[2025] FCA 904
General information, not legal advice.
Federal Court of Australia
2025-08-07
Stellios J
Original judgment source is linked above.
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
(a) Exhibit CT-2 to the Second Confidential Affidavit of Clarence Tan Guan Hong;
(b) Exhibit SJS-1 to the Affidavit of Samuel James Scerri affirmed 4 June 2025; and
(c) Pages 23-27 inclusive of the Affidavit of McKenzie Moore affirmed 14 July 2025
(together, the Confidential Information) not be published or disclosed to or by any person or entity and not be disclosed in the open part of any Court transcript, and be restricted to:
(d) the parties;
(e) the parties' legal representatives;
(f) the independent expert witnesses for the parties;
(g) the Mediator and necessary staff of the Mediator in respect of the Mediation due to be held between the parties;
(h) ASIC's staff working in respect of this proceeding as notified in writing by the plaintiff to the defendant from time to time;
(i) the presiding judge; and
(j) necessary court staff.
(a) be identified on any list of exhibits as such; and
(b) not be further copied or reproduced, by any means, including by electronic means or handwritten summary thereof.
(a) The defendant file and serve written submissions in support of the application and any evidence on which it intends to rely by 4:00pm on 14 August 2025.
(b) The plaintiff file and serve written submissions in reply and any evidence on which it intends to rely by 4:00pm on 21 August 2025.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
(1) A confidential affidavit of Clarence Tan Guan Hong affirmed on 5 May 2025 and its Exhibit CT-2 (Second Tan Affidavit); and
(2) An affidavit of Samuel James Scerri affirmed on 4 June 2025 and its annexures (Scerri Affidavit), including an expert report at Exhibit SJS-1 to that affidavit (Scerri Report)
34. During the Relevant Period, where a retail client traded in the CFD Product:
a. there was a high degree of risk of losses;
b. there was a high risk that a client may lose all of their investment;
there was a high risk of a retail client losing money rapidly after acquiring the CFD Product, and the level of risk was further increased if the underlying instrument itself was volatile or high risk;
- the high degree of leverage offered in the CFD Product could work against the client;
- there was a high risk of margin requirements changing and, at times, very rapidly;
- there was a high risk that a retail client would lose money rapidly when trading the CFD Product due to leverage.
During the Relevant Period, when a retail client traded the CFD Product with cryptocurrency as the underlying instrument (eToro Cryptocurrency CFD):
a. the retail client was trading in an extremely high risk investment;
- in the alternative to sub-paragraph (a), the retail client was trading in a high risk investment;
- the prices of the eToro Cryptocurrency CFDs quoted to the retail client were derived from price feeds from cryptocurrency exchanges or cryptocurrency hedge counterparties;
- the retail client could be exposed to fast and large changes to the value of their trading position and to their account with eToro, potentially triggering the need for more margin to be paid by that client, including at short or no notice;
- there was a risk of possible delays in closing out a trade due to underlying illiquidity, or volatility or early close out due to the underlying cryptocurrency;
- the prices available for cryptocurrencies could fluctuate significantly on any given day and over time, so that the pricing of the eToro Cryptocurrency CFDs could also fluctuate significantly and as often;
- there was no regulated market for cryptocurrencies, and this affected the pricing, liquidity and integrity of the markets and any exchange used for dealing in the cryptocurrencies which were the underlying instruments (where exchanges offering pricing for cryptocurrencies had little or no regulation or protections for users of them, affecting the pricing, liquidity and cost of transactions in cryptocurrencies, and correspondingly affecting the pricing of eToro Cryptocurrency CFDs);
- cryptocurrencies relied upon technology inherent in the software for the cryptocurrency, nodes and mining of cryptocurrencies, none of which were regulated or backed by any government or voluntary institution, so there were additional risks inherent in cryptocurrencies, and their predictability was much more uncertain;
- it was possible that some cryptocurrencies may become worthless, leading to a retail client's eToro Cryptocurrency CFDs becoming worthless;
- under certain market conditions, the retail client might find it difficult or impossible to liquidate a CFD position, for example, when the market reached a daily price fluctuation limit and there is insufficient liquidity in the market;
- if the market moved against the retail client's position, they might be called upon by eToro to provide a substantial amount of additional margin, on short notice, in order to maintain their position, and if they did not provide the required funds within the time required by eToro, their position might be liquidated at a loss;
- eToro allowed trading in eToro Cryptocurrency CFDs over the weekend, and where cryptocurrency exchanges might operate over weekends, there could be a significant difference between Friday's close and Sunday's open prices of eToro Cryptocurrency CFDs, which might result in not completing an order on a specific trading day or completing an order on a substantially less favourable price.
