pecuniary relief
30 The making of the declaratory orders under s 166 of the National Credit Act founds the Court's power to order GoGetta to pay a pecuniary penalty that the Court consider appropriate to the Commonwealth (s 167(2) of the National Credit Act). ASIC also seeks an order that GoGetta pay the Commonwealth pecuniary penalties for contravening ss 29 and 32 of that Act in the agreed amount of $750,000. The Court does not have to accept the agreed amount of the penalty, however as the High Court stated in Fair Work at [58], subject to the Court being sufficiently persuaded of the accuracy of the parties' agreement as to facts and consequences, it is desirable that the Court accept the parties' submissions on penalties, where it is satisfied that the penalty is appropriate in all the circumstances.
31 The relevant alleged contraventions occurred between 30 April 2015 and 21 December 2016. At the relevant times, a single contravention of either s 29 or s 32 of the National Credit Act attracted a maximum civil penalty of 2000 units. The penalty unit during that time was $170 until 30 July 2015 and $180 from 31 July 2015 to 30 June 2017. During the relevant period, s 167(3)(b) of the National Credit Act provided that the maximum penalty which may be imposed on a corporation for a contravention of a civil penalty provision is five times the maximum number of penalty units referred to in the relevant provision. Accordingly, the maximum civil penalties which may be imposed for GoGetta's contraventions of ss 29 and 32 of the National Credit Act during the Relevant Period are:
(a) between 1 July 2014 and 30 July 2015, $1,700,000 (being 2000 x 5 x $170);
(b) between 31 July 2015 and 30 June 2017, $1,800,000 (being 2000 x 5 x $180).
32 Pursuant to s 167(3) of the National Credit Act, in determining pecuniary penalty, the Court must take into account all relevant matters, including:
(a) the nature and extent of the contravention;
(b) the nature and extent of any loss or damage suffered because of the contravention;
(c) the circumstances in which the contravention took place; and
(d) whether the person has previously been found by a court (including a court in a foreign country) to have engaged in similar conduct.
33 Other factors that are usually relevant include:
(a) the seriousness of the conduct and period over which it extended;
(b) the deliberateness of the conduct and whether the conduct was dishonest;
(c) the period of time over which the contraventions occurred;
(d) whether further contraventions are likely;
(e) whether the contravener has engaged in similar conduct in the past;
(f) whether the contravener has cooperated with ASIC in relation to the contravention;
(g) whether corrective measures have been taken by the contravener in response to an acknowledged contravention;
(h) whether the company had disgorged any profit or benefit received as a result of the contravention, or made reparation;
(i) the financial position of the contravener and its resources to pay a penalty
34 The list is not exhaustive nor a rigid catalogue or checklist of matters to be considered, however those factors may be taken to be relevant because they directly bear on the assessment of the penalty that is necessary to achieve general and specific deterrence: Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2021] FCAFC 49 at [150]. The overriding requirement is that the Court should weigh all relevant circumstances that bear on the assessment of an appropriate penalty in the circumstances of the case: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v GE Capital Finance Australia, in the matter of GE Capital Finance Australia [2014] FCA 701 (per Jacobsen J at [72]). In weighing and balancing the relevant factors, the Court must ensure that the penalty is just, bearing in mind the protective and deterrent purpose of a pecuniary penalty and the factors relevant to the contravention and the contravener: see Fair Work at [109].
35 The purpose for the imposition of a pecuniary penalty is to act as a specific deterrent to the contravener and as a general deterrent to others who might be tempted to contravene the law: Fair Work at 506 [55] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ (Gageler J agreeing at 511 [68], Keane J agreeing at 513 [79]); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2018] FCA 155 (ASIC v ANZ). The specific and general deterrent effect of pecuniary penalties is achieved by putting a price on a contravention that is "sufficiently high" to deter repetition by both the contravener and would-be contraveners: Fair Work at 506 [55] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ (Gageler J agreeing at 511 [68], Keane J agreeing at 513 [79]). In Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2012) 287 ALR 249; [2012] FCAFC 20 in a passage at p 265 at [62]-[63], approved by the High Court in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640; [2013] HCA 54 at [64] and [66], the Full Court explained the need to ensure that the penalty "is not such as to be regarded by that offender or others as an acceptable cost of doing business" and will deter those engaged in trade and commerce "from the cynical calculation involved in weighing up the risk of penalty against the profits to be made from contravention". The penalty must also be proportionate to achieve the objective of specific and general deterrence, because the punishment should reflect what the offender has done: ASIC v ANZ at [7].
36 Ordinarily, where there are numerous contraventions arising from separate acts, each contravention should attract the imposition of a separate penalty. However it is also appropriate to consider whether, and the extent to which, the contravening conduct can be regarded as the same single course of conduct and penalised as one offence in relation to each category of contravention: ASIC v ANZ at [22]; Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2017) 254 FCR 68; [2017] FCAFC 113 at [145].
