estimate, save to say her mother gifted $15,000 "towards" the purchase in 2024. She estimated $50,000 had been expended on Motor Vehicle 1, including $18,000 in June 2022 to purchase the vehicle and monies spent on upgrades. She deposed those costs had been funded from monies drawn against the parties' mortgage. However, she acknowledged the current value of the vehicle is unknown. By way of submission, the father disputed the mother's accounts of monies spent on these items but did not adduce evidence to contradict her evidence or adduce evidence of their current value, notwithstanding they are items that remain in his possession. I am unable to attribute a value to either of these items on the evidence before me. I will take into account pursuant to section 90SM(5)(w) the father has retained the camper trailer and Motor Vehicle 1 of unknown value, in respect of which the mother has made significant contributions.
4. The mother does not know what superannuation the father holds. From the father's statement from the bar table that "my superannuation is my business", I infer he does hold some superannuation although I am unable to attribute a value to it. This is another matter I will take into account pursuant to section 90SM(5)(w).
5. I have not included accounts the mother says she holds for the children (a CBA Youth Saver account held for X and a Westpac Choice account held for Y), where the father did not dispute those monies belong to the children. I find the mother holds those accounts beneficially for the children.

Monies from which the parties have benefited after separation

1. Following separation, the mother has applied monies from N Bank account, being joint funds of the parties, to meet legal fees and other expenses. The third of her updated costs notices filed on 15 December 2025 at my direction, records she has paid legal costs of $25,957.46 from the N Bank account.
2. In Chorn & Hopkins[58] the Full Court confirmed that generally, "...where the payment of legal costs can be regarded as a premature distribution of funds (in which both parties have an interest), it is appropriate to add back those costs as a notional asset". The applicability of this guideline following the High Court's decision in Stanford v Stanford[59] was confirmed and explained by the Full Court in Trevi & Trevi.[60] However, the Full Court in Shinohara & Shinohara[61] explained the practice of "adding back" prematurely distributed joint property is unavailable following amendments made to the Act by the Amendment Act. Accordingly, the monies expended by the mother from N Bank account and applied to her legal costs is a matter I will take into account pursuant to 90SM(5)(w), noting section 114UB provides that ordinarily (subject to the court's discretion to make an order to the contrary), each party to proceedings under the Act is to bear their own legal costs.

Other monies expended from the N Bank account

1. Whilst the father alleged from the bar table that the mother "stole" about $115,000 from the N Bank account, he did not adduce evidence to support this claim, including when invited to adduce evidence of the balance of the N Bank account as at the date of separation.
2. In her financial statement filed on 20 December 2024, the mother deposed the N Bank account had a current balance of $64,501.39. She has paid $26,000 (rounded) in legal costs from the N Bank account. A tendered bank statement[62] shows she has recently paid from that account, $3,000 to have the father's belongings removed from the former family home and has expended $849 on house and garden cleaning, leaving the account with a current balance of $33,547. Accordingly, most of the balance of the N Bank account as at the time she filed her financial statement has been accounted for.
3. Evidence was not adduced of the balance held in the N Bank account when the parties separated in August 2024, to support the father's claim the mother has misappropriated a significant sum from the N Bank account. To the extent the mother may have drawn on the balance of the N Bank account to supplement her income and meet reasonable expenses after separation in August 2024, before making her financial statement in December 2024, that would not be a matter requiring adjustment pursuant to section 90SM(5) provided she did so to a reasonable extent. The Full Court made clear in M & M[63] and the court has repeatedly emphasised in subsequent cases:

Neither the Family Law Act nor the case law require that parties go into a state of suspended economic animation once their marriage breaks down pending the resolution of their financial arrangements. Parties are entitled to provide for their own support. Whether any expenditure so incurred is reasonable or extravagant is a matter that can be determined by the trial judge.

