The Body Corporate for Beach Front Apartments on Trinity Beach (respondent)

Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld), sections 227(1) and 229(3)(a)

Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020

GENERAL MEETING AGENDA - SAME-ISSUE MOTIONS - REASONABLENESS

The body corporate passed a resolution to give its consent to certain lot owners making a material change of use (MCOU) application to the local government authority, to permit permanent residency of lots in addition to the approved short term letting. The applicant is the authorised letting agent and seeks an order that the resolution was unlawful.

The questions for determination are (a) whether the motion was void from the outset given the motion was on one of 3 same-issue motions which were not properly grouped on the original agenda as 'same issue motions', albeit that the other 2 motions were ruled out of order at the AGM; and (b) whether the body corporate acted unreasonably in consenting to the MCOU application because the change would diminish the value of the applicant's letting rights and materially change the predominant type of use of the scheme.

Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld), ss 94(2); 242

Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020, s 79

• [1] B. Montgomery Pty Ltd ACN 079 110 393 as trustee for the Montgomery Family Trust (applicant) is the caretaker and letting agent for Beach Front Apartments on Trinity Beach CTS 32389.
• [2] This is an application for a final order to declare void the body corporate's resolution to pass motion 15, which was submitted by an owner for its 2025 annual general meeting, held on 7 May 2025 (AGM). The resolution gave the body corporate's consent to lot owners lodging a material change of use (MCOU) application with the local government authority. Motions 13 and 14 on the AGM papers dealt with the same issue, but were ruled out of order by the chair at the AGM, at the committee's request.
• [3] The MCOU application, now since lodged, is to allow lots to be used for permanent residential occupation, in addition to the currently-approved use as short-term holiday letting. The MCOU application has since been lodged with the local government authority.
• [4] On 25 August 2025, I dismissed the application for an interim order to stop further implementation of the body corporate's decision to consent to the MCOU application lodgement (interim order decision).[1]
• [5] The applicant applies for the order on 2 grounds, essentially:

¾ an agenda issue, in that motions 13, 14 and 15 were 'same-issue motions' but were not presented as such in the AGM papers in the way required by section 79 of the Accommodation Module, and nor was the explanatory schedule prescribed by section 80(4) of the Accommodation Module included in the papers, and accordingly motion 15 was void from the outset and could not have been voted upon, or alternatively

¾ a decision making issue, in that the body corporate acted unreasonably in passing motion 15, in contravention of section 94(2) of the Act, and accordingly the resolution was invalid.

• [6] I have dismissed the application because I am not satisfied the body corporate's decision to pass motion 15 was unlawful. I do not have jurisdiction to decide whether the MCOU application in fact should be granted, as that is a matter for the local government authority.

• [7] Beach Front Apartments on Trinity Beach CTS 32389 comprises 20 lots and common property. It is governed by the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (Act) and, as specified in its community management statement, the Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020 (Accommodation Module).
• [8] In my interim order decision at paras [10]-[13] I explained why I am satisfied the application is within an adjudicator's jurisdiction despite the fact the dispute is between a caretaking service contractor and a body corporate. I continue to hold that view and for the sake of brevity I will not repeat those reasons here.

15 Change of Use to include permanent residential occupation Ordinary Resolution

Body Corporate for CTS 32389 to approve that the committee provides owners consent for common property to accompany any development application(s) to Cairns Regional Council from any individual lot owner or owners seeking a Material Change of Use for permanent residential occupation as well as existing short-term holiday letting.

This cost would be met by each lot owner wanting "residential occupation as well as existing short term holiday letting" and the Body Corporate for CTS

• [10] Motion 15 passed, with 12 votes in favour, 6 against and 1 abstention. The AGM minutes record that the similar motions 13 and 14 were both "ruled out of order" and "withdrawn from the floor of the meeting by the proposer", the proposer being the committee.

• [11] By way of background, the applicant says:

¾ The Scheme is identified within the Tourist Accommodation Zone as per Cairns Plan 2016. The Tourist Accommodation Zone Code taken from the Cairns Plan 2016 relevantly provides that the Tourist Accommodation Zone is to provide for:

• − short term accommodation, and
• − community uses and small scale services, facilities and infrastructure, to support short term accommodation and tourist attractions

¾ The 20 lots within the Scheme are holiday apartments.

