Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Peninsula Health

Equity Financial Planners Pty Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1036

Ewok Pty Ltd as trustee for the E & E Magee Superannuation Fund v Wellard Limited [2024] FCA 296

Fakhouri v Secretary for the NSW Ministry of Health (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 1171

Matthews v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 663

McDonald v Commonwealth [2025] FCA 380

Paxtours International Travel Pty Ltd v Singapore Airlines [2012] FCA 426

Smith v Commonwealth (No 2) [2020] FCA 837

Tham v Australian Capital Territory [2024] FCA 1508

AUSTRALIAN SALARIED MEDICAL OFFICERS' FEDERATION

1. The parties are to confer and, if possible, agree upon a form of orders giving effect to the court's reasons.
2. In the event that such an agreement is reached, the Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation is to either:

(a) advise the court that the proposed orders attached as Annexures A and B of the court's reasons for judgment are suitable; or

(b) submit alternative agreed forms for the court's consideration.

1. In the event that no such agreement is reached within 14 days of these orders, the matter will be listed for a hearing on an estimate of 2 hours on a date to be fixed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Schedule to the court's orders dated 20 October 2025

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Peninsula Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Monash Health & Ors

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Western Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Eastern Health & Anor

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Alfred Health & St Vincent's Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Northern Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Bendigo Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Melbourne Health & Northeast Health Wangaratta

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Goulburn Valley Health & Anor

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Austin Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v The Royal Children's Hospital

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Albury Wodonga Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Bass Coast Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Calvary Health Care Bethlehem Limited

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Central Gippsland Health Service

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v East Grampians Health Service

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Echuca Regional Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v the

Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health (trading as

Forensicare)

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Western District Health Service

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Gippsland Southern Health Service

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v West Gippsland Healthcare Group

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Grampians Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v the Royal Victorian Eye and Ear Hospital

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Mercy Hospitals Victoria Limited

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Swan Hill District Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Mildura Base Public Hospital

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v NCN Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v South West Healthcare

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Peter MacCallum Cancer Institute

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Portland District Health

1. The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation ("ASMOF") is an applicant in 30 representative proceedings brought under pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the "Act"). The central allegation in each relates to the remuneration that the respondents, which are Victorian public health services, paid to certain junior doctors in their employ. Specifically, it is said that the respondents failed to pay those doctors (that is to say, those of them that each employed) their due entitlements in respect of the un-rostered overtime that they were "authorised" to work. Those failures are said to have contravened three industrial instruments that, from time to time and by operation of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ("FW Act"), applied in respect of such overtime work. Those contraventions, in turn, are said to constitute contraventions of the FW Act itself.
2. ASMOF has standing to prosecute each of the proceedings under ss 539 and 540(6) of the FW Act. Several are brought both by ASMOF and by a junior doctor (that is, a different junior doctor from matter to matter) who works or worked at the health service against which the proceedings are brought.
3. On 20 February 2025, the parties to all of the proceedings agreed upon terms for their resolution, which were documented on that day in a Deed of Settlement ("Deed"). A number of the proceedings that the Deed, by its terms, purported to resolve were then not yet in existence. They were, instead, in foreshadowed form only: and, consistently with the agreement that was struck, they were initiated in March 2025 with the goal of achieving resolution for all the health services and their employees to which the central grievance described above extends.
4. By an application dated 11 March 2025, ASMOF and the other applicants in those 30 proceedings move the court for orders pursuant to s 33V of the Act for approval of the global settlement that has been reached.
5. In support of that application, the applicants have filed written submissions, together with two affidavits: one affirmed on 21 August 2025 by Mr Andrew Alexander Grech (a partner at Gordon Legal and the applicants' solicitor) and another affirmed on the same date by Mr Grant Forsyth (the Chief Executive Officer of ASMOF). Each contains redactions but, consistently with the court's orders of 1 April 2025, confidential versions of those documents were also filed. Such a course reflected the applicants' view that some of the material upon which they seek to rely ought to be restricted in access to the parties and the court; and that the dissemination of certain other material ought to be limited even further, to the court only. The applicants seek non-publication orders giving effect to that view.
6. The applicants also rely on an earlier affidavit of Mr Grech dated 7 March 2025, which annexes the Deed.
7. On 29 August 2025, the respondents' representatives informed the court that they joined in the application and that they saw no need to put further material before the court in this respect.
8. The application was originally listed for hearing on Tuesday, 9 September 2025. For reasons that needn't be recorded, that hearing did not proceed. Instead (and upon enquiry from the court), the parties expressed their view that it was appropriate for the application to be heard and determined on the papers. It was observed that the three group members who had objected to the settlement did not intend to attend the hearing; and the parties otherwise offered to assist the court if any matters arose that required clarification. Taking account of all of those circumstances, I saw fit to determine the application on the papers.
9. On 23 September 2025, a further affidavit of Mr Grech was filed with the court. That affidavit was addressed to the registrations with his firm of a relatively small number of group members who seek to make a claim under the proposed settlement but who did not do so by the date stipulated in the April orders. I was informed that the applicants had otherwise closed the opportunity for further registrations.
10. For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make orders substantially in the form proposed by the applicants. I shall return later to the mechanics of how that should occur. For the purposes of what follows, I shall refer to "group members" as though a single collective, rather than as 30 separate groups. References to "applicants" and "respondents" is to be understood in similarly collective senses.

