AWX17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 2022

1. The applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) dated 26 April 2018. The Authority affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 970) visa (SHEV), a type of protection visa created by s 35A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). This Court has jurisdiction to determine this matter pursuant to s 476 of the Act.
2. The following four issues arise for consideration in this matter:

(a) First, whether the Authority's finding at [21] of its reasons to not accept the applicant's claim that he was kept at home for a year or was hiding in the homes of relatives because the Authority found it was evident that he continued to attend school, an IT course, lived at the same address from 1997 to 2007 and because he claimed he was out when he witnessed fighting in 2004 to 2006, was legally unreasonable, irrational or illogical.

(b) Second, whether it was legally unreasonable, irrational or illogical for the Authority at [24] of its reasons to reject that the applicant left Sri Lanka for Kuwait in 2007 because he was targeted, given that the Authority accepted other claims made by the applicant and because there was evidence, which the Authority ignored, that the applicant gave as to why he did not depart for Kuwait for at least a year.

(c) Third, whether the Authority's finding at [39] of its reasons that if the applicant was suspected Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or authorities wanted him, he would have encountered difficulties at the airport from authorities and be detained was legally unreasonable, irrational or illogical, given there was no country information to support that finding.

(d) Fourth, whether the Authority failed to obtain, or consider obtaining, new information pursuant to s 473DC of the Act.

1. For the reasons that follow at [29] to [63] of this judgment, I find the applicant has not demonstrated jurisdictional error on these grounds and I dismiss the application.

1. On 24 November 2012, the applicant first arrived in Australia by boat as an unauthorised maritime arrival (Court Book (CB) 42). On 2 February 2013, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Department) conducted an irregular maritime arrival entry interview of the applicant (CB 1 to 16).
2. On 3 May 2016, the Minister exercised his discretion and power pursuant to s 46A(2) of the Act to invite the applicant to make a valid application for either a Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) visa or a SHEV (CB 17). On 31 May 2016 the Department received the applicant's application for a SHEV dated 30 May 2016 (CB 22 to 78), which included, relevantly, the following documents:

(a) Form 790B - Persons included in this application and family composition dated 23 May 2016 (CB 22 to 33);

(b) Form 790C - Personal details for each person included in this application dated 23 May 2016 (CB 34 to 58); and

(c) written testimony of the applicant provided to NSW Service for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture and Trauma Survivors (STARTTS) dated 30 June 2015 (CB 59 to 67).

1. On 6 January 2017, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a SHEV, on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy s 36(2) of the Act, being that on the information provided at the interview and the supporting evidence, the applicant did not face a real risk of significant harm on his return to Sri Lanka (CB 118 to 135).

1. On 12 January 2017, the delegate's decision was referred to the Authority for a review (CB 141 and 142). The Department automatically referred the delegate's decision to the Authority, on the basis that the applicant was a fast track applicant who had been refused a protection visa and was entitled to a review (CB 143).
2. By email dated 30 January 2017, the applicant sent to the Authority the following documents:

(a) a written submission that included a request for an interview with the Authority and enclosed an email from the applicant's mother that was not before the delegate (CB 156 and 157);

(b) the 16 February 2015 DFAT Country Report for Sri Lanka (2015 DFAT Country Report) (CB 159 to 199), which was before the delegate; and

(c) the August 2016 UK Home Office Country Information and Guidance Report for Sri Lanka (2016 UK Home Office Report) (CB 200 to 250), which was before the delegate.

Authority's first decision dated 20 February 2017

1. On 20 February 2017, the Authority affirmed the delegate's decision under review not to grant the applicant a protection visa (CB 254 to 270). This decision was challenged by the applicant in this Court and on 5 March 2018, Manousaridis J made the following orders (CB 271 and 272):

THE COURT ORDERS, BY CONSENT, THAT:

1. A writ in the nature of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing its decision dated 20 February 2017 (IAA reference IAA17/01751).

2. A writ in the nature of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine according to law the review of the delegate of the first respondent's decision, dated 6 January 2017.

3. The first respondent pay such costs as the applicant may be entitled to as a self-represented litigant.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

1. The first respondent concedes that the decision of the second respondent was affected by jurisdictional error of the kind identified in BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958 at [46]- [47] and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176 at [11] by misconstruing or misapplying the term "exceptional circumstances" in section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

1. On 8 March 2018, the Authority wrote to the applicant informing him that the case had been remitted by the Court back to the Authority for reconsideration (CB 275 and 276).

