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Cited legislation

2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.

This judgment addresses only adjournment applications. It does not decide whether leave to appeal should be granted, whether the stay should be ordered, or the merits of the underlying dispute. The Court described the underlying procedural history as lengthy and unnecessary to restate, referring readers to Slattery J’s reasons in The Estate of Gaber Ekladious Awad; The Estate of Ognee Abd Elkodious Mikheil [2025] NSWSC 1346 for the broad background ([3]).

The applicants had sought more time on several occasions. They initially explained that they were waiting for the outcome of fee-postponement applications relating to transcripts of hearings on 5 and 6 May 2026 ([4]). The Registrar later advised that the 6 May transcript had been provided to the judges, but no transcript was available for 5 May ([6]). The applicants then asked for the leave hearing to be vacated, explaining that they had not received the official 6 May transcript and were still awaiting a fee decision ([7]).

On 14 September, the Registrar advised that the fee-postponement application for the 6 May transcript had been approved and that a copy would be provided that day. The application relating to the 5 May transcript was refused because the Registrar’s referral decision was not the subject of the leave application or substantive appeal ([8]). The applicants received the 6 May transcript at about 1.30 pm that afternoon. They sought another adjournment to analyse it, compare it with their affidavits and existing grounds, and consider amendments or supplementary material ([9]). That renewed request was rejected ([10]).

The first respondent then made a separate application. She reported having had an accident and being transferred by ambulance to a hospital ([16]). At the Court’s request, she provided a medical certificate stating that she would be unfit for work or school from 15 September and fit to resume on 18 September ([17]–[18]). Although the Court considered the certificate had shortcomings, it found it sufficiently supported her request ([19]).

The practical result was that the applicants did not obtain the adjournment they had requested on transcript-preparation grounds, but the first respondent’s later application meant the hearing of both matters was postponed. The new hearing date was 28 September 2026 at 10.15 am. The applicants could file and serve proposed amendments or additional material by 4 pm on 23 September, and there was no order as to costs ([20]–[21]).

Why the court decided this way

The Court began with the statutory case-management framework. It said s 58 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) required it to act in accordance with “the dictates of justice”. In doing so, it had to have regard to ss 56 and 57 and the other matters specified in s 58(2)(b) ([12]). The judgment specifically quoted s 56(1), which states the overriding purpose: “to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings”. It also referred to s 56(2), under which the Court must give effect to that overriding purpose when exercising powers under the Act or court rules and when interpreting provisions of the Act or rules.

The Court did not treat the applicants’ self-represented status as irrelevant. It expressly acknowledged that they were litigants in person and accepted that they should have a reasonable opportunity to compare their recollections with the official transcript ([13]). But it considered that this opportunity did not require an adjournment. The applicants had attended the 6 May hearing, and the Court considered their affidavits, summons and submissions showed that they already had a broad recollection of what occurred. On that footing, it concluded that 48 hours was enough time to analyse the transcript ([13]).

The balance was also affected by the consequences of delay. The Court described the estate’s value as being “seriously depleted by ongoing delays” ([14]). It considered the applicants’ proposed timetable, which would have moved further directions to on or after 7 October and left the hearing date uncertain and later than 2 October. That date mattered because the interim appointment of the joint administrators was due to expire under the existing orders. The Court considered that further delay would add to the depletion of what it described as a relatively modest estate ([14]).

The separate application by the first respondent was assessed on different facts. She reported an accident the previous afternoon and provided a medical certificate prepared at Blacktown Hospital Emergency Department. The certificate did not give the Court all the information it had requested, but the judges nevertheless considered it sufficient support for an adjournment ([16]–[19]). The Court also noted that the certificate anticipated recovery by 18 September and set the hearing for 28 September, nearly two weeks later. It said the parties should expect the hearing to proceed on that date ([19]).

The reasons therefore turn on the circumstances of each request, rather than a general rule that adjournments should or should not be granted. For the applicants, the Court considered the preparation time and prejudice from delay together. For the first respondent, it considered the medical evidence sufficient to justify postponing the scheduled hearing.

Before and after state of the law

This is a procedural ruling applying the statutory framework cited in the judgment. It does not announce a change to the law of adjournments or set out a new general test. The Court’s stated legal starting point was s 58 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), read with the overriding purpose in s 56(1) and the other provisions it identified ([12]).

Before this decision, the relevant statutory text, as described by the Court, already required attention to the dictates of justice and the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues. The ruling illustrates how the Court applied those objectives to a particular scheduling dispute. Relevant case-specific considerations included how much time the applicants had to consider the transcript, their attendance at the hearing, their existing recollection and filed material, the proposed timetable, and the effect of ongoing delay on the estate ([13]–[14]).

After the ruling, the immediate procedural position was that the leave summons and stay motion were to be heard on 28 September 2026, with proposed amendments or additional material due by 4 pm on 23 September ([21]). The Court did not determine the substantive appeal questions. Nor did it state that every litigant who receives a transcript 48 hours before a hearing has adequate preparation time. Its finding was expressly connected to these applicants and the circumstances described in the reasons ([13]).

The judgment mentions ss 56, 57 and 58, but its explanation of the statutory text is limited. It quotes the overriding purpose in s 56(1), describes the effect of s 56(2), and says that s 58 requires the Court to act in accordance with the dictates of justice while having regard to specified matters. It does not reproduce the full text of s 57 or s 58(2)(b). Accordingly, the ruling should not be read as a detailed construction of provisions whose full wording is not set out in the judgment.

