The evidence in relation to the involvement of Mr Green in the primary conduct
275 In determining the question of whether Mr Green was knowingly concerned in any of the contraventions by R2O, it is necessary to keep firmly in mind the "statutory text" of the primary contraventions. The text of each of the provisions of the National Credit Code contravened by R2O is set out at [90] - [97] of these reasons. Aspects of the formula set out in s 32B of the Code are discussed at [98] - [103] of these reasons. I do not propose to repeat the statutory text here. Although the provisions of the ASIC Act contravened by R2O have been discussed extensively in these reasons, it is convenient to set out the text of those provisions here. Section 12DA(1) is in these terms:
12DA(1) A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct in relation to financial services that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive.
276 Section 12DB(1)(a) and (g) is in these terms:
12DB(1) A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or the possible supply of financial services, or in connection with the promotion by any means of the supply or use of financial services:
(a) make a false or misleading representation that services are of a particular standard, quality, value or grade; or
…
(g) make a false or misleading representation with respect to the price of services.
277 See also [194] - [211] of these reasons.
278 It is also necessary to examine the extent to which Mr Green was, put simply, at the centre of the events involving the conduct of R2O's operations. Thus, it is necessary to examine Mr Green's evidence about these matters, the documents relevant to Mr Green's engagement in the affairs of R2O and Mr Green's evidence given in cross-examination.
279 The company search concerning R2O suggests that the company was registered on 20 May 1998 and changed its name to R2O on 18 July 2008. Mr Green was a director of the company for the period between 3 February 2014 and 8 December 2014. However, he was again appointed director on 27 April 2015. Mr Roberts was a director from 18 May 2012 to 4 February 2014, but appointed again on 10 June 2014. In the case of Mr Green, there was a period from 8 December 2014 to 27 April 2015 when he seems not to have been a director of R2O and in the case of Mr Roberts, there was a period from 4 February 2014 to 10 June 2014 when he appears not to have been a director.
280 As earlier mentioned, it is uncontroversial that R2O operated a business as a credit provider for the purchase by consumers of used cars. R2O held an ACL for that purpose as from 24 December 2012. As an indication of the scale of the business, R2O entered into 5,930 contracts, otherwise called credit contracts, in the period 1 July 2012 to 26 July 2018 and as at 19 April 2018, R2O had 2,239 credit contracts on foot. R2O operated its business through a network of franchise agreements. As at 17 July 2017 and 26 July 2018 there were 21 franchisees operating in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia. Mr Green, in the course of an examination pursuant to s 253 of the NCCP Act, said that R2O began to expand into the franchising model in 2011. Each franchisee (or a person employed by the franchisee) held a motor dealer licence for the relevant jurisdiction and R2O authorized either the franchisee or a person employed by the franchisee to be a credit representative of R2O under the provisions of the NCCP Act.
281 As to the franchise agreement, the document recites that R2O carries on the business of undertaking, as franchisor, motor vehicle sales by credit contracts throughout Australia and New Zealand. Mr Green emphasises that clause 10.7 of the franchise agreement provides that the franchisee must at all times operate the franchise strictly in accordance with all of the standards, practices and obligations "set forth in the Manual" which presumably is a reference to the "Operations Manual". Clause 10.13 provides that the franchisee must comply with all applicable "federal, state, local laws and regulations and other enactments or requirements" of all governmental bodies, and comply with R2O's risk and compliance policies. A failure to do so is to be regarded "as a major breach of this contract and result in immediate Franchise termination". Mr Green also emphasises clause 10.13 which provides that the franchisee must comply with all written directions and procedures given by R2O from time-to-time concerning the operation and management of the franchise area, including directions relating to standards, techniques, methods and procedures for rendering services.
282 As to the Operations Manual (the "Manual"), there were a number of such documents. One version is the Manual marked "2015.13" which Mr Green accepted commenced operation from 19 November 2015. Another version is the Manual of May 2017. Another version is the Manual of August 2017.
283 As to the May 2017 Manual as an example, it recites that the "objective of the franchise Operations Manuals [is] to ensure uniformity and high standards of quality and service amongst all [R2O] office premises, in order to create and maintain the goodwill, reputation and consumer acceptance of the system…". It also recites that the policies and procedures set out in the Manual are the "culmination of the Franchisor's experience in the business over the past combined 50 years (that is, the combined business experience of Mr Green and Mr Roberts)". Part of the business method described at section 3 of the Manual is the approach to the purchase of "stock" (vehicles). The Manual says that when purchasing stock "DO NOT pay over $3,000.00 for a vehicle unless you have a client with this much deposit. Stock purchases should be between $800 - $2,000 per vehicle. This will ensure that in most cases you will retrieve 75% of your stock purchase cost back through deposits". The Manual also tells franchisees that "…for the same outlay you could buy three cars for $1,000 each [and], you are going to make three times the profit and get 75% or more as deposits on each car." The Manual then sets out an example of what a basic 12 month contract might look like. The example is this.
Basic 12 month Contract Formula (example)
Vehicle purchase $1,500.00
Contract deposit $1,200.00
Average repayment $100.00 p.w. (52 weeks) $5,200.00
Total Repay $6,400.00
Gross Profit $4,900.00
284 The first thing to note about this example is that although the example uses the term "deposit", that term is not used in an orthodox way. It is not a deposit which results in a reduction in the balance payable for the goods. It is a first payment which is a measure of, a part of, total payments to be made for the vehicle. In the example, the total payments will be the first payment of $1,200 and the payments over 52 weeks amounting to $5,200, resulting in a gross return of $6,400 with the result that the postulated gross profit is the total receipts (payments) less the cost to the franchisee of purchasing the vehicle. This becomes immediately relevant because any interest payable by the hirer/buyer is not paid on a balance after payment of a deposit and nor does it appear to be calculated on a reducing debt (balance) taking account of incremental reductions in the debt over the 52 week period.
285 As to the "pricing", by which the Manual seems to mean the quantification of the weekly repayment over whatever might be the nominated period of weeks in the relevant transaction, the Manual says that R2O's intranet has a "Car Pricing Calculator". The Manual gives guidance about pricing in this way:
To estimate the sale price of a car go to "carsales.com". Search for your car from "Research" tab then take the Highest Retail sale price. This researched car MUST be similar to the car you are selling in regards to year, make, model, mileage. Add this price into the Car Pricing Calculator "Cash Price" field along with the amount of "Weeks" and the system will generate your maximum contract price and payments for the term required. You have a choice of mark-up percentages to suit your deal up to a maximum of 45% p.a.
286 I have already discussed in these reasons the elements of the contract with Ms Abbott and the contract with Ms Abraham at [133] - [149], emblematic of the two tranches of contracts in issue in these proceedings. In terms of the guidance quoted above, the price inserted into the calculator as the "Cash Price" is the so-called "Car Retail Price" or "Comparison Price" which, in the case of Ms Abbott and Ms Abraham, were $5,900 and $5,500 respectively. The "maximum contract price" (in the guidance statement above, or "Contract Cash Price" or "Contract Price" in the Abbott and Abraham contracts respectively) is the total of the repayments (the first payment sometimes called a deposit, and the total rental) which in the case of Abbott and Abraham, respectively, were $11,188.44 and $7,175.22. The August 2017 Manual does not recite the example but does recite the pricing guidance quoted at [285]. As to the August 2017 Manual, Mr Green was asked questions about the document in the course of an examination under the provisions of the NCCP Act. He said that the Manual had been created by him and Mr Roberts and that they received a "bit" of advice from Mr Latham at MinterEllison, but no other advice.
287 The May 2017 and August 2017 Manual had its origins in the 19 November 2015 Manual. That Manual recites the example quoted at [283] and frames the pricing guidance in this way.
