AVL15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs

Tribunal's Decision 12 The Tribunal concluded that the Appellants' protection claims were not credible. The Tribunal's Statement of Decision and Reasons was structured under the following headings: (1) the background to the Appellants' application for a Protection visa; (2) the issues in the case, including whether the Appellants met the refugee or complementary protection criterion; (3) the Appellants' personal information and their claims for protection as made in the application for a Protection visa; (4) the decision of the delegate; (5) the information it received from the Appellants prior to the hearing, including the appellants' written submissions, statutory declaration, attached documents and country information; (6) the evidence given by the Appellants during the hearing, including the questions it had asked them and their responses; (7) the concerns it had in relation to the credibility of the evidence; and (8) the s 424 Letter it had written to the Appellants in relation to these credibility concerns and the responses provided by the Appellants in the s 424A Letter . 13 The Tribunal then made the following findings in relation to the Appellants' credibility, which were helpfully summarised by the Minister in his written submissions at [19], and which I gratefully adopt: a) The Tribunal accepted that the First Appellant is a Christian, studied at the University of Benin between 1999 and 2002, had been ordained as a deacon and an assistant pastor, and has preached publicly in these roles. b) The Tribunal accepted that some of the inconsistencies in the Appellants' evidence should be given little weight, as applicants commonly exaggerate or are confused to some degree in giving evidence. Further, the Tribunal accepted that the Second Appellant might know less about the First Appellant's activities, which might explain some inconsistencies. c) However, the Tribunal held significant concern, and gave great weight to, the fact that the First Appellant did not mention to the Department, orally or in writing, that a claimed attack came four days after speaking publicly at a "crusade". The Tribunal found it implausible that the First Appellant would not disclose that he had been speaking publicly just days before a claimed attack. d) The Tribunal also had concern, and gave weight to, the fact that the First Appellant had not stated to the Department, orally or in writing, that he feared harm from the ex-Governor because of his prior political activities. The Tribunal found it to be implausible that the First Appellant would not have made those claims earlier if they were genuine. The Tribunal did not believe that he had forgotten about the issues with the ex-Governor until he was reminded in a phone call with a lawyer friend. e) The Tribunal found it to be implausible that claimed incidents in 2005 and 2008 would not have been reported to police, and that members of the "Black Axe" confraternity would be able to find the First Appellant on those occasions but no other times between 2002 and 2012. The Tribunal held particular doubt about this given that the First Appellant had continued to work as a real estate agent. Although the First Appellant claimed to have changed "contact details" and "office location", he did not claim to have changed his name, to have avoided being publicly identifiable or to have stopped working. The Tribunal gave weight to the fact that the First Appellant had not claimed to be the subject of any further incidents, despite his public profile. f) The Tribunal found that the fact the First Appellant had travelled to the UK in 2011 but did not seek protection there was further evidence that he was not at risk of harm at that time (or at all). g) The Tribunal gave some weight to the fact that the First Appellant had not provided any documents corroborating his claim, especially given the nature of claimed incidents, such as the destruction of his house and an attempted shooting. The First Appellant claimed that the police were aware of this and were investigating. The lack of documents was implausible in all the circumstances. h) The Tribunal gave some weight to the fact that the Appellants waited for some time - almost one month - between being granted visas to travel to Australia and departing Nigeria. This delay was inconsistent with claims that the house was recently destroyed and there was a very recent attempt to shoot the applicant. The explanation given, that arrangements for care of children needed to be made and money was being spent on hotels, was considered to be implausible, especially in the absence of any corroborating material. i) The Tribunal also gave some weight to an apparent inconsistency between the First Appellant's evidence that he had studied with a man named Ebehon and the fact that Mr Ebehon died shortly after graduating almost 10 years later. The Tribunal considered it unlikely that Mr Ebehon had studied for that long, which cast doubt on the First Appellant's claim about when they had studied together. 14 Having regard to these inconsistencies, the Tribunal found that the Appellants had deliberately fabricated some of their claims and the material used to support them, and consequently said it had "serious doubts about whether [it could] accept any of the [Appellants'] claims": Tribunal Reasons at [94]. While it also noted at [94] that it was not uncommon for applicants seeking protection to exaggerate or embellish their claims, it ultimately found "the discrepancies and implausibility of the [Appellants'] claims to be so great that [it could not] accept them as simply exaggerations or embellishments of genuine underlying claims." 