Pecuniary penalties
26 At the relevant time, s 1317G(1A) provided that the Court may order a person to pay the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty of the maximum amount if a declaration of contravention had been made under s 1317E, the contravention was of a specified kind of financial services provision (which is admitted in this case) and:
the contravention:
(i) materially prejudices the interests of acquirers or disposers of the relevant financial products; or
(ii) materially prejudices the issuer of the relevant financial products or, if the issuer is a corporation or scheme, the members of that corporation or scheme; or; or
(iii) is serious.
27 At the time of the admitted contraventions, 'the relevant maximum amount' for a pecuniary penalty for each contravention by a body corporate was $1,000,000: s 1317G(1B).
28 The Court may act upon the admission of fact that the conduct in the present case is serious: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hochtief Aktiengesellshcaft [2016] FCA 1489 at [98] (Wigney J); and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Newcrest Mining Limited [2014] FCA 698 at [57] (Middleton J); but see Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Lindberg [2012] VSC 332 at [131]-[132] (Robson J). In any event, the relevant announcements and transcripts of the 121 conference presentations as well as the Offtake Agreement are before the Court and they provide the factual basis for the admission that the conduct is serious. The failure to conform to the disclosure requirements concerned matters of considerable significance to the affairs of AML. They concerned matters of evident importance for shareholders. In particular, a claim that funding had been secured for what was a major project when it had not was hardly trifling. The representations involved the managing director of the company. I accept the joint submission that the contraventions were serious.
29 In the alternative to the claim that the contraventions were serious, it was submitted that a pecuniary penalty should be imposed on the basis that the contraventions materially prejudiced the interests of acquirers or disposers of shares in AML. In my view, the admitted evidence falls short of demonstrating actual prejudice. The evidence in that regard was confined to the evidence that there was a decline in the price of AML shares after they came out of suspension following corrective disclosure the previous day. However, as has been noted, there was no evidence to support any finding that the decline was attributable to the contravening failures to disclose. There was no basis for establishing a causative link. The joint submission was to the effect that those shareholders who purchased shares before the disclosure 'may have purchased shares at a price higher than what they would have done had [AML] disclosed [the information] at the time that it was obliged to'. Therefore, I do not accept the alternative submission.
30 As there is an agreed penalty, the question for determination is whether the agreed figure falls within the range of possible appropriate penalties for the conduct: Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; (2015) 258 CLR 482. I summarised the principles in Australian Energy Regulator v EnergyAustralia Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 644 at [4]-[10].
31 Determining an appropriate penalty involves an instinctive synthesis of relevant factors: Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] FCAFC 20 at [54] (Keane CJ, Finn and Gilmour JJ). The purpose of a civil penalty of the kind sought to be imposed in the present case is primarily, if not solely, the promotion of the public interest in compliance with the provisions of the legislation by deterrence of further contraventions: Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson [2022] HCA 13 at [15]-[16].
32 The following propositions concerning the approach to be adopted in assessing the quantum of an appropriate penalty where a civil penalty provision in Commonwealth legislation is primarily concerned with deterrence may be drawn from the joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ in Pattinson:
(1) The maximum penalty is not to be reserved for the most serious cases and there is no place for the notion that the penalty must be proportionate to the seriousness of the conduct that constituted the contraventions (at [10], [49], [51]).
(2) The required relationship between the statutory maximum and the penalty in a particular case is established where the penalty as imposed does not exceed what is reasonably necessary to achieve general and specific deterrence (at [10]).
(3) Neither retribution nor rehabilitation has any part to play in economic regulation where civil penalties are to be imposed where there is a failure to comply with the regulatory requirements (at [15], [39]).
(4) Factors pertaining to the character of the contravening conduct and the character of the contravenor may be considered, but there is no legal checklist and the task is to determine the appropriate penalty in the circumstances of the particular case (at [19], [44]).
(5) The discretion to assess the appropriate penalty must be exercised fairly and reasonably for the purpose of protecting the public interest by deterring future contraventions (at [40], [48]).
(6) The penalty must not be oppressive by being greater than is necessary to achieve the object of deterrence and, in that particular sense, must be proportionate (at [40]-[41]).
(7) Concepts from criminal sentencing such as totality, parity and course of conduct may be usefully deployed in the assessment of what is reasonably necessary to deter further contravention (at [45]).
(8) It will be appropriate to consider whether the conduct involves a deliberate flouting of the law, whether the person responsible was aware of the law and whether they have been disciplined for their conduct (at [46]).
(9) The penalty that is appropriate by way of general deterrence may be moderated by factors of the kind adverted to by French J in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR 41-076 to the extent that they bear upon an assessment of what is required to deter future contraventions (at [47]).
33 Therefore, it is not appropriate to approach the task of assessing penalty on the basis of the application of a yardstick of seriousness concerning the conduct. The seriousness of the conduct has only indirect significance in the sense that conduct that is less serious may be conduct that may be deterred by a lesser penalty than more serious conduct. However, a persistent and wilful contravenor may require a high penalty to deter future contraventions even if the conduct itself is not assessed as being at the highest level of seriousness. Therefore, I do not accept those submissions which directed attention in an unqualified way to where the conduct may be thought to lay on a spectrum of possible seriousness of the contravening conduct.
34 Finally, as to matters of overall approach, it has been accepted that the absence of evidence of loss or damage to those affected by the conduct will usually constitute a factor in mitigation of penalty: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 382 at [79] (Perram J); approved in Singtel Optus v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission at [58].
35 In the present case, the following matters have significance in determining whether the proposed penalty is appropriate:
(1) the period of the contravention was from 19 February 2018 to 27 June 2018;
(2) the contraventions involved AML's most senior executive who had been primarily responsible for the negotiation of the Offtake Agreement and had actual knowledge of the position concerning the terms of the agreement and the circumstances as to financing for the Project;
(3) the information that was not disclosed was information that was uniquely in the knowledge of AML and the buyer that was unlikely to be otherwise disclosed;
(4) the contraventions are serious;
(5) there was no involvement on the part of other executives in the conduct;
(6) AML made corrective disclosure;
(7) AML has cooperated and has admitted the contraventions early in the conduct of the proceedings;
(8) there is no evidence to suggest that the conduct involved a deliberate flouting of the disclosure laws;
(9) there is no evidence to suggest that there was an intention to mislead by failing to disclose;
(10) there is no suggestion of past contraventions;
(11) AML is a relatively small listed company;
(12) Mr Bell has resigned as managing director of AML and his employment has been terminated;
(13) since the investigation by ASIC, AML has adopted a new continuous disclosure policy;
(14) although there are three contraventions, there are in substance two courses of conduct, namely the release of the announcement on 19 February 2018 and the statements at the 121 conferences;
(15) ASIC does not lead evidence of actual loss or damage; and
(16) there is no evidence of the extent of actual profit or benefit to AML from the contraventions.
36 Synthesising these factors, I consider that the proposed penalty though at the lower end of the range, is reasonable and appropriate to achieve both specific and general deterrence. Of considerable significance in reaching that view is the absence of evidence of the extent of the financial consequences of the conduct. This is not a case where the financial consequences demonstrate a need for a particular price to be placed upon the contravention. Also of significance is the fact that the steps taken by AML in making corrective disclosure, revising its disclosure policy, terminating the employment of Mr Bell and in admitting the conduct are all matters which support an expectation of future compliance by AML. As a matter of general deterrence, recognising the significance of remediating conduct of that kind encourages self-disclosure and supports a general culture of compliance.