(1) the Financial Planning Expert Report dated 12 June 2025 (served on the parties on 16 June 2025); and
(2) the Derivative Expert Report dated 30 June 2025 (served on the parties on 3 July 2025)
The principles set out by the High Court in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175 are directly applicable to the present application. In Aon, the plurality (at [111]), when considering the issue of granting leave to amend, said that the court's discretion should:
... not be approached on the basis that a party is entitled to raise an arguable claim, subject to the payment of costs by way of compensation. There is no such entitlement. All matters relevant to the exercise of the power to permit amendment should be weighed. The fact of substantial delay and wasted costs, the concerns of case management, will assume importance on an application for leave to amend.
The plurality also emphasised (at [112]) that although parties have a right to bring proceedings and make choices as to how they frame their case, limits will be placed upon their ability to effect changes in their pleadings, particularly when, as in the case here, the proceedings are advanced. The plurality observed that in seeking the just resolution of the dispute, reference is made to parties having a sufficient opportunity to identify the issues they wish to agitate.
...
The need for a satisfactory explanation has been emphasised in cases applying Aon. In Solahart Industries Pty Ltd v Solar Shop Pty Ltd (No 1) [2010] FCA 1083; (2010) 88 IPR 337, Perram J refused an amendment application largely on the basis of the lack of any evidence of a satisfactory explanation.
...
Relevant factors to consider in determining whether to exercise the discretion were usefully summarised by Gleeson J in Tamaya Resources Limited (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm), in the matter of Tamaya Resources Limited (in liq) [2015] FCA 1098 (Tamaya Resources); approved by the Full Court on appeal: Tamaya Resources Limited (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm) [2016] FCAFC 2 at [125] (Gilmour, Perram and Beach JJ). Whilst these are expressed in terms of an amendment, they apply equally to the present case where leave is sought for late evidence. These factors are:
(1) The nature and importance of the amendment to the party applying for it;
(2) The extent of the delay and the costs associated with the amendment;
(3) The prejudice that might be assumed to follow from the amendment, and that which is shown;
(4) The explanation for any delay in applying for that leave;
(5) The parties' choices to date in the litigation and the consequences of those choices;
(6) The detriment to other litigants in the Court; and
(7) Potential loss of public confidence in the legal system which can arise where a court is seen to accede to applications made without adequate explanation or justification.
The object of the Court is not to punish parties for mistakes made in the course of their case, but to correct errors with the result that a decision can be made on the real matters in controversy.
(1) The new evidence in the Second Tan Affidavit comprises data recording the deposit and withdrawal activities of eToro's clients during the relevant period. It was contended that the evidence completes the data comprised in the First Tan Affidavit. In circumstances where ASIC has not engaged with the First Tan Affidavit, there is no good reason for ASIC to oppose the grant of leave.
(2) The majority of the underlying data was in Exhibit CT-1 to the First Tan Affidavit, and only supplemented by the data in Exhibit CT-2 to the Second Tan Affidavit.
(3) Paragraphs [34] and [35] of the ASOC allege that eToro's products gave rise to certain risks "[d]uring the relevant period". eToro's pleaded case:
(a) in relation to the alleged risks at [34] of the ASOC, includes that the existence, nature and materiality of those risks are to be assessed by reference to the actual CFD Product, the client making the trade, and the individual point(s) in time in question, and not merely by reference to the contents of a Product Disclosure Statement (PDS); and
(b) in relation to the alleged risks at [35] of the ASOC, is that the materiality of those risks cannot be, as a matter of fact, generalised by reference to statements made in the PDS.
In short, the alleged risks in those paragraphs of the ASOC must be assessed in the real world by reference to actual clients and in a way that involves an empirical assessment with observable data.