¾ The Cairns Plan 2016 defines short term accommodation as:

(i) providing accommodation of less than three (3) consecutive months to tourists or travellers; or

(ii) a manager's residence, office or recreation facilities for the exclusive use of guests, if the use is ancillary to the use in subparagraph (i), but

(b) does not include a hotel, nature based tourism, resort complex or tourist park.

Examples: includes motel, backpackers, cabins, serviced apartments, accommodation, hotel, farm stay. Does not include hostel, rooming accommodation, tourist park.

• [12] The applicant's other submissions, on the specific issues, are set out below.
• [13] The applicant is supported in this application by the owners of lots 10 and 16. Their arguments on the relevant issues coincide with the applicant's, and so I will not repeat them here, although I will note that they emphasise that they do not wish there to be a substantial change in the type of use, from short-term letting to partially also long-term residential, because that would detract from the scheme's present use.
• [14] I note that the applicant did not elect to make a submission in reply.

• [15] Section 79 of the Accommodation Module requires that, where there are two or more motions which propose alternative ways of dealing with the same issue, the committee must list those motions as a group of same-issue motions on the voting paper for the general meeting. The relevant provisions, including as to the effect of non-compliance, are:

(1) This section applies if 2 or more motions (the original motions) proposing alternative ways of dealing with the same issue are submitted, under section 76, for consideration at a general meeting of the body corporate.

(2) The committee must list the original motions as a group of motions dealing with the same issue (a group of same-issue motions) on the voting paper for the general meeting.

(9) Other than for an original motion that is part of a group of same-issue motions, if more than 1 motion about the same issue is listed on the agenda, or stated in a voting paper, for the meeting all motions about the issue are void.

¾ Motions 13, 14 and 15 all dealt with alternate ways of the Body Corporate making or consenting to a development application to Cairns Regional Council for a material change of use to allow permanent residential accommodation as well as short term letting (which is currently the only type of use permitted in lots within the Scheme).

¾ Motions 13, 14 and 15 were not included in the 2025 AGM Agenda as a Group of Same Issue Motions as required by section 79 of the Accommodation Module and nor was the explanatory schedule prescribed by section 80(4) of the Accommodation Module included in the 2025 AGM Agenda.

¾ Prior to the 2025 AGM being held, the Applicant instructed our firm to write to the Body Corporate to put the Body Corporate on notice that Motions 13, 14 and 15 in the 2025 AGM Agenda were void, pursuant to section 79(9) of the Accommodation Module because there was more than one motion included on the Agenda which proposed alternative ways of dealing with the same issue and they were not presented as a group of same issue motions.

¾ We requested that the Chairperson rule the Motions out of order pursuant to section 88 of the Accommodation Module. The Minutes of the 2025 AGM show that, in the event, Motions 13 and 14 were ruled out of order at the 2025 AGM, however, Motion 15 was not ruled out of order and it was voted upon as a valid Motion.

¾ Motion 15 was submitted by a lot owner, whereas Motions 13 and 14 were submitted by the committee. However, the lot owner who submitted Motion 15 must have had prior knowledge of Motions 13 and 14 because the words "Should Motion 13 and 14 be defeated" were included as a precondition to Motion 15 being considered, at the beginning of Motion 15.

¾ This is not a case where, if Motion 15 is declared void, a lot owner is disadvantaged by an error made by the committee in preparing the 2025 AGM Agenda and failing to include the three Motions as a Group of Same Issue Motions. The lot owner was cognisant that the other two Motions would be included on the Agenda, as is apparent from the drafting of Motion 15.

• [17] I have received a brief submission from the committee in regard to this issue. It says that when it was alerted by the applicant on 6 May 2025 (the day before the AGM) that motions 13, 14 and 15 did not comply with section 79 of the Accommodation Module, and it was asked by the applicant to have all 3 motions ruled out of order at the AGM, it decided to deal with the problem by organising to have motions 13 and 14 'removed at the AGM by the chairperson', to leave motion 15 standing as the only motion on the issue.
• [18] At this point I will comment that I do not share the applicant's view that the lot owner who submitted motion 15 ought to share responsibility for the error in drafting the agenda, because it is solely the committee's obligation and prerogative to prepare an AGM agenda and the voting papers in a compliant form.
• [19] It is not disputed by the body corporate, and I accept, that motions 13, 14 and 15 deal with alternative ways of the body corporate giving consent for the MCOU application, and that they were not properly listed as a group of same-issue motions on the issued papers and with the explanatory schedule required by section 80(4) of the Accommodation Module.
• [20] I note the AGM minutes record the following for each of motions 13 and 14: 'Motion was ruled Out of Order: Motion withdrawn from the floor of the meeting by the proposer.' The minutes also record that 19 votes had been cast on each of them (in each case, to defeat the motions).
• [21] Technically, it cannot be that the motions were both ruled out or order and withdrawn. I am satisfied that it was appropriate for the meeting chair to rule motions 13 and 14 out of order, for being inconsistent with section 79 by not being properly grouped,[2] and I note no party before me has raised a dispute to be resolved about that outcome. But in any event, nothing ultimately turns on the issue in this case, because I have decided, below, that motions 13 and 14 were void from the instant the committee decided they should be listed on the AGM papers, and accordingly they could not have been either withdrawn or ruled out of order at the AGM. However, for completeness, I will deal briefly with the withdrawal issue, further below.

• [22] The application turns on whether motion 15 was void.
• [23] Section 79(9) provides that if there is more than one motion on a general meeting's agenda or voting paper about the same issue, and those motions are not part of a group of same-issue motions, all of those motions are void. An original motion is, by definition in subsection 79(2), not a part of a group of same issue motions until such time as it is listed as a group of same issue motions. I cannot see that sub-section 79(9) can be read as meaning anything other than that same-issue motions are void as soon as they are listed non-compliantly. Accordingly, because of the listing of motions 13 and 14, motion 15 was arguably void - ie, non-existent - before any opportunity arose for the AGM chair to rule motions 13 and 4 out of order.
• [24] A very similar circumstance was dealt with by Adjudicator Jones in Arcadia Gardens[3]. An owner had submitted a general meeting motion. The committee submitted a motion dealing with the same issue, but failed to properly group the those motions on the agenda and voting paper. The Adjudicator found that the committee acted unreasonably, in contravention of section 100(5) of the Act, in erroneously preparing the papers and, by reason of that, declared the motion the committee submitted to be void from the outset, leaving the owner's motion to survive as the only motion on the agenda dealing with the issue. Adjudicator Jones reasoned as follows:

[33] The applicant argues that this issue should not disadvantage them or their relief regarding Motion 15, as this is nothing more than a technical defect. It is true that technical deviations from the legislation will not necessarily render a decision of the body corporate invalid. However, defective motions should not stand unless exceptional circumstances exist. Exceptional circumstances may be where the irregularity was trivial and has no material impact, and the irregularity caused no prejudice or disadvantage to other parties.

[34] I cannot accept the applicant's argument because, even when the elements of exceptional circumstances are established, where the legislative text indicates an intention that the error would invalidate the motions, I am bound to find those motions are void. The wording of section 79(9) of the Accommodation Module could not be clearer in that respect - the necessary consequence of not properly grouping same-issue motions is that all of them are void. Nonetheless, this does not conclude the matter for the applicant.

[35] The applicant also says that it was 'not necessary' for the body corporate to propose Motion 14. The applicant's position may be better articulated as an argument that the body corporate acted unreasonably in its decision and action to propose Motion 14 and not list it on the agenda as grouped with Motion 15. I do not suggest the committee could not have reasonably proposed Motion 14, but rather, the act of proposing and not listing it as a group of same issue motions could not be a reasonable action where it does not comply with the legislation. I also note that, before taking that action, the body corporate would have to make a conscious or inadvertent decision to do that act. It is with this decision process and action that the issue arises.

[36] Section 79 of the Accommodation Module was introduced, along with other amendments, for the purpose of enhancing lot owner protections and stopping 'gaming' of the outcomes where there are multiple motions dealing with the same issue. I do not mean to say that the committee actively turned its mind to the issue and purposefully failed to comply with section 79, rendering the applicant's Motion 15 invalid - in that regard, I note the outcome of the committee's action is that the body corporate's Motion 14 would also be invalid. Rather, the circumstances suggest committee failed to pay heed to the extremely relevant factor of section 79 of the Accommodation Module when it decided to place Motion 14 on the agenda and voting papers in the way it did, thereby unfairly disadvantaging the applicant In their legitimate attempt to have the installation approved.

[37] In my view, the circumstances indicate that the committee failed to have proper regard to a highly relevant requirement - namely, section 79 of the Accommodation Module - when resolving to list Motion 14 on the agenda and voting papers. I am therefore satisfied that the committee acted unreasonably in proposing and placing Motion 14 on the agenda and voting papers in the manner that it did. I will make an order that invalidates the body corporate's decision and action in this regard.

