Beadle v Director General of Social Security

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION From time to time in the administration of social security benefits overpayments occur. Sometimes these are the result of innocent non-compliance with the requirements of the law which can be affected by the stress associated with the circumstances that led to the receipt of benefits in the first place. The taxpayer is entitled to expect that in the ordinary course money paid to people which they are not entitled to receive will be recovered, albeit in a way appropriate to the circumstances which led to the overpayment and the circumstances of the persons concerned. However, the confining of a recovery regime by rigid rules, particularly in this area of the law, is likely to be productive of unfair or harsh outcomes in some of the great variety of fact situations that can arise. There are provisions in the Act which recognise that reality. They relate to the writing off and the waiver of debts otherwise due to the Commonwealth. This case primarily concerns the proper construction of a section of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) which provides for the waiver of debts where special circumstances are found to exist. There is a tension in the construction of such provisions between the needs for certainty of application and flexibility of response to the situations that may arise from time to time. BACKGROUND TO THESE PROCEEDINGS Coralie Hales began to receive Disability Support Pension under the provisions of the Social Security Act 1991 from 29 August 1991. Her entitlement was based upon the fact that she was suffering from Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. In a letter which was sent to her by the Department of Social Security on 16 January 1993 she was told that she must inform the Department, within fourteen days, if any of a number of listed events occurred. She was also told that: "Section 132 of the Social Security Act is the Authority for this notice. If you are paid too much pension because you did not tell us when you were supposed to, you may have to pay back what you have been overpaid." The letter then went on to say: "YOU MUST TELL US WITHIN 14 DAYS IF: . you and your partner's combined gross income (before) tax goes above $76 a week." Ms Hales' partner was Terence Reddy. A similar letter dated 24 March 1993 advised Ms Hales of an increase in her pension from 25 March 1993 and included a requirement to advise the Department within fourteen days if the combined gross income of her and her partner went above $76 a week. In another letter dated 22 March 1993 Ms Hales was asked to give the Department her partner's tax file number. She complied with that request. On 5 March 1994 Mr Reddy commenced employment in a retail business carried on by Mr D. Thorp. His starting gross weekly wage was $385. Ms Hales herself began working for Mr Thorp on 26 October 1995 earning a gross weekly wage of $418.70. Although she had complied with the Department's request for Mr Reddy's tax file number and had also supplied her own tax file number, Ms Hales did not advise of either his or her change of circumstances within the fourteen days required. On 27 October 1995 she told an officer of the Department by telephone of her employment income. Despite that advice she continued to receive the pension until 21 March 1996 when it was cancelled following a medical review of her condition. As a result of these events, Ms Hales was overpaid pension in the sum of $8,740.90. She was informed of the overpayment by a letter from the Department dated 30 July 1996, told that she owed a debt in that amount under s 1224 of the Act and asked to repay it. The initial view of the Department was confirmed by an internal review of her case of which she was advised by a letter dated 13 September 1996. Ms Hales appealed to the Social Security Appeals Tribunal in part on the basis that she had had no intention to defraud the Department. In advising the Department of Mr Reddy's tax file number and her own and receiving no further correspondence she had been confident, she said, that the Department had access to their taxation records and hence knowledge of their income. She also pointed to the effects upon her mental state of the illness for which she was receiving the pension. The Social Security Appeals Tribunal held that Ms Hales had been overpaid $8,740.90 and that this was a debt due to the Commonwealth. It also decided, however, that so much of the debt, $1,839.60, as had been incurred after 27 October 1995 was attributable to departmental error and should be waived under s 1237A. Ms Hales then applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of the departmental decision as varied by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the decision under review and in substitution for it decided that the amount of $8,740.90 was due by Ms Hales to the Commonwealth but that the Commonwealth's right to recover the whole of that debt was waived. The Secretary of the Department of Social Security now appeals against that decision on questions of law. THE DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL The Tribunal found that between 5 March 1994 and 21 March 1996 Ms Hales was overpaid the amount of $8,740.90 in Disability Support Pension. The question posed on the application was whether the whole or a part of that amount was a debt due to the Commonwealth and, if so, whether all or part of the debt should be waived or written off. The amount of $1,839.60 paid between 26 October 1995 and 21 March 1996 was found to be a debt