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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - TAXATION - application for recusal - apprehended bias - application refused - observations on confidentiality orders under the Taxation Administration Act - observations on making an application to vacate a substantive hearing

Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) - sections 9, 49, 50, 56, 70, 71(2), 172

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) - section 39B

Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) - section 14ZZE

AZC20 v Secretary, Department of Home Affairs [2023] FCA 1252

Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 19

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 3

FLLH and Commissioner of Taxation (Practice and Procedure) [2025] ARTA 216

MXSN and Commissioner of Taxation (Practice and Procedure) [2025] ARTA 557

MXSN and Commissioner of Taxation (Practice and Procedure) [2025] ARTA 1399

VNBM and Commissioner of Taxation [2021] AATA 3579

ZFPR and Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 572

Administrative Review Tribunal (Common Procedures) Practice Direction 2024

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

1. On 26 September 2025 I made an order dismissing the Applicant's application that I recuse myself from hearing the substantive hearing in this matter. These are my reasons for doing so.

1. This is the third interlocutory decision I have made in this matter since March 2025, with the substantive hearing listed before me commencing on 14 October 2025. The background as to the parties and issues in the substantive dispute is sufficiently set out in my first written reasons,[1] and in the decision of the Federal Court_._[2] These reasons concern the application made by the Applicant on 19 August 2025 that I recuse myself on the grounds of apprehended bias.[3]
2. This proceeding was filed with the Tribunal in September 2023. It has been the subject of multiple extensions of time to enable the Applicant to file a statement of facts, issues and contentions (SFIC), to gather evidence, and to enable other, potentially related matters regarding a different taxpayer's personal tax affairs, to reach a stage where they may be heard together.
3. The matter was first constituted to me on 19 August 2024, at which time a directions hearing was listed before me for 21 October 2024. I first made orders in September 2024 permitting the Applicant an extension of time to file a SFIC from 12 August 2024, to 2 September 2024. On 13 September 2024 I made orders further extending the date for the filing of the SFIC, and I vacated the directions hearing then listed before me for 21 October 2024. A directions hearing was subsequently held on 3 December 2024.
4. Following a further directions hearing on 11 February 2025, I made orders programming the Applicant's application to expand its grounds of review to a hearing on 25 March 2025. I also ordered that the parties file hearing certificates for a 3-day hearing in the months of August to October 2025. The parties' combined unavailable dates meant that the only dates available for the hearing were 14 - 16 October 2025, accordingly on about 4 March 2025, the matter was listed for a substantive hearing on those dates.
5. Since the substantive matter was first listed for hearing in March 2025 for dates in October 2025, I have heard an application by the Applicant to expand the grounds on which it seeks to challenge the Commissioner's assessment, which was partially successful, a second application to expand the grounds of review, which was unsuccessful because it became unnecessary in light of the Applicant's submission that the argument was part of a ground I had given leave for the Applicant to run, and an application to vacate the hearing, premised on the fact that there was an extant appeal from the interlocutory decision I made in March 2025, in the Federal Court.
6. The appeal to the Federal Court, which included an application for a stay of the substantive proceedings in the Tribunal following my decision in July 2025 refusing to vacate the hearing listed for 14 - 16 October 2025,[4] was dismissed prior to the hearing of this application, and a stay was refused.[5]
7. On 19 August 2025, the taxpayer's lawyer sent an email to the Tribunal in the following terms:
   1. Thank you for the provision of the reasons referred to in the heading.
   2. After advice from counsel, our client has instructed us to apply for recusal.
   3. Counsel has requested that the Applicant have 2 weeks for submissions, the Respondent have 2 weeks to respond and there be a half day hearing thereafter on a date available to counsel for the respective parties.
8. In accordance with directions made by another member, the Applicant filed its written submissions on 2 September 2025, the Respondent filed written submissions on 15 September 2025, and the matter was listed for hearing at 10 am on Thursday 18 September 2025.
9. The basis for the application, as articulated in the submissions, is apprehended bias arising from three factors:

Resentment or embarrassment at having her decision of 27 March 2025 challenged in the Federal Court; > > Contempt for counsel for the applicant; or > > Alignment with the respondent Commissioner.