15 At [96], the Tribunal set out the following factors it did not accept: a. The applicant has converted from Islam to Christianity. b. The applicant was a member of the fraternity either while at university or at any other time. c. The applicant was ever involved in disputes or conflicts with the BA fraternity or members of the BA fraternity either while at university or at any other time. d. The applicant ever undertook work for or on behalf of the ex-governor [or] any other political figure in Nigeria either while at university or at any other time. e. The applicant was kidnapped, attacked or threatened with harm in 2005 or 2008 by members of the BA fraternity or anyone else. f. The applicant was injured, either from being pushed from a moving car, being drugged or in any other way, in 2005 and 2008 or at any other time. g. The applicants' home was destroyed by members of the BA fraternity or anyone else in August 2012 or at any other time. h. The applicants and their children were required to live in hotels in August 2012 or at any other time. i. Members of the BA fraternity, or anyone else, attempted to shoot the applicants or their children in their hotel room, or anywhere else, in August 2012 or at any other time. j. The applicant is on any "blacklist" held by the BA fraternity or is otherwise of any interest to the BA fraternity. k. The applicant converted the friend or anyone else from Islam to Christianity. l. The friend has a brother who is a conservative Muslim who objects to the friend having converted to Christianity from Islam. m. Members of the BA fraternity or anyone else came looking for the applicants' children in 2013. n. The friend was killed by members of the BA fraternity or anyone else in the course of those people looking for the applicants' children or at any other time. o. The family of the friend hold the applicants responsible for the death of the friend (which, I have found, has not occurred). p. The applicant received a telephone call from a lawyer in Nigeria telling him that the friend had been killed. q. The applicant has received a text message threatening to take revenge on the applicants and their children for the death of the friend. r. The applicant has ever spoken, either publicly or privately, about having been part of the fraternity or any other secret society or cult (because, as I have found, he has never been a member of the fraternity or any other secret society or cult). s. The applicant has ever been a member of the group. t. The applicants have ever attended "crusade" or any other meetings organised by the group. 16 At [101], after taking into account all the information before it, the Tribunal found that the Appellants did not face a real chance of serious harm capable of amounting to persecution due to their religion or membership of any particular social group or for any other reason, considered both individually and cumulatively, if returned to Nigeria. In relation to the Appellants' religion, the Tribunal accepted that the First Appellant was a Christian pastor and had publicly preached about beliefs and that he would continue to preach as a Christian pastor on return to Nigeria: Tribunal Reasons at [99]. However, the Tribunal concluded that, based on country information, Christians, including pastors who preach about their beliefs, do not face a real chance of suffering harm in Lagos or elsewhere in southern Nigeria because of their religion: Tribunal Reasons at [100]. It follows that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the Appellants face a real chance of suffering serious harm because of their Christianity or because of the Appellant's work as a pastor in Nigeria: Tribunal Reasons at [100]. 17 Further, at [106], the Tribunal concluded that there were not substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the Appellants being removed from Australia to Nigeria, there was a real risk that the Appellants will suffer significant harm. 18 For these reasons, the Tribunal found that the Appellants did not satisfy the criterion set out in ss 36(2)(a), (aa), (b) or (c) of the Migration Act and therefore could not be granted a Protection visa: Tribunal Reasons at [107]. 19 On 25 May 2015, the Appellants applied for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the FCCA. The Appellants filed an amended application dated 5 December 2017 providing three grounds of review, namely: (1) Failure to address the question which the Second Respondent was actually required to address; i.e.: whether the Applicants have a well-founded fear of persecution or significant harm by virtue of the First Applicant being a former member of a social cultist group who then actively preached against them and instead addressing the question of alleged credibility of details his accounts of individual incidents of retribution. (2) Failure to consider the Applicants' claims that they meet the criteria for grant of Protection Visas, including whether they had a well-founded fear of persecution or significant harm by virtue of the First Applicant being a former member of a social cultist group who then actively preached against them including by failing to assess basic credibility of their knowledge of social cultist groups. (3) Unreasonably and irrationally drawing ultimate conclusion as to whether Applicants had well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm by virtue of First Applicant being a former member of a social cultist group who then actively preached against them, merely on basis of assessment of alleged credibility of details his accounts of individual incidents of retribution, rather than of their basic knowledge of social cultist groups. 20 The primary judge dismissed that application on 18 June 2020, concluding that there was no merit in the argument that the Tribunal failed to consider the Appellants' claim properly because it did not address their knowledge of social cultist groups: Primary Reasons at [51]. 