Authority's second decision dated 26 April 2018

1. On 26 April 2018, the Authority affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant the protection visa (CB 279 to 294). This decision is the subject of the judicial review application proceedings before me.

1. The Authority at [14] of its reasons summarised the applicant's claims as follows:
   • He is a single Tamil Hindu male. He was born in Sabaragamuwa province but grew up in Vavuniya, Northern Province. He lived in India for 1.5 years in 1990. He lived and worked in Kuwait between 2007 and 2012.
   • In the 1970s due to communal riots his parents moved to Vavuniya. His family relocated to India in 1990 due to the civil war. He was affected by jaundice but did not get treatment.
   • Between 1991 and 1996 he lived with his grandparents who treated him like a slave as he had to do all the housework and eat food he did not like. His aunt made fun of him.
   • Many of friends were or suspected LTTE and were shot dead due to their involvement, including in front of his house. The applicant did not join.
   • One day when returning from tuition he was at the side of the road when there was a fight between LTTE and Karuna group. They had to lie on the side of the road when the fighting began and one of his friends next to him was hit and his guts came out.
   • When he was about 18 a lot of problems started as there were many groups formed against the SLA and they would come to schools to recruit. The SLA and various groups would threaten and question them about the LTTE.
   • It was common for everybody to be questioned and over a period of two years he was questioned many times. For a year his mother would not let him go out and hid at his relatives' places.
   • The applicant witnessed combat between the LTTE, SLA and paramilitary groups and saw his friend hit, who was next to him. The applicant's home was in the middle of a battle. During the fighting in May 2006 he was rounded up with other boys, threatened, assaulted and questioned. He was slapped and accused of being LTTE. He was made to kneel on the gravel in the village until his release in exchange for his father. He was held for two days on the road by the SLA. They threatened to shoot him.
   • After his release the SLA visited his home and they were told to be at home next time they visited. He was released on condition he did not leave the house. The next day his mother sent him to Colombo and began working on sending him overseas.
   • The applicant obtained a work visa to Kuwait and went to Kuwait in 2007. He worked as a helper in an oil refinery. While in Kuwait a Kuwaiti national tried to have a homosexual relationship with him. He was his superior at work. The man harassed him by telephone.
   • One of the men living and working with the applicant and colleagues died at the time, but he does not know why. The applicant left Kuwait and returned to Sri Lanka in January 2012.
   • In May 2012 it was like he was living in jail. He went to relatives in Colombo and lived in the room and did not go outside. He could not stay in his village as they would tell SLA that he was in the village and he would be in trouble. (At his protection interview, he claimed the army threatened him in May 2012, so went to his aunt's house. In September 2012 he went to Colombo).
   • A friend of his who was born in India and returned to Sri Lanka was murdered. If he went the village he was frightened the same would happen to him. He was stressed about that murder.
   • At the time there stories of boats leaving for Australia so his mother sold the rest of her jewellery and sent him on a boat. The army visited his home and asked his mother where the applicant was.
   • At interview the applicant claimed that the army in civilian clothes came to his mother's house in 2013 asking for him, though no one has come since then.
   • It was submitted the applicant faced harm as a single Tamil male aged 30 from the North who arrived in Australia by boat. The authorities at the airport will be question him and notify his home area. His previous arrest, detention on suspected LTTE involvement and his escape after his LTTE friend was killed by an armed group will come to the attention of authorities. He will be detained and subject to harm.

1. The Authority accepted the following claims made by the applicant:

(a) he was a single young Tamil Hindu male from the North ([17] of its reasons);

(b) his family moved to Vavuniya in the 1970s due to communal riots, during the conflict his family fled to India in 1990 and life was difficult, the applicant returned one and a half years later to live with his grandmother in Sri Lanka, he suffered jaundice in India which was not treated, and while his parents could not afford to educate him in India, it was evident the applicant had completed O levels in Sri Lanka in 2002 ([18] of its reasons);

(c) he felt he was treated like a slave and had to do the housework and eat food he did not like at his grandparents' home ([20] of its reasons);

(d) there were many groups who tried to recruit people at school, but the applicant did not join; many of his friends were LTTE, but he was not; many of his friends were killed; he was questioned and threatened, like many other Tamil males, many times over a period of two years during the war; and he witnessed some fighting ([21] of its reasons);

