legal principles
17 ASIC has helpfully set out the well-established principles and statutory framework in its written submissions, at paragraphs 10 to 28, 30 to 31 and 64 to 65, and I gratefully adopt them as follows:
10. Section 1323(1) of the Corporations Act empowers the court to make a range of different orders where, relevantly:
(a) an investigation is being carried out under the ASIC Act or the Corporations Act in relation to an act or omission by a person (the relevant person) which constitutes or may constitute a contravention of the Corporations Act; and
(b) the Court considers it "necessary or desirable" to make such orders for the purpose of "protecting the interests" of a person (the aggrieved person) to whom the relevant person is liable, or may be or become liable, to pay money (whether in respect of a debt, by way of damages, compensation or otherwise) or to account for financial products or other property.
11. The orders which may be made under section 1323(1) are enumerated in sections 1323(1)(d) to (k). They include, inter alia:
(a) per section 1323(h), orders appointing receivers over the property or part of the property of the relevant person (be they a natural person or a body corporate); and
(b) per sections 1323(j) and (k), where the relevant person is a natural person, orders requiring the person to deliver up their passport to the court and prohibiting the person from leaving the jurisdiction or Australia without the consent of the court.
12. Although asset preservation orders are not one of the types of order expressly identified in section 1323(1), it is now established where the grounds for the appointment of receivers under section 1323(h) have been made out, a lesser order restricting or prohibiting dealings with the relevant property may be made instead (noting that such orders will often serve the same function, but be less practically prejudicial than the appointment of receivers): Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Carey (No. 14) (Carey (No 14)) [2007] 158 FCR 92; [2007] 310, at [33] (French J); Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Ostrava Equities Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 425, at [11] (Davies J).
13. An asset preservation order made in this context remains an order made under section 1323(1) (albeit one made calling in aid s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)). As such, it remains that the principles governing the exercise of the Court's discretion under s 1323 apply, not those relevant to the making of Mareva-style injunctions more generally: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Krecichwost (Krecichwost) (2007) 213 FLR 314; [2007] NSWSC 948, at [35]-[37] (McDougall J). The question is whether the power to make an order under s 1323(h) is enlivened. If so, the Court may consider whether a less drastic remedy will suffice: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Burnard (Burnard) [2007] NSWSC 1217, at [22] (Barrett J); citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Banovec (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 961.
14. If the Court is satisfied that it is necessary and desirable to make asset preservation orders or to appoint a receiver under section 1323(1)(h), it may also make disclosure orders requiring a person the subject of those orders to set out their assets and liabilities. Such disclosure orders are justified on the basis that they are ancillary to and in aid of the effective implementation of the preliminary order: Krecichwost (2007) 213 FLR 314; [2007] NSWSC 948, at [50] (McDougall J); Burnard [2007] NSWSC 1217, at [116]-[121] (Barrett J). Even though relevant persons may be taken to know what their assets are and therefore to need no disclosure in order to comply with an asset preservation order, it has been accepted that such an order is something in which ASIC has a continuing interest and that some ability to monitor compliance should be afforded to ASIC: Burnard [2007] NSWSC 1217, as [118] (Barrett J).
15. Pursuant to section 1323(6), an order made under section 1323(1) may be expressed to operate for a specified time or until further order.
16. Section 1323(3) empowers the court to grant interim orders pending determination of an application under section 1323(1).
…Principles relevant to the exercise of the Court's power
17. The critical question of whether the orders sought are "necessary or desirable" to protect the interests of an aggrieved person is not concerned with the character of the alleged wrongdoing of the defendants or the ability or willingness of the aggrieved persons to pursue their interests. Rather, it is concerned with the protection of the interests of those persons who may ultimately have claims against the defendants: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Sino Australia Oil and Gas Ltd [2014] FCA 565, at (Davies J and the authorities cited therein.