Key passages with plain-English translation

At [12], the Court states that it is “obliged by s 58” to act in accordance with “the dictates of justice”. In plain English, the judges treated the adjournment question as one that had to be decided consistently with the statutory case-management framework, not simply by asking whether a party preferred more time.

Also at [12], the Court quotes the overriding purpose as facilitating “the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings”. This explains why speed and cost were relevant alongside the applicants’ preparation needs. The reasons do not suggest that speed automatically overrides fairness. Rather, the Court weighed the claimed need for more time against the overall objectives and the impact of delay.

At [13], the Court says “48 hours was sufficient time” for the applicants to analyse the 6 May transcript. That is the key case-specific conclusion on their request. The Court’s stated reasons included that both applicants were present throughout the hearing and that their existing documents demonstrated a broad recollection. It also recognised the value of checking recollections against the official transcript.

At [14], the Court records that “the value of the estate is being seriously depleted by ongoing delays”. In plain English, the delay was not treated as an abstract scheduling inconvenience. The Court identified a practical consequence to the estate and considered that a further, uncertain timetable could worsen it.

At [19], the Court says the medical certificate had “evident shortcomings” but “sufficiently supports” the first respondent’s application. This shows that the Court did not regard the certificate as flawless. It nonetheless accepted the document as adequate support in the circumstances before it. The judgment does not specify what additional information would have removed the shortcomings.

Finally, [20] and [21] set out the practical orders. The cases were adjourned to 28 September 2026, and the applicants were given until 4 pm on 23 September to file and serve proposed amendments or additional material. The Court did not award costs.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

This decision is most directly relevant to procedural situations where a party seeks an adjournment because recently received material needs to be reviewed, and the Court must balance that preparation request against the consequences of delay. The specific considerations the Court relied on here included the time available, the applicants’ prior attendance at the relevant hearing, their demonstrated recollection, their existing filed documents, and the proposed timetable ([13]–[14]).

The decision also illustrates that self-representation is a factor the Court may acknowledge without treating it as decisive. The Court accepted the applicants needed a reasonable opportunity to check their recollections against the transcript, but concluded that this need was met within the time available ([13]). The reasons do not establish a general minimum preparation period for self-represented parties.

Another relevant feature was the stated effect of delay on an estate. The Court considered that the estate was already being seriously depleted, and that the proposed adjournment could push the matter beyond the date on which the interim administrators’ appointment would expire ([14]). The judgment therefore offers an example of case management in which ongoing financial consequences and the status of an interim appointment formed part of the context.

The first respondent’s application illustrates a different factual basis for seeking an adjournment: a reported accident, hospital transfer and medical certificate identifying a period of unfitness ([16]–[19]). The Court found the certificate sufficient despite shortcomings. The decision does not establish what evidence will suffice in other cases, because its assessment was tied to this application and the hearing dates involved.

The ruling should be used with care outside comparable procedural circumstances. It concerns an adjournment, not the merits of an appeal, the validity of the orders below, or the applicants’ entitlement to a stay. It also does not resolve the substantive significance of the missing 5 May transcript.

How later courts have treated it

The judgment itself refers to Slattery J’s reasons in The Estate of Gaber Ekladious Awad; The Estate of Ognee Abd Elkodious Mikheil [2025] NSWSC 1346 as providing a sufficient account of the broad background ([3]). It also notes that Slattery J had been mindful of the estate’s depletion through ongoing delay ([14]). The Court of Appeal does not analyse that earlier decision as a precedent on adjournments; it uses it as background to the proceedings.

No later decisions are identified in the supplied judgment, which is dated 16 September 2026. It is therefore not possible, on the text provided, to describe subsequent judicial treatment, such as whether later courts followed, distinguished or questioned this ruling. The judgment’s cited cases list contains the 2025 NSW Supreme Court decision, but no later authorities.

For research purposes, the procedural outcome should also be kept distinct from any future treatment of the underlying appeal. The Court adjourned the leave summons and motion but did not decide either application on its merits. The ruling therefore supplies no outcome on whether leave to appeal should be granted or whether the stay should issue.

Still-open questions

The judgment does not state the substantive grounds of the proposed appeal or explain the orders made by Slattery J on 6 May 2026. It consequently does not allow a reader to assess the prospects or merits of the appeal, and it makes no finding on the legal correctness of the orders below.

The reasons say that no transcript was available for the 5 May 2026 hearing and that the fee-postponement application relating to it was refused because the Registrar’s referral decision was not the subject of the leave application or substantive appeal ([6], [8]). The Court does not determine whether that transcript was otherwise relevant to the proposed appeal or whether its absence could later matter.

The Court’s conclusion that 48 hours was sufficient was based on the applicants’ presence at the hearing, their broad recollection and their existing material ([13]). The judgment does not say whether the transcript led to any amendment, what any proposed amendment might have been, or whether additional material was ultimately filed by the deadline.

The Court accepted the first respondent’s medical certificate despite shortcomings, but did not detail those shortcomings or identify a general evidentiary threshold for medical adjournment applications ([18]–[19]). Nor does it explain whether the first respondent’s medical circumstances were contested by the other parties.

Finally, the judgment does not report what happened at the adjourned hearing on 28 September 2026. The orders set the next date and permitted additional material, but the supplied text contains no later procedural history or determination.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.