BACKGROUND
1 In this proceeding, the Plaintiff ('ASIC') alleges against the Defendant ('Newcrest') two contraventions of s 674(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ('the Act') as follows:
(a) The defendant (Newcrest) contravened s 674(2) of the Act on and from 12.05pm on 28 May 2013 continuing until 9.19am on 7 June 2013 by failing to notify the Australian Stock Exchange (the ASX) that Newcrest management expected total gold production for financial year 2014 to be approximately 2.2 to 2.3 Moz (the total production information) ('the First Contravention').
(b) Newcrest contravened s 674(2) of the Act on and from 5 June 2013 continuing until 9.19am on 7 June 2013 by failing to notify the ASX that Newcrest management expected Newcrest's capital expenditure figure for financial year 2014 to be approximately AU$1 billion (the capex information) ('the Second Contravention').
2 Newcrest admits both contraventions and consents to appropriate declarations being made, the imposition of pecuniary penalties and for it to pay ASIC's costs of this proceeding.
3 ASIC and Newcrest jointly make submissions in relation to the disposition of these proceedings.
4 Agreed Statement of Facts and Admissions are annexed to these reasons as Annexure 'A'.
5 On the basis that each contravention is "serious" for the purposes of s 1317G(1A)(c)(iii) of the Act, ASIC and Newcrest submit that the following proposed penalties are appropriate:
(a) $800,000 for the First Contravention; and
(b) $400,000 for the Second Contravention.
6 Not infrequently, a regulator and a company (or individual) may reach an agreement whereby the company concedes a contravention and the company and the regulator jointly propose a figure (or a range) as the appropriate penalty to be imposed by the court. The approach to be taken by the court in such circumstances has been the subject of some judicial consideration in recent years.
7 I have already considered the Court's role in relation to joint submissions proposing penalties: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Energy Australia [2014] FCA 336 at [113] to [152]. Other judges of the Court have adopted a similar approach: see for a recent example Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Mandurvit Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 464 per McKerracher J.
8 Specifically, as to the Court's role and the need to scrutinise agreed statements of facts and law, in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v AGL Sales Pty Limited [2013] FCA 1030; at [40] to [44], I made the following observations:
(a) the Court must form its own opinion about the penalty, undertaking its constitutional role;
(b) in carrying out its constitutional role, statements of agreed fact may, as long as in the circumstances they are adequate, form a sound basis for a Court determination as to the appropriate orders to make, including as to penalty;
(c) there is a danger that the Court becomes blinkered by approaching the determination by reference to an agreed position;
(d) the Court should have an "overall view of the considerations relevant to the making of appropriate orders";
(e) the Court has an "onerous responsibility" in determining appropriate orders;
(f) a court will necessarily rely heavily upon the parties, which will include the regulator, to "appropriately inform the court of all relevant matters for deliberation" and there are risks if "the parties do not put all relevant matters before the court";
(g) a court will be "astute" to identifying whether or not the agreed facts and admissions "do not truly characterise the nature and event of the contravention";
(h) in such circumstances the "trial judge can and should insist upon a 'fuller and more realistic set of agreed facts'", or proceed to hear the matter as a contested hearing.
9 As is clear from the authorities, the Court itself must determine the appropriate penalty in all the circumstances. This is not a process of 'approving' a settlement reached between the regulator and defendant. It may be convenient for parties to inform the public that for their part they have agreed upon what they consider be an appropriate outcome; but is by no means a 'settlement' that is being placed before the Court for its 'approval'.
10 The parties have agreed certain facts and Newcrest has made certain admissions for the purposes of s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). I am satisfied that the agreed facts and admissions are sufficient for the Court to determine the appropriate relief to grant in this proceeding, and provide a sound and proper basis upon which to proceed to impose appropriate penalties: see generally Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Avitalb Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 222; and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v P&N Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 6. I do not consider I need any fuller set of agreed facts.
11 At the hearing, Earglow Pty Ltd ('Earglow') sought leave to participate in the proceeding as an intervener. Earglow has agreed to become a participant in proposed Part IVA proceedings which could raise related issues to this proceeding. Earglow did not seek to contest the appropriateness of the declarations and penalties sought by ASIC. Earglow wished the opportunity to place before the Court all relevant details as to when Newcrest first became aware of information which was materially different to information previously disclosed to the ASX concerning Newcrest's expected total gold production for FY14 and its expected capex expenditure figure of FY14. I gave Earglow that opportunity, it not seeking to play any further role in this proceeding.
12 Earglow contended that the Court needed further information going back in time to the matters alleged in the two contraventions. It proposed that ASIC file evidence to address four questions:
(a) when did an officer, or officers, of Newcrest first become aware of information (relevant information) which was materially different to information previously disclosed to the ASX concerning:
(i) its expected total gold production for FY14; and
(ii) its expected capex expenditure figure of FY14?
(b) who was that officer(s)?
(c) what were the circumstances in which the officer or officers became aware of the relevant information?
(d) when was it apparent that the relevant information would have a material effect on the price or value of Newcrest securities (notwithstanding that at that time the financial impact of the relevant information could not be calculated)?
13 I do not regard this as necessary.
14 I am satisfied that the budget process (as described in detail in the agreed statement of facts) was ongoing, and the information contained therein was insufficiently definite. This is a factual characterisation, but one I consider can be definitely made on the basis of the agreed facts.
15 There is no dispute in this proceeding that there was a relatively lengthy budgeting process from May to early June 2013. The facts before the Court sufficiently describe that process, and demonstrate that up to the relevant time the information in the budgets did not need to be disclosed. This is not to say that information, in appropriate circumstances, generated for internal management purposes only, may not be protected from disclosure. It will all depend on the context. In this proceeding, the context has been sufficiently explained by the parties.
16 As is apparent from the agreed facts, the total production information and the capex information were management expectations as to production levels and capital expenditure. They were at all relevant times matters for the Board to determine. It was not information in the sense of an existing fact affecting Newcrest's production capacity, but rather an expectation which was subject to Board deliberation and approval before it would come to fruition.
17 The relevant context is that Newcrest engaged in a process of planning its future production activities and related expenditure.
18 The plan, developed and recorded in drafts of the budget, had to be reviewed and approved by the Board before it was anything more than a proposal from management conveying their recommendation as to what Newcrest should do and spend in the future.
19 Management's expectations necessarily related to a proposal that was incomplete in the sense that the budget had, as at 28 May, not been provided to the Board, and, at 5 June, had not been approved by the Board.
20 I then proceed to consider the appropriate relief to grant based upon the evidence before the Court.