(e) he was rounded up and detained overnight on the village road during fighting between the LTTE and Karuna Group (who were working with the Sri Lankan Army (SLA)) in May 2006 ([22] of its reasons);

(f) he may have had a friend who was killed, as he had been consistent in this claim since his arrival interview ([34] of its reasons); and

(g) his friends were LTTE, however, on his evidence, they were all killed, and the applicant, as a young Tamil male, was threatened, questioned many times during the conflict, witnessed fighting and was rounded up, assaulted and detained in May 2006, and his friend was killed in 2012 ([38] of its reasons).

1. Relevantly, the Authority did not accept the following claims made by the applicant:

(a) he was kept at home for a year or hiding in at relatives' homes because the Authority found that the applicant continued to attend school, an IT course and lived at the same address from 1997 to 2007. Further, the applicant was out when he witnessed fighting ([21] of its reasons);

(b) he departed Sri Lanka in 2007 because he was specifically targeted or anyone was looking for him ([24] of its reasons);

(c) he was in hiding in Colombo the day after his release in May 2006, as his address history in his arrival interview did not indicate he lived or went to Colombo ([25] of its reasons); and

(d) he was perceived to have LTTE connections or be suspected LTTE ([39] of its reasons).

1. The Authority was not satisfied the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution from the Criminal Investigation Department in Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan authorities, army, police, paramilitary or unknown armed groups in the reasonably foreseeable future if he returned to Sri Lanka ([61] of its reasons). Accordingly, the Authority found at [62] of its reasons the applicant did not meet the requirements of the definition of refugee in s 5H(1) of the Act and thereby did not meet s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
2. With respect to the undated translated email from the applicant's mother submitted by the applicant on 30 January 2017, the Authority stated at [9] of its reasons that it was not satisfied ss 473DD(b)(i) or (ii) of the Act were met for the following reasons:

(a) the undated translated email from the applicant's mother was not an email from his mother or evidence of a letter from his mother, but rather text inserted into the applicant's submission purported to be written by his mother, and there was a real question whether in that form the information put was capable of being believed;

(b) the Authority considered the information to be of little corroborative weight because it was not signed and no identification was provided to confirm the email was from the applicant's mother;

(c) the claims in the email were not consistent with the applicant's claims;

(d) the applicant failed to provide an explanation for the delay in providing the corroborating email from his mother; and

(e) the applicant had confirmed he had provided all his information at the end of the Authority's interview with the applicant.

1. At [12] and [13] of its reasons, the Authority identified it had obtained new information, being the January 2017 DFAT Country Report (2017 DFAT Country Report), which was not before the delegate or in existence at the time of the delegate's decision. The Authority determined it would consider the information in the 2017 DFAT Country Report considering it contained more recent information and replaced the 2015 DFAT Country Report relied upon by the delegate and referred to in the applicant's submissions.

1. On 23 May 2018, the applicant filed an application for judicial review of the Authority's decision dated 26 April 2018. The applicant filed amended and further amended applications on 24 September 2018, 22 June 2025 and 31 August 2025 respectively. At the hearing, the applicant did not press the ground numbered 21. I granted leave to the applicant to file an amended application for the purposes of reformulating and renumbering the remaining four grounds for review (grounds 7, 20, 22 and 23).
2. The applicant's amended application for judicial review of the Authority's decision accepted for filing on 20 October 2025 contained the following four grounds for judicial review (particulars omitted):

Ground 1

The findings of fact made by the IAA at [21] of its reasons that the IAA did not accept the Applicant "was kept at home for a year or in hiding at relatives' homes because it was evident that he continued to attend school, an IT course, and lived at the same address from 1997 - 2007. Further, he was out when he witnessed fighting", was unreasonable, irrational or illogical because no reasonable decision-maker would have come to that decision, and this was material because it was a finding of credibility.

Ground 2

The IAA's finding at [24] of its reasons that it did not accept the Applicant "departed Sri Lanka in 2007 because he was specifically targeted or anyone was looking for him", was unreasonable, irrational or illogical in light of the matters accepted by the IAA, being the matters accepted in [17] to [22], [34] and [38] of its reasons, and the IAA ignored evidence, being the evidence in the Applicant's written testimony at Court Book 66 under the heading "My mother helps me flee to Colombo", which stated "The day after my release the SLA visited my home and took a count of all the people who were at home. They informed us that the next time they would visit they expected that we should be at home. This is because I was released under the condition that I do not leave the house. However, the day after my mother took me home she sent me to Colombo. Without anyone's knowledge she sent me to a relatives place there. From that day on my mother began working on sending me overseas. She pawned all her jewellery to raise the money for me to get to a safe place".