To estimate the sale price of a car go to "carsales.com.au". Search for your car from "Research" tab then take the Highest Private Saleprice. Add $1,500.00 for Dealer retail price markup. Then add $2,000.00 for ASIC allowable mark up for Rent 2 Own.
To simplify, add $3,500.00 to each vehicle above the highest retail price.
288 It can be seen that the pricing guidance in 2015 contemplated that there would be a price mark-up or margin for the dealer of $1,500 and a mark-up for R2O of $2,000. The aggregated mark-up of $3,500 would cover a dealer margin and a credit provision margin for R2O.
289 This question of adding an amount such as $3,500 was the subject of evidence in the proceeding directed to explaining a number of things. First, the evidence goes to the contextual evolution of the price calculators which were used for the purposes of the contracts in issue in the proceeding. Second, the evidence goes to showing the continuity of engagement by Mr Green and Mr Roberts in the development of the versions of the Operations Manual ultimately leading to the emails sent by Mr Green to franchisees by which he, on behalf of R2O, supplied the franchisees with price calculators for calculating total repayments in connection with each of the contracts in issue in the proceedings. R2O and Mr Green object to any evidence of pricing practices used by R2O prior to the implementation of the Microsoft Excel price calculator in August 2016, which is the first of the "Price Calculators". The objection as to para 49 of Ms Schoch's first affidavit is conceded, but objections to other paragraphs on this topic are maintained. The relevant paragraphs are pressed. I admit this evidence as it goes to the two matters identified above.
290 As to this topic, Mr Green said in a document addressed to ASIC dated 30 June 2016 that ASIC had recommended a "mark-up" which would be acceptable in the range $500 - $3,000 for vehicles of the same type which gave "approximately a 30% mark-up rate over the term of the contract which in most circumstances never exceeds 18 months". On 25 October 2016, ASIC sought from Mr Green copies of documents that demonstrate the implementation of a mark-up limited to 30%. An advisor to R2O, Mr Wills sent an email on 7 November 2016 to ASIC attaching a "Price Guide Calculator" which Ms Schoch says seems to be identical to Price Calculator 1, which is dated 16 August 2016. The mark-up was said to be calculated in accordance with the Price Calculator. Mr Green, in an examination under the NCCP Act, said that before the Price Calculator was used, the mark-up was in the range of $500 - $3,000 or 30% over the term of the contract with the result that if the cash price of the car was, for example, $10,000, 30% would be $3,000 (in that case) resulting in $13,000 divided by 100 equal weekly instalments (if that was the nominated period), resulting in a weekly payment of $130. Mr Green was also asked, in the course of the examination, about the nature of the difference between "mark up" and "interest". Mr Green said that "we anguished over this since these… credit laws came in". He said that:
We prefer to operate that way, with a mark up. With all the credit laws that came in and the more work that we had to do, employing QED Risk or all these new procedures it sort of - Tim and I spoke about it and we decided well we are better off, we need to charge more for our services to cover these costs and that is why we went from this way to charging up to 45 per cent.
291 On 16 August 2016, Mr Green sent an email to the franchisees (copied to Mr Roberts) attaching an excel spreadsheet Price Calculator (Calculator 1). On 10 November 2016, Mr Green sent another email to the franchisees attaching Price Calculator 2. In that email of 10 November 2016, Mr Green said this:
I have just completed a new "Pricing Calculator" (Delete old Calculator) this calculates on a weekly basis at 45% plus adds the cost of warranty at $1,000 up to 52 weeks then $1,500 over 52 weeks.
All you need to do is insert the high retail price (Cash Price) Deposit and any number of weeks which do not have to be multiples of 6 months now.
The "CASH PRICE" is the high retail price that you have researched and decided on, NOT the Contract price !
This tool will be implemented into the intranet when inputting new stock and will transfer figures into the price fields.
292 As mentioned earlier, Mr Green also sent an email to the franchisees on 14 December 2016 attaching Price Calculator 3. He developed Price Calculator 4, and on 19 January 2017, he sent an email to the franchisees attaching Price Calculator 5. He sent an email to the franchisees on 25 January 2017 attaching another Price Calculator (number 6) and another Price Calculator (number 7). He sent an email to the franchisees on 1 November 2017 attaching another Price Calculator.
293 As to these emails, Mr Green told the franchisees that they could select varying percentages having regard to the term of the contract, but the formula would ensure that franchisees were kept "well under the ASIC recommended rates". He told the franchisees that R2O had decided to "go with a set price for warranty of $1,000 per contract up to 18 months and $1,500 for 24 months". He told the franchisees that all they would need to do is put the figures into "car pricing and contracts". In Mr Green's email of 14 December 2016 concerning Price Calculator 3, he told the franchisees to delete version two. He said that the new version was easier to read with particular designations around the various cells in the calculator. Price Calculator 4 was a further version of that calculator. In the email of 19 January 2017, Mr Green said that this version of the calculator "is simpler and gives more flexibility to your contracts with variable interest, warranty amount or no warranty and term". Mr Green said "the main thing as you know - do not go over 45% per annum". Again, changes were made to the cells making up the module. On 25 January 2017, Mr Green sent another email to the franchisees advising that the Price Calculator had been modified so that it provided for "mark ups from 15% - 45% maximum". He said that the amounts charged for warranties were to be added into the calculation after the calculation of the mark up.
294 In his examination pursuant to the NCCP Act, Mr Green was taken to Price Calculator 4 and was asked, "where did this come from?". Mr Green said that QED Risk "helped us put this together". Mr Green was then asked: "And so the actual formulas in it though, as best you know, was it QED who did that or you guys?". Mr Green responded by saying: "it was mainly us instructing them what we wanted the outcome to be."
295 As to Price Calculator 1, Mr Green was taken to that Price Calculator and was asked, as to the calculations in the spreadsheet, "who wrote these?". Mr Green said that he wrote them. He said that he obtained "some guidance from QED". Mr Green was asked whether that guidance was in the form of actually giving Mr Green a formula. Mr Green said that it was not, and that the guidance came from "talking to Greg" and that there was "nothing actually written". Mr Green said that he spoke to Greg [QED] and said that R2O wanted to stay well under the 48% cap and that R2O was happy to have a maximum of 45%.
296 As to Price Calculator 2, Mr Green said that he worked out the formulas for that calculator. He said that he was not sure whether he took any advice, but that it was based on the original calculator (number 1). Mr Green said that the formulas in that calculator were written by him. Mr Roberts in his examination said that, in answer to the question of whether he had had any involvement in determining the formulas for the calculations in spreadsheet 4, that he had left that matter to "Paul" (Mr Green) because "Paul is more expert in the end of the field".
297 As to Price Calculator 1, Mr Green said that the email attaching the Price Calculator was sent to franchisees because QED had recommended that R2O "start standardizing the pricing" because "before it was a bit scattered, I guess". As to Price Calculator 2, Mr Green accepted that the change was designed to enable the franchisee to insert any number of weeks rather than a set number of weeks determined by the previous calculator at 52, 78 or 104 or some other precise number.
298 As to Price Calculator 4, Mr Green was asked why interest in Price Calculator 4 was being applied to the cost of the motor vehicle prior to deducting the deposit. Mr Green was given the example of a vehicle with a cash price of $7,900 which, under the formula, was then multiplied by 0.865 which is a weekly interest rate charge of 45% on a per annum basis, but in the example the hirer/buyer had paid a deposit or first payment of $1,500. Mr Green thought that taking account of the deposit was represented by "the minus [$1,500] there". Mr Green's attention was again taken to the proposition that if an interest charge was to be applied, it would be applied to the cost of the car after taking off the deposit, but that interest seemed to have been applied to the full cost of the car for the period and then the deposit was deducted after that. Mr Green said that he could not answer that concern. It was put to him: "You don't know why?"; answer: "No."