21 In relation to Ground 1, her Honour found that the Tribunal correctly addressed the question of whether the Appellants had a well-founded fear of persecution: Primary Reasons at [48], noting that findings as to credit of an applicant's claims are required to make the necessary findings of fact to inform the Tribunal's assessment of whether the fear is well-founded. In support of this conclusion, at [44]-[45] her Honour stated that: 44. Undoubtedly, findings as to the credibility of an applicant's claims are required in order to make the necessary findings of fact which will then inform the Tribunal's assessment of whether the fear is well-founded. That is exactly what the Tribunal did in this case. There is no one method in which the Tribunal may assess an applicant's credibility. It is entirely a matter for the Tribunal. While it is open to the Tribunal explore an applicant's knowledge on a particular topic (such as a particular religion or social practise) it is by no means mandated or required. The fact that the Tribunal does not do so and instead assesses other matters in making its findings regarding credibility does not amount to jurisdictional error or mean that the credibility assessment is "necessarily incomplete". It is simply the Tribunal exercising its fact finding function. 45. The Tribunal did not unduly focus on ''peripheral detail" as opposed to the "central" issue of whether the Applicants had a well-founded fear of persecution. The "'peripheral details" the Applicants' Counsel refers to were vital to the Tribunal properly undertaking its task and addressing the question of whether the Applicants had a well-founded fear of persecution. 22 For the reasons largely given in relation to ground 1, her Honour also found that Ground 2 and Ground 3 failed. In particular, at [61]-[62] her Honour held that: 61. … it is not the case that the Tribunal relied on "peripheral details" or objectively minor facts to undermine and ultimately reject the Applicants' credibility and claim. Rather there were multiple concerns that were set out in some detail by the Tribunal and which when offered the opportunity to explain the Applicants had no acceptable answer for. 62. It is also not the case that one credibility finding can be seen to have a cascading effect on the assessment of the Applicants' credibility as a whole. Each of the Tribunal's concerns has a logical and probative basis. They were reliant upon inconsistencies, implausibilities or a lack of supporting information. All of these matters are a reasonable basis to have concerns with an applicant's evidence. The Tribunal, having noted these concerns then considered them, on balance and with regard to the fact that refugees may embellish their claims despite them being genuinely held, was nonetheless satisfied that the Applicants were not credible. The Court can identify no error in this regard. It was entirely open for the Tribunal to find that the Applicants were no (sic) credible witnesses and there was no obligation for the Tribunal to test the Applicants' knowledge.

Appeal to this Court 23 By Notice of Appeal dated 8 July 2020, the Appellant appealed from the decision of the FCCA. The Notice of Appeal contained the following grounds of appeal: 1. The Appellants appeal from the whole of the judgment of the Federal Court of Australia constituted by the Honourable Judge C.E Kirton QC in proceeding MLG1172 of 2015 given in Melbourne on 18 June 2020 ("the judgment"), dismissing an application for review of, and relief by way of prerogative writ in respect of, a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") made on 29 April 2015 2. The appeal is brought pursuant to leave to appeal. GROUNDS: 3. The learned Judge erred in law in failing to find that the decision of the Second Respondent was made in breach of an imperative duty imposed on it or an essential pre-condition to or an inviolable limitation or restraint upon its power and its jurisdiction necessary for the existence of the satisfaction required by s 65 to grant or refuse the application and its powers to conduct a review under s 348 of the Migration Act 1958. The Second Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction and/or constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction: PARTICULARS The learned Judge failed to properly address the Applicant's grounds for review of the Second Respondent's decision in that the Court found that the Second Respondent's failure to test the Applicant's knowledge of social cultists groups did not involve a failure to address the question of whether the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution and supporting claims and did not involve unreasonableness or irrationality. 4. The learned Judge erred in finding that any such potential error was not an operative influence on the Second Respondent's decision because it gave the Applicant a more general opportunity to respond to concerns pursuant to Section 424A of the Migration Act. 5. The learned Judge erred in failing to find that the Second Respondent denied the Appellants natural justice or procedural fairness. PARTICULARS Failure to consider the Appellants claims that they meet the criteria for grant of Protection Visas, including whether they had a well-founded fear of persecution or significant harm by virtue of the First Applicant being a former member of a social cultist group who then actively preached against them; including by failing to assess basic credibility of their knowledge of social cultist groups. 6. The learned Judge erred in dismissing the application. 24 During the course of the hearing, and in the Appellants' written submissions, counsel for the Appellants only addressed grounds 3 and 4. In these reasons, I will refer to ground 3 as Ground 1 and ground 4 as Ground 2, as the other grounds relied upon were not pressed as independent grounds of appeal.