due to the Commonwealth pursuant to s 1223(1) of the Act. However it was conceded in accordance with the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal that that debt should be waived. The concession was made on the basis that the debt was attributable solely to administrative error on the part of the Department as Ms Hales had informed one of its officers, on 25 October 1995, of her employment and income. It was not disputed that she had received those continuing payments in good faith. As to the balance of the overpayment, being $6,901.30 made in the period from 5 March 1994 to 25 October 1995, there was no dispute that the letters of 16 January 1993 and 24 March 1993 were valid notices under s 132(1) of the Act and were effectively given to Ms Hales. She had failed to comply with the notices by failing to inform the Department that as from 5 March 1994 Mr Reddy's gross income exceeded $76 per week. The provision of Mr Reddy's tax file number to the Department did not constitute compliance with the requirement to notify income above the threshold. The failure to comply with the notice was held to be a failure to comply with s 132(1) of the Act. It was also held that the overpayment between 5 March 1994 and 25 October 1995 was made because of that failure to comply. For those reasons the amount of $6,901.30 overpaid in that period was a debt due to the Commonwealth pursuant to s 1224(1) of the Act. In so finding the Tribunal expressed the opinion that the question whether failure to comply with a notice amounted to a failure to comply with the relevant provision of the Act was not free from doubt. The Tribunal then considered whether it was appropriate to write off or waive the debt. It observed that there is a discretion to write off a debt conferred by s 1236(1) of the Act. In accordance with a decision in another matter by the President of the Tribunal, it noted that the financial circumstances of the debtor and the prospects of recovery of the debt are necessarily the primary factors for consideration in deciding whether to write it off - Re L and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 21 AAR 412 at 427. Ms Hales' financial circumstances, in the opinion of the Tribunal, could not be described as comfortable. But neither were they desperate or unduly straitened. She and Mr Reddy were able to make ends meet and had the financial capacity to repay the debt in at least very modest instalments. This was because both were in fulltime paid employment. The recovery of the debt by means of instalments was feasible and would not cause undue financial hardship to Ms Hales. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that it was not appropriate to write off the whole or part of the debt of $6,901.30 owed by Ms Hales to the Commonwealth. The Tribunal then turned to the question whether it was appropriate to waive the debt. It referred to s 1237AAD whereby a debt may be waived in whole or in part if the decision maker is satisfied that: . the debt did not result wholly or partly from the applicant knowingly failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the Act; and . there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and . it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt. The Tribunal had accepted Ms Hales' evidence as completely credible and held that she honestly believed that by supplying Mr Reddy's tax file number she had done all that was necessary to enable the Department to ascertain details of his income. Her failure to comply with s 132 of the Act was not done knowingly as she honestly believed she had complied with its requirements. A significant factor said to support that finding was that the last relevant notice under the Act was received by Ms Hales in late March 1993, almost twelve months before Mr Reddy commenced employment and began to earn more than the threshold amount. Thus, the first condition for waiver was satisfied in that the debt did not result from a knowing failure or omission to comply with a provision of the Act. On the question whether there were special circumstances other than financial hardship alone that would make it desirable to waive the debt, the Tribunal first considered the scope of the term "special circumstances". The Tribunal then made a number of factual findings relevant to that issue: 1. Ms Hales was suffering from Chronic Fatigue Syndrome when the two relevant notices under s 132(1) of the Act, dated 16 January 1993 and 24 March 1993, were sent to her and that this condition severely affected her ability to comprehend and deal with such correspondence. 2. Ms Hales supplied Mr Reddy's tax file number to the Department in response to its letter of request dated 22 March 1993 and that thereafter she received no further notices under s 132(1) of the Act prior to the end of the period presently under review - that is, 25 October 1995. 3. Ms Hales' honest belief ....that, by supplying Mr Reddy's tax file number to the Department in response to its letter of request dated 22 March 1993, she had done all that was required of her by way of providing the Department with the necessary information to enable it to ascertain details of Mr Reddy's income, was plausible having regard to the particular circumstances of her case, including her then adverse mental condition by reason of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and the fact that prior to 25 October 1995, she received no further periodic notices under s 132(1) of the Act after the notice dated 24 March 1993. 