299 As to Price Calculator 5, Mr Green accepted that the change introduced an option to select an interest rate of either "15, 20, 25, 30 and so on up to 45 per cent". Mr Green said that he thought the franchisees had requested a greater degree of flexibility.
300 As to the email of 11 April 2018 attaching two electronic excel spreadsheets, being the 2018 calculator and a copy of an "Amortising Calculator", the email says that the 2018 calculator is simpler, with new formulas, and the franchisees can put any interest rate into the calculator from 1% to 45% maximum and that interest was allowed to be charged on amounts relating to warranty, registration and servicing. Mr Green said that the amortising calculator was to be uploaded to the intranet for downloading to a franchisee's desktop and the tool was to be used to show the balance on a loan after every payment and that all that the franchisees needed to do was establish how many payments have been made and then go to the corresponding number in the calculator.
301 The references to responses by Mr Green are all references to his answers in the course of the examinations under the ASIC Act.
302 It should be noted that ASIC, by letter dated 21 March 2016 to Mr Roberts, raised a number of concerns about R2O's compliance with the NCCP Act and, in that letter, raised a number of questions about data, measurements, formulae or other factors used to determine the price of the vehicle, the market value of the vehicle and any additional charges imposed in the transaction for sale of the vehicle. On 13 December 2016, ASIC was still engaged in exchanges with QED Risk on behalf of R2O as to the basis upon which R2O arrived at the market price of the car and how any "mark up" was determined. ASIC was still asking for information that demonstrates how the contract price is reached. On 18 January 2017, ASIC sent an email to Mr Wills observing that information about those matters was still outstanding. On 13 February 2017, Mr Wills responded by email explaining the process undertaken by a franchisee to determine current pricing for a similar vehicle by going to carsales.com.au and "setting" the market price in that way. Mr Wills said that the market value is entered into the pricing guide to assist in determining the maximum amount chargeable [under the NCCP Act and Code] and that the "actual price" comes as a result of negotiations with a consumer by meeting both their overall needs and affordability requirements. Mr Wills said that "the price guide calculator is utilised to ensure that the maximum prescribed amount is never exceeded". On 15 February 2017, ASIC asked to be provided with copies of printouts and calculations which demonstrated that the maximum prescribed amount is never exceeded. Mr Green sent an email to Mr Wills on 25 February 2017 in which he said this.
This is the formula used in our Pricing Calculator the percentage shown is a weekly mark up of 0.865384 x 52 = 44.999968% p.a. the calculator works on the number of weeks that are put in, it processes the % for the contract based on the Cash Price entered, then takes off the deposit, then adds the warranty cost, then divides by weekly or fortnightly payments. The warranty or any other costs are NOT added prior to any mark up.
303 This formulation calculates, weekly, an interest rate of 45% p.a. based on the cash price across the period of the "number of weeks" put into the calculator. Mr Green accepts that this formula cannot be correct. This formulation was then forwarded to ASIC.
304 In March 2017, R2O generated for franchisees a document called "Mark Up Procedure". That document sets out the steps to be implemented in using the calculator of January 2017. The first step involves a franchisee researching the comparative retail price of a vehicle by going to a site such as carsales.com. Step two is to insert the selected retail price into the calculator which, in the example, is $7,990.00. That price is regarded as the market price. Step three is to insert any "deposit", otherwise called the first payment, paid by the consumer, into the calculator. Step four is to insert a warranty amount. Step five is to insert the term in weeks. As to steps three, four and five, the relevant entries are $1,500, $1,000, and 78 weeks in the example. The document then says that the calculator will now produce the numbers needed for the contract with the mark up being calculated only using the cash price of $7,990.00. The document says that the calculator gives franchisees a choice of mark up rates from 15% to 45% maximum. It also says that by implementing the calculator, franchisees "cannot overcharge on the cap interest rate of 48%".
305 On 9 March 2017, Mr Green and Mr Wills attended a meeting with representatives of ASIC at which a number of matters were discussed. ASIC observed that despite raising the matter previously, the issue of the contracts had not been addressed in the sense that the individual contracts did not disclose all of the Code's disclosure requirements. ASIC also raised "another issue of concern" about whether R2O's charges exceeded the cap and ASIC observed that it had "information to suggest it does and if that's the case then another factor to consider is remediation for those who paid in excess".
306 Mr Wills observed that he had done calculations which indicated that the 48% cap had not been exceeded. Mr Jordan Sugunasingam (of ASIC) observed that he had undertaken calculations "that indicate it has, which is why I have asked Julian (Wills) to provide me with his calculation to see how he reached his conclusions". Mr Wills said that he would provide calculations for vehicles where R2O had provided QED Risk with the documents. Mr Wills said that he would forward to ASIC calculations he had undertaken.
307 On 14 March 2017, Mr Wills sent documents to ASIC. In response, by email on 16 March 2017, Mr Sugunasingam responded with a number of important observations as follows.
2. The information you provided about the calculation of the charge, what you term as mark up or interest raises the following queries:
(i) Is the deposit amount deducted from the cash price for the purpose of working out the mark up or interest (it doesn't appear to be) and if not, why not;
(ii) How does your client's calculations reconcile with the calculation of annual cost rate prescribed by s 32B of the Code, particularly as the formula you provided us doesn't seem to match the one prescribed by the Code.
…
Could you come back to me early next week with the above clarifications and information as we need to deal with these issues on an urgent basis.
308 On 21 March 2017, Mr Wills responded by saying that as to point 2, he would discuss those items with Paul and Tim (Mr Green and Mr Roberts) and respond to ASIC early in the following week.
309 On 31 March 2017, Mr Sugunasingam responded to Mr Wills, making observations in relation to issues of "disclosure" and the "annual cost rate". ASIC had been advised that R2O's solicitor was reviewing the contracts and ASIC asked Mr Wills to ensure that the review addressed disclosure obligations under s 17 of the Code as, despite previously raising the disclosure issue with Mr Green and Mr Roberts, ASIC's view was that the obligation under the Code was not being met.
310 As to the annual cost rate, ASIC observed that there was a concern that R2O may be exceeding the cap set by the legislation and questions had been raised in relation to the accuracy of the calculations put to ASIC. ASIC observed that Mr Wills needed to respond to the earlier questions and in the event that R2O accepts that the cap has been exceeded, remedial action would need to be proposed. ASIC requested that Mr Wills respond by 6 April 2017.
311 On 6 April 2017, Mr Wills responded to ASIC on a number of matters, including the disclosure question and the issues in relation to the annual cost rate. As to disclosure, Mr Wills referred ASIC to pages of the contract which contained particular information and as to the topic of the "method of calculation" and frequency of payments, Mr Wills said that those matters were being assessed by Mr Latham of MinterEllison lawyers. It was not until 18 April 2017 that instructions were sent to MinterEllison about that matter.
312 As to the annual cost rate, Mr Wills said that R2O undertook to review a sample of ten percent of the contracts written for every month within the regulated period and that if the cost rate had been breached, then all contracts for that month would be reviewed applying the formulas "as previously outlined" (among other matters).
313 On 12 April 2017, ASIC responded in relation to the disclosure topic and the annual cost rate. As to the disclosure issue, ASIC observed that the language of the document did not address the requirements of the legislation and the Code. ASIC observed that Mr Wills had not confirmed if the template for current contracts is the same template about which concerns had been raised. As to the annual cost rate, ASIC said this.
You were asked to confirm if R2O had exceeded the caps and charged more than they were entitled to. If so, what will they do [to] remedy this overcharge and what will they do to ensure it doesn't reoccur.