1. The headline figures attending the settlement proposal, which if approved, are to be paid by the State of Victoria into the trust account of one of the applicants' solicitors, are as follows:

(1) $135,000,000.00 (the "Settlement Sum"), to be divided between:

(a) the lead applicants (in an amount of up to $470,000.00), to reimburse them for assuming the roles that they assumed in the proceedings;

(b) the group members who meet the criteria prescribed in the Deed, each in an amount commensurate with the value of their claim, as assessed using the methodology set out in the scheme annexed thereto (the "Settlement Scheme");

(2) $20,802,489.68, to be paid in respect of the applicants' legal costs and disbursements incurred in the course of the proceedings; and

(3) $17,500,000.00, to be reserved for the costs of administering the distribution of funds to group members in accordance with the Settlement Scheme.

1. Any funds not distributed at the conclusion of the Settlement Scheme are to be returned to the state. If there are insufficient funds to discharge the claims of eligible group members, then, prior to distribution, the payout amounts shall be reduced in proportion to the amount that each claim bears to the overall Settlement Sum.
2. The distribution is to occur at the hands of the applicants' solicitors, who will cease holding that role in order to act as the Settlement Scheme's administrators.
3. On 1 April 2025, orders were made that (amongst other things) required that the applicants convey to group members information of various kinds about the proposed settlement of the proceedings (including about their right to participate in or object to it). Those orders have been complied with and the position as at the date of Mr Grech's September 2025 affidavit is that:

(1) 12,846 group members have registered with the applicants' solicitors their interest in participating in the Settlement Scheme; and

(2) three group members have lodged objections to the settlement proposal.

1. As I have alluded to, s 33V of the Act prevents the parties' settlement from taking effect until it is relevantly approved:

33V Settlement and discontinuance - representative proceeding

(1) A representative proceeding may not be settled or discontinued without the approval of the Court.

(2) If the Court gives such an approval, it may make such orders as are just with respect to the distribution of any money paid under a settlement or paid into the Court.

1. I have considered and gratefully adopt the following aspects of the applicants' submissions, which deal with the principles that govern the approval (or otherwise) of the settlement (emphasis original; citations omitted):

The role of the Court in considering whether a settlement of a class action should be approved reflects its supervisory jurisdiction with respect to group members' claims. The Court assumes an onerous and protective role in relation to group members' interests. The Court must be astute to recognise that the interests of the parties before it, and those of the group as a whole (or parts of the group), may not wholly coincide. The analysis involves two key considerations - namely, whether the proposed settlement:

(a) is fair and reasonable, having regard to the claims made on behalf of the class members who will be bound by the settlement; and

(b) has been undertaken in the interests of group members as a whole and not just in the interests of the applicant(s) and the respondents.

In considering an application for approval, the Court is concerned to "identify the risks involved in the litigation, to weigh them, and to seek to determine the likely outcome of the proceeding, and compare it with the settlement". There will rarely be one unique outcome which should be regarded as the only fair and reasonable one. So long as the proposed settlement falls within the range of fair and reasonable outcomes, taking everything into account, it will qualify for approval. The Court's assessment as to whether the applicant and group members are likely to succeed in their claims at trial, and as to the quantum of the damages they may obtain if they do succeed, involves the exercise of judgement based on imperfect knowledge.

In Williams v FAI Home Security Pty Ltd (No 4) [2000] FCA 1925, Goldberg J enumerated a list of nine factors to which the Court may have regard when assessing the reasonableness of the proposed settlement. These factors, with some modification, have been set out at paragraph 15.5 of the Court's Class Actions Practice Note (GPN-CA) and are:

(a) the complexity and likely duration of the litigation;

(b) the reaction of the group to the settlement;

(c) the stage of the proceedings;

(d) the risks of establishing liability;

(e) the risks of establishing loss or damage;

(f) the risks of maintaining a group proceeding;

(g) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment;

(h) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best recovery;

(i) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation; and

(j) the terms of any advice received from counsel and/or from any independent expert in relation to the issues which arise in the proceeding.

Specific principles apply to an application for a reimbursement payment to be made to a representative applicant. The Court may order that an amount be deducted from the settlement sum to reimburse a representative applicant for out-of-pocket expenses incurred in representing group members in the proceeding. Such payments are based on "the notion that someone who assists in bringing in a fund for the benefit of others should have some compensation for the exertions of doing so." A payment of this kind requires consideration of whether such special or preferential treatment is justifiable and is in the interests of group members as a whole.