4. Ms Hales is gradually recovering her physical and mental health and has been engaged in fulltime employment since 26 October 1995. It is important to her continued recovery and to her capacity to remain in employment that she not be subjected to the stress of being required to repay a substantial debt to the Department - especially a debt that she honestly believes has arisen through no fault of her own. The Tribunal was of the opinion that these matters constituted special circumstances that made it not only desirable but also appropriate to waive the right to recover the debt of $6,901.30 due by her to the Commonwealth. It concluded that the condition specified in paragraph (b) of s 1237AAD of the Act was satisfied. The third condition, that "it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt" was disposed of by the Tribunal on the basis that it had already found that it was not appropriate to write off the whole or part of the debt. On this basis and having regard to the special circumstances referred to above, the Tribunal was of opinion that it was "more appropriate to waive the whole of the debt than to write it off in whole or in part". STATUTORY FRAMEWORK Section 132 of the Social Security Act provides in the relevant parts as follows: "132(1) The Secretary may give a person to whom disability support pension is being paid a notice that requires the person to inform the Department if: (a) a specified event or change of circumstances occurs; or (b) the person becomes aware that a specified event or change of circumstances is likely to occur. . . . 132(5) A person must not, without reasonable excuse, refuse or fail to comply with a notice under subsection (1) to the extent that the person is capable of complying with the notice. Penalty: Imprisonment for 6 months." Section 1223 as it was at the relevant time, dealt with debts arising under the Act: "1223(1)....if: (a) an amount has been paid to a person by way of social security payment; and (b) the recipient was not qualified for the social security payment and the amount was not payable to the recipient; the amount so paid is a debt due to the Commonwealth." Section 1224 of the Act relevantly provides: "1224(1) If: (a) an amount has been paid to a recipient by way of social security payment; and (b) the amount was paid because the recipient or another person: (i) made a false statement or a false representation; or (ii) failed or omitted to comply with a provision of this Act or the 1947 Act; the amount so paid is a debt due by the recipient to the Commonwealth." The writing off of debts is dealt with in s 1236 which provides: "1236(1) ....the Secretary may, on behalf of the Commonwealth, decide to write off a debt...." Section 1237 and related provisions deal with waiver of debt: "1237(1) On behalf of the Commonwealth, the Secretary may waive the Commonwealth's right to recover the whole or part of a debt from a debtor only in circumstances described in section 1237A, 1237AA, 1237AAA, 1237AAB, 1237AAC or 1237AAD." Section 1237A(1) deals with waiver arising from administrative error: "1237A(1) Subject to subsection (1A), the Secretary must waive the right to recover the proportion of a debt that is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth if the debtor received in good faith the payment or payments that gave rise to that proportion of the debt." Section 1237AAD provides for waiver in special circumstances in the following terms: "1237AAD The Secretary may waive the right to recover all or part of a debt if the Secretary is satisfied that: (a) the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly: (i) making a false statement or a false representation; or (ii) failing or omitting to comply with a provision of this Act or the 1947 Act; and (b) there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and (c) it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt." GROUNDS OF APPEAL The Secretary appeals against the decision of the Tribunal on the following grounds: "(a) The Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the expression "special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone)" in paragraph (b) of s 1237AAD of the Act. The Tribunal should have held that paragraph (b) of s 1237AAD impliedly requires that there must be financial hardship in order for there to be special circumstances within the meaning of paragraph (b) of s 1237AAD of the Act. (b) The Tribunal erred in finding that the circumstances of the respondent constituted "special circumstances" within the meaning of paragraph (b) of s 1237AAD of the Act. Particulars (i) The Tribunal held that the following findings constituted special circumstances within the meaning of paragraph (b) of s 1237AAD of the Act: (A) The applicant was suffering from Chronic Fatigue Syndrome which severely effected (sic) her ability to comprehend and deal with the two notices from DSS under s 132(1) of the Act dated 16 January 1993 and 24 March 1993; (B) The respondent supplied Mr Reddy's Tax File Number to the DSS in response to its letter of request dated 22 March 1993 and that thereafter she received no further notices under s 132(1) of the Act; (C) The respondent had an honest and, in the circumstances, plausible belief that she had fulfilled all the DSS's notification requirements; and (D) It was important to the respondent's continued recovery and to her capacity to remain in employment that she not be subjected to the stress of being required to repay a substantial debt to the DSS. (ii) The findings referred to in (A), (B) and (C) above were relevant to whether the condition specified in paragraph (a) of s 1237AAD of the Act was satisfied and cannot constitute "special circumstances" within