10. A further issue which was articulated in the written submissions was that a formal complaint had been made to the Tribunal regarding my conduct of this matter, something I know nothing about and was unaware of until I read the Applicant's submissions. That basis for the application was specifically withdrawn at the oral hearing and I do not consider it.
11. At the hearing on 18 September 2025, I informed the parties that, irrespective of the outcome of this recusal application, the hearing would proceed on the listed dates of 14 - 16 October 2025 and that they should prepare accordingly. Following the recusal hearing, I made amendments to the pre-hearing directions, which had been agreed by consent between the parties.

1. The making of an application for recusal on the grounds of apprehended bias is a very serious matter. The key question is whether a fair-minded lay observer, properly informed of the circumstances of the application, might reasonably apprehend that the decision maker has a closed mind against the party so that they might not bring a fair and impartial mind to the resolution of the proceeding.
2. The leading authority on the principles of recusal on the grounds of apprehended bias is Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, where the majority said:[6]

Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge (or other judicial officer or juror), as here, the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver (which is not presently relevant) or necessity (which may be relevant to the second appeal), a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, a requirement which reflects the fundamental importance of the principle that the tribunal be independent and impartial. It is convenient to refer to it as the apprehension of bias principle. > > The apprehension of bias principle may be thought to find its justification in the importance of the basic principle, that the tribunal be independent and impartial. So important is the principle that even the appearance of departure from it is prohibited lest the integrity of the judicial system be undermined. There are, however, some other aspects of the apprehension of bias principle which should be recognised. Deciding whether a judicial officer (or juror) might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that has not been determined requires no prediction about how the judge or juror will in fact approach the matter. The question is one of possibility (real and not remote), not probability. Similarly, if the matter has already been decided, the test is one which requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. No attempt need be made to inquire into the actual thought processes of the judge or juror. > > The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an "interest" in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed. > > . . . > > This is not to say that it is improper for a judge to decline to sit unless the judge has affirmatively concluded that he or she is disqualified. In a case of real doubt, it will often be prudent for a judge to decide not to sit in order to avoid the inconvenience that could result if an appellate court were to take a different view on the matter of disqualification. However, if the mere making of an insubstantial objection were sufficient to lead a judge to decline to hear or decide a case, the system would soon reach a stage where, for practical purposes, individual parties could influence the composition of the bench. That would be intolerable.

3. As is clear from Ebner, an applicant must be able to point with specificity to the conduct complained of and then demonstrate how that conduct would give rise to the apprehension of bias. The apprehension of bias must be both objective and real, not remote.
4. Of particular relevance to the matters raised in this application, are the observations of the Full Court in Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia at [11]:[7]

Claims of apprehended bias arise not infrequently, as they have in this appeal, in respect of interlocutory proceedings. The usual position in relation to interlocutory proceedings is that an apprehension of bias is not per se manifested by an unfavourable finding. That is because often there will be instances prior to a final decision where a judge will require steps to be taken or not taken which disappoint one side or another in a proceeding. It is inherent in the interlocutory process that such preliminary decisions are made. Unfavourable findings, in such circumstances, are not to be taken by a fair-minded person as an expression that the judge has other than an impartial and unprejudiced mind in relation to the substantive proceeding.

5. In AZC20 v Secretary, Department of Home Affairs,[8] Kennett J refused an application that he recuse himself from hearing a migration case, on the basis that he had previously worked as a Commonwealth lawyer and had acted for the Commonwealth on migration matters as a barrister. As Kennett J observed in that case, a 'fair minded observer' in this context has knowledge of facts relating to the circumstances relevant to the allegations, as well as knowing something of the legal system.

Ground (a) - resentment or embarrassment regarding the interlocutory appeal

1. The first basis articulated for my recusal is said to be my apparent embarrassment or resentment at having the interlocutory decision I made on 27 March 2025 regarding the grounds of the review, appealed. Several things can be said about that.