(4) The Scerri Report will significantly assist the Court's resolution of the issue of the alleged risks and their materiality, as illustrated by two examples:
(a) The Scerri Report states that 10% of customers contributed 77.68% of all deposited funds, and the median loss for all was US$31.01. In response to the alleged risks, eToro would like to put before the Court evidence that the median loss was a de minimus loss of US$31.01.
(b) A "survival analysis" shows that 64% of clients did not lose more than US$250 after a month of trading. This responds to the pleaded allegation in [34(b)] of the ASOC that there is a high risk that a client may lose all of their investment.
(5) Paragraph [44] of the ASOC alleges that eToro's clients made certain overall losses during a particular period. While it is unclear to eToro how ASIC intended to use that allegation at trial, the Scerri analysis would provide a more granular perspective about what those losses meant for individual clients.
(6) ASIC also alleges that eToro's actions, including the use of its screening tests, contravened s 994E(1) of the Act which provides that "[a] person who makes a target market determination ... must take reasonable steps that will, or are reasonably likely to, result in retail product distribution conduct in relation to the product ... being consistent with the determination". Part of eToro's response to that allegation will be pointing to the experience of real-life traders who were not losing vast sums of money.
(7) In the event of a finding of contravention, the real-world understanding of harms to consumers will be relevant to relief from liability under ss 1317 and 1318 of the Act.
(8) These questions of relevance should be determined at trial - not by way of a preliminary ruling.
(1) The Scerri Report is not relevant (or of marginal relevance) to the alleged contraventions, because:
(a) eToro was required to make a TMD before any person engaged in retail product distribution conduct in relation to the product (s 994B(2)).
(b) It is alleged that eToro contravened ss 994B(5)(b) and 994B(8)(b) of the Act in relation to each of the four purported TMDs, and:
(i) Section 994B(5)(b) requires that a TMD describe the class of retail clients that comprises the target market for the product. The requisite assessment is undertaken on the face of the TMDs.
(ii) Section 994B(8)(b) requires that a TMD be such that it would be reasonable to conclude that, if the product were to be issued, or sold in a regulated sale to a retail client in the target market, it would likely be consistent with the likely objectives, financial situation and needs of the retail client. The requisite assessment is an objective one and forward-looking before the relevant product distribution occurs, not on the basis of information about what happened afterwards.
(c) In relation to the alleged contravention of s 994E of the Act, contrary to eToro's submission, it has been accepted by this Court in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Firstmac Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 373 that the reasonable steps must occur before the relevant retail product distribution conduct occurred.
(d) Each of the four TMDs covered a defined period of time and:
(i) the question of risk was not central to the identification of the target market for the first two TMDs; and
(ii) the third TMD had a possible negative outcome listed as "a high risk that a client may lose all of their investment".
In relation to these TMDs, even assuming eToro's contention that the alleged risks must be assessed empirically by observable data, the data the subject of the Scerri Report was not observable at the time each TMD was made. That is, the data model that Mr Scerri was requested to build related to answers submitted by eToro customers and their experiences in the whole of the relevant period; the data with which he was briefed related to the whole of the relevant period; and the "Client Cohorts" on which Mr Scerri was briefed to report were not defined according to the TMD periods. Mr Scerri completed the report according to his instructions; he analysed and reported on the data and trends across the whole of the period. Nowhere does he identify or analyse the data available to eToro at the time each TMD was made. Accordingly, the resulting report can have no bearing on the requisite enquiries under ss 994B(5)(b) and 994B(8)(b).
(e) Similarly, the examples provided by eToro at [27(4)] above involve data and analysis that span the whole of the relevant period, without distinguishing the TMD periods.
(2) As to a lack of utility, the Scerri Report:
(a) excludes the top 4.3% of clients by deposit size, consequently omitting 4,622 clients and their transactions; and
(b) does not advance eToro's case as to the risk level of the CFD Products in any substantial way. Mr Scerri had been instructed with assumptions or statistical propositions which were, in substantial part, consistent with those provided to Mr Green for the purposes of preparing his report. And, on the basis of those assumptions, Mr Green agreed in the Financial Planning Expert Report that the eToro CFD Products "are high risk". While eToro points to two examples of matters that go beyond Mr Green's assumption, those are matters that go to quantum of loss and penalty rather than liability.