the meaning of paragraph (b) of s 1237AAD of the Act. (iii) There was no evidence reasonably capable of supporting the finding made by the Tribunal in (D) above. (c) The Tribunal erred in its interpretation of paragraph (c) of s 1237AAD of the Act in that, having found that it was not appropriate to write off the whole or part of the debt, the Tribunal concluded that the conditions specified in paragraph (c) of s 1237AAD of the Act was satisfied. The Tribunal should have held that paragraph (c) of s 1237AAD of the Act can only be satisfied if it appropriate both to write off and to waive the debt or part of the debt. (d) The Tribunal erred in its interpretation of s 1237AAD of the Act in that, having concluded that the conditions in paragraph (a), (b) and (c) of s 1237AAD of the Act were satisfied, the Tribunal failed to hold that it had a discretion to decide whether or not to waive the debt. The Tribunal should have held that it had such a discretion following satisfaction of the matters set out in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of s 1237AAD of the Act. (e) Alternatively to (d), the Tribunal failed to comply with the requirements of ss 43(2) and 43(2B) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, to give adequate reasons for its decision to exercise its discretion to waive the debt after it was satisfied of the matters set out in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of s 1237AAD of the Act. (f) In deciding whether to exercise its discretion to waive the debt under s 1237AAD of the Act, the Tribunal failed to take into account whether recovery of the debt would cause financial hardship to the respondent. Having regard to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act, the Tribunal was bound to take into account the financial circumstances of the respondent and any financial hardship, or lack of financial hardship, which might result from recovery of all or part of the debt." SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES The waiver provisions of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) have already been the subject of legislative attention in the short time since the Act came into operation. Initially s 1237 conferred on the Secretary a general discretion to decide to waive a debt but required him to act in accordance with ministerial directions in exercising that discretion. The ministerial directions limited by list, the circumstances in which the discretion could be exercised to waive the debt. One of those circumstances was: "Where, in the opinion of the Secretary special circumstances apply such that the circumstances are extremely unusual, uncommon or exceptional (as discussed by the Federal Court in Beadle v Director General of Social Security (1985) 7 ALD 670)." Beadle is a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court reported in 60 ALR 225 on appeal from Toohey J sitting as a presidential member of the Tribunal - see 6 ALD 1. The case concerned a claim for family allowance lodged more than six months after the eligibility date. In such a case payment could be backdated only in "special circumstances" (s 102 Social Security Act 1947 (Cth)). Even within the narrow confine of "special circumstances" which would support a discretion to overlook the delay, the Court said it "[did] not think it is possible to lay down precise limits or precise rules". The phrase, although lacking precision, was in the Court's view, "sufficiently understood....not to require judicial gloss" - Beadle v Director General of Social Security (1985) 60 ALR 225 at 228. There is no reference in the judgment to extremely unusual, uncommon or exceptional circumstances. The ministerial directions were held to be invalid as being an exercise of power - Riddell v Secretary Department of Social Security (1993) 42 FCR 443. In 1993 the waiver provisions were amended by the Social Security (Budget and Other Measures) Legislation Amendment Act 1993 (Cth). The effect of the amendments was "to entrench [the] guidelines by statutory enactment" - Secretary, Department of Social Security v Kratchovil (1994) 53 FCR 49. Section 1237AAD was introduced into the Act by the Social Security Legislation Amendment (Carer Pension and Other Measures) Act 1995 (Cth) which also repealed and substituted the former ss 1237 and 1237A. Although the Secretary has relied in argument upon the Explanatory Memorandum to support the Department's construction of s 1237AAD, the appropriate course is first to consider the words themselves having regard to their statutory context and apparent purpose. The section confers upon the Secretary a discretion to waive the right to recover all or part of a debt. That discretion is only enlivened when the Secretary is satisfied that the three conditions specified in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the section are met. It does not follow that the Secretary is then obliged to waive the debt. The first condition is negative, the second condition requires consideration of special circumstances that make it "desirable to waive" and the third condition requires the waiver be considered more appropriate than write off. The exercise of the discretion thus enlivened may be informed by other considerations which were not required to support satisfaction of the three necessary conditions. It is important in this case to say however that in some cases the satisfaction of the three conditions may be sufficient to persuade the Secretary to waive without reference to any further matter. The concept of special circumstances is broad. A constellation of factors, including