(b) Grounds 3 and 4 - the AAT's letters and ss 424 and 424B
58 (i) The legislative history of some provisions in Div 4 of Pt 7: It is convenient first to summarise the parties' supplementary submissions concerning the possible relevance to these grounds of the legislative history and extrinsic materials concerning the significance of the separate expressions in Div 4 of "information", "comment on" and "respond to" information, "evidence" and "documents".
59 Sections 424, 424A, 424B and 424C of the Act, in substantially the same form as they are now, were inserted by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 1998 (Cth) (Act 113 of 1998) (the 1998 Amending Act) (see Sch 3, Pt 1, Item 3 of the 1998 Amending Act). The Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 1998 (Cth) stated that "sections 424, 424A, 424B and 424C provide a code of procedure which the Tribunal is to follow in conducting its review" (see Sch 3, Pt 1, Item 3). The related provisions applicable to the then Migration Review Tribunal (i.e. ss 359, 359A, 359B and 359C) were also added at this time (see Sch 1, Pt 1, Item 22 of the 1998 Amending Act and the Explanatory Memorandum).
60 Provisions of similar effect and drafted in similar language to ss 424, 424A and 424B, but applicable to the Minister (rather than the Tribunal), had earlier been inserted into the Act by the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) (Act 184 of 1992) (the 1992 Amending Act). In particular, the then s 26X (inserted by the 1992 Amending Act) was similar in nature and drafting to the present s 424, s 26Y was similar in nature and drafting to the present s 424A, and s 26Z was similar in nature and drafting to the present s 424B.
61 Subsections 424(3) and 424A(2) were amended in 2001 by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Electronic Transactions and Methods of Notification) Act 2001 (Cth) (Act 58 of 2001), but these amendments concerned only the required method of notification and did not affect the use of terms "information", "comment" or "response".
62 Section 424AA was inserted into the Act in 2007 by the Migration Amendment (Review Provisions) Act 2007 (Cth) (Act 100 of 2007) (the 2007 Amending Act). Relevantly, s 424AA of the Act, as then inserted, included the phrase "comment on or respond to the information" (see eg. s 424AA(b)(ii), (iii) and (iv) as then enacted). Previously, s 424A had only used the phrase "comment on" (and did not use "respond to"). Amendments were also made, by the 2007 Amending Act, to ss 424A, 424B and 424C of the Act, inter alia by inserting the phrase "respond to" in those sections, so as to be consistent with the language used in s 424AA. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration Amendment (Review Provisions) Bill 2006 (Cth) does not clearly identify why the phrase "respond to" was added to these sections - but it appears intended to broaden what a review applicant might permissibly do once in receipt of a ss 424A or 424AA invitation, from "commenting on" information, to "commenting on" or (more generally) "responding to" the information the subject of the Tribunal's invitation. I accept the appellant's submission that the word "respond" is sufficiently broad to encompass the provision of further evidence by a review applicant.
63 Section 424 of the Act was also amended by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2009 (Cth) (Act 10 of 2009) (the 2009 Amending Act), by, relevantly, inserting into s 424(2) "either orally (including by telephone) or in writing" (i.e. such that s 424(2) now specified the means the Tribunal could employ to issue an invitation under s 424(2)), and altering "additional information" to "information") (see the 2009 Amending Act, Sch 1, Items 9-11). The Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2008 (Cth) stated that the amendments to s 424(2) were intended to broaden the means by which the Tribunal could obtain information under s 424 (i.e. by permitting less formal means such as orally over the telephone), and were made in response to the Full Court's decision in SZKTI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 83; 168 FCR 256 (note that the High Court upheld an appeal against from that decision in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKTI [2009] HCA 30; 238 CLR 489) (see Items 9-16). Sections 424B(1)(a) and 424C(1)(a) were consequentially amended to refer to, and apply to, invitations in writing under s 424. Section 424B(1) and (2), and 424C(1), were also amended to remove reference to "additional" information (see the 2009 Amending Act, Sch 1, Items 12-16).
64 Finally, s 424A and 424AA were amended, by the insertion of ss 424A(4) and 424AA(2), in 2015 by the Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Act 2015 (Cth) (Act 35 of 2015), but those amendments do not affect the use of the terms of "information", "comment" or "response" in those sections.
65 In light of this legislative history, it is apparent that ss 424, 424A, 424B and 424C of the Act are an interrelated group of provisions (or, as the Explanatory Memorandum described them, a "code of procedure"). Given that they were inserted together and have been amended at the same time and in like fashion, I accept the Minister's submission that these provisions should be read and interpreted together, in the context of each other. The Act creates and maintains different procedures for the getting or giving of "information" (ss 424(1) and (2)) and the giving of comment" or "response" about "information" (ss 424A/424AA). The content of these interrelated provisions highlights that the Act has always maintained the distinction between, on the one hand, "information" and "giv[ing] information" and, on the other hand, the giving of "comment" and "responses". The Act does not equate those concepts or treat them as synonymous, even though they may overlap to some extent.
66 As noted above, s424B interacts with both ss 424(2) and 424A. That is because both ss 424B(1) and (2) refer to invitations to "give information" or to give "comments or [a] response". I accept the Minister's submission that the application of s 424B to invitations made under both ss 424 and 424A highlights the distinction which is drawn in the Act between, giving "information" (s 424) and giving comment on or responding to information (s 424A).