1. Pursuant to orders made on 20 June 2025, the parties each received 20% of the net proceeds from the sale of the former family home by way of partial property settlement. During the course of the final hearing, it became apparent the parties each received, $41,066.50 pursuant to that order, including:

(a) 20% of the net deposit, being $5,040; and

(b) 20% of the balance paid on settlement net of expenses, being $36,026.50.[64]

1. Neither party gave evidence of how these funds have been applied by them. They are not reflected in the bank balances attributed to the parties on the balance sheet (being a historical balance for the mother of $2,100 and an unknown balance for the father).
2. The receipt of monies by way of interim or partial property settlement in this way has been another category of notional add back long accepted by the court as an approach available to do justice and equity between parties.[65] However, as with the adding back of monies expended on legal fees, this approach is no longer available following amendments made by the Amendment Act, as explained by the Full Court in Shinohara. I will therefore take into account the monies the parties have each received from the net proceeds from the sale of the former family home pursuant to section 90SM(5)(w).

1. The duty of disclosure applying to the parties in this proceeding is reflected in Part 6.1 of the Rules. Sub-rule 6.01(1) provides that each party has a duty to the court and to the other party to give full and frank disclosure of all information relevant to the proceeding, in a timely manner. Sub-rule 6.01(2) provides that duty applies from the start of the proceeding and continues until it is finalised. Rule 6.06 sets out the duty of disclosure as it applies specifically to financial or property proceedings.
2. The father has failed to comply with his duty of disclosure in this matter, including by failing to file a financial statement and to provide the mother with information and documents in relation to his financial circumstances. I find he did so deliberately. His attitude towards his duty of disclosure was evident from his failure to file only court documents not withstanding his attendances at court and repeated opportunities to do so. This attitude was also apparent from remarks made by the father during the hearing, including, "my superannuation is my business" and, in response to an invitation to provide a bank record he said he had confirming payments to the parties from the sale of the home, "that's got my personal bank account details on it so I'm a bit reluctant to provide that".
3. Having made this finding, Full Court authority supports that I can take a robust approach and should not be "unduly cautious" about making findings in favour of the mother[66] and can draw such adverse inferences from the non-disclosure as can be supported by the evidence before me.[67] The duty of disclosure is absolute and, had I not made a finding of deliberate non-disclosure, even accidental non-disclosure may warrant the erring of generosity to a party who might be otherwise seen to be disadvantaged by the lack of complete candour.[68] In Mayhew & Fairweather[69] the Full Court confirmed the "usual way" in which defective disclosure is taken into account is either by adding a sum to the pool, reflective of an estimate of the value of undisclosed property or under the former section 75(2)(o) of the Act. In this case, where there is insufficient evidence for me to make findings in respect of the father's financial position and to include a value for his assets on the balance sheet, I instead take into account his non-disclosure pursuant to section 90SM(5)(w).

1. In this case, the most valuable of the parties' assets was the former family home, which was jointly owned and was their home together with their children. The breakdown of the parties' relationship and their separation brought to an end their common use of property, including their use of that home. The home has now been sold and the net proceeds remain held in trust to be distributed pursuant to orders of this court. On this basis, I find the requirements of section 90SM(2) are satisfied and it is, in all the circumstances, just and equitable for there to be an alteration of property interests between the parties.

1. Given the modest value of the parties' assets and the absence of evidence of the father's superannuation interests, I take a single pool approach to the determination of this matter. I therefore consider the contributions made by both parties and the matters relevant to section 90SM(5) to their non-superannuation and superannuation assets together.

1. As required by sub-section 90SM(3)(b)(i) of the Act, I am to take into account the following considerations set out in subsection 90SM(4), so far as they are relevant:

(a) the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the de facto relationship, or a child of the de facto relationship:

(i) to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; or

(ii) otherwise in relation to any of that last‑mentioned property;

whether or not that last‑mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them;

(b) the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the de facto relationship, or a child of the de facto relationship:

(i) to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; or

(ii) otherwise in relation to any of that last‑mentioned property;

whether or not that last‑mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them;

(c) the contribution made by a party to the de facto relationship to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the de facto relationship and any children of the de facto relationship, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent;

(ca) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the de facto relationship has subjected or exposed the other party, on the ability of a party to the de facto relationship to make the kind of contributions referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c);

(d) the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the de facto relationship;

(f) any other order made under this Act affecting a party to the de facto relationship or a child of the de facto relationship;

(g) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the de facto relationship has provided for a child of the de facto relationship.