Appellants' Submissions 25 The Appellants' submission in relation to Ground 1, which was also their central contention before the FCCA, is that the Tribunal erred in assessing whether the Appellants had a well-founded fear of persecution. They contended that the Tribunal considered peripheral details as opposed to the substantive matters it was required to consider. 26 The core of Ground 1 is expressed at [10] of the Appellants' (renumbered) written submissions: The Appellant contended before Federal Circuit Court that Second Respondent failed to address the correct question of whether [appellants] had well-founded fear of persecution, instead addressing the question of alleged credibility of accounts of individual incidents of retribution; as outlined above in Paragraph 4 of these Submissions and this also involved unreasonableness or irrationality. Second Respondent recognised at Paragraphs 25 and 98 of its Decision Appellants claimed to fear persecution or significant harm on basis of First Appellant being a former member of a social cultist group who then actively preached against them. However, it then failed to address basic credibility of their knowledge of social cultist groups, by virtue of association with which they claimed to fear persecution or harm and instead proceeded at Paragraphs 72-5, 79 and 88-96 of its Decision to reject their claims on basis of a thus necessarily incomplete assessment of alleged credibility of details of their accounts of individual incidents of retribution. [Errors in original] 27 Specifically, the Appellants contended that the Tribunal fell into error because it did not test the First Appellant's knowledge of social cultist groups but rather focused on individual retribution incidences in making credibility findings. In particular, the Appellants submitted that the Tribunal focused on the following "peripheral issues" in making their credibility findings: (1) the length of time between the incidents mentioned; (2) the lack of related documentation from Nigerian Police; (3) the failure to mention all relevant incidents before the Tribunal's hearing; (4) the alleged inconsistencies in the Appellants' account of details involving an incident in 2008; (5) the frequency and timing of the First Appellant's public preaching against social cultism groups; and (6) the alleged implausibility of a friend with whom the First Appellant had attended University. 28 The Appellants submitted that despite the Tribunal recognising the existence of particular social groups including "former criminal confraternity members who have actively preached against criminal confraternities" (Tribunal Reasons at 25 and [98]), it failed to assess the First Appellant's credibility by reference to his knowledge of those groups. It is further alleged by the Appellants that by reason of these matters, the Tribunal's findings were unreasonable and illogical. 29 The Appellants submitted that the primary judge erred in upholding the Tribunal's decision. In particular, the Appellants stated at [9] of their written submissions that: (1) The Federal Circuit Court failed to properly address the Applicant's grounds for review of the Second Respondent's decision in that the Court found that the Second Respondent's failure to test the Applicant's knowledge of social cultists groups did not involve a failure to address the question of whether the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution and supporting claims and did not involve unreasonableness or irrationality. (2) The Federal Circuit Court further erred in finding that any such potential error was not an operative influence on the Second Respondent's decision because it gave the Applicant a more general opportunity to respond to concerns pursuant to Section 424A of the Migration Act. 30 The Appellants also submitted that the primary judge failed to appreciate the "basic link between [the] Appellants' state of knowledge and basis on which they claim to fear persecution originating from social cultist groups" in circumstances where the First Appellant had defected from, and preached against, a particular social cultist group. The Appellants further contended that the Tribunal's concern regarding the lack of records to corroborate the alleged police involvement in the retribution incidents, failed to take into account the fact that the Appellants claimed that the Police were unable to provide them with any assistance. 31 In relation to Ground 2, the Appellants submitted that if error were to be found in respect of Ground 1, this error cannot be said to have been remedied by virtue of the Tribunal giving the Appellants the opportunity to respond to its concerns in the s 424A Letter. The Appellants submitted that the jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's reasoning addressed in Ground 1 remained an operative influence on its Decision.

