Fair Work Commission|2026-01-08

"Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union" known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU) v Rota Die International Pty Ltd [2026] FWC 13 (8 January 2026)

s.739 - Dispute resolution

"Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union" known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU)

Alleged dispute about any matters arising under the enterprise agreement

[1] This decision arises from an application by the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU) (the Applicant) for the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) to deal with a dispute under s.739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). Rota Die International Pty Ltd (the Respondent) is the employer.

[2] It concerns the interpretation of the Rota Die International Enterprise Agreement 2023 (the Agreement). The dispute arises from the question of whether employees who ordinarily work an afternoon shift but have been moved to the day shift, receive a shift loading of 10%.

[3] The matter was listed for conference on 24 March 2025 which was attended by all parties. A second conference, where both parties again attended occurred on 26 August 2025. The matter remained in dispute and directions for the filing and service of materials were issued on 26 August 2025, after which the matter proceeded to arbitration.

[4] At the hearing of the matter on 16 October 2025, Mr Stephen Fodrocy appeared for the Applicant and Mr Joseph Hyde appeared for the Respondent. Mr Marko Bojic gave evidence for the Respondent as a witness.

[5] On 24 July 2025, I requested the parties provide an agreed statement of the facts. The parties provided these submissions to my Chambers on 15 August 2025.

[6] On 12 February 2024, the Agreement was approved and commenced operation from 19 February 2024, with a nominal expiry date of 30 June 2026. All the provisions of the Graphics Arts Award General 2000 (as it stood on March 1st, 2006) (GA Award) are incorporated into the Agreement, subject to clause 5 of the Agreement.

[7] The Applicant is covered by the Agreement pursuant to section 201(2) of the Act. The Agreement covers and applies to the 'Employees'. The Employees are the three employees who transferred from the Afternoon Shift to Day Work.

[8] The required steps set out in the dispute resolution procedure at clause 17 of the Agreement have been followed.

Major workplace change - decision and consultation

[9] In September 2024, the Respondent made a decision to cease operating an Afternoon Shift at its factory located at Heidelberg West, Victoria.

[10] At the time of making the decision, there were four employees rostered to work the Afternoon Shift, defined as "Shift (B)" at clause 30(a)(ii) of the Agreement. One of those employees subsequently ceased employment before the change took effect.

[11] The Employees were to be moved to a Day Work roster on one of the following configurations:

Monday to Thursday 6:00am to 2:30pm and Friday 6:00am to 11:30am;

Monday to Thursday 7:00am to 3:30pm and Friday 7:00am to 12:30pm ("Shift (A)" at clause 30(a)(i) of the Agreement).

[12] The move of the Employees to a Day Work roster was originally planned to occur sometime in November 2024, however, at the request of the Employees, it was delayed until after 1 January 2025.

[13] Between 23 September 2024 and 7 November 2024, the Respondent consulted with the Employees and with the Applicant regarding the proposed change.

[14] The Respondent considered all feedback provided during consultation. Outcome letters were provided to the Employees on 11 November 2024 confirming that the Afternoon Shift would cease, providing for transitional arrangements as noted below, and giving notice that the change would take effect from each employee's first shift back at work after 1 January 2025.

[15] The three Employees each transitioned from Afternoon Shift to Day Work from their first shift back at work after 1 January 2025. The Employees continue to work on a Day Work roster and there continues to be no Afternoon Shift at the site. While working Day Work, the Employees are paid no less than the relevant hourly rate specified in Appendix B of the Agreement.

[16] On 4 February 2025, the Respondent processed a once off good faith payment to the Employees to compensate them for losing their shift loading on annual leave taken. The payment was equivalent to the loading's value and paid on all annual leave accrued at the time.

[17] The Agreement is a single enterprise agreement. It covers and applies to employees working at the Respondent's facility at 36 - 38 Kolora Road, Heidelberg West 3081 who fall within the classification structure set out in Appendix A of the Agreement. The AMWU are covered by the agreement.

[18] Clause 5 of the Agreement refers to the "Relationship to parents award and other industrial instruments". It states that the GA Award is incorporated into the Agreement, and at subclause (c) provides that where there is any inconsistency between an express provision of the Agreement and a provision in the Award, the provisions of the Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.