18. The words "protecting the interests" of aggrieved persons in section 1323(1) are wide, and not amenable to precise definition: Mauer-Swisse Securities (2002) 20 ACLC 1530; [2002] NSWSC 684, at [36] (Palmer J). In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mauer-Swisse Securities Ltd (Mauer-Swisse Securities) (2002) 20 ACLC; [2002] 1530 NSWSC 684, Palmer J explained the proper approach of the inquiry [at [37]] as follows:
Accordingly, in any particular case, where the Court determines that the interests of aggrieved persons are or may be prejudicially affected, it will be a matter for the Court, in the exercise of a discretionary judgment, to decide what sort of protection available within the parameters afforded to s 1323(1) should be given. Sometimes, where claims actual or potential against a "relevant person" are few in number, readily identifiable and tolerably quantifiable, orders would be made primarily directed to the preservation of assets in order to meet those claims, and no further. But in other cases, there may be evidence to suggest that fraud has been perpetrated on a large scale and that many of the victims have no or little information about the extent of the fraud, no or little means for their own investigations, and no or little resources to prosecute their own claims. In such a case, the interests of such persons are protected, within the contemplation of s 1323, by enabling ASIC to conduct an investigation for the purpose of identifying the wrongdoers and exposing them not only to penalties under the Corporations Act and other legislation, but also to claims for compensation from the victims themselves.
19. The interests of aggrieved persons may be protected not only by orders designed to protect dissipation of assets, but also by orders which create an opportunity for the assets of the person under investigation to be ascertained: Re Richstar Enterprises Pty Ltd and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Carey (No. 3) (Carey (No3)) [2006] FCA 433, at [27] (French J),
20. Given the very nature of an application under s 1323 there is necessarily "an element of risk assessment and risk management in the judgment the Court is called to make": Carey (No 3) [2006] FCA 433, at [26] (French J). It has been accepted there is no requirement on the part of ASIC to demonstrate a prima facie case of liability on the part of the relevant person, or that the person's assets have been or are about to be dissipated: Carey (No 3) [2006] FCA 433, at [26] (French J) and the authorities cited therein.
21. The terms of section 1323 do not themselves make any express provision for the nature of the evidence upon which the court may act in making orders under it. The matter was considered by French J, as his Honour then was, in Richstar Enterprises Pty Ltd and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Carey (No. 3) [2006] FCA 433, at [30]-[31], where his Honour held that:
(a) s 1323 does not require concluded findings of fact about liability or whether assets have been dissipated;
(b) the logic of the section assumes that the court will not always have before its evidence of the kind that would be necessary and admissible in proceedings to final relief. Nor will it necessarily have before its evidence of the kind that would establish definitively that dissipation of assets has occurred or is likely to occur or that flight is imminent;
(c) in light of the above, hearsay evidence may be received and acted upon, not as proof of the truth of its contents but as evidence of the existence of a risk; and
(d) in particular:
[e]vidence may be received of the opinion of a suitably qualified person who has had the opportunity to review extensive documentation collected in the course of an investigation and to offer an overview of it for the benefit of the court. In such a case the opinion or overview should be supported by reference to the relevant documentation and factual material. The opinion is received not for the determination of any ultimate issue of liability but as probative of the risk which the Court must assess in determining whether to make an order under the section.
22. At the stage, an order is sought under section 1323 the court may not be in a position to identify with precision any particular liability owed by the person or persons the subject of the proposed order: Carey (No 3) [2006] FCA 433, at [25] (French J). The statutory text makes clear that the purpose of the provision is to protect the interests of not only persons to whom a defendant is liable, but also those to whom a defendant may be or become liable. In the case of an application made during an early stage of an investigation the evidence may be regarded as sufficient if it establishes the general circumstances, the nature of the investigation and the reason why it is thought there may be some liability on the part of a relevant person: Corporate Affairs Commission NSW v Walker (1987) 11 ACLR 884, at 888 (Waddell CJ in Eq); cited with approval in, for example, Krecichwost (2007) 213 FLR 314; [2007] NSWSC 948, at [42].
23. A finding of necessity or desirability enlivens the discretion to make orders under section 1323(1) but does not compel the exercise of that discretion: Krecichwost (2007) 213 FLR 314; [2007] NSWSC 948, at [33].