Minister's Submissions 32 In relation to Ground 1, the Minister submitted that the primary judge did not err in finding that the Tribunal properly addressed the question of whether the Appellants had a well-founded fear of persecution. 33 The Minister submitted that the primary judge at [42] of her reasons correctly set out the process by which an appellant's fear of persecution is to be addressed: (1) It is for the applicant to advance whatever evidence and arguments they have in order to satisfy the Tribunal of the facts that are necessary to establish their claims. (2) The Tribunal is to then make findings as to the primary facts and identify inferences which may be drawn from those findings of fact to assess whether the fear is well-founded. (3) Determining what is likely to occur in the future will require findings as to what has occurred in the past and therefore the logical starting point for the Tribunal will be to consider and determine whether the incidents occurred and if so, whether it is for a protected reason. 34 The Minister submitted that the primary judge then correctly concluded that the above process was in fact carried out by the Tribunal. The Minister also submitted that there is no one method by which a Tribunal must follow in assessing an appellant's credibility. It is a matter entirely for the Tribunal. The Minister contended that the fact that the Tribunal decided to assess other matters in making its findings regarding credibility does not amount to jurisdictional error. It simply reflects the Tribunal exercising its fact finding function. It follows in the Appellant's submissions that there was no error in the primary judge's conclusion that it was not unreasonable for the Tribunal not to test the Appellants' credibility by reference to their knowledge of social cults. 35 Further, it was submitted by the Minister that the primary judge correctly observed that the Tribunal did not only address the individual retribution incidents but considered a number of concerns it had with the Appellants' evidence cumulatively such that it cannot be said that the Tribunal only focused on "peripheral details" in making its finding. 36 In relation to the Appellants' submission regarding lack of documentation and police involvement, the Minister submitted that in giving some weight to the lack of documentary evidence about the incidents, the Tribunal accepted at [91] that "applicants for protection cannot be expected to provide corroborating documentary evidence of the claims they make". However, the Minister contended that it was entirely open for the Tribunal to reject the Appellants' claim on the basis of the implausibility of the First Appellant's evidence that the police were aware of the 2012 incidents and were conducting investigations into the destruction of the Appellants' home and that he had gone to the "police several times" and they could not be of assistance, particularly in the light of the Tribunal's finding that it is highly improbable that the Appellants would not have any documents or reports provided by or to the police in relation to these incidents if they were being investigated and had, in fact, occurred. 37 As to Ground 2, the Minister submitted that the primary judge was correct in finding that if, in the alternative, there was some error found as to Ground 1, that error had been remedied because the Appellants were given an opportunity to respond to the concerns raised by the Tribunal in the s 424 Letter. The Minister submitted that, as noted by the primary judge at [59] of her Reasons, the Tribunal provided the Appellants with extensive opportunities to answer credibility concerns and that it did accept the Appellants' submission in some regards in relation to the assessment of credibility. For example, the Tribunal did not place weight on inconsistencies in the statements about the number of men who were discussing whether to kill the First Appellant or the specific time that the First Appellant had returned home. 38 The Minister submitted that the Tribunal had taken a rational approach to these inconsistencies. Its ultimate finding to reject the Appellants' credibility was based on a number of concerns and its decision therefore was not merely based on "peripheral details". As such, the Minister submitted that the primary judge was correct to conclude that there was no error in the Tribunal's approach and it was entirely open to the Tribunal to find that the Appellants were not credible witnesses.