[19] Clause 10 of the Agreement deals with "Consultation in the workplace". Further, clause 11 deals with "Consultation about changes to rosters or hours of work". Combined, they apply to the proposed change, which involves changes to the roster of employees from Shift (B) to Shift (A). The application of these consultation clauses requires the Respondent to notify and consult with employees and the Union/s as soon as practicable about the proposed change, including its introduction, the likely effects on employees and measures being taken to avert or mitigate adverse effects of the change on employees.

[20] Clause 30 "Shift provisions" directly concerns the question for arbitration and provides:

(i) Shift (A) Day work - Monday to Thursday 7.00 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. and Friday 7.00 a.m. to 12.30 p.m.

(ii) Shift (B) Afternoon shift - Monday to Thursday 3.30 p.m. to 12.00 a.m. and Friday 12.30 p.m. to 6.00 p.m.

(b) Subject to the consultation obligations in Clause 11 (Consultation about changes to rosters or hours of work), the shift arrangements above may be altered to meet operating requirements.

(c) Employees who are rostered to complete their hours of work according to Shift (B) shall receive a shift allowance of 20%.

(d) Shift (B) afternoon shift workers may be required to work on Shift (A), or, to work Monday to Thursday 9.30am to 6.00pm and Friday 10.00am to 3.30pm - Shift (C) subject to the following conditions:

Loading of 10% whilst working other than on Shift (B);

Three weeks' notice of the commencement of work on Shift (A) or (C), or a shorter period by agreement with the employee

(e) When Shift (B) employees are rostered to work Shift (C), one employee from the Rotary Die / Main Office side of building may be rostered to work Shift (A). This will only occur where there is a minimum of four employees working on Shift (C). Due to the necessity to have a minimum of four employees working Shift (C) because of OH&S and production issues, the rostered Shift (A) employee may be given short notice to work back in this shift (next day to Shift C, to ensure four employee coverage of the shift)

[21] Clause 6.1.6 "Fixation and change of hours" provides the following:

6.1.6(a) The daily hours of each employee, including the meal period, will be as determined by the employer, provided that the employer will not alter the usual daily working hours of any employee unless and until the employee has had one week's notice of the alteration which is to be made.

6.1.6(b) Once an employee's working hours have been fixed in accordance with 6.1.6(a), such hours will not be changed until at least one week after such hours have been in actual operation.

[22] The parties agreed on the following question for arbitration:

'Are the Employees entitled to be paid a loading of 10% under clause 30 of the Agreement while they work a shift other than Shift (B) afternoon shift?'

[23] I have had regard to all of the submissions some of which are summarised below.

[24] The Applicant submits that the plain, ordinary meaning of clause 30 results in the employees being entitled to a loading of 10% while they work a shift other than Shift (B).

[25] The Applicant's submissions rely on the well-established principles in Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union' known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) v Berri Pty Limited [2017] FWCFB 3005 (9 June 2017) ('Berri') at [114] and include the following:

In relation to the first principle in Berri, the Applicant states that as 'Shift (B) afternoon shift workers' is not a defined phrase in the Agreement, by force of logic, the ordinary meaning of that phrase must be 'employees who work afternoon shifts according to the Shift Roster (B) as set out in clause 30(a) of the Agreement'. This meaning is derived from the context, as subclause (d) follows shortly after (a) in clause 30. Such context does not put an 'express qualifier' for when an employee is considered a Shift (B) worker.

Importantly, there is no express qualifier on the relevant time for which an employee is considered a 'Shift (B) afternoon shift worker'. Context suggests that the relevant time is when the employer seeks to require a relevant employee to work on Shift (A).

The time when the loading is payable is not confined to when a relevant employee only works on Shift (A) (or equivalent). The clause is relatively unlimited in that the loading is payable to an employee 'whilst working other than on Shift (B)'.

In relation to the second and third principles in Berri, the Applicant contends that their interpretation does not require any rewriting of the Agreement to achieve a fair outcome.

In relation to the fourth, fifth and sixth principles in Berri, the Applicant submits that their interpretation reflects the reality that the Agreement establishes binding obligations between the employer and the relevant employees and avoids an overly technical approach. The intention of the actual words in clause 30 is for the Respondent to be bound by certain conditions when requiring employees to work a certain shift.

In relation to the seventh, eight, ninth and tenth principles in Berri, the Applicant submits that there is no evidence of surrounding circumstances which results in ambiguity, clause 30 has an obvious and plain meaning.