R2O's proposal does not address the issues raised. They have not even told us if they have taken steps to determine if R2O's customers have been and are being overcharged.
The above are the concerns we have raised with you to date and might have further issues to raise. R2O do not appear to have taken sufficient steps to address the issues raised to date and ASIC may contemplate further action.
I will be on leave from tomorrow until the end of next week. I will consider any information you provide in the interim on my return and before we make a decision on what further action to pursue. Therefore if you wish to respond please do so by the end of the week.
314 The email from Mr Green to Mr Latham, seeking Mr Latham's advice, is dated 18 April 2017. In that email, Mr Green makes observations about requests made by ASIC (which, as the chronology reveals, had been going on for a long time) and then said this.
I have included the latest email requests from Jordan and the remedies put forward and implemented as he requested and again they are not acceptable, we are more than happy to comply with what we have [to] and I believe that our system is compliant save for a few minor touch ups, we are more than happy to make any changes necessary but we need to know what the problem is if any. I believe what we now need is to get you involved with a legal point of view, review our Contract so that it is compliant, this was another issue that he said the Contract was compliant except for checking the "Codes method of calculation" which we have informed him you are currently doing, but now as you can see in the emails he is not happy with a lot more of the contract.
So basically mate we need your help combined with Julian, he knows this bloke quite well, to get him off our back!
315 Obviously enough, this email understates both the seriousness of the concern put to Mr Green and Mr Roberts by ASIC and the period of time over which the issues had been agitated with the directors. Moreover, there is no reference in this email to the particular concern which had been put by ASIC repeatedly concerning the method of determining the mark up, the question of the basis for the calculation of the interest and the treatment of the "deposit".
316 Mr Wills responded on 24 April 2017. As to disclosure, Mr Wills observed that the inconsistency in the language used stems from the fact that the legislation does not "specifically identify the [R2O] process" and that R2O is the "industry leader" and therefore sets the benchmarks. As to the annual cost rate, Mr Wills said that "R2O does not believe that it has exceeded the annual cost rate". Mr Wills said that QED Risk's review is designed to "further substantiate this position". He observed that if the review finds that R2O has exceeded the cost rate, R2O will make its best efforts to provide the consumer with a full refund. Mr Wills advised that the "new contracts" are with R2O's solicitors and "we believe that everything should now be in order".
317 On 5 May 2017, Mr Green asked Mr Latham to advise whether R2O's contracts were compliant with the Code's method of calculation. Mr Green said that our calculations are: "Researched retail price + 45% p.a. then the warranty cost is added giving a total amount which is divided by the number of weeks the customer requests (have attached our "Pricing Calculator")". On 5 May 2017, Mr Latham responded saying "…I am not sure what ASIC are on about re the 'Code method of calculation'". Mr Latham asked, "is there an email or letter from ASIC that gives some more detail about that specific concern?". On 5 May 2017, Mr Green sent an email to Mr Wills forwarding on the email from Mr Latham and asked Mr Wills: "Mate can you answer this for Steve?". Mr Wills responded on 8 May 2017 to Mr Latham saying that he had no idea what ASIC was referring to and was not aware of any method of calculation in the Code or Regulations. On 8 May 2017, Mr Latham asked Mr Wills whether he might want to ask ASIC what the problem was.
318 On 22 May 2017, Mr Latham sent an email to Mr Green observing that s 32B of the Code contains a complicated formula for determining the annual cost rate. He advised that s 32A provides that the annual cost rate for a credit contract cannot exceed 48% and s 32B prescribes a formula for calculating what the annual cost rate of a credit contract is. He observed that ASIC's point was that R2O needed to ensure that the annual cost rate of the relevant contract did not exceed 48% and in order to ensure that that is so, R2O would need to work through the formula in s 32B to calculate R2O's annual cost rate. Mr Latham observed that the formula is quite complicated and was beyond his mathematical ability. He attached the section outlining the formula for Mr Green's reference. Mr Latham then made some observations about his suspicion as to the way the calculator works out different prices based on an annual cost rate of up to 45%. He suggested that if his suspicion about it was correct, then Mr Green should be able to go back to ASIC and confirm that R2O is compliant with s 32A because it never nominates a total contract price that has an annual cost rate of more than 45%. However, this was simply a hypothesis on Mr Latham's part, and he observed that there would need to be further analysis of the excel spreadsheet calculator "to determine whether it does in fact calculate the annual cost rate (and that probably is a job for a numbers person)".
319 Various exchanges took place throughout the period between 22 May 2017 and early August 2017. Early August proved to be an important period in these events because by then, Mr Wills was no longer with QED Risk, and his role had been taken over by Mr Ashe. Exchanges between Mr Ashe and Mr Sugunasingam began in June 2017 as Mr Ashe sought to become familiar with the outstanding matters.
320 Mr Ashe undertook an analysis and did indeed establish a "key flaw" in what Mr Green and thus R2O had been doing. Mr Ashe said this in an email to Mr Green on 2 August 2017:
I've finally worked out the best way to explain this to you. The key flaw in what you've been doing is in charging 45% per annum and then charging that twice.
The thing is that, after one year, they don't owe you the entire amount anymore, because they've been paying you throughout the first year. So a closer approximation for what you should have been doing is to apply the 45% for the second year on some lesser amount. The trick is to work out what is the correct repayment to charge the equivalent of 45% p.a. over two years and end up with a zero balance at the end of the two years.
The old fashioned way was to pull out what we called "amortisation tables" to work out the correct repayment. I'm not going to bore you with that as it's quite complicated. Nowadays we have tools like excel that can help us work this out. There is a formula called PMT that calculates the correct repayment for a given principal, interest rate and loan term. If you look at the yellow highlighted cell in the attached spreadsheet, you can see this formula in action.
The PMT formula requires you to line everything up right. It works like this: = PMT ("correct periodic interest rate", "number of repayments", "principal amount at start of loan"). In the case of the attached example, the correct periodic interest rate is 45/52 = 0.8653% per week, the number of periods is 104 weeks.
321 In that email, Mr Ashe goes on to explain that R2O was entitled to be charging interest on the warranty premium as well, and does some calculations about that matter. Mr Ashe attached a spreadsheet explaining the proper operation of a repayment schedule based on a case in which the vehicle has a relevant price of $4,500, the interest rate is 45% and the period is 104 weeks with a warranty amount of $1,500, making in effect a $6,000 loan.
322 On 8 August 2017, Mr Ashe advised ASIC that it would be necessary to undertake a 100% case-by-case calculation since the date of the change, by which R2O adopted a so-called "mark up" of 45% rather than 30%, so as to establish whether the contracts were "definitely under the 48% cap".
323 On 23 August 2017, Ms Denes of ASIC had a telephone discussion with Mr Green. The file note from Ms Denes says that Mr Green said that "they were halfway through checking the contracts, and wanted to let me know because he was aware that Greg Ashe had originally told me that it would take about two weeks". Mr Green said that the review was being undertaken to see if there had been a breach of the 48% cap. Ms Denes asked Mr Green if they were checking about 1,900 contracts. Mr Green said that it was about 1,400 contracts, but that they were checking the month before R2O increased the mark-up amount as well. Mr Green said that he could not recall exactly when the change to 45% occurred, perhaps in October or November 2016. Mr Green said that he thinks it was in November, but that he would check the October client files as well. He said that his "wife was doing the review" and "she's halfway through".