37 The contravening conduct in this case was serious. The contraventions are properly characterised as arising from a systemic failure by GoGetta from the outset to have an effective process for verifying business use in the conduct of its commercial rental business. Whilst GoGetta and SIV Capital were not subject to the obligations of Chapter 2 of the National Credit Act in respect of the rental and financing products they supplied to commercial customers, they did not have adequate processes and systems in place to ensure that the leases that GoGetta entered into were not consumer leases for the purposes of Chapter 3 of the National Credit Act. As a result, the 10 consumer leases the subject of this proceeding were entered into by GoGetta without the protection afforded to the consumers imposed by Part 3-4 of Chapter 3 of the National Credit Act. It is important to bear in mind that Part 3-4 of Chapter 3 of the National Credit Act imposes the obligation on a lessor to assess whether a consumer lease would be unsuitable for the consumer having regard to their ability to meet their financial obligations under the proposed lease or the consumer's requirements and objectives and not to enter into the consumer lease if it would be unsuitable for the consumer. The failure to have adequate systems in place to ensure that leases were for business, not private or personal use, had the consequence of GoGetta providing consumer leasing services, albeit unintentionally. There was no suggestion that the contravening conduct was deliberate or the result of dishonest action, however it was submitted by ASIC that it was, or should have been, obvious to GoGetta that a business model providing leasing through intermediaries was open to use and abuse by intermediaries avoiding their obligations under Chapter 3 of the National Credit Act, because GoGetta was not required to comply with that regulatory regime. GoGetta may properly be criticised for its inattention and failure to consider whether customers would seek a rental agreement for a consumer purpose and its consequential failure to consider whether any measures should be put in place to address that risk. In mitigation, though, it would seem that such risk was relatively modest, as it is noted that there was no suggestion of systemic rorting or that endemic fraud existed. The more salient point is that the contraventions occurred because of GoGetta's inattention to the adequacy of its own processes to ensure that none of the leases it entered into were consumer leases, including even after the possibility of contravention of s 29 of the National Credit Act was brought to its attention as far back as mid-2016. It was apparently only when ASIC took action and notified GoGetta of its investigation into the matter in mid July 2017, that GoGetta took steps to address the issue.
38 Significantly, however, since ASIC commenced its investigations and drew the contraventions to the attention of GoGetta, GoGetta has fully cooperated with ASIC, ceased this part of its business, admitted liability (save on the question of a number of contraventions which, initially, was the subject of dispute), acted swiftly to limit potential loss and damage to its customers, engaged Ernst & Young to conduct a review of its existing leasing and identify areas of concern, agreed to a court enforceable undertaking, agreed to (and implemented) a remediation program under which GoGetta and SIV Capital agreed to make remediation payments to affected customers, not to profit or retain any form of interest, or a fee or charge from an affected motor vehicle lease and not to seek to recover arrears or remaining payments from affected customers. GoGetta has, to date, complied with its obligations under the court enforceable undertaking and the remediation program. In its submissions to the Court, ASIC stated that it considered that "the level of cooperation by GoGetta since the commencement of ASIC's investigation and during these proceedings has been exemplary". Both parties submitted and I accept that these matters are significant mitigating factors that should be reflected in a significant discount to penalty. Another relevant consideration and mitigating circumstance in the assessment of penalty is that GoGetta has not been found to have engaged in similar conduct previously.
39 I am satisfied that a total pecuniary penalty of $750,000 is an appropriate penalty in the circumstances of the present case, taking all of these matters into consideration. In the overall circumstances, having regard to the mitigating factors, specific deterrence is not a significant factor and a weighty penalty is not necessary to achieve specific deterrence. In view of the fact that the contravening conduct was the result of system failures, rather than deliberate or dishonest conduct, and the significant mitigating factors of cooperation, admissions and remediation, it is also appropriate that there be a significant discount of the maximum penalty.
40 Both parties also submitted, and I accept that for the purpose of penalty, it is also appropriate that the 295 separate contraventions of s 32 (because GoGetta received multiple receipts in respect of each Rental Agreement) be treated as 10 courses of conduct, each constituting multiple receipts for a single Rental Agreement. It is also appropriate to treat the contraventions of ss 29 and 32 in respect of each Rental Agreement as a single course of conduct, given the close legal and factual relationships between the contraventions of s 29 and s 32 for each consumer and for the Court to determine a penalty on the basis of 10 courses of conduct. The contravening conduct under s 29 and s 32 was different, however the conduct was interrelated in that the contravening conduct under each provision was tied to GoGetta entering into, and being the lessor under the 10 Rental Agreements in question, without holding an ACL and exercising its rights as lessor under those rental agreements each time it accepted or received a payment without holding an ACL (s 32). The contraventions of s 32 are properly to be regarded as consequential to the primary contravention of entering into the Rental Agreements without an ACL in breach of s 29.
41 In my view, the agreed pecuniary penalty of $750,000 (or $75,000 per Rental Agreement) reflects the seriousness of the contravening conduct, is an amount that would not be regarded as an acceptable cost of doing business in relation to the 10 Rental Agreements and is sufficiently burdensome to act as general deterrence for others who engage in similar conduct, but which also makes appropriate allowance for the extensive mitigating factors. In the circumstances, it is appropriate to fix the pecuniary penalty in this amount.
I certify that the preceding forty-one (41) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Davies.