Finally, in relation to the fifteenth principle in Berri, the Applicant states that it does not concede that the loading is not payable because there is no end date to the Respondent's decision to no longer provide Shift (B).

[26] In reply to the Respondent's submissions, the Applicant submits that the Respondent's interpretation of the shift worker provision divorces the relevant words from their context. The assessment of whether an employee is considered a Shift (B) worker must be contemplated before the change of hours. Their submissions also include the following:

The requirement that the change not be 'permanent' is not in the text or context of the provision and it is introduces an impractical, meaningless concept of permanence. The plain meaning of 'permanent' includes 'lasting indefinitely', 'remaining unchanged' and 'not temporary.

As the Respondent has not confirmed whether the decision to change is truly permanent, if they reverse their decision, it does not render the earlier decision impermanent, or temporary would allow the employees to receive the loading retrospectively.

[27] The Respondent's submissions include the following:

The Respondent submits that the Applicant's proposed interpretation - to view the employees as afternoon shift workers despite them being permanently moved to Day Work - gives rise to inconsistency within the Agreement. They state that the answer to the question for arbitration should be no and the application subsequently dismissed.

The Respondent submits that the plain meaning of an "afternoon shift worker" is obvious: an employee whose regular roster is Afternoon Shift. This is supported by reading Clause 30(a), which provides that the "Company may operate two shifts", together with Clause 30(c), which provides a loading of 20% for employees "who are rostered to complete their hours of work according to Shift (B)", and Clause 11(a), which provides that consultation is required if the Company "proposes to change an employee's regular roster". Accordingly, that it can be deduced by reading these clauses together that employees work either of the two shifts, they are either day workers, or afternoon shift workers.

Having given at least one week's notice required under the GA Award, and having complied with its consultation obligations in the Agreement, the Respondent moved the Employees from Afternoon Shift to Day Work in January 2025. By virtue of its decision to cease operating an Afternoon Shift, the Employees' move from Afternoon Shift to Day Work was permanent.

In arguing the purpose of clause 30(d), the Respondent states that it provides for a shift loading of 10% to afternoon shift workers, who are accustomed to receiving 20% loading, while they are working Day Work. This is to incentivise afternoon shift worker flexibility, smooth over the employee's pay, and to provide the employer with a quid pro quo. Further, reading the clause, including the three dot points, supports the view that it is directed at impermanent changes to afternoon shift worker's rosters; the requirement to provide 3 weeks' notice prior to commencement takes note that Afternoon Shift is the employee's ordinary rostered shift; the requirement to provide one week's notice prior to returning to Shift (B) explicitly foresees that the employer has the ability to require the employee to return to Afternoon Shift without further consultation.

By the Respondent moving the Employees to Day Work in accordance with Clause 6.1.6 of the GA Award, the Respondent submits it has foregone the flexibility of Clause 30(d), and in return the employees are not entitled to the 10% loading which is intended to compensate for that flexibility.

[28] The principles to be applied to the interpretation of an enterprise agreement are well articulated and settled[1], and I will apply them in determining this dispute. The first step is to determine whether the disputed terms of an agreement have a plain meaning or are instead ambiguous or susceptible to more than one meaning. The language of the disputed terms is to be construed objectively, having regard to both context and purpose, a narrow or pedantic approach to interpretation is to be avoided. Where there is ambiguity, evidence of surrounding circumstances can be admitted, but only to establish background facts relevant to the meaning of disputed terms.

[29] The Agreement states at clause 30(a) that:

(i) Shift (A) Day work - Monday to Thursday 7.00 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. and Friday 7.00 a.m. to 12.30 p.m.

(ii) Shift (B) Afternoon shift - Monday to Thursday 3.30 p.m. to 12.00 a.m. and Friday 12.30 p.m. to 6.00 p.m.'

[30] The use of the word may indicates that the Respondent is not required to operate a Shift (B).

[31] Clause 30(b) logically follows and provides that arrangements described in subclause (a), that is the shift arrangements, may be altered to meet operating requirements. Operating requirements is to be given its ordinary meaning within a commercial context, that is the needs of the Respondent in running its business. The Respondent has done this when it explained the reason for ceasing to operate Shift (B) so that 'operational efficiency will be maximised.'[2]

[32] It is agreed by the parties that the Respondent has ceased operating Shift (B). There is no dispute that there are three employees who worked on Shift (B) and were permanently transferred to Shift (A) - also known as the day shift - effective from their first shift after 1 January 2025. Nor is it disputed that there was notice and consultation as per the requirements in the Agreement.