1. Parliament made its intention clear when amending section 90SM that the court's consideration of these matters remain part of a holistic assessment of the respective contributions of the parties, reflecting the well-established position at common law.[70] Those common law principles require that when determining what orders are to be made, the court is to approach the assessment of contributions holistically, by analysing the nature, form and characteristics of those contributions with reference to the particular circumstances of the particular relationship before the court.[71] This process involves the exercise of a wide discretion, not the performance of a mathematical or accounting exercise[72] and should be undertaken without over-zealous attention to the ascertainment of contributions.[73] All contributions are to be weighed collectively, not compartmentalised with some contributions weighed against others.[74]

1. I accept the mother's evidence that when the parties began living together in March 2002, neither party had any assets of significance, noting the mother was then aged 18 and the father was aged 20.

1. The mother acknowledges the father contributed $10,000 to the purchase of the former family home in 2005 from an inheritance he received. I accept the mother also contributed $10,000 to the purchase but she did so by borrowing monies for her grandparents which loan was subsequently repaid. Assessed at that time, the father's contribution was greater because it did not require repayment. However, these contributions were made approximately 20 years ago and the disparity in the nature and value of their contributions to the purchase has little bearing on my assessment of contributions given the myriad of contributions they have each subsequently made during that time. The former family home was sold in 2025 and the remaining net sale proceeds (being $123,199.50 after the parties each received 20% pursuant to interim orders) are held in trust by the mother's lawyers.
2. I accept the mother's evidence her mother made a gift of $15,000 in 2024 towards the purchase of the camper trailer, which the parties subsequently used to travel with the children and which remains in the father's possession. This was a relatively recent contribution, which I take to be made on behalf of the mother in the absence of evidence this was not a gift intended only to benefit her child, being the mother.[75] As already noted, the mother did not give evidence of the purchase price of the camper trailer or of its current value.
3. The father also informed the court from the bar table that Motor Vehicle 2 was gifted by the mother's mother. I take this into account as a contribution made on behalf of the mother, which I am unable to quantify, but noting Motor Vehicle 2 has been included on the balance sheet with a value of $12,000.

1. The mother worked in paid employment from 2004, save for periods of parental leave following the birth of both children. She worked full-time prior to X's birth in 2014 and then part-time. I accept the mother's evidence that from 2014, she has made contributions towards home loan expenses, household and family expenses. The father also worked in paid employment for most of the parties' relationship but evidence was not adduced in respect of his employment, income and application of his income. The mother deposed the father has not had a stable income since around 2023 but did not provide evidence in support of that submission.

1. I accept the mother was primarily responsible for the children's care during the parties' relationship, given her evidence she took parental leave following the birth of each child and worked part-time, to allow her to take the children to and from school. I accept the mother's evidence she also utilised long service leave entitlement to care for the children in the first year of their lives and for the family to travel to Queensland in 2024. As already indicated in my reasons, I find the father also contributed to the children's care but to a lesser extent than the mother.