financial circumstances, may fall within it. The express exclusion of financial hardship alone as a special circumstance is an indicator that it would otherwise be included. This gives some measure of the range of circumstances which will qualify as special. But as a matter of grammar and ordinary logic, the exclusion of financial hardship alone as a special circumstance does not mandate its inclusion in the range of matters constituting such circumstances for the purpose of enlivening the Secretary's discretion. On this point and as a matter of construing this section by reference to the ordinary meaning of its words, the Secretary's submission that there cannot be special circumstances for the purpose of s 1237AAD(b) unless there is also financial hardship is not accepted. The Explanatory Memorandum does not undercut this conclusion. There it is said that the new special circumstances provision can only be used where the debt arose because of an innocent mistake by a social security recipient. Secondly, it is said that financial hardship of itself is not a sufficient reason to waive the debt. This is in substance a restatement of the ordinary meaning of the provision. The evident purpose of s 1237AAD is to enable a flexible response to the wide range of situations which could give rise to hardship or unfairness in the event of a rigid application of a requirement for recovery of debt. It is inappropriate to constrain that flexibility by imposing a narrow or artificial construction upon the words. It may be that there will be few cases in which the Secretary will be satisfied that there are special circumstances in the absence of financial hardship. It may be that there are few cases in which having found special circumstances to exist, the Secretary would exercise the discretion to waive in the absence of financial hardship. But to anticipate the limits of the categories of possible cases by imposing on the language of the section a fetter upon its application which is not mandated by its words, is to erode its useful purpose. The second ground of appeal asserts error on the part of the Tribunal in finding that Ms Hales' circumstances constituted special circumstances within the meaning of s 1237AAD(b). The matters relied upon by the Tribunal were all said by the Secretary to relate to s 1237AAD(a). It was submitted that they could not therefore constitute special circumstances for the purposes of s 1237AAD(b). I do not accept this submission. As already observed, the concept of "special circumstances" is broad. In any given case it is quite possible that the matters by reason of which it is concluded that there was no knowing misrepresentation or non-compliance will be relevant to the special circumstances which are invoked. There may be a case, for example, in which a person has failed to comply with the requirements of the Act because of the effects of a psychiatric illness. This may explain the non-compliance and enable it to be characterised as innocent for the purposes of para (a). It may also be a special circumstance for the purpose of para (b). The proposition that the classes of circumstances which may support satisfaction of the condition in para (a) is mutually exclusive of the class of circumstances which may support satisfaction of the condition in para (b) is a proposition of law which I do not accept. The Tribunal did not err in law in this respect. The second limb of the second ground of appeal was that there was no evidence reasonably capable of supporting the Tribunal's finding that: "It was important to the Respondent's continued recovery and to her capacity to remain in employment that she not be subjected to the stress of being required to replay a substantial debt to the DSS." It was submitted for the Secretary that there was no medical evidence covering the state of Ms Hales' Chronic Fatigue Syndrome as at July 1997 nor any evidence concerning the effect upon her of having to repay the debt of $6,901.30 by modest instalments. It was submitted that any finding by the Tribunal in relation to the effect of stress resulting from her having to repay the debt would need to have regard to evidence of probative value on that point and there was no such evidence. Counsel for Ms Hales submitted that an attack upon a conclusion of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on the ground that there is a deficiency of proof amounting to an error of law assumes the task of showing that there was no material before the Tribunal upon which its conclusion could properly be based. In this case there was testimony from Ms Hales herself and Mr Thorp, her employer, who had had the opportunity to observe her at work since October 1995. The Tribunal also had the opportunity to observe Ms Hales giving evidence before it. Mr Thorp offered his own observation in evidence about the impact of stress including the financial stress of coping with repayment upon Ms Hales. Although ordinarily it might be expected that medical evidence would be addressed on such issues it cannot be said that there was no material before the Tribunal. Nor can it be said that the Tribunal was not entitled on that material to make a broad common sense judgment of the kind that decision-makers and jurors are called upon to make frequently. Whatever view I might have taken of the material before the Tribunal and its reliability, the assessment of that material was a matter for the Tribunal and no error of law is disclosed in relation to it. The third ground of appeal concerns the construction of s 1237AAD(c). It was submitted for the Secretary that para (c) provides that the Secretary must be satisfied that "it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt". The paragraph is thus said to require that it be both appropriate to write off the debt or part of the debt and to waive the debt or part of the debt but that it is more appropriate to waive the debt or part of the debt. Having found that it was not appropriate to write off the whole or part of the debt, the Tribunal, it is said, was precluded from coming to the conclusion that the condition in para (c) was satisfied. The ordinary meaning of para (c) does not mandate the construction for which the Secretary contends. If it is not appropriate to write off the debt but it is appropriate to waive it, then it is more appropriate to waive the debt than to write it off. Again, the construction contended for would deprive the Secretary of desirable flexibility in the face of a range of possible situations. It is not at all apparent how such a construction would serve the purposes of these provisions. In a sense, as counsel for Ms Hales submitted, this ground of appeal raises in a different guise the relationship of financial hardship to the identification of special circumstances. This ground of appeal also fails. The fourth and fifth grounds of appeal attacked the Tribunal's decision on the basis that it failed to hold that it had a discretion to decide whether to waive the debt even if the conditions in (a), (b) and (c) of s 1237AAD were satisfied and that in the alternative it failed to give any adequate reasons for exercising the discretion in favour of Ms Hales. In approaching the question of waiver the Tribunal began by saying: "The only relevant section for present purposes is s. 1237AAD whereby the Tribunal may waive the right to recover all or part of the debt if satisfied that, relevantly: . the debt did not result wholly or partly from the applicant knowingly failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the Act; and . there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and . it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt." The quotation of the words "may waive" which appear in s 1237AAD are themselves entirely consistent with the Tribunal understanding of their obvious purport. The operation of the word "may" in this context is clear enough not to require exposition of the kind that might be appropriate in other cases where the question of the existence or non-existence of a discretion may arise. And at para 39 of its reasons the Tribunal referred expressly to "...the discretionary waiver power conferred by s. 1237AAD of the Act". It is useful to set out paragraphs 42 and 43 of the Tribunal's reasons which were in the following terms: "42. The condition specified in paragraph (c) of s 1237AAD of the Act - namely, that "it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt" - can be dealt with briefly. the Tribunal has already found (see paragraph 34 above) that, having regard, in particular, to the applicant's present financial circumstances and the prospect of recovery of the debt of $6,901.30 owed by her to the Commonwealth, it is not appropriate to write off the whole or part of that debt. In the light of this finding and having regard to the circumstances referred to in paragraphs 37 and 41 above, the Tribunal is of opinion that it is more appropriate to waive the whole of the debt than to write it off in whole or in part. Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that the condition specified in paragraph (c) of s 1237AAD of the Act is also satisfied in this case. 43. The Tribunal, therefore, in exercise of the discretionary power conferred by s 1237AAD of the Act, waives the Commonwealth's right to recover from the applicant the debt of $6,901.30 which arose by way of overpayment of DSP during the period from 5 March 1994 to 25 October 1995." It is plain enough that the matters which led the Tribunal to be satisfied of the necessary conditions in (a), (b) and (c) have also, in its view, justified the exercise of the residual discretion. And it may well be that in many if not most cases, the discretion will be applied in that way. The Tribunal's reasons are not to be scrutinised in minute detail. Nor are its processes to be judicialised by imposing upon it requirements for detailed exposition not appropriate to an administrative body. Had it declined to exercise the residual discretion in favour of Ms Hales, having found the conditions satisfied as it did, there would undoubtedly have been a need for further explanation. But that is not the case here and I am satisfied that it adverted to the exercise of the discretion and that its reasons for making the decision it did are clear. The last ground of appeal also attacked the exercise of the residual discretion to waive the debt under s 1237AAD. The attack was made on the basis that the Tribunal had failed to take into account whether recovery of the debt would cause financial hardship to the respondent as being a matter which it was bound to take into account. In my view, however, the Tribunal took into account the whole range of matters which it had canvassed in deciding that it was satisfied of the three conditions. These included the issue of the absence of financial hardship offset by the stress of having to cope with the repayment of the debt by instalments into the future. The necessary substratum for this ground is not made out. CONCLUSION For the reasons which I have set out above, the appeal will be dismissed with costs. I certify that this and the preceding sixteen (16) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice French