1. At the hearing on 11 February 2025, the appellant abandoned her claims for travel expenses, as well as her claim for loss of employment income.[16] She persisted with her claim for treatment expenses and for loss of rental income.
2. The claim for loss of rental income arises because it is alleged that the appellant's housemates moved out after suggesting they did not feel safe there because of the offences. However, I do not consider that loss of rental income in that respect is loss 'suffered by the [appellant] as a direct consequence of the injury suffered'.[17] Therefore, such loss is not compensable under the Act. I do not allow the application to amend the claim to include loss of rental income.
3. As regards the claim for treatment expenses, the appellant estimates these at $15,000. Such treatment expenses, if established, are compensable, and I therefore allow the application to amend. As to whether such expenses are established on the evidence, and an award made, is dealt with later in these reasons.

Issue four: Is it appropriate to award compensation and if so, what amount?

1. At the hearing, the appellant contended that the statements of material facts available in respect of the offences do not accurately explain the incident as experienced by her and that it was essentially 'dismissed' as a 'one-minute situation' where the offenders had just come to her home and knocked on the door 'with [a weapon]'.[18] The appellant's case on appeal was that the incident was more prolonged, traumatic and scary than what the documents reflected.[19]

Evidence and findings as to the incident on 12 December 2022

1. The appellant gave a contemporaneous, signed statement to WAPOL on 13 December 2022.[20] She stated that:

(a) She had been at her home on the evening of Sunday, 11 December 2022, with a friend who attended for dinner and drinks. In the earlier part of the night, there had been several unscheduled/uninvited attendances at the property, first to the front door and then to the side door, involving at least one of the subsequent offenders. On each occasion, the appellant says she asked them to leave and closed the door.

(b) Her friend ultimately left the property at 1.00 am, and the appellant thereafter locked the doors and went to bed. At approximately 2.00 am, the appellant heard a car outside and observed a vehicle across the street. She observed figures at the front door of her property; she called 000 and while calling, she could hear 'loud banging and bashing' outside. The noise was so loud the telephone operator kept asking the appellant to repeat the address, and the call somehow became disconnected.

(c) The appellant called her friend and, while on that call, the emergency operator telephoned back, which she answered. She spoke to the operator and informed her that it seemed they had left the property, and the operator told her to call back if they returned. She says that during the incident, she stayed in her bedroom as she was scared for her safety. She alleged the loud banging had carried on for approximately 10 minutes.

(d) WAPOL officers attended the property the following morning, and the appellant told them about the incident. She provided WAPOL with a copy of CCTV footage from the property.

1. The statement of material facts in the case of the first offender records that:

At approximately 2.08am on Sunday the 11th of December 2022, the accused was on the front porch of [address] in company with another male who was in possession of a mattock.

...

The accused and the male have attempted to intimidate [appellant] and threatened to enter the address by punching the front door security screen.

The accused continued to act in a threatening manner by standing on the porch punching into his hand and yelling '[redacted]' at the front of the address. These actions have been captured on the occupant's CCTV ... These actions caused the occupant fear and alarm that he would enter the address.

...

1. The second statement of material facts records that:

At about 2am on Monday the 12th of December 2022, the accused was at [address].

The accused was in company with a co-accused.

The accused had attended the address earlier in the night but had been told to leave the address by the victim.

The accused later returned and walked up to the front door of the house with a wooden Mattock over his right shoulder.

The accused used the mattock to knock on the front door. The accused stood on the porch whilst the co accused punched the front door and jumped around in an aggressive manner.

This caused the victim to fear for her safety and she hid in her bedroom.

...

1. In her original compensation application, the appellant stated that:[21]

I had 2 unknown men come to my house at 2am threatening me. They were armed and violent.

1. In an email to the CIC office on 18 December 2023, the appellant stated, among other things that:[22]

I called 000 (twice) whilst the men were banging on the doors and windows threatening me for 20 mins, it was so loud that I had to scream my address 5 times over the phone. The [redacted] Police called me back but then refused to contact or dispatch any [redacted] Police officers as they were 'asleep' I begged them to please call them. They hung up on me and told me to 'calm down'. 2 days after the incident I received a phone call from a police officer asking if I was ok, I told them it was a bit late now to call as i could have been killed? The [redacted] Police also came over later that day 2 days after the incident. told me they were only just informed about what happened and didn't understand why they were not notified.

i cannot find any lawyer to actually help me, I have called EVERYWHERE this makes everything even more stressful

1. Also adduced on appeal were the audio recordings of the two telephone calls between the appellant and emergency services between 2.00 am and 2.30 am. The audio was played during the appeal hearing. I understand the appellant's contention to be that the audio is relevant because she says it is demonstrative of the trauma suffered during the incident and supports the extent of injury alleged.
2. The first call lasted 1 minute and 33 seconds, during which the appellant contacted emergency services and reported people trying to 'break into [her] house and roll [her]'. The appellant did communicate a sense of urgency, at one point directing the operator to 'hurry up, quickly, come on'. She confirmed, in answer to questions, that the intruders were not inside; that all doors and windows were locked and that a male was present with her in the home inside. There was also a dog barking which could be heard continuously over the audio. The operator informed the appellant that they would 'be there as quick as they can'.
3. The second audio is for a further call from the appellant to emergency services, lasting 3 minutes and 47 seconds. According to the appellant's telephone log, this call was at 2.22 am. In this call the appellant states that she:

just tried to call before and the guy wouldn't send the police; I just had two guys with an axe try and bash through my doors; they've already been four times today; they've just gone to my friend's house as well; we need the police to come.

1. The operator asked whether the appellant 'had just spoken with [redacted] police', and the appellant answered in an agitated manner that 'yes and that [inaudible] keep asking all these stupid questions about how I know them; I don't know these people, they've just come and with an axe ...'.
2. On answering questions from the operator about whether she knew the people who had attended, and why she thought they might be persistently attending, the appellant became more agitated, argumentative and angry. The conversation between the appellant and the operator deteriorated as the operator attempted to get further information from the appellant. It was clear, during that call, that the offenders had left the appellant's property. At one point, after angrily reciting the telephone number of her friend, the appellant stated in an aggressive tone: 'you do realise that we could, like, be actually getting stabbed and murdered right now'. During the call, both the operator and the appellant raised their voices at each other. One or the other then eventually disconnects the call.
3. Also available are screenshots of the appellant's mobile phone records.[23] In the period between 2.00 am and 2.30 am, the following call times appear:

1. A preponderance of the available evidence suggests that the incoming call at 2.12 am was in fact from WAPOL, triggered by reason of the appellant's call to emergency services. The duration of that call was 4 minutes and 6 seconds. I say this because in the further call with emergency services at 2.22 am, the appellant indicates having spoken to police, but expresses dissatisfaction with their conduct and response. It is apparent that, in her mind, they kept 'asking stupid questions'. Being unhappy with the response of WAPOL seems to be a trigger for the appellant to again contact emergency services to request police attendance. Further, in her affidavit filed 10 January 2024, the appellant refers to being contacted by '[redacted] police', who she says refused to dispatch local police officers.
2. Based on all available evidence, I find that when home overnight, the appellant was the victim of offences committed, being those listed in [2] herein. While she recounts now, being substantially traumatised and that the incident was severe and prolonged, I do not consider the available objective evidence corroborates me making such a finding. The appellant was agitated and demanding during her communications with emergency services. She did not sound genuinely concerned for her safety, rather, she was unhappy with the response of WAPOL and emergency services, and her perceived refusal of them taking her reports seriously. It is not apparent that this was borne out of trauma or genuine fear that has been demonstrated as having any significant or long-lasting impact in terms of her capabilities.
3. Notwithstanding, there is no question that the offences have had some impression on the appellant, and unsurprisingly, caused some psychological sequelae. While I do not accept the appellant's case as to the extent alleged, I nonetheless assess her claim on the basis of some recognised compensable injury. It has been established that at some point she held genuine fear for her safety and that the offences have caused her some psychological symptoms.