[33] Clause 30(d), central to this dispute, refers to the entitlement of a Shift (B) workers to, amongst other things, a 10% loading whilst working on a shift other than a Shift (B).

[34] The Respondent submits that the purpose of the 10% loading in clause 30(d) is to provide incentive to Shift (B) employees to perform Day Shifts when needed by the Respondent. Accordingly, it submits that the loading cannot apply to the current employees because the change in their roster has been permanent. The Applicant rejects this submission, including on the basis that the roster changes are not permanent because the Respondent cannot confirm that it will not reintroduce an afternoon shift at some stage in the future.

[35] The Applicant's submissions that the cessation of the afternoon shift was not permanent but instead temporary, is not persuasive. Firstly, the Respondent made it clear in its correspondence to workers that it 'has decided to cease operating an afternoon shift.'[3] It was Mr Bojic's evidence at the hearing, that there would need to be exceptional growth in the business to force a situation of the reopening of Shift (B). Unsurprisingly, practical commercial realities dictate that the Respondent will not re-open an afternoon shift unless there is exceptional growth. No one has a crystal ball, but in the meantime and for a whole year since the employees were transferred to a day shift roster, there has been no resumption of Shift (B). I am not persuaded that Shift (B) somehow remains in abeyance until such time as the Respondent decides to reinstate it. There is no sufficient evidence to suggest that the Respondent is contemplating or is likely to re-establish Shift (B).

[36] The plain reading of clause 30(d) supports the interpretation that the clause is concerned with the temporary use of Shift (B) workers on other shifts. The clause uses the word may in the context that the workers may be required to work a different shift. Currently, the Respondent is only operating a day shift and therefore has no discretion as to which shift the Employees will work, because there is no Shift (B) and they must work the day shift.

[37] This interpretation is supported by the requirement that workers be given three weeks' notice prior to the commencement of work on Shift (A) or (C) and one weeks' notice to return to Shift (B). Relevant to this dispute, there is no evidence that there is movement between different shifts.

[38] The Applicant submits that 'there is no express qualifier on the relevant time for which an employee is considered a 'Shift (B) afternoon shift worker'.'[4] and that if, at the time the employer requests of an employee to work day shift, they are a Shift (B) employee the 10% loading in clause 30(d) of the Agreement must apply. The fact that the Agreement does not include such a time qualifier, is not unusual. The absence of it cannot objectively support the Applicant's submission that an employee is permanently defined as a Shift (B) worker. That interpretation would result in a perverse outcome because there is no Shift (B) for a worker to return to.

[39] I am persuaded by the Respondent's submissions[5] that it is able to change an employee's regular roster or ordinary hours of work and that this is supported by the Agreement.

[40] The Respondent's submissions include that the Employees are not entitled to the 10% loading because they have been permanently moved to Shift (A) and that they are no longer Shift (B) workers.

[41] A logical interpretation of the plain words of the Agreement would mean that if there is no Shift (B), there cannot be any Shift (B) workers and the answer to the question in dispute must necessarily be 'no'. I do not find the Applicant's submissions on the definition of a Shift (B) worker persuasive because it would result in an impractical outcome whereby the employees are treated as Shift (B) workers, but there is no such shift in operation.

[42] Nor can a practical interpretation of the Agreement support the idea that the Employees remain Shift (B) workers, because at some stage in the future (which has not been planned for or is foreseeable) the Respondent may restart operating a Shift (B).

[43] Taking all foregoing matters into account, including the consultation undertaken as per clause 11, I do not find the employees are Shift (B) workers. The Respondent has ceased operating Shift (B) and has moved the employees to the Day Shift. This is not a temporary arrangement. As the employees are no longer Shift (B) workers, there is no 10% loading payable.

[44] Question: 'Are the Employees entitled to be paid a loading of 10% under cl 30 of the Agreement while they work a shift other than Shift (B) afternoon shift?'

[1] Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union' known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) v Berri Pty Limited [2017] FWCFB 3005

[2] C2025/1632 Digital Hearing Book, p94).

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

"Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union" known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU) v Rota Die International Pty Ltd [2026] FWC 13

At a glance

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Judgment (82 paragraphs)

"Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union" known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU) v Rota Die International Pty Ltd [2026] FWC 13 (8 January 2026)

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Legislation Cited (2)