Penalty
44 By s 47(4) of the NCCP Act a contravention of s 47(1)(m) is a contravention of a civil penalty provision (Regulation 7.6.03C of the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) imposes a similar obligation as Regulation 11A(2) of the Regulations).
45 Section 47 further provides that the relevant civil penalty is 5,000 penalty units (presently $210 per penalty unit).
46 Section 167 of the NCCP Act provides:
(1) Within 6 years of a person contravening a civil penalty provision, ASIC may apply to the court for an order that the person pay the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty.
Court may order person to pay pecuniary penalty
(2) If a declaration has been made under section 166 that the person has contravened the provision, the court may order the person to pay to the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty that the court considers is appropriate (but not more than the amount specified in section 167A).
Determining pecuniary penalty
(3) In determining the pecuniary penalty, the court must take into account all relevant matters, including:
(a) the nature and extent of the contravention; and
(b) the nature and extent of any loss or damage suffered because of the contravention; and
(c) the circumstances in which the contravention took place; and
(d) whether the person has previously been found by a court (including a court in a foreign country) to have engaged in similar conduct.
Civil enforcement of penalty
(4) A pecuniary penalty is a debt payable to the Commonwealth.
(5) The Commonwealth may enforce a pecuniary penalty order as if it were an order made in civil proceedings against the person to recover a debt due by the person. The debt arising from the order is taken to be a judgement debt.
47 Section 167A provides that the maximum pecuniary penalty must not be more than the "pecuniary penalty applicable to the contravention".
48 By s 167B the "pecuniary penalty applicable to the contravention" is, for an individual, the greater of the penalty specified for the civil penalty provision (in this case 5,000 penalty units), or three times the "benefit derived and detriment avoided". That latter term is defined in s 167D.
49 For a corporation, the pecuniary penalty applicable to the contravention is the greater of ten times the penalty specified (ie 50,000 penalty units in this case), or three times the "benefit derived and detriment avoided", or 10% of the annual turnover of the body corporate (up to a maximum 2.5 million penalty units).
50 In relation to the assessment of an appropriate civil penalty, the Full Court in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (2007) 161 FCR 513, 527 - 528 [61] held:
In determining a pecuniary penalty the Court will have regard to the nature, character, content and extent of the contravening conduct; whether the conduct was deliberate and undertaken by Mr Russell in disregard of the prohibition imposed by the legislation; the scale (size, resources, and market power) of the corporation engaging in the conduct through the actions of Mr Russell; the seniority of and role discharged by Mr Russell in relation to the conduct of the corporation; the commercial consequences of the conduct upon all participants affected by the conduct; the contextual events within which the conduct occurred (such as the nature of the industry and the methodology adopted to give effect to the conduct); whether the contravention is truly isolated or aberrant notwithstanding a demonstrated culture of compliance (if one exists) on the part of the corporation or a demonstrated culture of compliance on the part of the senior manager engaged in the conduct giving rise to the contravention; whether Mr Russell has cooperated with ACCC in seeking to address the conduct in the face of examples of contravening conduct identified and put by ACCC to Mr Russell; and whether Mr Russell has previously been found by the Court to have contravened a provision of Part IV of the TPA.
51 More recently in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v GoGetta Equipment Funding Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 420 [35], Davies J assayed the current authorities and observed:
The purpose for the imposition of a pecuniary penalty is to act as a specific deterrent to the contravener and as a general deterrent to others who might be tempted to contravene the law: Fair Work at 506 [55] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ (Gageler J agreeing at 511 [68], Keane J agreeing at 513 [79]); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2018] FCA 155 (ASIC v ANZ). The specific and general deterrent effect of pecuniary penalties is achieved by putting a price on a contravention that is "sufficiently high" to deter repetition by both the contravener and would-be contraveners: Fair Work at 506 [55] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ (Gageler J agreeing at 511 [68], Keane J agreeing at 513 [79]). In Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, in a passage at p 265 at [62]-[63], approved by the High Court in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd , the Full Court explained the need to ensure that the penalty "is not such as to be regarded by that offender or others as an acceptable cost of doing business" and will deter those engaged in trade and commerce "from the cynical calculation involved in weighing up the risk of penalty against the profits to be made from contravention". The penalty must also be proportionate to achieve the objective of specific and general deterrence, because the punishment should reflect what the offender has done.
52 In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Kobelt [2017] FCA 387, White J referred to the High Court decision in Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 326 ALR 476, and noted the "primary role of deterrence in the fixing of civil penalties". His Honour said, at [10]:
In Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate at [59], French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ said, in relation to civil penalties generally, that they are not retributive but are "essentially deterrent or compensatory and therefore protective". Earlier, at [24], the plurality had noted that civil penalties are part of the range of enforcement mechanisms available to regulators by which to achieve compensation, prevention and deterrence. Their Honours also referred to the primary role of deterrence in the fixing of civil penalties at [55]:
[W]hereas criminal penalties import notions of retribution and rehabilitation, the purpose of a civil penalty, as French J explained in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd, is primarily if not wholly protective in promoting the public interest in compliance:
"Punishment for breaches of the criminal law traditionally involves three elements: deterrence, both general and individual, retribution and rehabilitation. Neither retribution nor the rehabilitation, within the sense of the Old and New Testament moralities that imbue much of our criminal law, have any part to play in economic regulation of the kind contemplated by Pt IV [of the Trade Practices Act]. ... The principal, and I think probably the only, object of the penalties imposed by s 76 is to attempt to put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others who might be tempted to contravene the Act."
