Introduction
80 Section 167 of the NCCP Act provides:
167 Court may order person to pay pecuniary penalty for contravening civil penalty provision
Application for order
(1) Within 6 years of a person contravening a civil penalty provision, ASIC may apply to the court for an order that the person pay the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty.
Court may order person to pay pecuniary penalty
(2) If a declaration has been made under section 166 that the person has contravened the provision, the court may order the person to pay to the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty that the court considers is appropriate (but not more than the amount specified in section 167A).
Determining pecuniary penalty
(3) In determining the pecuniary penalty, the court must take into account all relevant matters, including:
(a) the nature and extent of the contravention; and
(b) the nature and extent of any loss or damage suffered because of the contravention; and
(c) the circumstances in which the contravention took place; and
(d) whether the person has previously been found by a court (including a court in a foreign country) to have engaged in similar conduct.
Civil enforcement of penalty
(4) A pecuniary penalty is a debt payable to the Commonwealth.
(5) The Commonwealth may enforce a pecuniary penalty order as if it were an order made in civil proceedings against the person to recover a debt due by the person. The debt arising from the order is taken to be a judgement debt.
81 In light of my satisfaction that declarations under s 166 of the NCCP Act should be made in respect of the Hardship Claims, the Training Claims, the DD Default Claims, the Enforcement Claims, and the Jurisdiction Claims, the requirement of s 167(2) is satisfied for the imposition of pecuniary penalties in respect of those declared contraventions.
82 In respect of each contravention, the pecuniary penalty must not be more than the "pecuniary penalty applicable" to the contravention, as defined (for a body corporate) in s 167B(2) of the NCCP Act: s 167A.
83 Section 167B(2) provides:
Pecuniary penalty applicable to the contravention of a civil penalty provision - by a body corporate
(2) The pecuniary penalty applicable to the contravention of a civil penalty provision by a body corporate is the greatest of:
(a) the penalty specified for the civil penalty provision, multiplied by 10; and
(b) if the court can determine the benefit derived and detriment avoided because of the contravention - that amount multiplied by 3; and
(c) either:
(i) 10% of the annual turnover of the body corporate for the 12-month period ending at the end of the month in which the body corporate contravened, or began to contravene, the civil penalty provision; or
(ii) if the amount worked out under subparagraph (i) is greater than an amount equal to 2.5 million penalty units - 2.5 million penalty units.
84 ASIC submits that, in applying s 167B(2) in the present case, the appropriate penalties are to be gauged by reference to para (a). This is because, in relation to para (b), it is not possible to quantify the benefit of the contravening conduct to Membo and RGFS. ASIC certainly does not contend that Membo or RGFS derived any substantial monetary benefit from the contraventions.
85 In relation to para (c), ASIC submits that the financial information that is available is incomplete or lacking in the detail necessary to calculate a penalty based on turnover. It submits that, in any event, 10% of the annual turnover for each of Membo and RGFS at any given time would be less than the amount provided for under para (a), based on the available financial statements for Membo and RGFS (as to which, see below).
86 I am prepared to accept those submissions.
87 Turning to para (a), the specified penalty for contravention of each relevant subsection of s 47(1) of the NCCP Act, and of s 72(4) of the Code, is 5,000 penalty units. For contraventions that occurred in the period 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2020, the penalty unit amount is $210. For contraventions that occurred in the period on and after 1 July 2020, the penalty unit amount is $222. Therefore, the maximum penalty for each contravention is an amount between $10.5 million and $11.1 million, depending on the date of the contravention in question.
88 ASIC submits, and I accept, that the maximum penalties available (having regard to ss 167A and 167B(2) of the NCCP Act) should be considered in the context of the financial size of the respondents. The maximum penalty per contravention represents a significant proportion of, or more than, their annual turnover. The Court has been informed that the parties have taken those parameters into account in agreeing upon the amount of the appropriate penalties in this case.
89 ASIC has drawn the Court's attention to a number of general principles with respect to the imposition of pecuniary penalties: see ARS paras 42 - 59. I will not repeat those principles in these reasons, save to note ASIC's reliance on the principle that, where there are multiple contraventions of a provision, it may be permissible and appropriate for the court to impose a single pecuniary penalty for those contraventions, even when a course of conduct analysis is not adopted.
90 In Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] FCAFC 113; 254 FCR 68 (ABCC v CFMEU), the Full Court said (at [145]):
145 The decisions in both Coles Supermarkets and Matcham tend to suggest that … it may be permissible and appropriate for the Court to impose a single pecuniary penalty for multiple contraventions of a civil penalty provision or provisions having regard to the approach jointly taken by the parties in the pleadings, statement of agreed facts, and submissions. In particular, where the parties jointly propose to the Court that, having regard to the particular facts and nature of the contraventions, it would be appropriate to impose a single penalty, or to group the contraventions in terms of separate courses of conduct and impose single penalties in respect of those groups, the Court may accept that proposal and order a single penalty, or single penalties in respect of groups of contraventions.