29 At the hearing, by way of response to ASIC's written and oral submissions, eToro submitted:
(1) ASIC had not addressed the relevance of the Scerri Report to the allegations in the paragraphs [34] and [35] (and also paragraph [36]) of the ASOC. Those pleadings relate to the whole of the relevant period and do not depend on what eToro knew or what the risk profile was based on the data available to it at the time of the TMDs. Unless ASIC were to withdraw those allegations of risk identified as arising "[d]uring the relevant period", then there is a dispute between the parties about the alleged risks during the whole period.
(2) Even if the requisite enquiry under the relevant provisions is forward-looking, that enquiry can be informed by evidence about whether the steps taken have worked. The decision in Firstmac does not suggest otherwise.
(3) In terms of utility:
(a) Mr Scerri's evidence is important because the assumptions with which Mr Green was instructed were, in some respects, not quite right. At least to that extent, the report has utility.
(b) The language of "high risk" used in the Financial Planning Expert Report conceals what can be revealed by the real-world assessment undertaken in the Scerri Report.
(4) The Second Tan Affidavit contained all of the data, including in relation to the 4,662 clients omitted from the Scerri Report. ASIC may choose to use the complete data to have a responsive report prepared or use it to cross-examine Mr Scerri. However, those are matters for the trial.
(1) The Scerri Report is likely to compromise the utility and finality of the expert conclave between the Derivate Experts. Dr Jarnecic and Mr Wilson were instructed to address questions directed to the risks faced by, and overall level of risk to, a retail client when acquiring or selling the CFD Product, and any factors that may impact the level of risk.
(2) eToro is now suggesting that the data underpinning Mr Green's assumptions was incomplete. That, in turn, will compromise the utility and finality of the Financial Planning Experts' conclave and report.
(3) ASIC would incur substantial cost and expense in responding to Mr Scerri's evidence.
(4) Whether ASIC decides to put on further expert evidence in response to Mr Scerri will depend on what the existing experts have to say in response to his report. It is possible that an expert will say that Mr Scerri's evidence is unremarkable.
(5) eToro has yet to identify whether it will put the Scerri Report to the existing experts or whether it proposes to ask any further questions of them. Nor has it indicated whether it proposes to make any submission that the conclusions and opinions in the Expert Reports, particularly Mr Green's concession that the CFD Products are high risk, are in any way undermined or qualified by Mr Scerri's findings. In short, it is unclear how eToro proposes to deploy the Scerri Report.
(1) ASIC will not suffer any prejudice because it would have the opportunity to respond. ASIC confirmed that it is able to respond to the evidence in time for the hearing.
(2) ASIC indicated in oral submissions that it intends to brief an expert, the implication being that it has not done anything about the Scerri Report in the two months since the Scerri Report was served. It is yet to determine whether it takes issue with the findings of the Scerri Report.
(3) Any prejudice is a consequence of ASIC's inaction since being served with the Scerri Report.
(4) There will be no material impact on the existing Expert Reports, given that:
(a) ASIC has produced no evidence from its experts that their reports would need to be reconsidered.
(b) ASIC has not engaged with either the First Tan Affidavit or the expert evidence of Ms Byrne. Neither of ASIC's experts were briefed with that evidence. It should not be assumed that ASIC will seek to engage an expert to address Mr Scerri's evidence.
(c) It is not apparent how the Derivative Expert Report would be affected.
(d) The assumptions in relation to which the Financial Planning Experts were instructed were substantially consistent with Mr Scerri's brief. A table prepared by eToro showed minor differences, if not consistency, between the assumptions underlying the Scerri Report compared with the Financial Planning Expert Report.
(e) Even if the experts have to reconvene and supplement their original reports, there is ample time before the hearing. In any event, that is a consequence of ASIC's delay in determining whether the evidence should be admitted. The Scerri Report was served on ASIC on 4 June 2025. The Expert Reports were completed on 12 and 30 June 2025.
(5) Contrary to ASIC's submissions, the only real potential for prejudice would arise if the Scerri Report were not admitted. eToro would be forced to defend a civil penalty proceeding on the basis of incomplete evidence about the way that the CFD Product is used by clients in the real world.
I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Stellios.
Australian Securities and Investments Commission
eToro Aus Capital Limited
(2009) 239 CLR 175
(2010) 88 IPR 337