The consent or acquiescence of a respondent to such a compensation payment will not be determinative, particularly insofar as the proposed payment raises questions of fairness inter se between group members. A claim for such payment "must be based on adequate evidence" going to the time and effort expended by the applicant on the proceedings for the benefit of the group as a whole. The authorities indicate a conservative approach should be taken to the quantification of compensation of this kind.

Where a lead applicant is entitled to a compensation or reimbursement payment, "a distinction should be drawn between time devoted by the [applicant] to work activities that benefit the group as a whole, as opposed to work that benefits the [applicant's] personal claim." Evidence of the basis for compensation should not be reconstructed after the event and should be contemporaneously recorded, although this may not be a "hard and fast rule".

Lastly, there is no legal barrier to this Court approving a settlement which applies to multiple proceedings, provided the Court is satisfied the settlement is otherwise fair and reasonable in the interests of group members as a whole in each proceeding. This follows from the breadth and nature of the Court's power under s 33V: that is, the only limit on the Court's power to approve a settlement is that the power be exercised judicially, having regard to the all the circumstances of the particular application before it.

1. Those submissions as to the applicable principles are augmented in a confidential opinion authored by the applicants' counsel. That opinion is predominantly addressed to whether the settlement now proposed is fair, reasonable and in the interests of group members as a whole. Its content is, so far as I can discern, unimpeachable; but I must reach independent satisfaction of the fairness of the proposed settlement: Matthews v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 663, [37] (Osborn JA).

1. In approaching negotiations for settlement, the applicants undertook a detailed process to model the maximum total value of the group members' claims. To this sum they have applied discounts that take account of the risks that attend its recovery, as well as the time and effort that would need to be expended to secure it.
2. I have, at some length, considered the nature and magnitude of those risks and the "hoops" through which the applicants must pass to secure the relief for which they move.
3. Taken together, the proceedings are industrial litigation at the more (if not most) complex end of the spectrum. I accept the applicants' submission that, although each proceeding is distinct, they share similar areas of dispute, namely (and putting aside any question of penalties):

(1) construction - that is, whether the overtime provisions of the relevant industrial instruments, properly construed, encompass implied authorisation or are, instead, confined to express authorisation;

(2) overtime policies - that is, whether or the extent to which the respondents' overtime policies bear upon or limit the application of those overtime provisions;

(3) estoppel - that is, whether the applicants and group members are estopped from bringing their claims; and

(4) proof and quantum - that is, whether and to what extent each of the personal applicants (save for Dr Gaby Bolton, whose claim has been determined) and group members can prove that they did in fact perform relevantly authorised overtime.

1. The parties' respective positions on those questions - and a way in which they might be determined if they are not, by settlement, compromised - are at least partly exposed by the judgments of Bromberg J in VID 115 of 2021, the first of the 30 proceedings with which the settlement proposal is concerned. The detail of those three judgments (the "Bolton judgments") needn't be rehearsed in detail here. It suffices to record that the court answered several questions (said there to be "common questions") in relation to how the industrial instruments ought to be interpreted; and adjudicated the questions of liability, quantum and penalty in relation to the employment by Peninsula Health of the lead applicant in that case, Dr Bolton. The nature of the trial was such as to necessitate (or otherwise result in) several interlocutory skirmishes and three weeks of hearing. Judgment was awarded in the applicants' favour, following which an appeal was initiated (but later withdrawn).
2. It is not for the court now to assess - and much less am I able to assess - the extent to which the findings made in the Bolton judgments can or ought to be extrapolated across the other proceedings and their constituent group members. I note, however, that there is before me correspondence between the parties that makes it clear that, but for the settlement now pending approval, there is or will be a controversy about the extent to which the resolution of Dr Bolton's personal claim is of utility to the claims of the group members on whose behalf she brought the suit. It is fair to assume that any dissonance in that regard would only be amplified in respect of the claims of the group members (and lead applicants) in the other proceedings, which are not at law bound by the result in the Bolton judgments and might be decided differently on any number of grounds (including with respect to particular working conditions within the health services concerned and the extent to which they might be said to support or recognise the notion of implied authorisation for overtime worked).
3. Even putting those issues to one side, there remain significant questions to be resolved in order to determine the claims of each group member. For one, the Bolton judgments concerned the 2013 and 2018 iterations of the relevant industrial instruments; but the settlement now proposed also includes un-rostered overtime performed during the nominal period of the 2022 agreement (the overtime clause in which differs in form from its predecessors).
4. For another, a number of the suits are proposed to proceed on footings different to what confronted Bromberg J. Specifically, they advance upon the proposition that there was a "system of work" in the relevant health services, pursuant to which junior doctors were authorised to perform certain overtime duties. It is by that new framing that the applicants seek to clear the "implied authorisation" hurdle. The applicants suggest that leave might be sought to advance that "system of work" case more widely if the proposed settlement is not approved.
5. A similar "systems" case was sought to be prosecuted in a representative proceeding concerning junior doctor overtime that came before me for settlement approval in Tham v Australian Capital Territory [2024] FCA 1508 (Snaden J) ("Tham"). There (at [13]), I noted that proof of such a contention is not an endeavour free of difficulty; an observation that has equal force in the present setting.
6. If they are not settled, the applicants suggest that it is plausible that each of the remaining 29 proceedings will require initial trials to determine the lead applicants' claims and the associated questions; after which time, the court (or its appointed referee) would assess and determine each group member's individual loss claims. The cost and time involved in such an undertaking cannot be overstated.
7. It is well understood that the Settlement Sum is intended to be reduced in the hands of group members. That reduction reflects payments proposed to be made to the representative applicants for their time and other costs incurred in pressing the suits on behalf of the group members (as well as on their own behalf), in the following amounts:

(1) Dr Gaby Bolton: $75,000.00 (in respect of 171 hours of work);

(2) Dr Wendy Hodge: $40,000.00 (in respect of 46 hours of work);

(3) Dr Teak McPadden: $35,000.00 (in respect of 101 hours of work);

(4) Dr Catherine Gaggin: $20,000.00 (in respect of 45 hours of work);

(5) Dr Joanne Peel: $20,000.00 (in respect of 35 hours of work);

(6) Dr James Lisik: $20,000.00 (in respect of 41 hours of work);

(7) Dr Soumya Sarkar: $15,000.00 (in respect of 45 hours of work);

(8) Dr Michael Hand: $15,000.00 (in respect of 27 hours of work);

(9) Dr Evelyn Bian: $15,000.00 (in respect of 26 hours of work); and

(10) ASMOF: $175,000.00 - $215,000.00,

1. The making of a reimbursement payment to each of the lead applicants is orthodox and defensible. The applicant doctors, in addition to the time and effort that they have invested, have each assumed a level of professional and reputational risk that, whilst impossible to quantify, is a significant factor in the exercise of my discretion to approve what is proposed.
2. With respect to ASMOF, I am informed that, if the settlement is approved, it will mark the first occasion on which a reimbursement payment has been awarded to an industrial association. There is, in my view, no reason to treat ASMOF any differently from a corporate entity that brings a representative proceeding on its own behalf as well as that of the group. Indeed, the applicants contend that, as a matter of policy, the bringing of such proceedings by unions ought to be encouraged (following Lee J in Elliott-Carde v McDonald's Australia Limited (Stay Application) [2023] FCA 1210; (2023) 301 FCR 84, 113 [116]). In either event, as the applicants' solicitors submitted, "ASMOF's contribution has benefitted group members in circumstances where only a small fraction [around 12%] of those group members are, [or] have been, members of ASMOF". It is clear to me that the role that it has played for the benefit of all group members, and not only those that were its members, is such that it might rightly look to the Settlement Sum for some degree of compensation.
3. Turning now to quantum: certain of the payments proposed to be made to the applicants are at the higher end of what one commonly sees in suits of this nature. That is perhaps unsurprising when one considers that the total value of the proposed settlement would, so I am told, place it in the top ten ever awarded by this court. At less than 0.5% of the Settlement Sum, the total value of the proposed reimbursement payments is not a source of any concern.
4. For the applicant doctors, the proposed reimbursement amounts are said largely to be based on contemporaneous records of the time that they spent assisting in the prosecution of the claims. It will be apparent that there is not a linear relationship between the time spent and the quantum of payment proposed for each applicant. It doesn't much matter: the evidence establishes that there were intangible and tangible contributions made and risks assumed by each of the lead applicants in different measures between the proceedings. I am satisfied that there is a sufficient correlation between the amounts; and one that reflects a "sliding scale of representative involvement": Smith v Commonwealth (No 2) [2020] FCA 837, [100] (Lee J).
5. There is a lack of contemporaneous records supporting ASMOF's estimate of the time that it has spent on the proceedings (571 hours). Whatever might be said about that, it is plain that ASMOF's time investment has been significant. I accept that the industrial association (which is a small one), engaged additional staff to deal with the workload arising from its prosecution of the matters; and that it could not, on that account, pursue its other industrial objectives to the same degree. Payment is sought in the range of $175,000.00 to $215,000.00. It is acknowledged that, in circumstances where some of the estimates of the time that ASMOF invested in the proceedings are not based on contemporaneous records, it is open to the court to favour the lower end of that range. Given that that course is endorsed by the applicants themselves as appropriate to ward against any possible overestimation, it seems prudent to adopt it. As Jessup J said about reimbursement claims in Darwalla Milling Co Pty Ltd v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 1388; (2006) 236 ALR 322 at [80] (my emphasis):

Notwithstanding those reductions, there are two aspects of these claims that have given me concern. The first arises from what I would call a general cautionary feeling that one has about the basis of calculation of the claims. At the point of quantifying the amount of time spent by each of the claimants, the court has nothing but the say-so of the claimant concerned. There is no audit of the process or the result, and the applicants' solicitors are in no position to certify as to the extent or nature of the attendances upon which the claims are based. Likewise, at the point of placing a money value on each hour, I have no reason to suppose that the standard rates supplied by the applicants' solicitors are appropriate (apart, that is, from the claimants' own say-so). As I have mentioned, there are no scales or taxation procedures. At both of these points, although the calculations are supported by spreadsheet records which look detailed enough as far as they go, there is very considerable generality in the way that some of the items are identified. If there is a risk that the real value of fair and reasonable compensation claims might be something less than stated in the spreadsheets, I am inclined to think that the claimants themselves should wear that risk_._ In other words, given that those who maintained the records on which the claims are based and then made the claims are the same parties as would stand to benefit from the granting of the claims, I consider that the court should be astute to identify any possibility of over-estimation and to make an appropriate allowance therefor.