The relevant law as to the appropriate award of compensation

1. Section 12 of the Act provides that a person who suffers 'injury as a consequence of the commission of a proved offence' may apply for compensation for the injury and any loss also suffered. Section 3 of the Act defines 'proved offence' to mean 'a crime, misdemeanour, or simple offence of which a person has been convicted'.
2. Section 12(3) of the Act provides that an assessor must not make a compensation award unless satisfied that the claimed injury and any claimed loss has occurred and did so 'as a consequence of' the commission of the proved offence.
3. Section 3 of the Act defines 'injury' to mean bodily harm, mental and nervous shock. The phrase 'mental or nervous shock' has been established to:

(a) comprehend any malfunction of the person which can be seen to be a consequence of the impact of events constituting the offence, or associated with the commission of the offence, as those events impact on the mind or nervous system;

(b) include distress, horror, disgust, and other similar adverse mental reactions, but to exclude mere fright, humiliation, or anguish; and

(c) ultimately, be more than a mere emotional reaction, and something of a more enduring character which may, in both the legal sense and in common parlance, be described as an injury.[24]

1. The phrase, 'as a consequence of', requires a causal relationship or connection. Whether that causal relationship exists is a question of fact, to be resolved as a matter of commonsense. It is sufficient that, as a matter of ordinary commonsense and experience, the offence should be regarded as having materially contributed to the injury.[25]
2. Section 31(1) of the Act provides that the maximum award of compensation available is $75,000.
3. The court must apply the ordinary tortious principles for assessment of damages when assessing the amount of compensation under the Act, while operating in the jurisdictional limit and within the scope of the definitions of 'injury' and 'loss'.[26]
4. When assessing the amount of compensation, I must have regard only to any injury sustained by reason of the commission of the alleged offence. The amount awarded is only a reflection of the injury sustained and not a reflection of sympathy to the appellant or a representation of the alleged offender's culpability. Other extraneous matters such as the alleged experience of the appellant with WAPOL and/or with emergency services or concerns about their alleged conduct are also irrelevant to my assessment.

1. The appellant was a victim of proven offences. She claims that she sustained psychological injury as a consequence of the offences. She has been granted compensation for psychological symptoms in the amount of $7,500 by the CIC assessor.
2. In her appeal, the appellant says she was reviewed by a clinical psychologist, MPT, in August 2024. MPT appears to have produced a draft report, but the report is neither signed nor dated, and it does not appear on letterhead. According to an email on 16 September 2024 from MPT to the appellant, he forwarded her the report as a draft and requested that she confirm there are no major errors of fact, subsequent to which he will finalise the report.[27]
3. In it, MPT recounts his qualifications, the documents reviewed and the history obtained by the appellant as to the incident. He ultimately opines that the appellant had genuine fear for her life. He considered she meets the relevant diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 80% causally related to the incident.
4. The appellant also produced a copy of an invoice for 'MPT Psychological Consultancy' dated 31 August 2024, in the amount of $1,276.[28] As submitted on behalf of the amicus, the appellant may have been entitled to claim for expenses incurred in obtaining the report. However, despite expressly requesting the invoice from MPT, nothing was ever paid by the appellant for it. From the communication exchanges produced, this does not appear to have been through her own fault or decision not to pay. The exchanges reflect attempts to have minor factual matters amended and a final report signed/issued for submission. She asked MPT for some assistance with ensuring, in essence, the admissibility of his report before it was finalised and before she paid the invoice. MPT appropriately recommended she obtain some legal advice, and stated, while giving her a recommendation for a lawyer: 'Please get advice as I would not like you to pay money for a useless report'. The appellant subsequently continued to chase MPT to get the report finalised, however, says that in the end 'she just gave up'.[29]
5. Without evidence from MPT, it is difficult to be clear as to what happened from his perspective in terms of finalising the report. The appellant produced no communication to suggest he requested, or demanded payment prior to issuing the final report, and according to the appellant, despite her attempts, she simply could not get hold of him again and did not hear from him.
6. Notwithstanding that the report is not signed or dated, I am prepared to give some weight to it in light of the emails between MPT and the appellant. I do so also noting that in this appeal, pursuant to s 18(2) of the Act, the court is not bound by rules or practice as to evidence, and may inform itself in any manner it thinks fit.
7. In that respect, the following is relevant insofar as the court's receipt of that report is concerned:

(a) on its face, the report appears in all respects complete - it sets out underlying facts on which the opinion is based, answers a series of questions, and expresses an opinion;

(b) the emails between the appellant and MPT also suggest that the report was, in all respects, complete and his enquiry of her before finalising it was simply to confirm that there were no major errors of fact; and

(c) in an email reply to MPT, the appellant clarified small matters of fact (her parents' birth places and her own employment details) and otherwise confirmed at the hearing that they were the only matters which required amendment. Such matters, in my assessment, are not material to the opinion ultimately expressed.

1. However, while I am prepared to ascribe some weight to MPT's report, it is of course not without its limitations. It is not signed and it was not ultimately 'complete'. To place significant weight on such material, notwithstanding s 18 of the Act, would be an error. This is also because, regardless of its completion or otherwise, it contains a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder made by a clinical psychologist. In that regard, I have given consideration to the findings in BAS v The Estate of NAS (dec)[30] also involving a claim for criminal injuries compensation and the use of an opinion expressed by a psychologist rather than a psychiatrist. In BAS, the Court of Appeal concluded that the report of the psychologist in that case opining as to the claimant's PTSD and clinical depression was 'important evidence probative of the appellant's case and it therefore demanded adjudication of her application'.[31]
2. In the present case, I consider there are some critical distinctions as to the probative value of MPT's report compared to that in BAS. That includes that the MPT report was still in draft and ultimately was not signed. In addition, the report and opinion of the psychologist in BAS were noted to have been based not just on information and history given by the appellant, but on the results of clinical testing that he had conducted. Such testing was not a feature in MPT's report. I therefore place less weight on such report.
3. Finally, I note it is the appellant's evidence that she suffers from ADHD, pre-dating the offences, and that she thinks she was diagnosed when she was around 24 years old.[32] Such diagnosis is relevant in the context of assessing compensation for a psychological injury, given it would impact on the appellant quite apart from any psychological symptomology caused as a consequence of the offences. In assessing an amount for loss, applying the usual principles, her pre-existing condition is a causative factor of her psychological symptomology.
4. Overall, by reference to the available evidence:

(a) I am satisfied, like the assessor before me, that the appellant has suffered some psychological symptoms as a consequence of the offences; and

(b) I am also satisfied that, based on the MPT report, there is a proper basis for me to award expenses for future medical treatment.

1. I therefore allow an amount for future expenses, being to cover the therapeutic services set out in MPT's report. Specifically, MPT opines that the appellant would 'do well' with specific PTSD therapy to help alleviate her chronic symptoms of feeling unsafe. He recommends 10 sessions with a suitably qualified private psychologist, with an understanding of ADHD and trauma, and estimates 10 sessions at a total of $2,500.
2. The payment of this award will be subject to the regime in s 48 of the Act.
3. I otherwise affirm the assessor's award of $7,500. I do not consider a proper basis has been established for that award to be varied.

1. For the reasons herein, the assessor's award is confirmed, and an additional award of $2,500 for future treatment is made, to be dealt with pursuant to s 48 of the Act. A total amount of compensation of $10,000 is allowed in this appeal.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.

[1] Underwood v Underwood [2018] WADC 13 [19] (Underwood).

[2] Section 56(1) of the Act.

[3] Re CJR [2023] WADC 111 [7].

[4] [Redacted] [2024] WACIC 2 (Reasons) [6].

[9] Appellant's submissions filed 30 January 2025 (AS), pages 2 - 3; ts 115, ts 147 - ts 148.

[12] Section 56(2)(a) of the Act.

[14] Affidavit filed 8 November 2024, pages 8 - 9.

[23] Appellant's affidavit filed 4 January 2025.

[24] S v Neumann (1995) 14 WAR 452, 461; M v J and J v J (Unreported, WASC, Library No 920598, 19 November 1992), 10 - 11 (Scott J); Martin v Martin [2015] WADC 138 [85].

[25] Re Richards [2022] WADC 100 [55].

[26] Re Warrek [2019] WADC 50 [29] (Troy DCJ).

[27] Appellant's affidavit filed 8 November 2024, Attachment A.

[28] Appellant's affidavit filed 12 February 2025, Attachment A.

[29] ts 151 - ts 152; Appellant's affidavit filed 12 February 2025, Attachment B.

[30] BAS v The Estate of NAS (dec) [2000] WASCA 270 (BAS).

[32] ts 155 - ts 156. This is consistent with the information given to MPT, as it is included in his report as part of the history given.