(Emphasis added).
53 Subsequent to the filing by the parties of their joint submissions on penalty, the High Court handed down its decision in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson [2022] HCA 13 (Pattinson). There, a majority (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ) reaffirmed the centrality of the object of deterrence in the imposition of civil penalties. Their Honours identified (at [15] - [16]) that "it has long been recognised that, unlike criminal sentences, civil penalties are imposed primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of deterrence", such that notions of denunciation, retribution and rehabilitation derived from the Criminal law have no part to play: Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 258 CLR 482, 506 [55] (the Agreed Penalties Case). The object sought to be achieved by the imposition of civil penalties is the promotion of the public interest in compliance with enacted regulation by putting a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and those who might be tempted to contravene in the future: Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR ¶41-076 at 52,152. In other words, a penalty must be fixed at a level so as to ensure that it is not regarded by the offender as being the acceptable cost of doing business.
54 The majority also cited with apparent approval the several non-exclusive factors identified by French J in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR ¶41-076 at 52,152 - 52,153, which may inform the assessment of a penalty in a particular case. His Honour said:
The assessment of a penalty of appropriate deterrent value will have regard to a number of factors which have been canvassed in the cases. These include the following:
1. The nature and extent of the contravening conduct.
2. The amount of loss or damage caused.
3. The circumstances in which the conduct took place.
4. The size of the contravening company.
5. The degree of power it has, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market.
6. The deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended.
7. Whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management or at a lower level.
8. Whether the company has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the Act, as evidenced by educational programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention.
9. Whether the company has shown a disposition to co-operate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Act in relation to the contravention.
55 These submissions, which were advanced jointly by the parties, are consistent with the principles stated by the majority in Pattinson.
56 The parties also correctly submitted that the key criterion to be considered by the Court in imposing penalties on Lightspeed and on Mr Fitzpatrick is the level of deterrence necessary to promote the public interest, and to set that level at least to some extent above the benefit otherwise gained by the respondents. That is, the level of deterrence should be sufficient that the respondents do not consider the penalty to be merely the "acceptable cost of doing business". However, the penalty imposed should not be excessive, and not directed toward retribution.
57 As the parties further submitted, here, the relevant contravention was not the facilitation of any loan to Mr Birnie or Ms El Ghalemi. It was the failure to give effect to the second AFCA determination. The respondents operated a small to medium business and there is no evidence that they have significant income or assets in this case. Moreover, the contravention here is a single contravention (each) and there has been some co-operation with ASIC in this action.
58 The parties referenced the following decisions on the basis that they might be useful comparators relating to the penalties imposed in other cases:
(a) In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Financial Circle Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1644, O'Callaghan J imposed penalties of several million dollars for numerous (totalling in the thousands) breaches (set out in a table in paragraph [185]). A penalty of $1 million was sought, and imposed, for 144 contraventions of s 961L of the Corporations Act 2001. That provision requires licensees to take reasonable steps to ensure that their representatives comply with certain other provisions of that act. A penalty in that sum amounts to about $7,000 for each contravention of s 961L;
(b) In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ACN 092 879 733 Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 923, Nicholas J imposed a penalty of $7,500 for a breach of s 30 of the Act, by the director of a corporate respondent holding itself out on a number of occasions as engaging, or being able to engage, in credit activity. At the time, contravention of that provision provided for a maximum penalty of 2,000 penalty units (or 10,000 for a company), and the value of a penalty unit was $110. The maximum penalty which could be imposed on an individual was $220,000, and on a company $1,100,000.
59 In addition to the prospect of an order for compensation being made against them, the respondents have also agreed to pay ASIC's costs (being the costs of this proceeding and investigation costs) in the sum of $50,000.
60 For these reasons the parties jointly submitted that in this case, an appropriate pecuniary penalty to be imposed in respect of the contravention by each respondent of s 47(1)(m) of the Act is:
(a) $15,000 in respect of the first respondent;
(b) $5,000 in respect of the second respondent.
61 These submissions should be accepted. Here, there has only been a single breach of s 47(1)(m) of the NCCP Act although that is not to diminish its seriousness. Lightspeed and Mr Fitzpatrick were entitled to the benefit of a credit licence so as to engage in their business only by reason of their agreement to be bound by the AFCA external dispute resolution scheme. They took advantage of the opportunities which the licence afforded them but failed to meet the obligations which it entailed by their refusal to comply with AFCA's determinations. However, it is important to keep in mind that Lightspeed and Mr Fitzpatrick conducted a relatively small operation and there is nothing to suggest that either would be able to meet a substantial penalty. The respondents have co-operated with ASIC in this matter and, to a degree, this evidences an appreciation of the situation and an intention to avoid future contraventions. The penalties suggested by ASIC and agreed to by the respondents impose a sufficient deterrence to further conduct by them as well as providing a deterrence by others. The penalties to be imposed should be in the amount proposed by the parties.