1. The mother has been solely responsible for the children's care after separation, in August 2024, so for approximately 16 months by the time of the final hearing.
2. I accept the mother's evidence she initially continued to make home loan repayments after separation, amounting to $13,860, and that she paid for home and contents insurance and utilities in the amount of approximately $1,467. However, she did not identify the source of those payments. The mother's weekly income net of tax is approximately $902 per week and she deposed the required mortgage payments were $924 per week. In the absence of evidence the monies applied by the mother from her salary to the mortgage was supplemented from another source, I infer the mother drew upon savings in existence at separation to at least some extent to contribute to those costs. To the extent she did so, the father is also to be regarded as contributing to those costs. However, given the deficiencies in the evidence before me I cannot quantify either party's contributions in respect of the home loan payments made after separation.
3. In November 2024, the mother applied for hardship assistance from the parties' lender, who agreed to postpone mortgage repayments until May 2025. The monies paid by the mother after separation toward the home loan were insufficient to meet the parties' obligations and the balance of the home loan increased from approximately $580,000 at the time the mother filed her financial statement in December 2024 to $597,119 when she filed her affidavit on 15 May 2025, with a total payment required to the parties' lender on settlement of $612,984.41.[76] It is apparent from tendered correspondence, the mother sought the father's cooperation with the sale of the former family home from at least November 2024.[77] I find the father's failure to promptly agree to and cooperate with the sale of the former family home contributed to the increase in the party's indebtedness. This is a matter I take into account pursuant to section 90SM(5)(d) of the Act. I take into account the mother's efforts to secure orders for a private sale rather than for the bank to foreclose on the mortgage as proposed by the father in his email to her,[78] was a valuable contribution made by her in an effort to protect the most significant of the parties' assets.
4. The mother was required to ready the former family home for sale, including arranging for the father's belongings to be packed for collection by him and then removed from the property where he failed to collect them. I find this required a significant amount of work given the photographic evidence adduced by the mother of the state of some of those items.[79] She was also appointed pursuant to interim orders to conduct the sale, and I find the work required to undertake that task is a further contribution made by her to be given weight.
5. In relation to the father's belongings, the mother deposed that in July 2025, she engaged a removalist service to attend at the former family home and remove and dispose of those items pursuant to order 5 of the orders made on 13 June 2025 ("June 2025 orders"). The removalist's fee of $3,000 was paid from the parties' N Bank account.[80] The June 2025 orders provided that the question of who was to be responsible for that cost was reserved to the final hearing with a notation recording the mother seeks the father be solely responsible for those costs. Given those costs have already been paid from joint funds, I will not make any order for reimbursement but will instead take into account that both parties have contributed to that cost in my assessment of their contributions.
6. I find the mother made greater contributions to the conservation and maintenance of the former family home after separation, by her contribution to the home loan and outgoings, maintenance of the property, seeking orders for sale, preparing the property for sale and attending to the sale. However, I also take into account she had the benefit of living in the former family home after the breakdown of the parties' relationship, to the exclusion of the father.

1. Notwithstanding the submission made in the mother's case outline, counsel for the mother appropriately conceded there is insufficient evidence before the court to support a finding the family violence perpetrated by the father affected the mother's ability to the kind of contributions referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section 90SM(4).[81]

1. Whilst I have set out my consideration of the parties' evidence in respect of their contributions in categories for convenience, referring to initial contributions and post-separation contributions for example, I have weighed and assessed the contributions of all kinds and from all sources made by each of the parties throughout the period of cohabitation, as the Full Court in Wallis & Manning[82] made clear is the task of a trial judge. My holistic assessment of the parties' contributions has extended to the period after separation.
2. I have also taken into account those matters in paragraphs (d), (f) and (g) of subsection 90SM(4) as required by section 90SM(3). There is no evidence to indicate the orders I am asked to make will have any impact on the earning capacity of either party or that there is any order made under the Act affecting a party or the child. The father has not so far paid child support for the children. There is no child support assessment in place.
3. Having undertaken this assessment, I find the parties' contributions, assessed in percentage terms, to be 60% to the mother and 40% to the father: a differential of 20%. I do so placing weight on the gifts from the mother's mother (including the gift of Motor Vehicle 2 acknowledged by the father, the recent gift of $15,000 towards the purchase of the caravan which is to be retained by the father) and the mother's contributions made after separation, to the care and support of the children and in respect of the former family home.
4. Where I have found the total net value of the parties' known assets including superannuation to be approximately $344,528.50, applying those percentages to those known assets and superannuation would see the mother receive assets with a net value equivalent to approximately $206,717 and the father approximately $137,811 (rounded). The difference between the value of property to be retained by the parties on this assessment would be approximately $68,905. The mother has also contributed directly and indirectly to assets which have not been valued, including the vehicle and caravan in the father's possession and his superannuation and this is a matter to be taken into account when I consider those assets pursuant to section 90SM(5)(w).

CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO CURRENT & FUTURE CIRCUMSTANCES

1. Subsection 90SM(5) requires me to take into account a range of listed considerations for the purposes of subparagraph 90SM(3)(b)(ii), being considerations relating to current and future circumstances, so far as they are relevant. Parliament has made clear that the list of matters in section 90SM(5) is non-hierarchical and consistent with existing jurisprudence, they are to be considered as a part of a holistic assessment of the current and future circumstances of the parties.[83] I have considered all of those considerations as relevant to this matter and in particular those matters I will now refer to.

