[2021] FWC 5921
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2021-11-04
Original judgment source is linked above.
s.238 - Scope order
"Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union" known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU)
Application for a scope order - s. 238 considerations - Scope order seeks separate agreement for employees in maintenance classifications - Commission not satisfied that making the order will promote fair and efficient conduct of bargaining - Application refused
Legislation and the approach to deciding whether to make a scope order
Bargaining representatives may apply for scope orders
(1) A bargaining representative for a proposed single-enterprise agreement (other than a greenfields agreement) may apply to the FWC for an order (a scope order) under this section if:
(a) the bargaining representative has concerns that bargaining for the agreement is not proceeding efficiently or fairly; and
(b) the reason for this is that the bargaining representative considers that the agreement will not cover appropriate employees, or will cover employees that it is not appropriate for the agreement to cover.
No scope order if a single interest employer authorisation is in operation
(2) Despite subsection (1), the bargaining representative must not apply for the scope order if a single interest employer authorisation is in operation in relation to the agreement.
Bargaining representative to give notice of concerns
(3) The bargaining representative may only apply for the scope order if the bargaining representative:
(a) has taken all reasonable steps to give a written notice setting out the concerns referred to in subsection (1) to the relevant bargaining representatives for the agreement; and
(b) has given the relevant bargaining representatives a reasonable time within which to respond to those concerns; and
(c) considers that the relevant bargaining representatives have not responded appropriately.
(4) The FWC may make the scope order if the FWC is satisfied:
(a) that the bargaining representative who made the application has met, or is meeting, the good faith bargaining requirements; and
(b) that making the order will promote the fair and efficient conduct of bargaining; and
(c) that the group of employees who will be covered by the agreement proposed to be specified in the scope order was fairly chosen; and
(d) it is reasonable in all the circumstances to make the order.
(4A) If the agreement proposed to be specified in the scope order will not cover all of the employees of the employer or employers covered by the agreement, the FWC must, in deciding for the purposes of paragraph (4)(c) whether the group of employees who will be covered was fairly chosen, take into account whether the group is geographically, operationally or organisationally distinct.
Scope order must specify employer and employees to be covered
(5) The scope order must specify, in relation to a proposed single-enterprise agreement:
(a) the employer, or employers, that will be covered by the agreement; and
(b) the employees who will be covered by the agreement.
Scope order must be in accordance with this section etc.
(b) may relate to more than one proposed single-enterprise agreement.
(7) If the FWC makes the scope order, the FWC may also:
(b) make or vary such other orders (such as protected action ballot orders), determinations or other instruments made by the FWC, or take such other actions, as the FWC considers appropriate."
"It is intended that in assessing whether a group of employees is fairly chosen, FWC might have regard to matters such as:
"[165] Perhaps a useful starting point is the general approach framed by the Full Bench in BRB Modular v AMWU in the following passage found at paras 53-54:
[53] The scope of an agreement is an open question in many enterprise bargaining exercises. It is frequently a topic of competing claims, discussion and negotiation. Rarely will it be possible to say that one scope proposal is wrong and another correct. There may be justifications for a preference one way or another. Hence it is usually the case that the scope is left to the bargaining parties to determine in the context of the overall enterprise bargaining framework. The reasonableness of making a scope order should be considered against that background.
[54] As we have said above, a consideration of reasonableness requires a full consideration of all of the circumstances and a level of satisfaction that the order requiring the parties to adopt a particular scope of an enterprise agreement in their ongoing bargaining is objectively justified. We are not satisfied that the applicant has established that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to make the scope order. We are satisfied that bargaining can continue and it remains open to the parties to continue to consider the scope of the agreement in the overall context.
[166] A number of other general principles have been developed in the body of jurisprudence dealing with scope order applications. These include the following:
1. By the inclusion of the word 'may' in the heading to s 238(4) of the Act, the Commission is to exercise its discretionary powers after determining whether all of the criteria in ss (a)-(d) are satisfied. As all of the criteria must be satisfied (by use of the disjunctive word 'and' separating each criterion), it must follow that if one of the criterion is not met, then a scope order cannot be made. The converse is true; that is, if all of the ss (4) criteria are met, the Commission may make a scope order.
2. The scope of a proposed enterprise agreement is a matter that can itself be the subject of bargaining by the parties for their agreement. ...