(a) First, it is a relatively common incident of the role of a Tribunal member that decisions are appealed. A fair-minded observer with knowledge of the legal system would know that appeals from Tribunal decisions are not at all uncommon. > > (b) Secondly, the assertion of resentment or embarrassment is made solely on the basis that a well-informed bystander would think a Tribunal member was embarrassed or had resentment for a party because of the mere fact of an appeal having been instituted in respect to an interlocutory decision. When considered against the frequency of appeals in this jurisdiction, it is unlikely that a fair-minded observer with knowledge of the legal system would regard it likely that a member would be embarrassed or resentful that an interlocutory appeal had been filed. > > (c) Thirdly, the mere fact of an interlocutory appeal, without more, is not a reason for a Tribunal member to recuse themselves from hearing the substantive matter which has been allocated to them. To do so would be contrary to the objectives of the Tribunal set out in section 9 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act). The work of the Tribunal would rapidly grind to a halt if a party could delay a substantive hearing solely by filing an application to appeal an interlocutory decision. I accept there may be a situation when that is the appropriate course to take, but that would be a rare case. This is not one of those cases. > > (d) Fourthly, as is clear from my reasons,[9] my concern regarding the appeal was in respect to the competency application, not the fact of the appeal. The Commissioner confirmed that there was a competency challenge on foot, arising from the form of the appeal, which I understood to mean that the appeal had been brought under section 172 ART Act, not section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). My interest was in the potential impact of the competency application, which suggested to me that it was highly unlikely that a decision on any substantive question in the appeal,[10] would be finally determined prior to the hearing in this matter in mid October 2025. > > (e) Fifthly, given that the appeal was dismissed prior to my hearing this application,[11] the ground has fallen away. The appeal was struck out as incompetent in the legal sense, having been brought under the ART Act, not as an application under the Judiciary Act. The Applicant submitted that the outcome of the appeal was irrelevant to this application, however I do not accept that submission. In my view, if a ground of the application for recusal is my apparent resentment or embarrassment at having my interlocutory decision appealed, and the appeal has been resolved by it being stuck out, any resentment or embarrassment must logically have been resolved.

Ground (b) - contempt for counsel for the Applicant

*_ The second basis articulated is apparent contempt for counsel for the Applicant.

• At the commencement of the oral hearing on 18 September 2025, counsel for the Applicant advised that he would not be appearing any further in the matter and that new counsel was to be briefed for the substantive hearing. That removed the factual foundation for the proposition that the Applicant would not have a fair hearing of its substantive matter before me because I had apparent contempt for him. Irrespective of that, I will deal with the allegation.
• The objectives of the Tribunal are set out in section 9 of the ART Act, and the duties and role of counsel for the respective parties are set out in section 56 of the ART Act. These provisions, along with the General Practice Directions of the ART, are all designed to ensure that matters reach a conclusion as soon as reasonably practicable, within the bounds of procedural fairness. Against that statutory background, I have expressed concern on several occasions as to the manner in which this matter has proceeded. One of those occasions was as a result of the non-compliance with the directions I made on 27 March 2025. Another was in the failure of the parties to prepare for the 29 July 2025 directions hearing by filing any minutes of proposed directions, despite that directions hearing having been listed on 27 March 2025, and being scheduled to take place in the lead up to the substantive hearing. As a result, I circulated a minute of proposed directions on the morning of that directions hearing. Requiring the parties to pursue a matter with an appropriate level of focus on achieving a final resolution, is a core part of the role of a member of the Tribunal.
• The Tribunal has tens of thousands of matters awaiting hearing so that parties who fail to comply with the directions made will in turn disadvantage other applicants who are awaiting their turn to have their matter heard, by taking up resources in case management which could be used resolving other matters. Disproportionate amounts of time for case management on one matter has a direct impact on access to Tribunal resources for other users.
• Contrary to counsel's submission, the granting of an extension of a deadline to comply with a direction to file a SFIC, or amend one, or to file evidence or some other material, does not mean there has been a history of compliance; that is, an extension of time does not clean the slate of non-compliance, as if it never happened. To the contrary, it means that the non-complying party has been granted an indulgence to ensure that it has an appropriate opportunity to put their case. This is especially so in the taxation jurisdiction where the requirements of section 14ZZK of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (TAA) can prove a very high bar for a taxpayer to achieve and so the Tribunal will give taxpayers a proper opportunity to put their case.
• Counsel is entitled to not like the decision I made regarding the partial loss of his client's application to expand the grounds of objection. The correct course to follow if it was considered that I had made an error, was to file an application in the Federal Court under section 39B of the Judiciary Act, but at the same time comply with the orders I had made by filing an amended SFIC which removed the disallowed grounds and making any further necessary adjustments arising from my decision to allow two of the four new grounds the Applicant sought to run. It was also necessary for both parties to come to the 29th July directions hearing having thought about, and preferably conferred about, the directions necessary to ensure the matter went to hearing on the listed substantive hearing dates, then less than 12 weeks away.
• The filing of an appeal against an interlocutory decision is not a reason to fail to comply with the orders made, nor is it a reason, without more, to vacate a substantive hearing. As I explained in my reasons dated 15 August 2025, there was no basis for not proceeding with the substantive hearing.[12] Furthermore, I note the Federal Court refused a stay of the substantive hearing.[13]
• The matters articulated by the Applicant as grounding this argument all fall within the rubric of usual interlocutory skirmishes, or otherwise seek to take issue with parts of my reasons in either of the two in interlocutory decisions. They primarily fit within the sort of matters that the Full Court dealt with in Doggett, which I have extracted above. For those reasons, and because of the removal of the factual foundation for the ground, I do not accept that a fair-minded lay observer with relevant knowledge would apprehend that I would not bring an open mind to the final determination of this matter._**