1. It was not contended the family violence the mother was subjected to and/or the children were exposed to has an impact on the current and future circumstances of the mother.
2. The parties are of a comparable age. At the time of the final hearing, the mother was 42 and the father 44. There is no evidence either party is in poor health.
3. The mother's gross income from her employment as a community worker is $1,082 per week, which is equivalent to $56,264 per annum.
4. In October 2025, the father reportedly informed the court child expert he was reliant on Centrelink benefits though was seeking longer term employment. He also informed the court child expert he is uncontactable when working in rural areas. There is no evidence before the court of the father's recent employment history or capacity for employment. The mother did not adduce evidence of the details of his employment or income during the parties' relationship to enable me to assess his income earning capacity based on his previous work history and income. However, there is no evidence before me the father does not have the capacity to engage in full-time gainful employment and earn an income equivalent to or greater than that of the mother.
5. I take into account the modest value of the parties' assets including superannuation as known to me and of the value of assets I have assessed the mother should retain pursuant to my contribution-based assessment.
6. The mother disclosed she has a modest financial resource in the form of long service leave entitlements valued at $3,237. The mother has previously utilised her long service leave to care for the children and I expect she will continue to do so given she will remain responsible for their care. Accordingly, this is not a matter I consider warrants an adjustment pursuant to subsection 90SM(5)(c).
7. I take into account pursuant to sub-section 90SM(5)(d), the father's conduct in opposing the early sale of the former family home which I find contributed to the increase in the parties' indebtedness and constitutes waste arising from his deliberate or reckless disregard for the consequences of his conduct.
8. Pursuant to the final parenting orders I have determined to make, the mother will have sole responsibility for the care of the children. She is currently renting accommodation for herself and the children but did not adduce evidence of her rental costs. She has a need to provide housing for herself and the children on an ongoing basis. This supports an adjustment in her favour pursuant to section 90SM(5)(f). Whilst the father submitted he requires funds to secure housing appropriate to accommodate the children, the parenting orders I make will not provide for the children to spend time with him other than at a children's contact service, so he will not have that need.
9. Save for the father informing the court child expert he receives Centrelink benefits, evidence was not adduced of any entitlement of the parties to any government or other pension, allowance or benefit.
10. The mother did not give evidence she has re-partnered or lives with any person other than the children. The father informed the court child expert he is living with a friend in Queensland. There is no evidence before me of the financial circumstances of their cohabitation.
11. The father is not currently paying child support. Given his attitude towards the mother and this proceeding, I am not satisfied he will provide meaningful child support for the children on an ongoing basis.
12. Pursuant to sub-section 90SM(5)(w), I am of the opinion the justice of this case requires the following other facts and circumstances to be taken into account, as foreshadowed earlier in my reasons:

(a) The father's non-disclosure of his financial circumstances;

(b) That the father has retained Motor Vehicle 1 and camper van, which were (on the mother's evidence) acquired and improved spending approximately $65,000 or more in 2022 and 2024 respectively. These are assets to which the mother has made a direct contribution, via the gift from her mother applied to purchase the caravan and drawing down against the parties' home loan to fund the acquisition and improvement of Motor Vehicle 1. The current value of these assets are unknown but their acquisition and improvement costs were significant in the context of the parties' modest assets;

(c) The father has superannuation of an unknown value in respect of which the mother has made an indirect contribution to the extent it relates to his employment or contributions made during the parties' relationship and/or after separation; and

(d) The mother has had the benefit of $25,957.46 from joint funds from the N Bank account, applied to the payment of her legal fees.