91 At [149], the Full Court also said:
149 In an appropriate case … the Court may impose a single penalty for multiple contraventions where that course is agreed or accepted as being appropriate by the parties. It may be appropriate for the Court to impose a single penalty in such circumstances, for example, where the pleadings and facts reveal that the contraventions arose from a course of conduct and the precise number of contraventions cannot be ascertained, or the number of contraventions is so large that the fixing of separate penalties is not feasible, or there are a large number of relatively minor related contraventions that are most sensibly considered compendiously. As revealed generally by the reasoning in Commonwealth v Director, FWBII, there is considerably greater scope for agreement on facts and orders in civil proceedings than there is in criminal sentence proceedings. As with agreed penalties generally, however, the Court is not compelled to accept such a proposal and should only do so if it is considered appropriate in all the circumstances. It is also at the very least doubtful that such an approach can be taken if it is opposed or the proceedings are defended.
92 In ARS paras 85 - 104, ASIC has drawn attention to a number of factors that are relevant, generally, to the Court's consideration of the appropriate penalties in this case.
93 First, as to deterrence, ASIC points to the fact that a company called Grenwich Pty Ltd (Grenwich) now claims to have the legal and equitable title to the ClearLoans' loan book and appears to be carrying on the ClearLoans business to the exclusion of Membo and RGFS. This is consistent with advice given by Membo to ASIC in 2020 that it intended to exit the Australian market. While these circumstances are relevant to whether the necessity for specific deterrence remains, Membo still holds an Australian credit licence. As ASIC submits, the possibility exists that Membo might resume trading in Australia, potentially with RGFS's involvement.
94 General deterrence remains an important consideration, particularly having regard to the protective nature of the provisions that have been contravened and the vulnerabilities of debtors who are the subject of those protections.
95 Secondly, as to the respondents' size, the evidence is incomplete. Documents produced by Membo show that it had a gross income of $9.5 million and $16.4 million for the 2019 and 2020 financial years respectively, with substantial net profits of $6 million and $10.5 million for the same years. Documents produced by RGFS for the same period show no gross income and significant net losses.
96 The ultimate parent company of the respondents, Richmond Group Limited (Richmond), is located in the United Kingdom and is of a substantial financial size. Its financial statements for the financial years ended 31 March 2019 and 31 March 2020 show significant revenue (£308.3 million and £343.2 million, respectively) as well as a substantial profit after tax of £70.8 million for the 2019 financial year. Richmond recorded a loss after tax of £12.5 million for the 2020 financial year.
97 ASIC submits, and I accept, that the available evidence shows that Membo had a substantial business operation during the relevant period and that the size of Membo and RGFS is not inconsistent with the imposition of the agreed penalties.
98 Thirdly, as to whether Membo and RGFS have a culture of compliance, ASIC points to the fact that the ClearLoans business operated in Australia for a short time, from 2017, before the earliest contraventions commenced. There is no baseline against which a culture of compliance can be meaningfully assessed. I accept that submission.
99 Fourthly, as to prior conduct, so far as ASIC is aware neither respondent has been found by a court to have engaged in similar conduct, whether in Australia or overseas.
100 Fifthly, as to cooperation and contrition, it is relevant to bear in mind that each respondent agreed to make admissions and consent to the relief sought by ASIC. However, this was done immediately prior to the liability hearing and did not relieve ASIC from the burden of preparing extensive evidence in support of its case and in response to the denials and assertions previously made by each respondent in their Responses filed on 25 October 2021. ASIC submits, and I accept, that limited weight should be given to the degree of cooperation offered in this case. The respondents have not participated in the liability hearing or the penalty hearing and have proffered no evidence of contrition.
101 Sixthly, the evidence suggests that the day-to-day management and administration of the ClearLoans business was carried out by senior management. ASIC points to the involvement of Mr Garcia in the conduct of the ClearLoans business. Mr Garcia was, variously, the Responsible Manager, the Risk Manager, and the Breach Manager of RGFS. He also undertook other roles, including as Training Manager. Mr Garcia reported to, and was in frequent contact with, the Chief Executive Officer, Mr Waylett, and the Chief Operating Officer, Mr Malki in relation to day-to-day management and operational matters concerning the ClearLoans business. ASIC submits, and I accept, that it should be inferred that senior management had a level of day-to-day involvement with, and an understanding of, the ClearLoans business and had, at least, a general awareness of the circumstances relating to the contraventions.
102 I now turn to ASIC's submissions in respect of the particular contraventions, recognising, once again, that the quantum of the proposed penalties represents an agreed position between the parties.