1. Assuming that only $430,000.00 is awarded to the lead applicants, it is anticipated that the Settlement Sum will, on average, afford to each claimant around $11,700.00. Accepting that the suits and their constituent claims are by no means identical, that is generally in line with the average values of claims in the NSW and ACT equivalents of the current proceedings: namely, $9,337.00 in Fakhouri v Secretary for the NSW Ministry of Health (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 1171 (Garling J) and $12,889.00 in Tham (Snaden J).
2. There are three objections to the settlement proposal. It is convenient to extract the substance of each in full:

(1) "I have done many afterhours overtime especially in the weekends. Not claimed these hours because our work culture at that time was like that";

(2) "I do not believe that it is appropriate to accept a settlement in this instance as while material payment will be made as reparation, it is not appropriate that the hospital services in question do not and will not acknowledge fault, and that no precedent will be set. The wage theft was deliberate and malicious in intent and to my belief admission of and documentation of fault is as important as the payments being made"; and

(3) "I've been paid appropriately. I believe Gordon Legal are more interested in their pay packet than the doctors affected by this."

1. None of these objections causes me any hesitation in approving the proposed settlement. The first and third convey opposing views on the merits of the suits themselves but say nothing of the appropriate bounds for their resolution, including any deductions to be made. I take it that the second objector would oppose any settlement, apparently on policy grounds. That is not something of which the court can take notice in determining whether the proposed settlement is within the range of reasonable outcomes.
2. There have been several applications for reinstatement and a moderate volume of late registrations. In Paxtours International Travel Pty Ltd v Singapore Airlines [2012] FCA 426 [43], Robertson J identified factors that are relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion to reinstate a group member who has previously chosen to opt out of a representative proceeding. It is not necessary that I repeat those factors here. It suffices to say that I have considered them and, in particular, I note that the reinstatement of a small number of group members will not materially dilute the Settlement Sum. There is, in my view, a very limited likelihood that they would make separate claims and thereby be otherwise compensated. It is appropriate that they be reinstated as group members.
3. In April 2025, I made orders for the closure of the class by reference to a registration process. Chief Justice Mortimer said as follows about such a process in McDonald v Commonwealth [2025] FCA 380, [194]-[197]:
   1. ...Orders "closing off", and therefore limiting, the group of people who will be eligible to receive payment under the settlement are, as the applicant submits, a common feature of class action settlements.
   2. Here the mechanism used to close or limit the group of people entitled to receive payments is registration, and registration by a particular date, fixed by Court at 31 August 2025. As I have explained at [137]-[139], registration occurs when people are accepted by the Administrator as meeting the criteria to be eligible for compensation. Group members who do not register will lose their rights to sue the Commonwealth for claims covered by this proceeding...these are fair and ordinary components of settlements of this kind. They provide finality for the Commonwealth in return for its agreement to pay compensation.
   3. As Beech-Jones CJ...observed in Ellis v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] NSWSC 550; 411 ALR 578, the Court has power to make class closure orders on a settlement approval application and it is a matter for the Court's discretion whether such an order is appropriate, depending on the view taken about the adequacy and reasonableness of opportunities given to group members to participate in the settlement before the class closes.
   4. I am satisfied that there has been and will continue to be an adequate opportunity given to group members in this proceeding to register.... In any event, the parties are always able to apply on appropriate material to extend the Registration Date.

1. Those observations apply with equal force in the present context.
2. In respect of the 277 late registrations, the applicants support that those individuals be granted leave by the court to participate in the settlement on the basis that it is unlikely that the additional registrations will materially dilute the settlement. I have no doubt that that is so, and the time for registration in the April orders will be extended pro nunc tunc to the date of Mr Grech's September affidavit. Any group member who has failed to submit their registration by that time due to exceptional circumstances may apply to the Settlement Scheme's administrators for a further extension.
3. Those observations made, I am amply satisfied that the Settlement Sum - taking into account any deductions therefrom for the reimbursement payments up to the value of $430,000.00 - falls within the bounds of what is fair and reasonable and in the interests of group members as a whole.