Ground 3

The IAA's finding at [39] of its reasons that if the Applicant "was suspected LTTE or authorities wanted him he would have encountered difficulties at the airport from authorities and be detained", was unreasonable, irrational or illogical, because there was no country information to support that finding.

Ground 4

The IAA erred when it did not get, or consider getting, new information pursuant to s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) concerning the Applicant's claim referred to at [25] of its reasons that "he went to Colombo the day after his release in May 2006" and information about why this date was not mentioned by the Applicant in his documentation, if it were true.

1. The applicant was represented at the hearing before me by Mr Foster of counsel (Mr Foster). The Minister was represented by Mr Tsaousidis of counsel (Mr Tsaousidis). The evidence (which was read without objection) from the applicant comprised of the affidavit of Mr Senthil Rajan Sinnarajah (Mr Sinnarajah), the applicant's solicitor, affirmed on 23 August 2025, which annexed a copy of the 2017 DFAT Country Report which was inadvertently not included in the Court Book. The Minister tendered the Court Book, which was marked "Exhibit R1".
2. The applicant relied on his counsel's written submissions accepted for filing on 1 September 2025 and the Minister relied on his counsel's written submissions dated 2 October 2025. I also had the benefit of oral submissions from both Mr Foster and Mr Tsaousidis.

1. The issues raised in grounds 1 to 3 in the application for judicial review essentially turn on allegations that the Authority, in various respects made findings that were legally unreasonable, irrational or illogical.
2. Before considering those grounds, it is useful to set out the relevant legal principles that apply when considering whether jurisdictional error is established based on illogicality, irrationality or legal unreasonableness.

1. The Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44] (Allsop CJ, Robertson, Mortimer JJ (as her Honour then was)) in considering legal unreasonableness referred to the High Court decisions of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; [2013] 249 CLR 332 and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS) and noted legal unreasonableness may arise in two different contexts:

(a) The first is the identification of an underlying jurisdictional error in the decision-making process.

(b) The second is the outcome (ultimate conclusion) of the exercise of power was arbitrary, capricious or outside the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.

Jurisdictional error in decision-making process

1. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516 (SZUXN) at [49], Wigney J elaborated on the first context in which legal unreasonableness may arise, being where "a Tribunal that employs irrational or illogical reasoning, or makes irrational findings of fact not based on probative material, is likely to be in breach of the implied requirement that it act reasonably in exercising its statutory review powers and jurisdiction". So, for example, in exercising a statutory power, the Authority may need to weigh up a number of different matters or reach a decision as to credibility. In making those determinations, the Authority's reasons and findings can be examined as to whether they have been made reasonably. In so doing, it is noted where reasonable minds might differ as to the reasoning or the findings of fact, then it cannot be said there has been irrational or illogical reasoning or irrational finding of fact: SZMDS at [130] and [131] per Crennan and Bell JJ.
2. Further, if an error is identified in the decision-making process (that is, on the way to the ultimate conclusion), then as Wigney J said in SZUXN at [55]:

... the overarching question is whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 at 137-138 [151]. Even if an aspect of reasoning, or a particular factual finding, is shown to be irrational or illogical, jurisdictional error will generally not be established if that reasoning or finding of fact was immaterial, or not critical to, the ultimate conclusion or end result: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT [2010] FCAFC 159; (2010) 189 FCR 577 at 598-599 [83]- [84] (Nicholas J); SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 123 at [113]. Where the impugned finding is but one of a number of findings that independently may have led to the Tribunal's ultimate conclusion, jurisdictional error will generally not be made out.

