Austwide Property & Developments Pty Ltd v Vukasinec [2004] VSC 333

27. In the current case it is contended the caveat is bad for two reasons: firstly, it is said the caveat does not disclose a caveatable interest in land. Secondly, it is said that it has been lodged in breach of s.90(4) of the Transfer of Land Act. This provides: "A caveat shall not be renewed by or on behalf of the same person in respect of the same interest."

30. Although it is strongly arguable that the caveat does not disclose a caveatable interest, I would have some reluctance to dispose of it on this basis if I were persuaded that what was really in issue was a matter of English expression by a litigant in person whose first language I infer is not English. It is strictly unnecessary, however, for me to determine this question because I have reached the view that there is no credible evidence that the grounds of the interest claimed could be sustained and that the caveat was lodged in breach of s.90(4) of the Transfer of Land Act.

33. The first defendant explains the position as he sees it in an affidavit sworn 24 August 2004 and filed in this proceeding. He states at paragraphs 15 and 16 as follows: "I refer to transfer of land as it is dated and attested and executed on 29 November 2002 as such, and it is signed in my name by Registrar of the Family Court pursuant the order of the Family Court made on 3 July 2001. Annexed and marked IB4 is the copy of the order made on 3 July 2001. The order of 3 July 2001 is an product of fraudulent act by the solicitor, Ms Alda Bradford, for the wife, as she did mislead the Court as to the making of the order. She was dishonest as at the time the relevant order was the order made on 9 June 2000, made as stated by consent."

36. In elaboration of his contentions that the execution of the transfer by the Registrar of the Family Court was procured by fraud, the first defendant submitted to me firstly that the order of July 2001 was inconsistent with the prior order of the Court of June 2000. Secondly, that he has read the transcript of proceedings on 3 July 2001 before the Judicial Registrar, and the Judicial Registrar was not informed of the terms of the prior order. And thirdly, that the first defendant was not served with a copy of the order of 3 July 2001.

39. The first defendant has tendered to me both the first order upon which he relies made in the Family Court on 9 June 2000 which provided for a sale by the husband and wife of the land, and the second order of which he complains, which was made on 3 July 2001 and provided for execution of necessary documents on behalf of the husband by the Deputy Registrar of the Family Court. In my view there is no inconsistency between the second order and the first order. The second order gives effect to the intent of the first order.

42. In so far as it is alleged that Judicial Registrar Nikakis was not fully informed of the terms of the prior order, the overwhelming probability is that he had before him on the file a copy of the prior order which as I have said is the logical precursor to the order in issue. In so far as it is said that the order was not properly served, the order of the Judicial Registrar provided that upon the wife forwarding a sealed copy of these orders by pre-paid post to the husband at 27A Wells Road, Edithvale, service of the orders on the husband otherwise be dispensed with unconditionally. There is no evidence before me that the wife failed to forward a sealed copy of the orders in accordance with the requirements of the Judicial Registrar and I need say no further about this point.

45. It follows in my view that there is no seriously arguable basis on which the facts for which Mr Vukasinec contends can be said to establish any fraud with respect to the order of the Judicial Registrar. Further, however, it is apparent that it was subsequent to the order of the Judicial Registrar that the first caveat was lodged and in my view it is also apparent from its terms and from the terms of the subsequent caveat that they in substance claim the same interest in the land.[2]

48. It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to an order for removal of the caveat but before making that order, I should deal with some other matters. Firstly, it is apparent that in any event, even if the order of the Family Court were tainted, the equities would favour the plaintiff. There is no suggestion that the plaintiff was a party to any fraud and there is no suggestion on the evidence that the plaintiff did other than acquire the land bona fide and for good value.

51. The completion of the acquisition was effected as a result of the first defendant failing to take proceedings to support the first caveat. The situation has thus resulted where the plaintiff has purchased the land, a mortgage has been registered and the defendant seeks now to interfere with a subsequent dealing. The equities of this situation rest squarely with the plaintiff. The first defendant has been guilty of laches, acquiescence and delay in seeking to assert his alleged interest.

54. Lastly, it was said by the first defendant that the current proceeding is incompetent because the Registrar has issued a notice pursuant to s.89A of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 and the 30 days specified in that notice have not expired. The short answer to this point is that such a notice does not preclude an application pursuant to s.90(3) by a person who is adversely affected by a caveat.

57. Accordingly, I propose to make the orders sought in the summons both against the first defendant and in the alternative against the second defendant to ensure that the caveat is removed.

[1] Lewenberg and Pryles v Direct Acceptance Corporation Limited [1981] VicRp 36; [1981] VR 344.

[2] cf. Layrill Pty LTd v Furlap Constructions Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 51.