1. The Settlement Sum is exclusive of amounts proposed to be paid to the applicants' legal advisors and administrators of the Settlement Scheme.
2. Turning first to the amount proposed to be paid for legal costs and disbursements. That amount has been slightly reduced (by around 7.5%) compared with what is documented in the Deed, reflecting what a solicitor specialising in legal costing services, Ms Kerri-Ann Rosati, considers would be recoverable as fair and reasonable. Her report, excluding its annexures, ran to some 124 pages. The conclusions stated therein present as considered, reasonable and well-supported. The applicants' legal representatives assumed the risk that the proceedings would fail. Further, the legal costs now sought to be recovered are, proportionately to the Settlement Sum, less than what is typically incurred in representative proceedings finalised in this court. The costs now claimed are not such that the settlement can be impugned as not fair, reasonable or in the interests of group members considered as a whole.
3. Nor can the amount reserved for the administration of the Settlement Scheme be impugned as such. It is to the applicants' advantage that that amount is capped and any overrun cannot be recovered from the Settlement Sum. Any underrun is to be repaid to the state. As with the legal costs, Ms Rosati attests to its fairness and reasonableness in the circumstances and there is no reason why the court should form a different view.

1. The Settlement Scheme's provisions for each of its key phases - registration, eligibility, assessment and distribution - appear to be sensible and well-adapted to the nature, volume, and value of the claims that are the subject of the various proceedings. Its detail needn't be rehearsed beyond noting, first, that it contemplates individualised assessments of the amount of un-rostered overtime that each eligible group member worked (and therefore the value of their claim); and second, that there is a procedure for independent review of those assessments. The elasticity in the total value of the claims is addressed, as I noted above, in a procedure for adjustment prior to distribution. Its essential features are very similar to those that I endorsed in Tham (at [16]), and they strike me as appropriate measures to ensure just and efficient distributions from the Settlement Sum in the present context.
2. It is convenient to address here the suitability of the proposed administrators. They are undoubtedly qualified for the role that they propose to assume, both from their experience acting as the applicants' solicitors in the current proceedings and from their (ongoing) role as scheme administrators in Tham. There is nothing to suggest that that scheme is not being administered appropriately or with due expedition. As in that matter, I have no hesitation in accepting that their appointment in respect of the present settlement is appropriate.

1. The applicants have moved for confidentiality orders in respect of aspects of the affidavits of Mr Grech and Mr Forsyth, together with (in narrower compass) their submissions. In Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao (No 2) [2018] FCA 527, [8], Murphy J observed:

It is wrong to assume that confidentiality or non-publication orders will be routinely or automatically made. Part VAA of the Act provides that the starting point for consideration of such orders, and it is mandatory under s 37AE for the Court to take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice. The Court must be satisfied that the order is necessary "to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice" (s 37AG(1)(a)), and "necessary" is a "strong word": Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21 at [30].

1. That acknowledged, confidentiality orders are frequently made in applications for settlement approvals in representative proceedings like the present. That is so because there will generally be some information before the court that is of such a nature that one or more of the following grounds for confidentiality readily attaches to it.
2. First, the applicants have - and maintain - a claim of client legal privilege in respect of various species of information (including, in some circumstances, fee agreements, invoices and estimates): Ewok Pty Ltd as trustee for the E & E Magee Superannuation Fund v Wellard Limited [2024] FCA 296, [103]-[104] (Button J) ("Ewok"). Second, the applicants have led evidence that conveys for the court's benefit - in the absence of a contradictor - frank and candid professional opinions (such as those of Mr Grech, Ms Rosati and the applicants' barristers), which would otherwise not be available, or would be tempered if they were to be made available to the world at large: Ewok, [103]; Tham, [24], [26] (Snaden J). Third, some of the evidence is, by nature, of a kind by which the applicants would be prejudiced in the event that the settlement is not approved: Equity Financial Planners Pty Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1036, [187] (McElwaine J).
3. The claims for relief under pt VAA of the Act require some thought as to the period of time for which the information ought to be kept confidential: for example, information that might prejudice the applicants' case if the settlement is not approved should, in general, be suppressed only until the expiry of the applicable appeal limitation period: Tham, [25] (Snaden J). The professional opinions conveyed to assist the court should, by contrast, be suppressed for longer.
4. Having surveyed the schedule to the applicants' submissions, which sets out the rationale for, and duration of, each claim to relief under pt VAA of the Act, I am satisfied of the necessity that attends that relief and of the appropriateness of the orders proposed.