324 As to Mr Green's primary evidence-in-chief given in his affidavit sworn 5 June 2019, Mr Green gave this evidence.
325 At paragraph 3, Mr Green says that he became aware that ASIC was questioning R2O's compliance with the 48% cap in about early 2017 after Mr Wills sent him an email dated 31 March 2017 from Mr Sugunasingam in which Mr Sugunasingam said things, quoted earlier, about ASIC's concern that R2O may be exceeding the cap. At paragraph 4, Mr Green says that prior to that time, he had never had cause to suspect that R2O might be exceeding the 48% cap.
326 As to the period prior to August 2016, Mr Green at paragraph 5 says that R2O simply applied a 30% mark-up on the purchase price of the vehicle to obtain the total contract price to be recovered over the life of the contract. He gives an example where the retail price of the vehicle is $10,000 and a consumer agrees to pay weekly instalments over 2 years. In that case, the consumer would be charged $13,000 in total by way of 104 weekly payments of $125. He says that this calculation was conceived by Mr Green and Mr Roberts to give customers a fair deal in light of other companies which were charging a much higher mark-up.
327 At paragraph 6, Mr Green says that "we decided" (which I take to mean Mr Green, Mr Roberts and thus R2O) that franchisees would be given the ability to charge a higher mark-up in the contracts. He says that using the 48% cap as a yardstick, "we implemented a 45% interest model within our contracts rather than the previous 30% mark-up model". At paragraph 7, he says that the reason "we fixed upon" a maximum rate of 45% was to ensure that none of the franchisees would accidentally breach the 48% cap.
328 At paragraph 8, Mr Green says that he produced an excel spreadsheet containing a formula for use by the franchisees which set the interest rate at 45% per annum so that no franchisee could breach the 48% cap. That was Price Calculator 1. Mr Green says that he sent the calculator to the franchisees by email on 16 August 2016 with the instructions quoted earlier. He says that the interest rate of 45% per annum applied to the "retail price" of the vehicle and was set at that rate for contracts of 52 weeks, 78 weeks and 104 weeks.
329 At paragraph 12, Mr Green says that when creating the first Price Calculator, he did not know about the complex formula contained in the Code for the provision of credit. He says that he believed that the "interest method" that he had adopted would comply with the requirements of the Code because he thought that his calculator could never allow the interest charged to be higher than 45%. He says at paragraph 13 that he is "now aware" that ASIC has identified "numerous faults with this formula". He says that one of those faults is that the deposit paid by the consumer was not deducted from the retail price before the interest rate was charged, with the result that interest was charged on an amount that had already been paid. Mr Green, at paragraph 13, observes that Mr Ashe later told him that the interest rate was not amortised over the period of the loan. Mr Green says that he is not now defending this formula as accurate, but says that at the time he designed the calculator, and throughout the period in which it was used, he honestly and genuinely believed that its use would ensure that the 48% cap would not be breached.
330 At paragraph 14, Mr Green says that on 10 November 2016 he sent an email to all franchisees enclosing an amended Price Calculator he had created (otherwise described as the second Price Calculator). He says that the difference between this calculator and the previous one is that the per annum interest rate of 45% was converted to a weekly rate. He says that he thought that this charge would make the calculation more precise. He says at paragraph 16 that he now realizes that the change "did not address the faults since identified by ASIC and referred to at paragraph 13". He says that at the time he designed the second price calculator and throughout the period in which it was used, he honestly and genuinely believed that its use would ensure that the 48% cap would never be breached.
331 He says that on 14 December 2016, he sent an email to all franchisees enclosing an amended Price Calculator and directing the franchisees to delete the "old version". He says that the statements he has made at paragraph 16 (as I have described) apply equally to this third calculator.
332 He says that on or about 19 January 2017, he sent a further email to franchisees enclosing another amended Price Calculator which was said to be simpler and more flexible. Again, he says that the statements he has made at paragraph 16 (quoted above) about the second calculator apply equally to this calculator.
333 Mr Green says that in January 2017, he liaised with Mr Wills in order to comply with requests from ASIC and that on 25 January 2017, he sent Mr Wills an email attaching a copy of a further Price Calculator (described by Ms Schoch as calculator number 6). Mr Green says that this calculator was modified so as to provide for mark-ups from 15% to 45%, with amounts charged for warranties added into the calculation after the calculation of the mark-up.
334 Mr Green says, at paragraph 23, that he acknowledges that he did not specifically ask Mr Wills to check the calculator. However, Mr Green observes that at no time did Mr Wills suggest to him that there was "anything wrong with the structure of the calculator". Mr Green says that in the absence of some such correction, he continued to assume that the calculator was effective in preventing any breach of the 48% cap.
335 At paragraph 24, Mr Green says that he has reviewed the content of what is described by Ms Schoch as the fourth, fifth and sixth Price Calculators and can confirm that they are the same calculator using the same formula (that is, with no difference between them).
336 At paragraph 25, Mr Green says that he sent a further email to Mr Wills on 25 February 2017 explaining the operation of the Price Calculator. Aspects of that email have been quoted earlier. At paragraph 26, Mr Green says that at no time did Mr Wills suggest to him that there was "anything wrong with the structure of the calculator and that in the absence of 'some such correction' I continued to assume that the calculator was effective in preventing any breach of the 48% cap".
337 At paragraph 27, Mr Green again observes that it was not until Mr Wills forwarded to him a copy of Mr Sugunasingam's email dated 31 March 2017 that he became aware "of any suggestion" that R2O might be breaching the 48% cap. Mr Green says that he "had absolutely no idea" why Mr Sugunasingam was questioning whether R2O might be breaching the 48% cap.
338 At paragraph 28, Mr Green says that on 18 April 2017 he sent Mr Latham an email seeking advice about R2O's compliance systems. Mr Green quotes aspects of the text of that email earlier quoted in these reasons. Mr Green then describes the email exchanges of 5 May and 8 May involving Mr Latham, Mr Green and Mr Wills mentioned earlier in these reasons.
339 At paragraph 34, Mr Green refers to an email he sent to Mr Latham on 15 May 2017 observing that there had been no response from ASIC to matters put to ASIC concerning the method of calculation required by the Code and the incorrect reference by Mr Sugunasingam to s 34B of the Code, rather than s 32B of the Code.
340 At paragraph 35, Mr Green refers to Mr Latham's advice of 22 May 2017 mentioned earlier and quotes from it extensively in his affidavit.
341 At paragraph 36, Mr Green says that nothing in Mr Latham's advice caused him to "reconsider my assumption that the calculators used by [R2O] would ensure that it did not breach the 48% cap", although Mr Green observes that he noted that the calculators did need to be checked by a "numbers person" in light of the complicated formula in the Code.
342 At paragraph 37, Mr Green says that Mr Wills left QED Risk in late May 2017 and Mr Green then began dealing with Mr Ashe. Mr Green asked Mr Ashe to check R2O's contracts for any potential breaches. At paragraph 38, Mr Green refers to the email from Mr Ashe of 2 August 2017 earlier mentioned in these reasons. Mr Green quotes the email extensively. At paragraph 39, Mr Green says that receipt of Mr Ashe's email was "the first time that I became aware that there was a flaw in the formulae that I had used in [R2O's] various price calculators".
343 Mr Green says that, even so, having regard to Mr Ashe's explanation that Mr Green's decision to not include the warranty payment in the contract price seemed actually to result in lower repayments than would have been payable had the formula been applied properly, Mr Green "still did not consider either that customers were being charged more than the interest rate stated in the contract, [or] that the 48% was being breached".
344 At paragraph 40, Mr Green says that that belief was further reinforced in his mind when he read an email sent by Mr Ashe to ASIC on 2 August 2017, which was copied to him. In that email, Mr Ashe said that the interest rate had not been applied to the warranty amounts. He also said that his initial calculations were showing that if the warranties were properly capitalised to the loans and amortised over the term, the loans seem to come in well under the 48% cap. Mr Ashe described this as a "fluke" brought about by R2O's "sense of 'fairness' to their clients!"