1. In SZMDS (Crennan and Bell JJ) stated the following:
   1. Because illogicality or irrationality may constitute a basis for judicial review in the context of jurisdictional fact finding as explained above, it becomes necessary to decide whether the Tribunal's conclusion about the state of satisfaction required by s 65 and its findings on the way to that conclusion revealed illogicality or irrationality amounting to jurisdictional error. It is clear, from the extracts from the Federal Court decision set out above, that the Federal Court emphatically disagreed with the Tribunal's finding that the first respondent's return to Pakistan and failure to seek asylum in the United Kingdom was conduct which was inconsistent with the claimed fear of persecution arising as a result of homosexuality. It also seems clear that the Federal Court, acting on the same material or evidence on which the decision was based, would have been satisfied that the first respondent feared persecution as alleged.
   2. However, the correct approach is to ask whether it was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning in which it did engage and to make the findings it did make on the material before it...

...

1. On the probative evidence before the Tribunal, a logical or rational decision maker could have come to the same conclusion as the Tribunal. Whilst there may be varieties of illogicality and irrationality, a decision will not be illogical or irrational if there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision maker. A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn...

1. I now turn to consider each of the applicant's grounds for review.

1. By ground 1, the applicant challenges the Authority's finding at [21] of its reasons, where the Authority did not accept the applicant's claim that he was kept at home for a year or was hiding in the homes of relatives. The Authority's finding at [21] of its reasons was as follows:

I do not accept he was kept at home for a year or in hiding at relatives' homes because it was evident that he continued to attend school, an IT course and lived at the same address from 1997 - 2007. Further, he was out when he witnessed fighting.

1. The applicant contends that this finding was legally unreasonable, irrational or illogical. The question that arises is whether the impugned finding lacks an evident and intelligible justification or whether it can be said that no reasonable decision-maker would have reached the same conclusion as the Authority.
2. The reasons of the Authority did not expressly state the date the applicant was in hiding from. However, the applicant's counsel submitted, which I accept, that from a reading of the applicant's claims summarised at [14] of the Authority's reasons, as set out at [12] of this judgment, it is clear at dot points 6 and 7 that the applicant's claims were that he started to encounter problems when he was about 18 years of age, and that for a year his mother would not let him go out and he hid at his relatives' places. Given this evidence, the applicant's counsel submitted that the applicant turned 18 in November 2004 and therefore his claim was that he was in hiding in late 2004 to 2006 (Tp37.5-8).
3. Counsel for the applicant pointed to the "details of all education and qualifications since birth" information provided by the applicant in Form 790C (CB 50) to demonstrate that the applicant did not continue to attend school or an IT course after 2004, and therefore could have been in hiding after 2004, when he was 18 years old.
4. Contrary to the applicant's counsel's submissions, I find there was evidence on which it was open to the Authority to find that during the alleged period the applicant claimed to have been in hiding, being late 2004 to 2006, he in fact continued to attend school, an IT course and lived at the same address from 1997 to 2007.
5. The first piece of evidence is the applicant's evidence recorded in the Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview document (CB 1 to 16), which stated that during the period from 2003 to 2006 he was undertaking technical training in computing at Vest Track College (CB 5). I find it was open to the Authority on this evidence to find the applicant continued to attend school and an IT course during his alleged period of being in hiding in late 2004 to 2006.
6. The second piece of evidence is the applicant's testimony given to STARTTS (CB 59 to 67), where the applicant at page 7 of that statement (CB 65) stated that "[o]ne day in May 2006 there was a severe fight between LTTE and Karuna group...During that time the Sri Lankan Army conducted a "round up"...They took all the boys around the age of 16 and over and separated them from their parents so they could conduct enquiries with them. At that time I was 22 years old. I was studying a computer course at that time...I was taken away from my parents that day" (emphasis added). I find it was open on this evidence for the Authority to find that the applicant was still studying during May 2006.
7. The third piece of evidence is the applicant's address history provided in Form 790C (CB 48), which was as follows (emphasis added):

Full residential address (including house number, street name, suburb, town/city, state/province, postcode). Do NOT provide a PO Box