24. In Re HIH Insurance Ltd and HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd, re; Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v Adler (Adler) (2002) 41 ACSR 72, [at [7]] Santow J set out what his Honour considered to be the proper approach to the exercise of the discretion to make asset preservation orders under section 1323. That passage has since been cited with approval on a number of occasions. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Guo (Guo) [2024] FCA 125, at [29] (Button J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Goel [2020] FCA 1369, at [22] (Jackson J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v M101 Nominees Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1166, at [47] and [48] (Anderson J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Secure Investments Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 639, at [27] (Derrington J).
25. Most relevantly to the present application, his Honour observed that:
(a) Evidence of dissipation of assets and at least a reasonably persuasive case are powerful discretionary considerations affecting the court's willingness to make an order and, if so, effecting the scope of the orders justified in the circumstances.
(b) That said, where there is an ongoing investigation and ASIC has investigated seeks asset preservation orders in pursuit of its public interest role, ASIC may satisfy the court that the state of its investigations and the wider public interest justify such orders, even absent evidence of the significant risk of dissipation of assets, noting that ASIC must act in the public interest, rather than self-interest, and
(c) in giving a reasonable margin of appreciation to ASIC in its public interest role. The court does not abdicate from its responsibility to make sure that the orders that it makes operate in a manner that is proportionate and not more intrusive than is necessary in the circumstances, recognising that it is inevitable that such orders will intrude upon private rights.
26. The making of travel restraint orders under sections 1323(1)(j) and (k) was very recently considered by the court in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Guo (Guo) [2024] FCA 125.
27. As the authorities make clear, it is a serious matter to restrain a person from travelling internationally. Nonetheless, in appropriate circumstances, the private right to travel may be outweighed by the public interest in ASIC being able to pursue its investigations and for the purpose of protecting of aggrieved persons: Guo [2024] FCA 125, at [20]-[22] (Button J) and the authorities discussed therein.
28. Factors to be weighed against the right to travel freely include:
(a) the fact that the investigation being carried out by ASIC cannot be properly or effectively conducted in the absence of the person;
(b) the importance of the person in the ongoing investigation, the character of the potential offences or contraventions, whether the person has a base overseas and the stage at which the investigation is at; and
(c) whether there is evidence that, by examination of the person, which may be thwarted if the person flees Australia, ASIC is likely to improve the chances of the aggrieved persons retrieving their moneys; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Johnston [2009] FCA 1276 (ASIC v Johnston), at [10]-[12] (Siopsis J).
(footnotes incorporated into text)
18 As to the ex parte nature of this application, again, adopting the submissions of the plaintiff:
30. Such orders ought only to be made on an ex parte basis where there are good reasons for doing so. Good reasons include when a scam is first discovered, and it is necessary to prevent the money that has been received by the defendants being dissipated immediately or when to alert the defendants that the acts as about to fall mean that they have time to disperse: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1079, at [3] (Young CJ in Eq).
31. In Adler, Santow J observed that consideration of ASICs public interest role will also affect the court's approach when an urgent ex parte application is made by ASIC in that, while the justification for ex parte relief would ordinarily be centred around whether - around there being a significant risk of dissipation of assets, there may be exceptional circumstances where the evidence for this may still be in the process of collection and very brief ex parte orders to maintain the status quo are still justified: Adler (2001) 38 ACSR 266, at [7(e)] (Santow J).
…
64. Section 12GF of the ASIC Act provides that a person who suffers loss or damage by conduct of another person that contravenes, inter alia, s 12CB may recover the amount of the loss or damage by action against that other person or against any person involved in the contravention. In addition, s 12GM(2)(c) provides that the Court may make compensation orders in enforcement proceedings commenced by ASIC for contraventions of various provisions, including s 12CB.
65. Section 1041I of the Corporations Act provides that a person who suffers loss or damage by conduct of another person that contravenes, inter alia, s 1041G, may recover the amount of the loss or damage by action against that other person or against any person involved in the contravention. Section 35 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) provides that the Court may make restitution or compensation orders against a person convicted of an offence under the Criminal Code.
(footnotes incorporated into text)