1. Save for the monies the mother has utilised to pay her legal fees, these matters cumulatively warrant a substantial adjustment in favour of the mother.
2. I also take into account pursuant to sub-section 90SM(5)(w), the parties have each received $41,066.50 by way of partial property settlement from the net proceeds from the sale of the former family home.
3. Taking into account all of these matters, in the context of the modest value of the parties' assets and superannuation and that the mother will be receiving a significant proportion of her entitlement as superannuation, I find it is just and equitable for there to be an "adjustment" from my contribution based assessment pursuant to section 79(5) of 30% in favour of the mother so she receives 90% of those assets with a known value and the father 10%. I do so taking a robust approach given the father's non-disclosure. To do otherwise would risk the father gaining an advantage by not disclosing his financial circumstances, as the Full Court warned is the risk of the court being unduly cautious in making findings in favour of an innocent party in cases of deliberate non-disclosure.[84]
4. Where the total value of the parties' known assets is $344,528.50, to achieve this outcome the mother is to receive assets and superannuation with a combined value of $310,075.50 and the father $34,453. The differential between the value of known property to be retained by each of them is $275,623. This excludes the value of property and superannuation retained by the father which I have been unable to attribute a value.
5. The mother will therefore receive the following (rounded to the nearest dollar):

1. She will also retain the benefit of the monies she has already received from the sale of the former family home (being $41,066) and the monies applied from the joint N Bank account to her legal costs (being $25,957). The total value of assets and superannuation to be retained by the mother and joint monies she has benefited from, amounts to approximately $377,100.
2. The father will then retain the following assets:

$34,453 + assets and superannuation of unknown value

1. He will also retain the benefit of monies he has already received from the sale of the former family home (being $41,066). This total known value of assets to be retained by the father and joint monies he has benefited from, amounts to $75,519. He will also retain Motor Vehicle 1 and camper trailer (acquired and improved for a total cost of approximately $65,000 in 2022 and 2024) and superannuation of an unknown value.
2. I consider this to be a just and equitable outcome, in actual terms as far as I can assess it given the father's non-disclosure, consistent with my holistic assessment and weighing of the parties' respective contributions and those matters relevant pursuant to section 90SM(5) weighing significantly in favour of the mother in the context of an asset pool of modest value. I am satisfied the configuration of the proposed settlement, in terms of the particular assets and superannuation each party is to retain (as known to the court), is appropriate.

1. The father did not speak against the form of order sought by the mother and I will make orders in those general terms, with some amendments made to make the parties' obligations clear.
2. The mother seeks orders providing for the parties each to relinquish any right title and interest in motor vehicles "registered in [the other's] possession or control at the date of these orders", in bank accounts, "properties" and superannuation. I find such orders are unnecessary given the proposed "catch all" order for each party to retain all other property, financial resources and chattels in their possession at the date of the final orders. I will however provide for the transfer of Motor Vehicle 1 and caravan to the father in the event they are not already registered in his name, this being unclear from the mother's financial statement which identified she has a 50% interest in those items, notwithstanding vehicles and caravans are ordinarily registered in the name of a single owner.

Section 106A order

1. Given the father's attitude towards the mother and non-compliance with the rules and orders made by the court to date, I will make an order pursuant to section 106A providing for a registrar to sign any deed or instrument required to be signed by the father, in the event he neglects or refuses to do so in accordance with the final orders I make. This will enable a registrar to sign to authorise the release of monies held in trust for example, should the father fail to do so.

1. In her amended Initiating Application, the mother seeks the father pay her costs. When I asked the parties if they would consent to me determining that application in chambers on the basis of written submissions, the father responded that he seeks "his day in court". Given the father's position, the mother instructed her counsel not to pursue her application for costs. Accordingly, upon the making of final orders, I will provide for the dismissal of all applications.

1. I therefore make the final property order as set out at the commencement of these reasons, finding it to be appropriate and just and equitable in the circumstances.

1. I will make an order requiring the mother, via her lawyers if they remain engaged, to serve upon the father by the email address advised in his notice of address for service, a sealed copy of the final orders I make and these reasons and to file an affidavit of service confirming she has done so. The father has filed a notice of address for service and will be notified by email of the delivery of my judgment. This order will ensure he receives copies even if he does not to attend at court to receive a hard copy of the judgment and orders and is not registered to use the court portal to download those documents.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and eighteen (218) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge A Humphreys.

[1] Although he left court before a hearing concluded on 29 April 2025, as recorded in notation B to orders made that day.