3. Consideration of the views of employees may be taken into account. However, this does not mean that such views are given any greater weight than the other factors to be considered by the Commission under the other subsections. In UFU v MFESB, the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia said at para 53:
[53] As recorded above, it was submitted by the UFUA and the ACTU that particular weight should be given to the views of employees because of, for example, legislative policy imperatives concerning freedom of association. While we generally agree with that submission it requires some qualification. The power to make a scope order is predicated on disagreement between bargaining representatives. The discretion to resolve that disagreement is to be exercised as provided for in ss.238(4) and (4A). While those provisions do not assign priority to the views of employees, in applying the provisions it is necessary to have regard to the overall context. The legislative scheme supports collective bargaining principles and the Fair Work Act encourages freedom of association and collective bargaining. It may be implied from the legislative scheme that the collective choice of employees is significant. It must be said, however, that while weight should be given to the views of the employees potentially affected, it may be that a proper consideration of the matters specified in ss.238(4) and (4A) in a particular case may make it appropriate to make a scope order contrary to the views of the employees potentially affected. (My emphasis)
4. It is improper to use a scope order application to address a bargaining representative/s' good faith bargaining concerns, which are more properly considered under s 228 of the Act. In BRB Modular v AMWU a Full Bench of the Commissions said at para 52:
[52] We have made the observation above that the major complaints raised by the AMWU go to the conduct of the Respondent in the negotiations and that they are, in essence, allegations that the Respondent was not engaging in good faith bargaining. It is apparent, therefore, that the Appellant was attempting to use the vehicle of a scope order application to address good faith bargaining concerns. It was an improper vehicle to ventilate those concerns.
5. The onus rests on the moving party to demonstrate that the making of a scope order will encourage and facilitate bargaining which is fairer and more efficient than if no order is made. In UFU v MFESB, the Full Bench said at para 55:
[55] The relevant consideration under s.238(4)(b) is whether the order will promote the fair and efficient conduct of bargaining. The implication is that the tribunal should be satisfied that if an order is made the bargaining will at least be fairer or more efficient or both than it would be if no order were to be made. The relevant consideration under s.238(4)(c) is whether the specified group is fairly chosen. It may be that a number of groupings might be fair - what this criterion requires is that the group which is included in the scope order is fairly chosen. This issue is also dealt with in s.238(4A), which we discuss shortly.
6. Issues of mere inconvenience or preference with the bargaining process are not decisive to whether a bargaining process is fairer or more efficient. In Shinagawa I said at para 28:
[28] Mr Stewart deposed, and it was not disputed, that the negotiations for the 2008 agreements were conventional, without any disputation or angst over the outcome of two separate agreements. Moreover, the respondent's management in 2005 had made no complaint when the two agreements concept was proposed. In my view, this history relevantly demonstrates that any perceived difficulties arising from two agreements on site, is largely speculative and is probably little more than an inconvenience, rather than a real impediment to securing appropriate and fair industrial outcomes.
See also: Royal District Nursing v HSU at para 53 and Tasmanian Water at paras 115-120.
7. Evidence which is said to support the making of a scope order which is speculative, hypothetical or presupposes outcomes of bargaining, is unhelpful to the task of determining whether a scope order should be made. In APESMA v Red Cross, Hampton C said at para 70:
[70] On balance, I am not persuaded that the granting of the scope order would promote fairer or more efficient negotiations in this matter. The evidence reveals that at this point in time many of the considerations supporting the application are largely speculative, and weighing up all of the considerations it has not been demonstrated that the making of a scope order would meet the requirements in s.238(4)(b) of the Act given all of the circumstances of this matter.
8. The history of bargaining between the parties is a relevant consideration to whether a scope order should or should not be made (status quo). In TWU v Chubb, Asbury DP said at para 69:
[69] I have also given consideration to the following circumstances, which in my view, weigh against the making of a scope order in this case. The status quo is that there are separate agreements to cover each of Chubb's Queensland Depots. The TWU is seeking to alter the status quo. I do not accept the argument that because Chubb has not filed a competing application for a scope order, that less weight should be placed on the maintenance of the status quo. This is not a case where the issue of the scope of the proposed agreement is causing disputation and has stalled the negotiations. On the case advanced by the TWU, the granting of a scope order will increase disputation by strengthening the capacity of Nerang AVOs to take protected industrial action, presumably with the involvement of Moorooka AVOs.
See also: Shinagawa; TWU v Chubb at 26, NUW v Linfox at 60, FSU v BWA at 101-104 and Tasmanian Water at 157-158.
9. Seeking leverage by increasing the bargaining power by weight of numbers is not a valid basis to make a scope order. In TWU v Chubb, Asbury DP at 60:
[60] In relation to s.238(4)(b), I am unable to be satisfied in the circumstances of this case that making a scope order will promote the fair and efficient conduct of bargaining. It is apparent from the evidence that the TWU is seeking a scope order principally for the purpose of strengthening the bargaining position of Nerang AVOs by reducing the capacity of Chubb to use AVOs from Moorooka to cover any periods of protected industrial action taken by Nerang AVOs. The view of the TWU and its members that this will increase the fairness of bargaining is subjective and I do not accept that enhancing the bargaining strength of Nerang AVOs to assist them to take more effective protected industrial action against Chubb, is a valid basis upon which I could find that bargaining would be fairer or more efficient if a scope order was made.
maintenance and production sections also have separate internal organisational and financial arrangements. The separation between production and maintenance employees is further illustrated by the way that Thiess sought employee feedback from production and maintenance employees at different times and in different locations, before bargaining commenced.