67 (ii) Other relevant matters: As noted above, the word "information" is not defined in the Act. In VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 123; 436 FCR 549, the Full Court referred at [24] to the "considerable body of case law" concerned with the meaning of the term "information" in s 424A(1) (in circumstances where it is well settled that the term when used there has the same meaning as in s 424). The Full Court summarised the following propositions:
24 … The following propositions emerge from it:
(i) the purpose of s 424A is to provide in part a statutory procedural analogue to the common law of procedural fairness: Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396 at [104]. However the obligation imposed is not coextensive with that which might be imposed by the common law to avoid practical injustice: VAAC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 168;
(ii) the word "information" in s 424A(1) has the same meaning as in s 424: Win at [20]; and in this setting it refers to knowledge of relevant facts or circumstances communicated to or received by the Tribunal: Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1109 at [3]; irrespective of whether it is reliable or has a sound factual basis: Win, at [19]-[22]; and
(iii) the word does not encompass the Tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations: Tin at [54]; Paul at [95]; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1679 at [25]; appr VAAM v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 120; nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc: WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 276 at [26]-[29].
68 This passage was referred to with apparent approval by the High Court in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; 235 ALJR 1190 at [18]. In the same paragraph, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ said (emphasis added):
… However broadly "information" be defined, its meaning in this context is related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence. The appellants were thus correct to concede that the relevant "information" was not to be found in inconsistencies or disbelief, as opposed to the text of the statutory declaration itself.
69 It is unnecessary to determine in this case the outer limits of the word "information" as used in s 424(1). It may be noted, however, that that provision is "primarily an enabling provision". As the Full Court said in Win at [15] (emphasis added):
… It empowers the RRT "to get any information that it considers relevant" (although the sub-section also requires the RRT to have regard to the information so obtained). Section 424(1) appears to be directed to enabling the RRT to take the initiative in obtaining material it considers relevant. It does not exhaust the circumstances in which the RRT can receive and consider material relevant to the issues it has to decide. In particular, s 424(1) has nothing to say about a case like the present, where the RRT simply receives unsolicited material from another source such as the Department or a third party informant. Whether the RRT can take such material into account does not depend on the operation of s 424(1), but on the legislative scheme as a whole: see, for example, ss 414(1); 415(1), (2); 420(2).
70 I accept the Minister's submission that the primary judge was correct to find that s 424 did not apply to the two invitation letters. Those letters were sent, not to get "information" within the meaning of that provision but, rather, to meet the AAT's procedural fairness requirements by providing the appellant with an opportunity to comment on or respond to the content of those letters if he so wished. This is evident from the terms of both letters. As to the first, it was clearly sent to afford the appellant procedural fairness. This is because the AAT had asked the appellant various questions at the hearing about the possible application to the appellant of Sri Lanka's laws relating to people who illegally departed the country. But, on reviewing the hearing transcript, the AAT realised that this questioning had been based on a false premise because it now appreciated that the appellant said that he had left Sri Lanka legally and with a visa. Accordingly, in accordance with procedural fairness requirements, the appellant was given an opportunity to comment, if he wished to do so, on the proposition that, because he left legally, he would not be charged or prosecuted. He took advantage of that opportunity.
71 Similarly, the second letter was plainly sent to meet procedural fairness requirements. It was written after the AAT hearing and in circumstances where the AAT had recently come into possession of a DFAT country report dated 18 December 2015 on Sri Lanka. The AAT afforded the appellant the opportunity to comment on and respond to the document if he so wished. As noted above, he availed himself of that opportunity.
72 I accept the Minister's submission that Div 4 provides the minimum requirements for procedural fairness. This is not inconsistent with s 422B because, in its terms, that provision operates to deem Div 4 to be an exhaustive statement of requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with. Accordingly, there is scope for the residual operation of procedural fairness requirements which are not otherwise "dealt with" in Div 4. As Mr Swan submitted, there is no need to identify an explicit source of statutory power for the AAT to send the two invitation letters because their despatch was done in order to fulfil the AAT's residual procedural fairness obligations.
73 In my respectful view, the appellant's criticisms of the primary judge's finding on this matter is based on a false premise, namely that Div 4 of Pt 7 constitutes an exhaustive statement of the hearing limb of natural justice requirements, with the consequence that a source of power has to be found within the provisions in that Division for the sending of the two letters. That premise underpins the appellant's ultimate submission that the source of power can only be s 424. The flaw in this argument is that it overstates the effect of s 422B, which confines the exhaustive ambit of Div 4 to matters which are dealt with in the Division. This leaves residual room for the natural justice hearing rule to apply to matters which are not dealt with in Div 4.
74 No appealable error has been demonstrated in respect of the primary judge's finding that s 424(2) had no application to the two invitation letters. Ground 3 of the notice of appeal is rejected.
75 In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to determine ground 4, which is predicated on the Court accepting the appellant's contention that the primary judge erred in finding that s 424 did not apply to the two letters.
76 For completeness, as noted above, the Minister did not seek to defend the primary judge's finding at [62] of his reasons for judgment that s 424(2) did not apply to a review applicant. That finding was plainly in error (see SAAP at [6] per Gleeson CJ), but the error is immaterial because the primary judge was correct to conclude on an alternative basis that s 424(2) did not apply to the two invitation letters.
77 In the circumstances, it is also unnecessary to address the Minister's amended notice of contention.