1. The assertion of alignment with the Commissioner was solely based on the outcome of the March 2025 interlocutory hearing which resulted in the Applicant being permitted to run two of the four grounds it sought leave to rely on, having filed its SFIC in October 2024 without leave having first been granted.
2. Objectively, it cannot be said that there is any alignment with either party arising from the outcome in that interlocutory decision, which resulted in a split outcome. In addition to the sole articulated complaint the Applicant made under this heading, there are several decisions I have made in the course of this matter which the well-informed objective bystander would also be aware of, which I set out below.

(a) I acceded to the Applicant's requests for extensions of time in respect to filing its SFIC, in September and October 2024, and filing the amended SFIC, in June 2025. > > (b) To facilitate the Applicant being in a position to argue its preferred case, I adjourned the December 2024 directions hearing to February 2025, so as to enable an unfiled but potentially related matter to catch up with this matter, and thereby program the matters to be heard together. > > (c) In February 2025, when ordering hearing certificates to be filed for the substantive hearing, I nominated the months of August, September and October 2025 to provide the Applicant further time to achieve the objective in paragraph (b) above. > > (d) I listed the matter for substantive hearing for the only three days on which both parties were available in the identified months, listing it seven months in advance and thereby giving both parties ample time to properly finalise their cases and be ready for hearing. > > (e) In choosing the listing dates, I was conscious that in August and September the Applicant's director, who is a witness, was said to be entirely unavailable due to work commitments, so that the hearing was listed taking into account his commitments. > > (f) I had raised with the Applicant's counsel in March a legal issue which needed to be resolved arising from the Applicant's request to have video evidence taken from the USA.[14] That was quite appropriately resolved by the Applicant's lawyers, and the evidence is able to be heard by video, in accordance with the Applicant's request. > > (g) I permitted the Applicant to rely on certain matters raised in what was filed as a 'supplementary SFIC' in June 2025, objected to by the Commissioner, but which I understood from the argument I heard on 29 July 2025, did not in fact raise any new ground, meaning leave to raise the issues was not in fact required. > > 1. The proposition that a fair-minded lay observer with relevant knowledge would apprehend that I would not bring an open mind to the final determination of this matter because of my 'alignment with the Commissioner' is unsustainable.