"No, because they are heavily out voted by the production employees and that is the issue. So Thiess know, in effect, that even if they give the maintenance guys nothing, they only really have to look after one group and it's, potentially, not even 100 per cent of that group, the production employees. If 75 per cent of them vote yes, we're in a situation where the maintenance employees are under an agreement and, potentially, not one single person, not one single maintenance employee has voted 'Yes' to that agreement, and they're covered by it. That's unfair."[27]
(iii) specific allowances related to maintenance employees such as electrical, high risk, tyre fitter and tool allowance for trades and non-tradespersons;
(v) special allowances applied to tradespersons based on their years of experience on site.
(i) the grandfathered employees' clause (total of forty-eight employees of 394 production employees);
(ii) main and relief dispatch employees (eight employees in total);
(iii) the introduction of additional core equipment skills such as electrical trucks and rubber dozer; and
(a) 21 production employees of a cohort of approximately 394 production employees (approximately one EBR to every 19 production employees), however, four resigned resulting in 17 production EBRs (approximately one EBR to every 23 production employees); and
(b) 12 maintenance EBRs of a cohort of approximately 129 maintenance employees (approximately one EBR to every 11 maintenance employees) however, five maintenance EBRs ceased in their role as EBRs for a variety of reasons (e.g. resignation) resulting in 7 maintenance EBRs (approximately one EBR to every 19 maintenance employees).
majority" prejudicing a minority would require strong evidence before it could be acted upon.
There is no such evidence in this case, or during the preceding 17 years.
"[59] there appears to be an inescapable inefficiency attached to the pursuit of a scope order at a point in time after the enterprise bargaining negotiations have progressed. Logically, in order to ensure that enterprise bargaining is undertaken with efficiency any issue regarding the scope of the proposed agreement needs to be resolved before time, money and energy is spent in negotiation of the particular terms of a proposed agreement. Consequently there is a very strong prospect that any scope order which is not made at or shortly after the commencement of the bargaining process will fail to satisfy the requirement that it would promote the efficient conduct of bargaining."
Bargaining representative may apply for scope order - s. 238(1)
No scope order if single interest employer authorisation is in operation - s. 238(2)
When the FWC may make a scope order - s. 238(4)
Has the AMWU met the good faith bargaining requirements?
Will making the scope order promote the fair and efficient conduct of bargaining?
Is the group of employees the subject of the scope order fairly chosen?
Is it reasonable in all the circumstances to make the order?
A Herbert of Counsel instructed by McCullough Robertson for Thiess.
[1] Thiess Curragh North Certified Agreement 2004; Thiess Curragh North Agreement 2008 - 2012; Thiess Curragh Mine Enterprise Agreement 2013.
[2] Exhibit AMWU2 - Witness Statement of Glenn Desmond Sam dated 27 April 2021; Exhibit AMWU3 Witness Statement of Glenn Desmond Sam dated 2 June 2021.
[3] Exhibit AMWU1 Statement of Craig Thomas dated 18 June 2021.
[4] Exhibit THIESS1 Witness Statement of Adrian Francis McCowan dated 19 May 2021.
[5] Exhibit THIESS2 Witness Statement of Liesl Nell dated 19 May 2021; Exhibit THIESS3 Supplementary Witness Statement of Liesl Nell dated 17 June 2021.
[6] Exhibit CFMMEU1 Witness Statement of Jeffrey Michael Scales dated 14 June 2021; Exhibit CFMMEU2 Supplementary statement of Jeffrey Michael Scales filed on 18 June 2021.
[7] Exhibit CFMMEU3 Witness Statement of David Andrew Paterson filed 14 June 2021.
[8] LexisNexis Butterworths, Workplace Law - Fair Work, Vol 1 Service 73 [80,730]
[10] United Firefighters' Union of Australia v Metropolitan Fire & Emergency Services Board (2010) 913 IR 293 at [54] - [55]; BRB Modular Pty Ltd v AMWU [2015] FWCFB 1440 at [6]- [15].
[11] National Union of Workers v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FWC 9851 at [59].
[12] Transport Workers' Union of Australia v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FWC 1591 at [145]- [148].
[13] United Firefighters' union of Australia v Metropolitan Fire & Emergency Services Board [2010] FWAFB 3009; (2010) 193 IR 293.
[14] The Australian Workers' Union v BP Refinery (Kwinana) Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 1476; (2014) 242 IR 238.
[15] Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2009 at [777].
[41] United Workers' Union [2020] FWC 3211.
[43] United Firefighters' Union of Australia [2010] FWAFB 3009 at [55].
[50] Transport Workers' Union of Australia v Chubb Security Services Limited [2012] FWA 2226 (TWU v Chubb) at [64]
[51] General Principle 9 of that case described at [166]; adopted in the UWU Case at [18] and quoting Deputy President Asbury from TWU v Chubb at [60]
[52] [2017] FWC 1526 at [183] to [184].
[56] AMWU's closing submissions at paragraph 16.
[57] BRB Modular Pty Ltd v AMWU [2015] FWCFB 1440 at [54].
[58] [2012] FWA 6329 at [69].
[60] [2014] FWC 7123 at [62].
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
"Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union" known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU)
Thiess Pty Ltd T/A Thiess [2021] FWC 5921
(2010) 193 IR 293
(2014) 242 IR 238
(2010) 913 IR 293
(2012) 219 IR 139