[38] It then follows that the only valid motion proposed dealing with the air conditioning condenser is Motion 15, and section 79 of the Accommodation Module does not impact the validity of Motion 15.

• [25] I consider the approach taken by Adjudicator Jones is appropriate in this case also. Accordingly, I find that the committee acted unreasonably at the time it made its decision to list motions 13 and 14 on the papers other than as a group with motion 15. I note that decision was taken prior to creating the agenda and voting papers. I therefore also find motions 13 and 14 were void from the outset, as if they were never listed, leaving motion 15 validly standing as the sole motion on the agenda and voting papers dealing with that issue. I saying that, I do not suggest the committee's deliberately acted with ill intent.
• [26] It follows that there was also no contravention of the requirement to include an explanatory note for motion 15, because it was not part of a group of same issue motions.
• [27] I would also add that, if I were to find and declare the resolution pursuant to motion 15 void, the appropriate remedy would be to allow the body corporate an opportunity to ratify the body corporate's purported decision to consent to the MCOU lodgement by again voting on it, at a later general meeting. However, in circumstances where motion 15 comfortably passed, and the submissions on this application do not indicate it would now fail or even be a close vote, and the applicant does not seek an order for motion 15 to be considered afresh at a new general meeting, I will not take that approach.

• [28] The legislation is silent on withdrawing a motion once listed on the meeting papers.
• [29] The modules, for example Accommodation Module at section 105, expressly provide for amending a motion; in essence: only by a vote of those present and entitled to vote; and only to the extent that the motion retains the same subject matter. That provision certainly precludes amendment by the proposer acting alone, and also withdrawal by removing all substance from the motion.
• [30] The fact that amendment is provided for, but withdrawal is not, might suggest that withdrawing a listed motion is not allowed. However, that would be at odds with the common law and the view shared by various adjudicators.
• [31] While it is not necessarily determinative for this jurisdiction, given there is legislated meeting procedure, the learned authors of Horsley & Lang's Meetings Procedure, Law and Practice provide the following as to the common law of meetings and the standard rules of meetings procedure:[4]

A motion that has been moved and accepted by the Chair thereupon comes into the control of, and is the property of, the meeting. It must be put to the vote unless:

1. one or more amendments to it are moved, voted on, carried and embodied in the original motion, thereby changing and superseding it;

3. one of the formal motions is passed to prevent a vote being taken.

• [32] The learned authors go on to discuss (at [12.16]) the potential procedures for withdrawal, and indicate that in any event this should occur before a vote on the motion and with at least the tacit consent of those present, or otherwise a formal vote to that effect.
• [33] In the context of this legislation, Adjudicator Schmidt in Festival Towers[5] accepted that withdrawal might be effected by a procedural motion passed by those present, but not once a vote had been cast on it. The adjudicator noted also that once a motion is listed it does not belong to the proposer. Adjudicator Rosemann in Silver Quays[6] agreed that a motion's withdrawal cannot occur once a vote had been cast on it, and suggested that withdrawal, by the meeting passing a procedural motion, would surely also require the explicit consent of the proposer (that being an issue in that case), otherwise an owner's right to propose a motion could too easily be stymied.
• [34] The regulation modules provide for procedural motions, for example Accommodation Module section 97(6)(b). That subsection lacks explicit provision for withdrawing a motion, and provides only for passing a procedural motion (in a generic sense), a motion to amend a motion, and a motion to correct minutes. Again, the omission of a provision for a motion's withdrawal might indicate a lack of power to effect that, but I am satisfied that the provision for a procedural motion encompasses a power to withdraw a listed motion.
• [35] In light of the above, in my view, a motion's withdrawal can be effected, but not unilaterally by the proposer, nor once a vote has been cast on it. In a particular case, depending on the circumstances, I might be prepared to accept that, for all practical purposes, a motion had been withdrawn by the tacit consent of the meeting, without a formal procedural vote, if there were no dispute in the application about whether the motion had in fact been withdrawn.
• [36] There is no evidence before me that any person has objected to motions 13 and 14 being minuted as withdrawn. Further, as I have found they were void and therefore in effect never existed, and otherwise that it was proper for the meeting chair to rule them out of order for being inconsistent with the legislation. Therefore, a finding as to whether they were properly withdrawn either before or at the AGM is rendered unnecessary.