1. The proposition was put that I had identified the director of the Applicant, in breach of a confidentiality order, and that doing so was gratuitous,[15] or punitive.[16] This proposition does not sit neatly within any of the three grounds which were articulated, but it is important that I deal with it.
2. It is worth noting the following matters.

(a) The director of the Applicant is not a party to the proceedings. > > (b) A private hearing request was made by the Applicant on 7 September 2023 under section 14ZZE of the TAA, and an order was made on 11 September 2023. > > (c) The order under section 14ZZE of the TAA gave rise to two things:[17] a private hearing, and the anonymisation of the identification of the taxpayer Applicant, by the use of a pseudonym. > > (d) Once an order has been made under section 14ZZE of the TAA, other measures may be taken, including in reasons for decision, to preserve the confidentiality of an applicant. One example is the manner in which a person associated with an applicant, for example a director, is referred to in written reasons, for example, by the use of 'the director', or Mr [initial], or Ms [initial]. Sometimes the matter will require pseudonyms to be used for associated companies, or other witnesses.[18] > > (e) There is no obligation under section 14ZZE of the TAA to conceal the identity of a director of an applicant in the Tribunal; the obligation of confidentiality is owed to the applicant, not to ancillary people. > > (f) If a party desires to have wider confidentiality than the quite limited confidentiality afforded by section 14ZZE of the TAA, orders may be made under section 70 ART Act. Generally, those orders would require conferral between the parties and, if a joint position cannot be agreed, the Tribunal will need to make a ruling. In either case, the making of orders under section 70 is not guaranteed and would need to be determined in accordance with the ART Act, in particular section 71(2), and the General Practice Directions. In my experience it is unusual for the Commissioner to take issue with a request for wider confidentiality orders. > > 1. The gravamen of the submission made was that the director, not the Applicant, was able to be identified by reason of some factual material included in the reasons, and by reference to him as 'Mr [initial]', which was said to be in breach of the private hearing order. As is plain from what I have said above, the information contained in my reasons dated 7 April 2025 does not in fact breach the order made under section 14ZZE of the TAA as it did not identify the Applicant. > 2. However, I accept, as counsel submitted, that the director believes he may be identifiable from the reasons. Whilst I accept that is his belief, I also note that his subjective belief is not a proxy for the fair-minded lay observer, nor does it prove he was in fact identified. > 3. As counsel acknowledged, if a party has a concern that someone has been inappropriately identified in reasons, it is open to request that the reasons be recalled and appropriately redacted. Counsel informed me he has followed that path in other matters. The Applicant did not request that the reasons be recalled and redacted, nor have wider confidentiality orders been requested under section 70 ART Act. An application for wider confidentiality orders has not been made in respect to the substantive hearing. The first and only time the matter was raised was in the Applicant's recusal submissions, filed on 2 September 2025, about 5 months after the reasons in MSXN (No 1) were published. > 4. In filing its appeal in the Federal Court of Australia on 5 May 2025, the full name of the Applicant was used,[19] as is required by the Federal Court Rules. This meant that for 4 months the Applicant's full name appeared in court lists published on the internet or the press, in the electronic court file, and on all documents pertaining to the matter. In September 2025, an order changing the name of the Applicant was made to reflect a recent name change, as part of the suite of orders made dismissing the appeal. > 5. Nothing in the Federal Court Appeal Reasons records any concern being raised by counsel regarding the disclosure of information regarding the director;[20] to the contrary, at [2] of the Federal Court's reasons, similar information is recorded to that which was said by the applicant to be "punitive" in my reasons in MSXN (No 1).[21] > 6. I do not accept that a fair-minded lay observer with knowledge of the relevant circumstances would regard the benign factual information I published as gratuitous or punitive, even if it did identify the director. Nor is it a basis for my recusal.

*_ Counsel relied on my refusal of the application made on 29 July 2025 as one of the factors displaying antipathy towards him. Putting that submission aside, having dealt with it substantially at ground (b) above, it is useful for something to be said regarding applications for adjournments of substantive hearings more generally.