248 Great Western Highway Wentworthville NSW 2145

Sea Voyage, Coco Island IDC, CI IDC, Darwin NIDC, Qld Shoga IDC

1. The applicant's counsel contended that the date in bold above, being 11/1991 to 02/1997, was in fact a date from 11/1991 to 02/1994, and therefore there was a gap shown in the address history from 02/1994 to 02/1997. I do not accept that the date in bold is a reference to 02/1994 but rather find that the date stated is 02/1997. My reason for so finding is because there is a clear pattern, as can be seen from the table set out in the preceding paragraph in the way the addresses are recorded, in that the "Date to" is repeated in the line above as "Date from". Therefore, there was evidence on which it was open to the Authority to find that the applicant lived at the same address from 1997 to 2007, being the fifth last entry in the table.
2. In conclusion, I find that there was an evident and intelligible justification and it was open on the evidence for the Authority at [21] of its reasons to find that the applicant was not in hiding in late 2004 to 2006 and not in hiding at relatives' homes, because the applicant's education history recorded in his Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview and testimony given to STARTTS showed that he was studying during the period 2003 to 2006, which included the 2004 to 2006 period, and because he was living at the same address from 02/1997 to 05/2007.
3. The Authority's other reason for not accepting that the applicant was in hiding was because of the applicant's claim that he was out when he witnessed fighting. The delegate's decision at page 5 (CB 122) recorded that "the applicant claimed that between around 2004 to 2006, he witnessed combat between the LTTE, paramilitary groups such as the Karuna Group, and Sri Lankan authorities", and the applicant's evidence claimed he was in hiding during the period 2004 to 2006. I find the reason for the Authority not accepting the applicant was in hiding was because there was a logical inconsistency in the applicant being in hiding from 2004 to 2006 and being out witnessing fighting in 2004 to 2006. I find that this conclusion was rationally open to the Authority on the evidence before it.
4. For the reasons set out at [33] to [39] of this judgment, I find that no jurisdictional error is disclosed by ground 1.

1. By ground 2, the applicant challenges the Authority's finding at [24] of its reasons, where the Authority did not accept the applicant's claim that he left Sri Lanka to go to Kuwait in 2007 because he was targeted or anyone was looking for him given his delay in departing. The Authority's finding was as follows at [24] of its reasons:

The applicant returned to Sri Lanka in 2012, after five years in Kuwait. The applicant has not claimed to have been involved in any activities that could be seen as supporting the LTTE or being critical of the Sri Lankan government whilst in Kuwait. He told the delegate that he was not detained, harassed or otherwise questioned when he returned to Sri Lanka. I am satisfied that the applicant was not a person of interest to the authorities on his return.

1. There are two aspects to ground 2, one being that the Authority ignored evidence which explained the applicant's delay in departing and the second is that in light of the Authority's acceptance of certain claims, it was then legally unreasonable for it not to find at [24] of its reasons that the applicant departed Sri Lanka in 2007 because he was specifically targeted and had people looking for him.

1. The applicant's counsel submitted that the finding at [24] of the Authority's reasons was legally unreasonable, irrational or illogical because there was evidence that the applicant gave as to why he did not depart for Kuwait for at least a year after the May 2006 incident, being that the applicant claimed he went into hiding to Colombo the day after his release in May 2006, which evidence the applicant alleges the Authority ignored. The applicant's counsel pointed to page 8 of the applicant's written testimony given to STARTTS (CB 66) in which the applicant stated that the day after he was released in May 2006 his mother sent him to Colombo to hide, and from that day his mother began working on sending him overseas and pawned all of her jewellery to raise the money for him to get to a safe place.
2. I reject the applicant's counsel's submission that the Authority ignored and did not consider the applicant's evidence given to STARTTS at page 8 (CB 66) because it is evident from the Authority's reasons at [25] that the Authority was clearly aware of the evidence that the applicant claimed he went to Colombo the day after his release in May 2006, however it did not accept the applicant was in hiding in Colombo as his address history did not record he lived or went to Colombo at that time. Further, the Authority at [14] of its reasons (ninth dot point), set out at [12] of this judgment, expressly stated that "[t]he next day his mother sent him to Colombo and began working on sending him overseas". I find the reference discloses the Authority was aware and did not ignore the applicant's claims as to being in hiding in Colombo as the claim was expressly considered and expressly rejected at [25] of its reasons.
3. Further it is noted the Authority was not required to explicitly refer to every piece of evidence in its reasons: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593; [2003] FCAFC 184 at [46] (per French, Sackville and Hely JJ).

