Consideration
27 In considering whether to make the orders that ASIC sought on an interim basis, I was conscious that freezing orders of the kind sought, and orders prohibiting travel, were substantial incursions into the liberty of the defendants and should not be made lightly. I was also conscious that ASIC was seeking the orders on an ex parte basis so that if the orders were made, that would occur before the defendants had an opportunity to oppose the orders.
28 Nevertheless, I determined that it was appropriate to make the order sought for the following reasons:
(1) The relevant precondition to the orders is satisfied here. ASIC is conducting an investigation into the conduct of the defendants. The conduct may involve contraventions of the Corporations Act, including s 1041G, which prohibits dishonest conduct in relation to a financial product of a financial service. It may also involve contraventions of the ASIC Act, including s 12DB, which prohibits the making of false and misleading representations in connection with the supply or possible supply of financial services. ASIC is also investigating whether the defendants' conduct involved breaches of the Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA), including s 409, which concerns fraud as an offence.
(2) The conduct alleged against the defendants is at a high level of dishonesty and impropriety. It involves a pattern of identifying vulnerable members of the community who may be susceptible to the suggestion that they can obtain early access to superannuation funds, and inducing those persons to apply for that access without regard to their actual interests. The manner in which it is alleged that the applications were conducted may have involved impersonating the putative clients without their authority, using email accounts set up in the clients' names without their authority for the purposes of making the applications, forging signatures on application forms, and having money withdrawn from superannuation funds paid into the personal bank accounts of Mr Goel or associates. While money may have then been paid out to the putative clients, that was not without the deduction of substantial fees, which may not have been agreed with or authorised by the clients.
(3) It goes without saying that if this conduct is established then, to the extent that it was carried out under the rubric of a financial advisory licence, it would fall grossly short of the standards of propriety to be expected of the authorised representatives of such a licensee, including many of the standards imposed by law.
(4) ASIC's investigations into these matters are advanced, so while they are unproven allegations, they are not speculative and in some cases are based on specific evidence from aggrieved persons and objective evidence from reliable sources such as banks and AUSTRAC. In the ASIC examination Mr Goel partially confirmed the allegations, although he put a different complexion on them.
(5) In those circumstances the level of dishonesty and impropriety alleged is significant to the risk assessment which the court must undertake. It increases the likelihood of dissipation of assets and flight against which the proposed orders would guard.
(6) The number of aggrieved persons is large and the conduct alleged is likely to be important to those persons. While each putative fee which Mr Goel, AR Wealth and associates may have obtained from those persons might not be a large sum of money when considered alone, it is likely to be of substantial importance to at least some of the aggrieved persons given their individual circumstances. In the case of Mr M, for example, the alleged fee appears to have been around a quarter of the total sum withdrawn from his superannuation and in the case of Ms C it was nearly 20%.
(7) The dishonesty involved in the alleged conduct, and the manner in which it resulted in the aggrieved persons, gives rise to a real possibility that Mr Goel and AR Wealth are liable to compensate those persons for the moneys that have been appropriated or otherwise account to them. For example, if a breach of s 1041G is established, then any person who suffered loss as a result of conduct engaged in contravention of that section may recover the amount of the loss or damage from the contravenor: Corporations Act s 1041I(1).
(8) The assets of the defendants in Australia which have been identified are comprised of cash which would be easy to transfer out of the jurisdiction or otherwise put out of the reach of creditors. Mr Goel has a history of transferring cash overseas.
(9) Mr Goel has appears to have few ties to Australia. Relocating to India, the country in which he was borne and where he still has family, would seem to be a practicable option for him. He has an aeroplane ticket and an exemption to leave the country which would enable him to do so at any time.
29 In my view these matters, taken together, give rise to a level of risk that assets of the defendants may be taken out of reach of legal processes available to enforce their recovery, and a risk that Mr Goel will leave Australia, so that it is desirable to make orders that will protect the interests of aggrieved persons by prohibiting those things. The amount of money in the bank accounts of the defendants that has been identified may be sufficient to compensate aggrieved persons, but is not so large that freezing the entire amount is disproportionate to the need to protect those persons' interests.
30 Nevertheless, I had three reservations about making those orders. The first was that the evidence that AR Wealth engaged in any of the alleged conduct is not substantial. It appears that Mr Goel may deny that he did act through or for the company at relevant times. But given that he is the company's sole shareholder, director and secretary, and that the company has the capacity of an authorised representative of a financial services licensee, it is open to infer that AR Wealth did engage in relevant conduct that may make it liable to aggrieved persons. The inference is not a strong one, but in my view it is sufficient to make it desirable to mitigate the risks by making the orders sought on an interim basis.
31 The second reservation was that it was not immediately apparent how travel restrictions would protect the interests of aggrieved persons. The cases I have cited above in that regard tend to place emphasis on the desirability of the targets of investigations staying in the jurisdiction so that they can assist with ongoing investigations. Here, however, it is clear that ASIC's investigation is almost complete, in the sense that it is ready to place criminal charges. There is no reason to suppose that it will need Mr Goel's assistance in future or be able to obtain that assistance. In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hawley [2008] FCA 1423 at [6] Perram J said:
It is tolerably plain that s 1323(1) is directed to the protection of the interests of aggrieved persons (so defined). If the purpose for which the order is made is not for that purpose then the provision does not authorise the making of an order. The purpose of keeping Mr Hawley within the jurisdiction to ensure that he is present if and when the Director of Public Prosecutions decides to prosecute him is not the purpose of protecting the interests of the aggrieved persons. It follows that orders under s 1323(1) cannot be made for that purpose.
32 However on the basis of submissions by senior counsel and junior counsel for ASIC I was persuaded that in the circumstances of this case, it was desirable in order to protect the interests of aggrieved persons that Mr Goel remain within the jurisdiction. If Mr Goel leaves Australia, any criminal prosecution and resulting verdict will be delayed by reason of the need to seek extradition, and may be entirely frustrated. That may adversely affect the interests of aggrieved persons because one possible outcome of a criminal prosecution may be an order for compensation to victims under s 117 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). Indeed, given the relatively small individual amounts involved and the likely lack of resources of some of the aggrieved persons, an order of that kind may be the only realistic prospect of recovery of compensation for any wrongdoing established.
33 The third reservation was that on the face of the evidence, Mr Goel may have a good reason to go to India which is unconnected with the allegations ASIC makes against him, and not motivated by a desire to flee Australia. That is his mother's apparent illness. ASIC had no basis to suggest that the medical certificate I have mentioned was anything other than what it appeared to be. If so, Mr Goel's mother has experienced a potentially life threatening health emergency. Obviously, if that is established it will provide a ground that Mr Goel may wish to advance in support of any wish on his part to travel to India.
34 Nevertheless, the apparent date of the heart attack was 19 August 2020. While the medical certificate said that Mr Goel's mother came to the hospital in a 'very critical condition' and that her condition was serious, it also said that she 'needs her near and dear ones to look after her and to boost her morale', suggesting that after treatment at the hospital her condition was not critical and may be susceptible to improvement. That suggestion is strengthened by the fact that Mr Goel did not apply for an exemption to leave Australia until 2 September 2020, did not book travel for a date before 8 September 2020, and did not in fact travel on that date. While this provides little for the court to go on, in my view it was enough to mean that there was no compelling reason not to impose travel restrictions for at least a short time. Mr Goel will, of course, have an opportunity to put on evidence in support of any submission he may wish to make that his mother's medical condition means that the interim restriction should not be extended further.