[2] [2003] HCA 48; (2003) 77 ALJR 1598 at [62] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ.

[3] As expressed at paragraph 17 of the explanatory memorandum to the Family Law Amendment Bill 2023.

[4] [2025] FedCFamC1F 858, at [18]-[21].

[5] [2024] FedCFamC1A 249.

[7] McClelland DCJ at [20]-[21] and [38] referring to the decision of Heyden J in F v M [2021] EWFC 4, adopted and applied by the England and Wales Court of Appeal in Re H-N [2021] EWCA Civ 448; [2022] 1 WLR 2681; [2022] 1 All ER 475].

[8] McClelland DCJ referring to the decision of Heyden J in F v M [2021] EWFC 4 ("F v M") at [4].

[9] McClelland DCJ at [2], Austin & Williams at [111], and Aldridge & Carew JJ at [46]-[47] and [51].

[11] McClelland DCJ, at [4] and [29] and [31] referring to the analysis of Gill J in Olivier & Olivier [2020] FamCA 639 at [51]-[52]; Aldridge & Carew at [48].

[12] McClelland DCJ, at 35, referring to GK v PR [2021] EWFC 106 at [40] and [45].

[14] Annexure MSB-5 to the mother's affidavit filed on 20 December 2024.

[15] Annexure MSB-2 to the mother's affidavit filed on 20 December 2024.

[16] Annexure MSB-4 to the mother's affidavit filed on 15 May 2025.

[17] Annexure MSB-4 to the mother's affidavit filed on 15 May 2025.

[18] Beckett & Wicks [2025] FedCFamC2F 857.

[19] Keating & Keating (2019) FLC 93-894at [42] referring to Amador & Amador [2009] FamCAFC 196; (2009) 43 Fam LR 268 at [79].

[20] In their section 67ZBD response dated 3 February 2025.

[21] Annexure MSB-1 to the mother's affidavit filed on 20 December 2024.

[22] Annexure MSB-1 to the mother's affidavit filed on 20 December 2024.

[24] Annexure MSB-1 to the mother's affidavit filed on 13 December 2025.

[25] (1988) 166 CLR 69 ("M v M").

[27] Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092at [56], citing with approval A v A (1998) FLC 92-800 at [3.14]-[3.15] and [3.24].

[31] Annexure MSB-2 to the mother's affidavit filed on 20 December 2024.

[32] Pacotto & Galvin [2025] FedCFamC1A 27 ("Pacotto & Galvin") at [60], citing Bielen & Kozma [2022] FedCFamC1A 221; (2022) FLC 94-123 ("Bielen & Kozma") at [51]-[55].

[33] [2024] FedCFamC1A 112 at [33].

[34] [2015] FamCAFC 146 at [27], cited by the Full Court very recently with approval in Pacotto & Galvin at [60].

[36] (2023) FLC 94-166 at [36] ("Lainhart & Ellinson").

[44] Notation C to the orders made on 20 March 2025.

[45] Hedlund & Hedlund [2021] FedCFamC1A 84; (2021) FLC 94-065 citing previous authorities with approval.

[46] (2022) FLC 94-123; [2022] at [30].

[48] Oberlin & Infeld [2021] FamCAFC 66

[49] [1978] FamCA 26; (1978) FLC 90-434 at [15] per Asche SJ with Gun and Yuill JJ concurring.

[50] (1997) FLC 92-729, including at [4.49]-[4.51].

[51] Lainhart & Ellinson at [28] to [29].

[52] Section 68 of Schedule 1, Amendment Act.

[53] Explanatory memorandum, Family Law Amendment Bill 2024 (Cth) ("explanatory memorandum"), as amended by the Addendum to the explanatory memorandum.

[54] Being essentially the same approach taken to the alteration of property interests for married couples pursuant to section 79 of the Act.

[55] Babett & Falconer [2015] FamCAFC 124; (2015) FLC 98-067 at [44]; cited with approval in Perrin & Perrin (No 2) [2018] FamCAFC 122 at [57]-[58] referring in turn to Dickons & Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154; (2012) 50 Fam LR 244 regarding section 79.