345 Mr Green says that having regard to the issues raised in Mr Ashe's email, Mr Green undertook to review all of R2O's current contracts.
346 At paragraph 42, Mr Green refers to an email to him from Mr Ashe dated 14 August 2017 which contained an excel spreadsheet entitled "Loan difference calculator". The email provided instructions on how to use the calculator. In the email, Mr Ashe said, in relation to the review by Mr Green of "every file since you made the change to 40 - 45%", Mr Green should do the following:
1. Type in the file name and date.
2. Type in the car purchase amount (as per the [hire] contract).
3. Type in the warranty price and any deposit paid upfront (you had this listed as "first repayment" on the files I looked at).
4. Type in the number of payments from the file, as well as selecting whether it's weekly or monthly (all the ones I saw were weekly).
5. Type in the interest rate listed on the [hire] contract.
6. Type in the ACTUAL repayment amount that the client was paying under the contract.
What the calculation then gives you on the last line is whether the client was better off or worse off. If the number at the bottom is negative and Red, then you owe the client money. If the number is positive and Green, then you're all good. Technically, in the latter case, the client really owes you money but I don't think we want to go there in the circumstances.
347 At paragraph 44, Mr Green says that following receipt of Mr Ashe's email, he used the "Loan difference calculator" to review 1,267 contracts, being all current contracts between consumers and R2O. He says that of the 1,267 contracts that he reviewed, only one contract was identified in which the interest actually charged exceeded the interest that should have been charged had the "contracted interest rate been correctly applied". Mr Green says that as a result of finding only one such contract, he says that he "assumed that the formulas used in [R2O's] price calculators were correctly calculating interest".
348 At paragraph 46, Mr Green refers to giving evidence at an ASIC examination on 10 October 2017 at which he was shown the Price Calculator described by Ms Schoch as Price Calculator 4. He says that counsel for ASIC pointed out to him that the Price Calculator did not deduct the deposit from the cash price against which the interest rate was applied. He observes that counsel for ASIC pointed out to him that Mr Green's calculator was applying interest to the full cost of the car with the deposit being deducted later. Mr Green observes that in response, he had said that he could not answer why that was so and had said that he did not know why that was so. At paragraph 47, Mr Green says that he reviewed the calculator as a result of that exchange with counsel, and came to realise that counsel for ASIC was correct. He says that "until then I had never realised that the calculators contained this flaw, and nobody, including anyone at QED risk had ever pointed that out to me". Mr Green says that Mr Ashe's calculator does deduct the deposit from the contract price prior to applying the interest rate percentage. Mr Green says that Mr Ashe did not draw Mr Green's attention to "that aspect of his calculator, or the fault in mine, at the time". Mr Green says that had he realized the flaw pointed out to him by counsel for ASIC, he would have changed the calculator earlier. Mr Green says that, as it happens, in light of the discussion at the examination on 10 October 2017, Mr Green created, on 31 October 2017, what is described by Ms Schoch as the ninth Price Calculator. Mr Green emailed that Price Calculator to the franchisees on 1 November 2017. He says that the major difference between this calculator and earlier calculators was that he factored into the new calculator any deposit paid by the consumer such that interest was only paid on "the sum that was remaining after payment of the deposit". He says that car registration and servicing costs were included as well.
349 At paragraph 51, Mr Green says that he attended a further examination conducted by ASIC on 29 March 2018, at which he was told that ASIC had cause to be concerned that R2O's Price Calculators were not "calculating in accordance with the Code". Mr Green was shown a report by McGrath Nicol in support of that concern. Mr Green says that he was told that ASIC had reviewed the "Amortising Loan Calculator" created by Mr Ashe and, using a sample of the same contracts used by McGrath Nicol, the conclusion was that the calculators were not making calculations in accordance with the requirements of the Code. Mr Green says that "this came as a huge surprise to me". Mr Green says that he told ASIC that he had used the loan difference calculator to check the contracts. He says that although he nominated that he had reviewed 200 contracts over a period of months, he wasn't really sure how many contracts he had checked or over what period he had checked them, when he was being examined. He says that, looking back now, the correct position on his investigation into the R2O contracts is that set out at para 44 of his affidavit. That is the paragraph where he says that he used the loan difference calculator to review 1,267 contracts and found that only one contract was identified in which the interest actually charged exceeded the interest that should have been charged under the contract had interest been correctly applied.
350 At paragraph 54, Mr Green says that following the examination on 29 March 2018, it became apparent to him that he must not have used the loan difference calculator correctly and, as a result, he decided that he would create a new calculator and would ask the franchisees to rewrite all existing contracts in accordance with the formula contained in the Amortisation Loan Calculator. At paragraph 55, he says that on 11 April 2018, he sent an email to all franchisees attaching what Ms Schoch describes as the "New Calculator 2018". He notes that on 30 May 2018, Mr Roberts sent an email to all franchisees asking them to implement the new calculator. He says that on 1 June 2018, he sent an email to all franchisees enclosing the loan difference calculator with instructions on how to use that calculator to conduct a recalculation of the existing contracts. On 7 June 2018, he sent an email to all franchisees providing them with a template letter to go to each existing customer whose contract required recalculation.
351 At paragraphs 60 to 64, Mr Green explains that the franchisees were instructed to use the "Ezi Debit" system. That system provided each of the franchisees, in respect of their own customers, and R2O with access to records of all of the repayments made by customers. Mr Green explains that he has reviewed the history of payments by particular consumers as set out in his affidavit.
352 It is now necessary to examine the criticism made of Mr Green's evidence by the applicant.
353 Although Mr Green said in his affidavit at paragraph 5 that R2O simply applied a 30% mark-up on the purchase price of the vehicle to obtain the contract price to be recovered, Mr Green conceded that R2O added $3,500 to the purchase price of a vehicle.
354 At paragraph 6, Mr Green says that a decision was made to allow franchisees to charge a higher mark-up in contracts, and thus a 45% interest model was adopted rather than the previous 30% mark-up model. However, Mr Green accepted that this was not accurate as one element was an interest rate and the other was a mark-up amount.
355 At paragraph 3, Mr Green said that the first time that he became aware that ASIC was questioning R2O's compliance with the 48% cap was in early April and, at paragraph 4, he said that prior to that time, he had no cause to suspect that R2O might be exceeding the 48% cap. However, Mr Green accepted that the file note dated 9 March 2017 earlier described concerning the discussions with ASIC reflected fairly the matters discussed at that time; that the reference to disclosure obligations in the file note was a reference to s 17 of the Code; and he knew at the meeting on 9 March 2017 that ASIC, having undertaken its own calculations by reference to the calculator, had formed the view that the calculations using that calculator breached the cap.
356 In his affidavit at paragraph 27, Mr Green says that it was not until Mr Wills forwarded to Mr Green a copy of Mr Sugunasingam's email dated 31 March 2017 that he "became aware" of "any suggestion" that R2O might be breaching the cap, and that he had "absolutely no idea" why Mr Sugunasingam was questioning whether R2O might be breaching the 48% cap. ASIC says that these statements are not correct and that under cross-examination Mr Green conceded that they were not accurate having regard to Mr Green having been present when ASIC made its concerns on this topic known.