Ground 1 39 In my view, the Tribunal did not fail to discharge its statutory function in assessing whether the Appellants had a well-founded fear of persecution. In particular, the Tribunal did not fall into error in the approach it took in the assessment of the Appellants' credibility. I respectfully agree with the primary judge that the Tribunal took an entirely conventional, and I would add rational, approach when addressing the factual question of whether the Appellants had a well-founded fear of persecution. I agree with the summary given by the primary judge as to the steps in the process for addressing such a question, which was set out in her Honour's reasons at [42] (and as set out above at [33] of these reasons). It is clear from the Tribunal's reasons that it carried out this process. It considered the Appellants' claims and evidence. Moreover, it made findings as to the facts relevant to inform their assessment of whether the Appellants had a well-founded fear. 40 In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW [2010] FCAFC 41; 183 FCR 575 at [35]-[36], Keane CJ (as his Honour then was) observed: [35] In summary to this point, there is nothing in the text of s 425, or in the statutory context in which it appears, or in the authoritative judicial exegesis of s 425, to suggest that it was the intention of the legislature that the Tribunal should take upon itself the role of ensuring that all possibly arguable lines of argument which might be available to an applicant in any given case are pursued to the applicant's best advantage. [36] There was, in my respectful opinion, no foundation for the magistrate's ultimate conclusion that "the applicant was denied a fair opportunity of having the Tribunal assess whether those defects [in addition to demeanour, memory, and consistency] were attributable to a mental impairment, or to concerns about veracity." The Tribunal was not obliged to conduct an inquiry to discover whether the respondent's case might be better put or supported by other evidence. The applicant had the opportunity to adduce such evidence as to his psychological state and its impact on his "demeanour, memory and consistency", as he wished. There is no suggestion that his capacity to make decisions in his own interests in that regard was impaired by his condition. [Emphasis added] 41 I respectfully agree with, and adopt his Honour's analysis of the scope of the statutory task. There is no single method by which a Tribunal is required to assess credibility. 42 The Tribunal was therefore not obliged to conduct an inquiry to determine what knowledge the Appellants had of social cultists group. The process of fact finding is an intellectual exercise, informed by human experience and observation. In any curial or administrative decision-making process, the trier of fact, notionally the jury, is required to give real and genuine consideration to the evidence, and to test that evidence in an intellectual sense against the background of human experience. Claims and contentions concerning the subjective state of mind of the witness can be difficult to assess, principally because it is only the person concerned who can assert what they subjectively believe. However, an assertion of belief, like any claim concerning the state of mind, can only be scrutinised by reference to the evidence. The contemporaneous evidence of conduct on the part of the person concerned and contemporaneous communications which are not created in anticipation of a claim are usually relevant for the purpose of testing the asserted state of mind. 43 Further, in many instances, it is the objective contextual facts and the state of affairs which are often the most illuminating when it comes to assessing the veracity of the claim. These contextual facts may be 'peripheral' in one sense, but they are also very often highly probative because they form part of the factual matrix relevant to assessing the veracity of the claims. Thus, in the intellectual process of fact finding, the trier of fact must synthesise, and distil the evidence, including importantly within the context in which the events in question occurred. A fact, or issue may appear to be peripheral, and turn out not to be peripheral. The apparently peripheral fact may be very significant, not to the determination of the issue directly, but to assessing whether other facts or claims make sense in the context. Inconsistencies in the accounts given by the party, or witness, invariably give rise to legitimate concerns, or legitimate scepticism about the veracity of claims. That does not mean that an inference adverse to the person's credit necessarily follows from the fact of an inconsistency between different accounts given to the relevant facts. Not all inconsistencies support inferences adverse to the credit of the witness or party concerned, but many do. 44 In this matter, I am not persuaded that the Tribunal erred in its analysis of the evidence or the conclusions it reached as to the credit of the Appellants. Needless to say, factual findings, including as to credit, are matters for the Tribunal. Those findings are not immune from challenge, but where there is a foundation in the evidence for a finding, whether it be as to fact, directly as to credit, or because the credit finding is supported by other facts, must depend on a common sense assessment by the trier of fact of the claims assessed in the whole of the relevant context. In my opinion there was nothing in the Tribunal's approach that was inconsistent with a cogent and rational analysis of the part of the Tribunal. 45 I am also not persuaded that the Tribunal only considered "peripheral issues" in assessing the Appellants' credibility. It emerges from the Tribunals Reasons at [96] that the Tribunal held a number of concerns in relation to the First Appellant's evidence. It considered these concerns cumulatively, and did not only focus on the inconsistences relating to the individual retribution incidences. Rather, it made its assessment that "on balance", it did not accept the credibility of the Appellants' evidence: Tribunal Reasons at [95]. That is the proper fact-finding function of the Tribunal. 