1. There is nothing in the evidential landscape that serves to stigmatise the settlement in these proceedings as anything other than fair, reasonable and consistent with the interests of group members. Looked at in the round, I am satisfied that the proposed settlement ought to attract the court's approval under s 33V(1) of the Act.
2. I am also, for the reasons given above, minded to make the orders sought by the applicants under pt VAA of the Act.
3. There are, however, two minor wrinkles to iron out. First, given that the application has proceeded on the papers, it is not appropriate to make orders that deviate from what the parties have proposed without first giving them an opportunity to comment on them. But as the reasons above make clear, at least some deviation is required (for example, to address the late registration of group members). I propose, then, to identify a form of orders that I presently anticipate are appropriate to bring all of the proceedings to an end; and to make orders affording the parties a short period of time either to endorse them or to propose (preferably by consent) an alternative consistent with these reasons.
4. Second, there are some mechanical complications to be worked through. As has been made clear, there are 30 matters that are the subject of the proposed settlement. Although, for obvious reasons, the parties have been content to approach the question of settlement on a global basis, the requirements of the Act are such that 30 approvals are necessary. Plainly, it is not a good investment in time or effort (even supposing that it might be feasible) to attempt any division of the settlement across individual matters. Just as plain, it is not appropriate to make the same order in each matter, at least not without some acknowledgment that the approval is offered globally and not cumulatively.
5. With that acknowledged, annexures "A" and "B" hereto are draft forms of orders that I anticipate are appropriate to give effect to these reasons. Annexure A is the operative form of order that I envisage should be made in one of the 30 proceedings (namely, the "Peninsula Health" matter); and annexure B is a facilitative form that I envisage as appropriate for the remaining 29. I shall afford the parties a short period of time to endorse or propose alterations to them. I envisage that that will be done by consent; but, if I am wrong about that, it might be that the matter should be listed for a short hearing directed to that sole remaining issue. If extra time is required, the parties will have liberty to inform my chambers.

I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Snaden.

AUSTRALIAN SALARIED MEDICAL OFFICERS' FEDERATION

1. The settlement in respect of which these orders are made applies to all of the 30 matters named in the Schedule hereto (hereafter and collectively, the "proceedings").
2. Any reference in these orders to:

(a) "applicants" is a reference to the applicants in the proceedings;

(b) "respondents" is a reference to the respondents in the proceedings; and

(c) "group members" is a reference to the group members in the proceedings.

1. Pursuant to s 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the "Act"), the settlement of the proceedings be approved on the terms set out in:

(a) the deed of settlement between the applicants, the respondents, Gordon Legal and Hayden Stephens and Associates annexed as 'AG-1' to the affidavit of Mr Andrew Grech dated 7 March 2025 (the "Deed"); and

(b) the settlement scheme (the "Scheme"), in the form set out in Annexure A of the Deed.

1. Pursuant to s 33ZB of the Act, the persons affected and bound by the settlement of the proceedings are:

(a) the applicants;

(b) the respondents;

(c) Gordon Legal;

(d) Hayden Stephens and Associates; and

(e) the group members who did not file an opt out notice in accordance with s 33J of the Act and/or order 15 of the court's orders dated 1 April 2025, or who did file such a notice and have been reinstated as group members pursuant to order 7.

1. Pursuant to s 33ZF(1) of the Act, the applicants, the respondents and the group members each have leave to apply to the court for orders in respect of any issue arising in relation to the administration of the Scheme.

1. Pursuant to ss 33V(2) and 33ZF(1) of the Act, Gordon Legal and Hayden Stephens and Associates be jointly appointed as the Scheme Administrators, to act in accordance with the Scheme and have the powers and immunities contemplated by the Scheme.

1. Pursuant to s 33ZF(1) of the Act, each of the five group members who:

(a) had opted out of the proceedings; and

(b) have since applied to be reinstated as group members, as set out at annexure AG-9 to the affidavit of Mr Grech affirmed on 21 August 2025,

be, in each case, reinstated as a group member in the proceeding from which they opted out.

1. The date by which group members were required to submit a registration form to the applicants' solicitors, pursuant to order 8 of the court's orders dated 1 April 2025, be extended pro nunc tunc to 23 September 2025.

1. Pursuant to ss 33V(2) and 33ZF(1) of the Act, within 14 days of these orders, the State of Victoria pay the following sums of:

(a) $67,500,00.00 (in respect of 50% of the Settlement Sum);

(b) $20,802,849.68 (in respect the Legal Costs Sum);

(c) $17,500,000.00 (in respect of the Administration Costs Sum) (as those terms are defined in cls 5.1(a) - (c) of the Deed),

into the applicants' solicitors trust account (the "Account") as payments in accordance with cls 5.5 and 5.6 of the Deed.

1. Pursuant to ss 33V(2) and 33ZF(1) of the Act, by 15 July 2026, the State of Victoria pay the sum of $67,500,00.00 (being the remaining Settlement Sum) into the Account.

1. Pursuant to ss 33V(2) and 33ZF(1) of the Act, the costs of the applicants' solicitors payable under the Deed pursuant to cl 5.1(b) of the Deed in respect of the conduct of the proceeding on behalf of the applicants and group members, be approved in the amount of $20,802,849.68.
2. Pursuant to ss 33V(2) and 33ZF(1) of the Act, the costs of the Scheme Administrator in respect of the implementation and operation of the claims assessment and settlement scheme process under the Deed pursuant to cl 5.1(c) of the Deed be approved in the amount of $17,500,000.00.