• [37] As the applicant notes, section 94(2) of the Act requires a body corporate to act reasonably, including in making a decision. The leading authority on section 94(2) reasonableness is the High Court in Ainsworth v Albrecht.[7] From that and other decisions[8] which follow it, the following general principles may be drawn:

¾ The standard of reasonableness is objective and the test is to be applied with reference to the time the allegedly unreasonable action was taken, given all relevant factors and excluding irrelevant factors.

¾ Acting reasonably requires consideration of all the circumstances, including a balancing of any competing interests.

¾ There is no onus on a body corporate to satisfy an adjudicator that it acted reasonably. Rather, if the adjudicator is to invalidate an action or decision, the adjudicator must be satisfied that the body corporate acted unreasonably.

¾ A body corporate's decision is not an unreasonable action simply because it could reasonably have made a different decision.

¾ An adjudicator may not simply substitute their own view as to what would be a preferable or 'more' reasonable decision.

• [38] The applicant says the Body Corporate has failed to act reasonably in approving Motion 15 for the following reasons:

¾ The material change of use to include concomitant permanent residential accommodation offends the:

• − tourist accommodation zone within which the Scheme is located;
• − original development approval for the Scheme;
• − the regulation module which applies to the Scheme, being the Accommodation Module; and
• − conditions which existed at the Scheme at the time the Applicant purchased the management rights at the Scheme, including the right to operate a letting business at the Scheme for short term accommodation holiday apartments.

¾ The original regulation module which applied to the Scheme was the Standard Module. Lot Owners decided by special resolution in 2013 to change the regulation module to the Accommodation Module, due to the nature of the Scheme. The Accommodation Module is not designed for community titles schemes that are used for permanent accommodation purposes. According to the Explanatory Memorandum for the Accommodation Module, it:

provides management processes designed for community titles schemes that are used predominantly for short or long-term letting purposes (including for example, holiday letting or serviced apartment operations) with the need for accommodation management.

¾ After changing specifically to the Accommodation Module from the Standard Module and putting long term Caretaking and Letting Agreements in place under the Accommodation Module, to introduce permanent residential accommodation to the Scheme is an unreasonable and inconsistent about-face which places the Applicant at significant and substantial financial disadvantage, having purchased the management rights business at the Scheme in reliance upon the fact that the Scheme allowed short term holiday accommodation only.

¾ The infrastructure on Scheme land, including carparking and activities permitted under the Letting Agreement, are tailored specifically to short term/holiday let accommodation and not to permanent residential accommodation, for example, until 30 June 2048 when the Letting Agreement expires, the Applicant may, without limitation:

• − Use an area of common property to park a courtesy bus or coach for the convenience of short term/holiday guests;
• − Hold an exclusive right to use areas of common property including the reception area and other areas for the conduct of the letting business;
• − Run a car hire business on Scheme land;
• − Provide cleaning, laundry and room service facilities;
• − Provide ticket sales, tour bookings and entertainment bookings;
• − Install and maintain amusement and vending machines on the common property;
• − Conduct the business of sales or letting agency for lots in the building; and
• − Provide serviced apartments within the building.
• [39] As I noted in my interim order decision, the permissible and appropriate uses of the scheme from a planning perspective are matters for the local government authority and those matters will no doubt receive primary consideration in its decision on the MCOU application. It is not unlawful for an owner to make a MCOU application; indeed the local authority explicitly permits such applications. I also note that there is no statutory obligation on other owners to act reasonably, but even if there were I cannot see that such an application would be unreasonable.
• [40] I also noted in my interim order decision that, even if it is successful, the MCOU application will not necessarily result in a substantial change to the predominant type of occupancy becoming inconsistent with the Accommodation Module,[9] and if that does eventuate, the Act contemplates a body corporate deciding to change to a more appropriate regulation module. Further, the Act also acknowledges the effect that might have on rights awarded to service contractors and letting agents, by 'grandfathering' rights concerning any renewal or extension of the engagement or authorisation[10]
• [41] I turn now to the claim that the change in use of the scheme, if it occurs, would put the Applicant at significant and substantial financial disadvantage, having purchased the management rights business at the scheme in reliance upon the fact that the scheme allowed short term holiday accommodation only.
• [42] Body Corporate for the Reserve CTS 31561 v Trojan Resorts Pty Ltd (Trojan)[11] was a decision on appeal from an earlier Tribunal decision, about a dispute over a body corporate's decision to terminate a caretaking service contract. Senior Member Stilgoe OAM (as she was then) and Member Collins affirmed that the body corporate's section 94(2) obligation extended to acting reasonably in making a decision affecting a third party, ie not just a decision affecting an owner or occupier. They also observed that the competing interests to be balanced therefore included the caretaking service contractor's interests.[12] I am therefore satisfied that the body corporate's obligation to act reasonably includes as towards the applicant.
• [43] However, the obligation to act reasonably does not require a body corporate to put a third party's interests on an equal footing with owners'; it simply requires the interests of both the third party and owners to be taken into account.[13] A body corporate may reasonably have its primary focus on the owners' interests.[14] Where only one of the two competing side's interests can prevail, treating each side equally in the outcome is not necessary and indeed may not be possible.
• [44] The Tribunal in Trojan decided that the body corporate's decision to terminate the agreement was unreasonable. However, in my view Trojan is otherwise not particularly instructive for the present circumstances, because in that case the body corporate's action, which was prompted by technical non-compliance by one of the contractor's directors with conditions of their engagement, seemingly was of no real benefit to owners (or did not account for the disbenefit), in circumstances where the caretaker was otherwise carrying out its duties and where the consequent cost of litigation eroded body corporate assets.[15] In other words, it did not actually advance either parties' interests. In this case, I note that some owners say the change would be a disbenefit to their interests. While I accept that to be a reasonable view for the dissenting owners to hold, given the outcome of the vote on motion 15 and the small number of owner submissions in support of the applicant, I consider that on balance the change in permitted occupancy uses (if approved) would more likely be an overall benefit to owners, or at least they perceive it to be so, as evidenced by the motion attracting a very high voter turn-out and easily passing. That benefit presumably arises primarily from the broadening of the scope of their lots' permitted uses (if the MCOU is so approved).
• [45] Even though I have decided that it is not inherently unreasonable for the body corporate's decision to benefit some owners at the expense of the applicant and some other owners, I also should dealt with the question of whether the body corporate's decision does not adequately account for the applicant's interest in maintaining their income from the letting business and the value of their rights as a saleable asset. That raises the question of what were the applicant's reasonable expectations for its income and asset value when it purchased the letting rights. I note the following:

¾ A letting agent for a scheme is a person authorised to conduct a business of letting out lots in the scheme for owners. However, owners are not obliged to use the authorised letting agent to let out their lots; they can do so privately or through another letting agent.

¾ The body corporate may choose to execute an agreement to the effect that the letting agent has such rights exclusive of other letting agents, but that exclusivity extends only to exclusive rights to use parts of the scheme for the purpose of the business, for example a reception area.

¾ If due diligence had been done, those matters presumably would have been priced into the value of the letting agreement from the outset.

¾ Even if the MCOU application is successful, it does not necessarily follow that the scheme will not still prominently be used for short term letting.

• [46] Accordingly, I am not satisfied that this potential for the change in the demand for the letting agent services would defeat a reasonable expectation held by the applicant as to the future circumstances of the scheme.
• [47] If in fact the agreement has been induced by a misrepresentation or a mistake in that regard, I do not have jurisdiction to resolve such a dispute.
• [48] Similarly, I am not satisfied that the dissenting owners could have had a reasonable expectation that the permitted uses for the scheme would never change.
• [49] The applicant does not explain why it is unreasonable for a body corporate to seek to change either its permitted uses or, if appropriate, its regulation module, and I cannot see how that ordinarily could be so when these are actions plainly within owners' statutory rights. The issue of whether the scheme's infrastructure would cope with the change is a matter for the local government authority.
• [50] With all of that in mind, I am not satisfied that the body corporate's decision to consent to the MCOU application was unreasonable.

• [51] I light of the above, I will dismiss the application.

[1] Beach Front Apartments on Trinity Beach [2025] QBCCMCmr 290

[2] See Accommodation Module ss 88(1)(a) and (5)

[3] [2025] QBCCMCmr 193

[4] Horsley & Lang's Meetings Procedure, Law and Practice 8th ed, LexisNexis Australia, [10.15]

[5] [2011] QBCCMCmr 42 at p.6

[6] [2020] QBCCMCmr 162 at [20]- [25]

[7] [2016] HCA 40 (Ainsworth)

[8] See also for eg Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177

[11] [2017] QCATA 53

[15] Ainsworth at [51]; Trojan at [32], [49]