46 A claim of legal unreasonableness can only be established if it is demonstrated that the decision-maker formed a view that no rational decision-maker could have arrived at: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 at [130]-[131], [135] (Crennan and Bell JJ). As the Full Court of this Court explained in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496 at [60]-[61] (McKerracher, Griffiths and Rangiah JJ), unreasonableness requires "extreme illogicality or irrationality, measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions": see also Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99 at [148] (Robertson J). 47 Similarly, in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 at [11], Allsop CJ explained that a decision may be legally unreasonable if it is "plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or lacking common sense". Ultimately, these different formulations merely serve to "highlight the fact that the test for unreasonableness is necessarily stringent" and that "courts will not lightly interfere with the exercise of a statutory power involving an area of discretion": Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541 at [11] (Kiefel CJ). 48 It follows from the views that I have reached in relation to the Tribunal's findings as to credibility that the Tribunal did not act unreasonably or illogically by failing to conduct an inquiry to determine the extent of the Appellants' knowledge of social cultists group. In this regard, I respectfully adopt the reasoning of the primary judge at [62]-[63] in dismissing Ground 1: [62] … Each of the Tribunal's concerns has a logical and probative basis. They were reliant upon inconsistencies, implausibilities or a lack of supporting information. All of these matters are a reasonable basis to have concerns with an applicant's evidence. The Tribunal, having noted these concerns then considered them, on balance and with regard to the fact that refugees may embellish their claims despite them being genuinely held, was nonetheless satisfied that the Applicants were not credible. The Court can identify no error in this regard. It was entirely open for the Tribunal to find that the Applicants were no (sic) credible witnesses and there was no obligation for the Tribunal to test the Applicants' knowledge. [63] … while a different Tribunal may have taken a different approach (and may have tested the Applicants' knowledge) that is not the test. The test is whether it was reasonable for the Tribunal to have arrived at the conclusion it did. Here, it was entirely open to do so. There were numerous concerns with almost all aspects of the Applicants' evidence.

Ground 2 49 Ground 2 is interlinked with Ground 1 in that the Appellants contend that the error in the Tribunal's assessment of credibility described in Ground 1 was not remedied by reason of the s 424A Letter provided to the Appellants. 50 During the course of the Tribunal hearing, the Tribunal advised the Appellants' of its concerns about the credibility of their evidence due to, among other things, the significant length of time between the claimed attempts to kill the First Appellant and the lack of documentation from the Nigerian Police: Tribunal Reasons at [73]-[74]. The Tribunal put these concerns to the Appellants in writing and gave them an opportunity to comment on, or respond to, any of those concerns. 51 The Tribunal considered the responses to the s 424 Letter provided by the Appellants, and accepted some of Appellants' submissions in relation to the assessment of credibility. At [87] of its Reasons, the Tribunal stated: … I raised some of my concerns about the applicants' credibility in a letter sent to them after the hearing. I acknowledge, as was submitted in the response to that letter, that the inconsistencies in some of the evidence provided by the applicants should be given little weight because it is common for there to be some exaggerations or confusion in evidence provided by protection applicants and I have taken this into account in assessing the inconsistencies put to the applicants in the letter after the hearing and in my assessment of the applicants' credibility generally. I accept that this may explain the inconsistencies in the statements about the number of men who were discussing whether to kill the applicant in 2008 and the time when the applicant returned home after that incident. I also accept that the second applicant may not have the same knowledge of the applicant's activities and that this should be taken into account in assessing the differences between the evidence given by the applicant and the second applicant about the applicant's involvement with the group. As a result, I give these inconsistencies less weight in assessing the applicants' credibility. [Emphasis added] 52 In my view, this makes it clear that the Tribunal took an entirely rational approach in dealing with the credibility concerns. In any event, had the Appellants' knowledge of social cultist groups been of such significance in establishing their credibility or claim, the s 424 Letter was an apt opportunity for them to express this to the Tribunal, which opportunity they did not take up. 53 As stated above, it was principally a matter for the Tribunal if it wished to test the Appellants' knowledge of social cultist groups in assessing the credibility of the Appellants' claims. It was not required to do so to discharge its statutory duty. Nevertheless, the Tribunal took one step further and gave the Appellants the opportunity to raise this for the Tribunal's consideration in response to the s 424 Letter. 54 I agree with the primary judge that there was no error in the Tribunal's approach to its findings on credibility. I reject Ground 2 for the above reasons.

Disposition 55 For the above reasons, the appeal should be dismissed with costs. I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Anastassiou.