• By way of context, on 23 July 2025 the Applicant foreshadowed an application to be heard at the forthcoming directions hearing on 29 July 2025. Nothing was filed in support of the application and nothing, other than the email extracted below, was apparently provided to the Respondent. The information provided to the Tribunal and the Respondent was, relevantly:[22]_**

A directions hearing is listed for Tuesday 29 July 2025.

. . .

The applicant respectfully submits that the hearing scheduled for October should be vacated pending the Federal Court proceedings. . . .because: (a) the Tribunal should not finally determine a review where the Federal Court may set aside the Tribunal's decision to refuse the enlargement of grounds; . . .

The applicant will move to this effect on 29 July 2025. Alternatively, the applicant invites the Tribunal to vacate the directions listed for 29 July and direct the applicant to file a written application and submissions within 14 days, with a corresponding submissions to the respondent, and all matters be listed in early September.

1. I accept that pursuant to the ART Act sections 49 and 50, there is scope for informal or even oral applications to be made to adjourn or vacate a hearing.[23] However, the ART Common Procedures Practice Directions at [5.12] to [5.15] make it very plain that adjournment applications need to be put on a proper footing.
2. In practical terms this requires, at least for represented parties:

(a) save for occasions of genuine urgency,[24] a written request, articulating proper grounds and identifying the arguments in favour of the adjournment;[25]

(b) it is expected that the party seeking to adjourn a substantive hearing will have conferred with any other parties to ascertain their attitude prior to advising the Tribunal of the application;

(c) prejudice to any other party typically needs to be addressed;

(d) any proposed programming directions that may need to be made if the outcome is successful should be provided;

(e) if, as a result of conferral, the application is opposed, the party opposing it should be provided with a proper response to any concerns it has raised, in a genuine attempt to limit the opposition, and accommodate the opponent's concerns; and

(f) most importantly, evidence in support of any application should be provided in advance of the hearing so that the Tribunal, and the opponent, has an opportunity to consider the material.

1. It should be kept in mind that requesting a substantive hearing be adjourned or vacated is an indulgence which causes inconvenience to both the Tribunal and the other parties, as well as impacting other users of the Tribunal. Requiring parties with competent legal advisors to make what is a very serious application in a serious and considered manner, with a proper foundation and supported by evidence, is plainly appropriate. As a general proposition, a party, particularly a represented party, should not expect to obtain a vacation or adjournment of a substantive hearing without good reason, conferral with their opposing party, and a proper evidentiary foundation.

1. For these reasons, I dismissed the application to recuse myself on the basis of apprehended bias.

I certify that the preceding forty-three paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decisions herein of Deputy President C Thompson SC

..................................[sgd]..................................

Australian Taxation Office Litigation and Legal Services

[1] MXSN and Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 557 (MSXN (No 1)).

[3] Email from the solicitors for the Applicant, dated 19 August 2025 11.25 am.

[6] [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, [6] - [8], [20].

[7] [2019] FCAFC 19.

[8] [2023] FCA 1252, [10] - [12].

[9] MXSN and Commissioner of Taxation (Practice and Procedure) [2025] ARTA 1399 (MXSN (No 2)), [18].

[10] The content of which was entirely unknown to me at that time because no information other than the mere fact of the appeal had been provided.

[13] Federal Court Appeal Reasons, [132].

[14] FLLH and Commissioner of Taxation (Practice and Procedure) [2025] ARTA 216.

[15] Applicant's submissions dated 2 September 2025, [81] - [82].

[16] Transcript of Tribunal proceedings on 18 September 2025, p 34.

[17] VNBM and Commissioner of Taxation [2021] AATA 3579, [6].

[18] See by way of example ZFPR and Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 572.

[19] Which at the time included the actual name of the director.

[20] Similarly to in the Tribunal, the director was not a party in the Federal Court proceedings.

[21] Federal Court Appeal Reasons, [2].

[22] Email from Mossensons, solicitors for the Applicant, dated 23 July 2025 7.23 pm.

[23] I use the terms interchangeably here.

[24] For example, occasioned by sudden illness, or last minute unforeseen unavailability for some other cogent reason, of a critical witness or counsel.

[25] This does not necessarily mean extensive written submissions need to be filed.