357 At paragraph 36, Mr Green said that nothing in the advice from Mr Latham caused him to "reconsider my assumption that the calculators used by [R2O] would ensure that it did not breach the 48% cap". However, ASIC observes that Mr Green conceded that Mr Latham's advice was that he could not advise him on that question (not being a "numbers man"), and that the legal advice did not provide an answer concerning the very question of whether R2O had breached the cap in the relevant contracts. Also, Mr Green conceded that he knew that what needed to be done was to perform calculations consistent with s 32B of the National Credit Code. Moreover, Mr Green conceded that prior to receiving Mr Latham's advice by email, he was aware that ASIC had been provided with his Price Calculator; that calculations had been performed consistent with s 32B of the Code; that ASIC was of the view that the method of calculation effected by the formulas in the Price Calculator was not consistent with s 32A and s 32B of the National Credit Code; and, having received Mr Latham's advice, Mr Green was extremely concerned that his method of calculation was not compliant with the Code.
358 In paragraph 39, Mr Green says that Mr Ashe's email of 2 August 2017 was the "first time" that he became aware that there was a flaw in the formulae he had used in R2O's various Price Calculators. However, under cross-examination, he said that Mr Ashe's email was the first time that someone independent of ASIC had confirmed ASIC's view that there was a flaw in the formulae. Mr Green accepted that that was not the way he had put that matter in paragraph 39 of his affidavit. In addition, at paragraph 39, Mr Green added that after Mr Ashe's explanation in the email to the effect that warranty payments had not been included, he "still did not consider either that customers were being charged more than the interest rate stated in the contract [or] that the 48% was being breached". ASIC observes that under cross-examination, Mr Green accepted that he knew when he received Mr Ashe's email that the interest rates would be inaccurate and could be higher or lower than the interest rate stated in the contract.
359 At paragraphs 46 and 47, Mr Green said that he was shown Price Calculator 4 in his examination in October 2017 and that "until then" he had never realised that the calculators contained the flaw of not deducting the deposit from the cash price. However, ASIC note that under cross-examination, Mr Green conceded that he was aware of this issue from his communication with Mr Wills on 25 February 2017, seven to eight months earlier.
360 ASIC is particularly critical of Mr Green's evidence about the steps he took having received Mr Ashe's email on 14 August 2017 attaching the loan difference calculator. Mr Green gave evidence that he used the calculator to review 1,267 contracts, "being all current contracts between consumers and [R2O]". At paragraph 44, he says that of those 1,267 contracts that he reviewed, only one contract was identified in which the interest actually charged exceeded the interest that should have been charged if the rate in the contract had been correctly applied. ASIC observes that the loan difference calculator, properly used, would have produced the same results in relation to the credit contracts the subject of these proceedings as set out in the report of Mr Hill. ASIC says that follows because the calculator created by Mr Ashe and the calculations performed by Mr Hill both used the correct formula in accordance with the requirements of the Code. ASIC points out that Mr Hill's report reveals the difference between what the consumers were required to pay pursuant to their contracts and what ought to have been paid if the correct interest rate had been applied. ASIC observes that using the Abbott contract as an example, the loan difference calculator, if properly used by Mr Green, would have revealed, if her contract interest rate of 45% had been used, that she would have been required to repay $95.66 per week, rather than $118.91 according to her contract.
361 ASIC emphasises that under cross-examination, Mr Green said that using the Abbott contract as an example, instead of entering the input described in the contract as the "Comparison Price" of $5,900 into the field of the calculator, described as the car price as demonstrated and disclosed (by reason of the research conducted to determine that price by going to sites such as carsales.com), Mr Green entered the input of the "Contract Price" or "Compact Cash Price" of $11,188.44 into that field. According to Mr Green's evidence, he undertook this exercise using Mr Ashe's calculator on 1,267 occasions. ASIC's ultimate contention on this matter is that Mr Green's evidence at paragraph 44 of his affidavit ought not to be accepted. ASIC contends that it is "almost inconceivable" that Mr Green would enter an incorrect input into the loan difference calculator, having regard to his deep understanding of the business undertaking and business model. ASIC says that Mr Green was the director of a franchisor whose business was to sell cars to consumers on a hire purchase style arrangement where franchisees were directed to identify a car for sale at a retail price or comparison price based on research on sites such as carsales.com, and then add a mark-up on that price which would reflect the interest charged on the so-called comparison price such that the consumer would pay, over the periodic weekly term of the contract, the combined comparison price plus the so-called mark-up (together with any warranty amount also charged to the consumer, where relevant). ASIC says that Mr Green knew this business well and knew the model for deriving a profit from it. He had written the Price Calculators.
362 On this topic, ASIC observes that Mr Green accepted under cross-examination that he knew that the purpose of the exercise Mr Ashe had undertaken, in creating the loan difference calculator, was to create a calculator that required Mr Green, in reviewing the contracts, to enter into the relevant fields the very same inputs as he had instructed his franchisees to enter when using Mr Green's own Price Calculator, for the very purpose of arriving at outputs which would demonstrate repayable amounts in accordance with the Code and using the correct formula prescribed by the Code. ASIC observes that the directions contained in Mr Ashe's email of 14 August 2017 were the very same inputs that Mr Green had directed the franchisees to enter when using his Price Calculator. The emblematic example of that is the document described as "Mark Up Procedure", described earlier in these reasons, which set out the various steps franchisees were to take. Step one involved researching the "retail price" in the manner already described. In that document, great emphasis is placed upon the mark-up being calculated only upon the Cash Price based on the step one price. Moreover, ASIC observes that in the directions to franchisees about how to use the Price Calculator, set out in the email of 10 November 2016 (described earlier), Mr Green directed the franchisees to insert the high retail price ("Cash Price"). More particularly, Mr Green emphasised that the "Cash Price" is the high retail price the franchisee has researched and decided upon, "NOT" the Contract price. In this context, ASIC notes that Mr Green's evidence was that he emphasised these matters "to enforce that that was the price to go in there, not the total price of the… contract". ASIC observes that without properly entering the Cash Price or Comparison Price or Researched Retail Price of the car into the calculator, there would be no base figure upon which the calculations would operate. ASIC observes that Mr Green's evidence would have him entering the higher contract price (in Ms Abbott's case $11,188.44) into the relevant field rather than $5,900, and that he took that step in respect of the 1,267 contracts that he says he reviewed following receipt of Mr Ashe's email.
363 ASIC's ultimate submission is that Mr Green well understood that the critical figure to enter into the calculator, using the Abbott example, was $5,900.
364 A further criticism of Mr Green's evidence on this topic is that, in his affidavit, he said that he reviewed 1,267 contracts, and yet during the course of an ASIC examination on 29 March 2018, he said that he had reviewed 200 contracts. ASIC observes that under cross-examination, Mr Green accepted that he had been asked if he had reviewed all the contracts and in response, he told ASIC that he had examined 200 contracts. ASIC contends that if Mr Green had examined 1,267 contracts, he would have been well familiar of that and would have been able to so advise ASIC of that matter. ASIC contends that Mr Green was not able to do so because the correct position is that he had not reviewed 1,267 contracts. Moreover, ASIC observes that in the file note of Ms Denes, Ms Denes records the conversation with Mr Green in which he told her that his wife was conducting the review of about 1,400 contracts and that she was about halfway through the review.
365 Other anomalies in the evidence of Mr Green are said to have been revealed in cross-examination and they are identified in the submissions of ASIC. I do not propose to detail every one of them.