Approval of amount to be deducted from Settlement Sum pursuant to the Deed

1. Pursuant to ss 33V(2) and 33ZF(1) of the Act, an amount of $430,000.00 be deducted from the Settlement Sum to reimburse the applicants for their time and out-of-pocket expenses in performing their role as representative of group members in the conduct of the proceeding, in the following sums:

(a) Dr Bolton: $75,000.00

(b) Dr Hodge: $40,000.00

(c) Dr McPadden: $35,000.00

(d) Dr Gaggin: $20,000.00

(e) Dr Peel: $20,000.00

(f) Dr Lisik: $20,000.00

(g) Dr Sarkar: $15,000.00

(h) Dr Hand: $15,000.00

(i) Dr Bian: $15,000.00

(j) ASMOF: $175,000.00

1. Pursuant to ss 22, 23 or 33ZF of the Act, and/or r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and/or the court's implied jurisdiction and upon the date that the Scheme Administrators file a confidential report with the court in accordance with cl 5.10 of the Deed, the proceedings be dismissed (without the need for any further order).

1. There be no order as to costs in the proceedings.

1. Pursuant to section 37AF(1) of the Act and until the conclusion of the corresponding period identified in the table below - and on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice under s 37AG(1)(a) of the Act - there be no publication or other disclosure of the materials identified in the table below, save to the extent there identified:

From the beginning of the paragraph to the words "... between February...".

Between the words "... as potential representative applicants,..." and "... who were then..." in the final sentence.

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

From the beginning of third sentence to the words "... a considerable amount of work..."

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

From the beginning of the first sentence to the words "... a claim that";

In the final sentence, from the words "... to introduce a similar allegation... " to the words "... noting that Hodge"

In the first sentence of the second paragraph, from the words "... until May 2023..." to the end of the sentence.

Last sentence, from the words "... was performed because..." to the end of the sentence

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

The values following the words "... claims is between..." and "... excluding legal costs..."

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

The value following the words "... economic loss of..."

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Whole paragraphs (including the table following 99)

The values between the words "... is from..." and the words "... (excluding legal costs)..."

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Between the words "... at paragraph 97(a)..." and the word "apply"

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

From the word "apply" to the end of the paragraph

From the heading immediately preceding paragraph 104 to the words "junior doctors" in paragraph 106.

The words between "junior doctors" and "... work on short, fixed term contracts".

Whole paragraphs (including the heading immediately before paragraph 127)

The names in the first, second and fourth sentences

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Assumptions used in applicants' Loss Assessment Model (AG-4)

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

The expert report of Ms Kerrie Rosati dated 19 August 2025

The names, employers, addresses, email addresses and phone numbers of each reinstatement applicant (insofar as that information is present in each application)

The names, employers, addresses, email addresses and phone numbers of each group member who filed an objection notice (insofar as that information is present in each objection notice)

The names and positions of AMA and ASMOF employees in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)

From the words "... I was contacted by Mr Stephens..." to the end of the paragraph

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

From the start of the paragraph to the words "... Mr Stephens thereafter..."

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

From the words "... scope of the investigation..." to the end of the second sentence.

Between the words "... due to the need to..." to "... and explain why..." in the third sentence.

From the words "... to obtain information, including:..." to the end of the paragraph

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

From the words "... regarding those doctors, particularly..." to the end of the first sentence

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

From the words "... from ASMOF by..." to the end of the first sentence.

From the words "... on matters relating to..." to the end of the third sentence.

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

From the words "... with senior doctors to..." to the end of the penultimate sentence.

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

From the start of the second sentence to the end of the paragraph

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Between the words "... representing junior doctors,..." and "... ASMOF found itself...".

From words "... leading role in litigation doctors,..." to the end of the penultimate sentence.

From the words "... the sum paid to ASMOF..." to the end of the first sentence.

From the words "... group members because..." to the end of the second sentence.

Between the words "... was used to..." and "... meaning that the balance..." in the third sentence.

Until the expiry of any appeal period following approval of settlement

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Peninsula Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Monash Health & Ors

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Western Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Eastern Health & Anor

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Alfred Health & St Vincent's Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Northern Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Bendigo Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Melbourne Health & Northeast Health Wangaratta

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation & Anor v Goulburn Valley Health & Anor

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Austin Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v The Royal Children's Hospital

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Albury Wodonga Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Bass Coast Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Calvary Health Care Bethlehem Limited

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Central Gippsland Health Service

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v East Grampians Health Service

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Echuca Regional Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v the

Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health (trading as

Forensicare)

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Western District Health Service

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Gippsland Southern Health Service

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v West Gippsland Healthcare Group

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Grampians Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v the Royal Victorian Eye and Ear Hospital

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Mercy Hospitals Victoria Limited

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Swan Hill District Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Mildura Base Public Hospital

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v NCN Health

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v South West Healthcare

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Peter MacCallum Cancer Institute

The Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation v Portland District Health

AUSTRALIAN SALARIED MEDICAL OFFICERS' FEDERATION and another named in the schedule

1. Pursuant to s 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the "Act"), the settlement of this proceeding, as set out in the orders made today in VID 115 of 2021, be approved.
2. For the avoidance of doubt (if any), the settlement so approved is approved on the basis that it applies globally to the various proceedings (including this one) in respect of which it has been reached and not cumulatively as between this proceeding and others.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.