Unreasonableness due to accepting certain claims

1. The applicant's counsel pointed to the following claims accepted by the Authority and submitted that in light of the accepted claims, no reasonable Authority would have found at [24] of its reasons that the applicant was not in fear or that he did not depart because he was fearful or being targeted:

(a) he was a single young Tamil Hindu male from the North ([17] of its reasons);

(b) his family moved to Vavuniya in the 1970s due to communal riots, during the conflict his family fled to India in 1990 and life was difficult, the applicant returned one and a half years later to live with his grandmother in Sri Lanka, he suffered jaundice in India which was not treated, and that while his parents could not afford to educate him in India, it was evident the applicant had completed O levels in Sri Lanka in 2002 ([18] of its reasons);

(c) he felt he was treated like a slave and had to do the housework and eat food he did not like at his grandparents' home ([20] of its reasons);

(d) there were many groups who tried to recruit people at school, but the applicant did not join, many of his friends were LTTE, but he was not; many of his friends were killed; he was questioned and threatened, like many other Tamil males, many times over a period of two years during the war; and he witnessed some fighting ([21] of its reasons);

(e) he was rounded up and detained overnight on the village road during fighting between the LTTE and Karuna Group (who were working with the SLA) in May 2006 ([22] of its reasons);

(f) he may have had a friend who was killed as he had been consistent in this claim since his arrival interview ([34] of its reasons); and

(g) his friends were LTTE, however, on his evidence, they were all killed, and the applicant, as a young Tamil male, was threatened, questioned many times during the conflict, witnessed fighting and was rounded up, assaulted and detained in May 2006, and his friend was killed in 2012 ([38] of its reasons).

1. The High Court in SZMDS made it clear that the correct approach is to ask whether it was open to the Authority to engage in the process of reasoning in which it did engage and to make the findings it did make on the material before it. I find that the Authority's finding at [24] of its reasons is not irrational as there is an evident and intelligible justification for the Authority's finding that because of the delay in departing from Sri Lanka to Kuwait, the Authority did not accept the applicant departed for the reason he claimed, being that he was specifically targeted and people were looking for him. It is a rational observation to make and open to the Authority to engage in the process of reasoning that if the applicant was genuinely fearful or was being targeted, he would not have waited a year to depart Sri Lanka. Further, the Authority specifically addressed the applicant's explanation for the delay in departing at [25] of its reasons, being that the applicant went to Colombo the day after his release in May 2006 and did not accept the applicant's claim that he was in hiding in Colombo.
2. Accordingly, I find that no jurisdictional error is disclosed by ground 2 for the reasons set out at [44] to [47] of this judgment.

1. By ground 3, the applicant contends that the Authority's finding at [39] of its reasons, that if the applicant was suspected LTTE or authorities wanted him he would have encountered difficulties at the airport from authorities and be detained, was legally unreasonable, irrational or illogical, given there was no country information to support that finding.
2. In relation to ground 3, the applicant's counsel submitted that there was no country information to support the Authority's finding at [39] that the applicant would have encountered difficulties and been picked up or stopped by the authorities at the airport in 2007 or 2012 if he was of adverse interest to authorities, the result of being perceived to have LTTE connections or be suspected LTTE. To support that submission, the applicant's counsel pointed to the fact that there was no country information that the Authority considered that supported its finding about there being sophisticated information intelligence that would have picked up the applicant either leaving or returning to Sri Lanka. The applicant's counsel referenced the 2016 UK Home Office Report (CB 200 to 250) and contended that there was nothing in the said report to suggest that the presence of the applicant would have alerted airport authorities in 2012 or 2017 based on his perceived connections to the LTTE or for being suspected LTTE.
3. In essence, the applicant's argument is that the Authority found at [39] of its reasons that another reason it did not accept the applicant was perceived to have LTTE connections was because the country information indicated that if that was the case, the applicant would have been detained at the airport when he departed Sri Lanka in 2007 and returned in 2012. Contrary to the applicant's counsel's submission, I find there was in fact country information before the Authority that supported the Authority's finding. At [12] of its reasons, the Authority referenced that it had obtained new information, being the 2017 DFAT Country Report. At [5.16], the 2017 DFAT Country Report provided as follows:

The UNHCR's December 2012 Eligibility Guidelines for Sri Lanka state that 'an internal flight or relocation alternative is not available in Sri Lanka in cases where the feared persecution emanates from the state itself or elements associated with it'. Sri Lankan authorities retain comprehensive country-wide 'stop' and 'watch' lists of those suspected of involvement in terrorist or serious criminal offences. Individuals in this category will generally not be able to avoid adverse attention from security forces...