366 There is much force in the criticism ASIC makes of the accuracy of the evidence given by Mr Green in his affidavit. This is particularly so as to the statements about when he first became aware of the contention that the method of calculating the weekly repayment amount failed to properly apply the method prescribed by the Code in ss 32A and 32B, and in relation to the evidence he gave about the review he said he undertook of the contracts following receipt of Mr Ashe's email. I am not willing to accept Mr Green's evidence on these matters. I accept that ASIC had been raising concerns about the method of determining price; the question of calculations exceeding the 48% cap; and concerns going to matters contemplated by s 17 of the Code, for some considerable time, and before the time when Mr Green said he first became aware that his calculator was not compliant with the Code. I also accept that Mr Green's evidence about his contended review of the 1,267 contracts is unreliable. It is also true that Mr Green sought to attribute to Mr Latham advice or propositions said to support Mr Green's "comfort" with his calculator's compliance with the Code, which Mr Latham did not give or adopt and, in fact, expressly disavowed. Mr Green also sought to attribute to Mr Wills a failure to advise him of problems with his calculator. However, Mr Green did not expressly ask Mr Wills to validate the calculator, and Mr Wills's engagement in these questions only arose as a result of ASIC's agitations about the problems with the calculator and the contracts. In these and other ways, Mr Green has obfuscated the real position. This is no doubt explained (but, of course, not answered) in part at least by the difficult position Mr Green found himself in as a director of R2O and one of the two primary actors in the conduct of the company in bringing into existence a sequence of calculators that manifestly failed to comply with the requirements of those provisions of the Code expressly designed to protect the interests of consumers in entering into "credit contracts" for the "provision of credit".
367 It is now necessary to return to aspects of the relevant facts concerning the engagement of Mr Green and Mr Roberts in the conduct of the company and the state of knowledge of those individuals in relation to the contraventions of the Code and the ASIC Act by R2O.
368 Before turning to that matter, it is useful to keep in mind some further principles relevant to those questions.
369 First, the essential facts or essential circumstances required to be known by the person said to be knowingly concerned in R2O's contravention is determined by the statutory text governing the contravention.
370 Second, in order to know the essential facts or essential circumstances isolated by reference to the statutory text, it is not necessary that the person, said to be knowingly concerned, know that those facts are capable of being characterised in the language of the statutory text. Nor is it necessary that the relevant person be shown to have known that the conduct was unlawful in terms of the statutory text. That principle is best illustrated in the following observations of Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in Rural Press Limited v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 216 CLR 53 at [58]:
The trial judge rightly held that it was necessary to find that McAuliffe and Law participated in, or assented to, the companies' contraventions with actual knowledge of the essential elements constituting the contraventions. The Rural Press parties complained that he failed to make particular findings, but they are in fact inherent in his reasoning. In the end the argument was only that McCauliffe and Law "did not know that the principal's conduct was engaged in for the purpose or had the likely effect of substantially lessening competition… in the market as defined". It is wholly unrealistic to seek to characterise knowledge of circumstances in that way. Only a handful of lawyers think or speak in that fashion, and then only at a late stage of analysis of any particular problem. In order to know the essential facts, and thus satisfy s 75B(1) of the Act and like provisions, it is not necessary to know that those facts are capable of characterisation in the language of the statute.
[emphasis added]
371 Third, in order to be knowingly concerned in each contravention by R2O, it is necessary to demonstrate that each contended accessory had actual knowledge of the essential facts.
372 Constructive knowledge is not sufficient. However, actual knowledge may be inferred from wilful blindness or from dishonest or deliberate ignorance. In Young Investments Group Pty Ltd v Mann (2012) 293 ALR 537, Emmett, Bennett and McKerracher JJ said this at [11]:
For statutory breaches, it is well-established that, in order to be an accessory or to be knowingly involved in a contravention, a person must have intentionally participated, having knowledge of the essential matters constituting the contravention: see Yorke v Lucas. That is not imputed or constructive knowledge but, rather, actual knowledge. It would not usually be sufficient to establish a statutory breach to show that a person said to be an accessory to such a breach wilfully shut his or her eyes to the obvious: see Giorgianni v R (1985) 156 CLR 473. Actual knowledge of suspicious circumstances and a failure to make enquiry may be different: see Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 82 ALR 217 at 219…
373 In Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v IMB Group Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 17, Cooper, Kiefel and Emmett JJ observed at [135] that before any accessorial liability will arise in a person, it is necessary to establish the subjective element of knowledge of each of the essential elements of the contravention. Their Honours observed that that knowledge may arise because it is possible to show wilful blindness in relation to the elements of a contravention. Their Honours also observed that absent a finding of wilful blindness, it is necessary to establish actual knowledge on the part of a person to whom it is sought to "sheet home accessorial liability in respect of a contravention" (with their Honours referring, in that case to a contravention arising under Pt V of the TPA).
374 In Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473, Gibbs CJ made these observations at 482:
However, some cases suggest that some qualifications should be admitted to the general principle that a person cannot be found guilty of having aided, abetted, counselled or procured an offence unless he had actual knowledge of all the essential matters which made the act done a crime. One qualification that must be accepted is that wilful blindness, the deliberate shutting of one's eyes to what is going on, is equivalent to knowledge.
375 Gibbs CJ at 482 observed that Lord Devlin had said in Roper v Taylor's Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd [1951] 2 T.L.R. 284 at p 288 that a person who has shut his eyes to an obvious means of knowledge may be described as having "knowledge of the second degree". At 495, Mason J observed in relation to the question of establishing secondary participation that "it is enough if the defendant has deliberately shut his eyes to a relevant fact or has deliberately abstained from obtaining knowledge by making an enquiry for fear that he may learn the truth." Mason J also observed (together with related observations) that his Honour was in agreement with the observations of Gibbs CJ.
376 At 505, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ said this:
Secondly, although it may be a proper inference from the fact that a person has deliberately abstained from making an enquiry about some matter that he knew of it and, perhaps, that he refrained from enquiry so that he could deny knowledge, it is nevertheless actual knowledge which must be proved [of the essential facts] and not knowledge which is imputed or presumed.
377 In Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 82 ALR 217, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ (the Court) at 220 observed that in cases where actual knowledge must be established, "it is never the case that something less than knowledge may be treated as satisfying a requirement of actual knowledge". Their Honours also made the following observations at 220:
Finally, where knowledge is inferred from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged offence, knowledge must be the only rational inference available. All that having been said, the fact remains that a combination of suspicious circumstances and failure to make enquiry may sustain an inference of knowledge of the actual or likely existence of the relevant matter. In a case where a jury is invited to draw such an inference, a failure to make enquiry may sometimes, as a matter of lawyer's shorthand, be referred to as wilful blindness. Where that expression is used, care should be taken to ensure that a jury is not distracted by it from a consideration of the matter in issue as a matter of fact to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
[emphasis added]
378 The principles identified by their Honours at 220, of course, apply to a judge who is undertaking the process of fact-finding, and in civil proceedings where proof of actual knowledge of the essential facts must be established, the question of the standard of proof, subject to the statute, will be the civil standard.
379 Fourth, Hamilton v Whitehead, as earlier discussed, is a decision which concerned the conduct of Whitehead as Managing Director of the relevant company engaging in the contravention. It is an illustration of a case in which the person said to be knowingly concerned was at the centre of the conduct of the company. At 127, Mason CJ, Wilson and Toohey JJ observed that on the facts of the case, there could be no doubt that Whitehead, in placing the advertisement and in dealing with those who responded to it, "was the company". Whitehead was its Managing Director and his mind was the mind of the company. The particular statutory provisions in question had, as their essential elements, a prohibition upon offering or issuing to the public interests in the relevant trust. Whitehead was found to be knowingly concerned in the commission of the offences by the company because of two factors. First, he was the "actor" in the conduct constituting the offences and, second, he "had knowledge of all the material circumstances", having regard to the statutory text, constituting the commission of the offences. Like Mr Whitehead, Mr Green was the "actor" in the conduct constituting the contraventions by R2O (along with Mr Roberts, particularly since Mr Roberts had elected to leave to Mr Green all matters relating to the creation of the calculators), and the question to be determined was whether he "had knowledge of all the material circumstances" constituting the commission of the offences, having regard to the essential facts determined by reference to the statutory text in relation to each contravention.