(Emphasis added)

1. In Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 51; (2017) 250 FCR 309 (Logan, Griffiths and Moshinsky JJ), the Full Federal Court was considering the extent to which some fact-finding was susceptible to judicial review for jurisdictional error. The Court found at [63] that findings that "were illogical or based on no evidence at all" will constitute jurisdictional error. In other words, fact-finding may be challenged on grounds including "reaching a finding without any logical or probative basis" and unreasonableness (at [64]). The Court held the error must be material to the Tribunal's decision for it to be a jurisdictional error (at [65]).
2. I find that the core finding at [39] of the Authority's reasons is that the applicant had been able to depart Sri Lanka to work in Kuwait and return to Sri Lanka in 2012 without incident or detention. Thus, the core finding was with respect to 2012. I find the country information that was before the Authority, being 2017 DFAT Country Report, provided some evidence to support the Authority's finding at [39] of its reasons that the authorities had sophisticated intelligence and "stop" and "watch" lists at the airport in December 2012.
3. I find that no jurisdictional error is disclosed by ground 3 for the reasons set out at [51] to [53] of this judgment.

1. By ground 4, the applicant contends that the Authority was unreasonable in not obtaining, or considering whether to obtain, new information pursuant to the power in s 473DC of the Act. Section 473DC at the relevant time provides:

(1) Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may, in relation to a fast track decision, get any documents or information (new information) that:

(a) were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and

(2) The Immigration Assessment Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances.

(3) Without limiting subsection (1), the Immigration Assessment Authority may invite a person, orally or in writing, to give new information:

(a) in writing; or

(b) at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.

1. In relation to ground 4, the applicant's counsel contended that the Authority erred when it did not exercise its discretionary power to get, or consider getting, new information pursuant to s 473DC from the applicant as to why he did not mention his 2006 Colombo address in the address history in Form 790C (CB 48). Specifically, the applicant's counsel submitted that the Authority should have asked the applicant for information on why, in the address history provided in Form 790C (CB 48), he had not mentioned the Colombo address when he claimed he went to Colombo in 2006.
2. I do not accept the applicant's submissions for the reasons that follow.
3. First, the Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances: s 473DC(2) of the Act.
4. Second, the delegate's decision to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa was referred to the Authority for review under s 473CA of the Act due to it being a "fast track decision" and the applicant being a "fast track applicant": s 5 of the Act. A fast track decision in relation to a fast track review applicant is a "fast track reviewable decision": s 473BB of the Act. As specified in s 473DB of the Act, the Authority is to review a fast track reviewable decision referred to it under s 473CA of the Act by considering the review material provided to it under s 473CB of the Act "(a) without accepting or requesting new information; and (b) without interviewing the referred applicant": see also Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217; [2018] HCA 16 (Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ) at [22]. Accordingly, the Authority was to make its decision on the material before it and was not obligated to request or get new information from the applicant. It would be inconsistent with the nature of the statutory scheme behind the Authority to impose a general requirement for the Authority to get, or consider whether to get, new information.
5. Third, the Authority turned its mind in a general sense as to whether it should get further information from the applicant, and decided against it in light of the fact that the applicant had been given ample opportunity to present all the information, was legally represented and had confirmed to the Authority that he had in fact provided all his information, at [7] of its reasons:

...I have listened to the recording of the interview and I am satisfied that the delegate explained that if the applicant did not provide complete and accurate claims, he may not be able to raise new information with the IAA. As well as being put on notice about providing full and accurate claims, the applicant (who was represented at the interview) was invited to provide post-interview submissions. I also note that the delegate reiterated at the end of the interview that he would consider any information provided before the decision was made.

1. Fourth, as Thawley J identified in CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1641 at [51], upheld in DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 269 FCR 134; [2019] FCAFC 43 (Griffiths, Mortimer and Steward JJ) at [37] to [39], merely because there has been a failure by the Authority to consider the exercise of the power in s 473DC does not of itself involve error, let alone a jurisdictional error.
2. Fifth, the Authority made its finding at [25] of its reasons that it did not accept the applicant was in hiding in Colombo based on the evidence put forward by the applicant, being the address history (CB 48). In doing so, there was no requirement for the Authority to request additional information on the applicant's address history when the Authority had before it the information provided by the applicant.
3. I find that no jurisdictional error is disclosed by ground 4 for the reasons set out at [58] to [62] of this judgment.

1. As no jurisdictional error has been disclosed, the application must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kaur-Bains.