(a) Mr Surana told the Tribunal that the only customers of the Applicant during the Relevant Periods were the Superannuation Fund and one or more not-for-profit entities. Those not-for-profit entities were not identified and any work done for them appears to have been on a pro bono basis with no evidence of fee or other income being derived (and no documentation or other material evidencing the nature of services provided to those entities or when any services were provided). > > (b) Subsection 9-20(3) provides that, for the avoidance of doubt, the fact that the activities of an entity are limited to making supplies to members of the entity does not prevent those activities being in the form of a business or an adventure or concern in the nature of trade. However, even if regard is had to services said to have been provided by the Applicant to Mr Surana's family superannuation fund, these are also very few in number and value and there is no indication of what services were provided.[56] > > (c) The number of contacts on the Applicant's LinkedIn page was not necessarily indicative of engagement with current or prospective clients and did not indicate services being provided by the Applicant or a plan for services to be provided. The Applicant did not provide evidence in support of Mr Surana's claim that the Applicant had been approached by potential clients during the Relevant Periods. The responses to the Respondent's business profile questionnaire suggested potential means of sourcing customers (for example, by having a social media presence or cloud based operations providing access for overseas customers) but this was of a very high level or general nature and no 'verified Business to Business' customers had been identified. > > (d) Mr Surana is correct in stating that it would not be permissible for the Applicant to advertise or seek to provide tax services in the absence of a TPB registration. However the Applicant's own description of its business goes beyond the provision of tax services to outline a range of other accounting and consultancy services. It is not clear why the Applicant could not have provided those 'non-tax' services to clients during the Relevant Periods, particularly in circumstances where its director Mr Surana stated that he had maintained his membership of appropriate professional bodies such as CA or CPA and had undertaken further qualifications related to such services. > > (e) Although the Tribunal acknowledges Mr Surana's concern that the Respondent's 'business profile questionnaire' gave a complete or accurate picture of the Applicant's circumstances, the Tribunal does observe that he told the Respondent that the services provided by the Applicant also included management consulting, community health services/community health influencing blogging services and tax dispute resolution services. The Tribunal was unable to see any evidence of management consulting or community health services being provided during the Relevant Periods. The only demonstrated tax dispute resolution activities were the Applicant's own involvement in the subject of the Previous Tribunal Proceeding and this proceeding, and potentially Mr Surana's involvement in a dispute with the TPB. > > (f) Mr Surana suggested that his available time during the Relevant Periods and subsequently had been taken up with engaging with various regulators (including the Respondent, TPB and ASIC) and other business-related disputes. He said that the Respondent's 2021 audit led the Applicant to suspend his CPA membership and tax agent registration reinstatement work because of what might be inferred as allegations of professional misconduct, negligence or incompetence.[57] The Applicant's statement that it provided taxation dispute resolution services appears to refer to activities it undertook in relation to its own disputes, and those of Mr Surana, with regulatory bodies rather than assisting third parties. The Tribunal does not accept that engagement in disputes with regulatory bodies is necessarily probative of the carrying on of an enterprise (or the continuation of an existing enterprise) even where those disputes are related to matters such as business registrations with ASIC and TPB. The link between engaging in complaint processes with bodies such as the OAIC and FSO and the conduct of an accounting enterprise is even more uncertain.

9. Other than Mr Surana stating an intention or wish for the Applicant to engage in profitable activities when registration with the TPB was obtained at a future date, it was not clear to the Tribunal what plans had existed in relation to the Relevant Periods for this to occur.
10. The Applicant did not provide any evidence in support of its assertion that it held a significant intangible asset in the form of goodwill. The Applicant acknowledged that no goodwill had been recorded in its books and had never been valued. Further the public ruling cited by the Applicant talks about businesses or enterprises which comprise the holding of assets, however those assets generate ongoing returns and there is some form of activity in relation to the management and administration of those assets directed towards profit making. The Tribunal is unable to place weight on the Applicant's assertion of the existence of goodwill, as a matter of fact or as an indicator of the Applicant carrying on an enterprise.
11. The Tribunal has not placed significant weight on the deregistration of the Applicant as a corporation for a period prior to the subsequent reinstatement of its ASIC registration. That is, the Tribunal does not necessarily view the deregistration as fatal to the Applicant's case. However even where the Tribunal accepts that the reinstatement had retrospective effect such that the Applicant is taken to have continued in existence during the Relevant Periods, the Tribunal must still look at the activities that were said to be undertaken in relation to the conduct of an accounting practice. For the reasons given above the Tribunal is not satisfied that there was evidence of a sufficient level of activity to constitute an enterprise.
12. In reaching its decision the Tribunal placed no or less significance on the following matters:

(a) In relation to an absence of employees of or contractors retained by the Applicant, the Tribunal believes that an accounting practice could be conducted by a sole trader or service provider who is a qualified accountant. > > (b) In relation the premises from which an accounting practice is conducted, the Tribunal believes it is quite possible such a practice be conducted from the owner's residential premises, particularly in circumstances where financial constraints or personal circumstances make working from separate rented commercial premises difficult. > > (c) In relation to the size and scale of activity, the downsizing or scaling down of a business, even if substantial, is not necessarily conclusive of an enterprise having ceased. > > (d) In relation to the fact that the Applicant had not renewed its previously registered Trade Mark, this could be explained by the Applicant's financial constraints as well as the Applicant not presently being permitted to promote itself as a registered tax agent. > > (e) The decisions of the NSW Supreme Court indicate that the primary loan secured by the mortgage over the Westmead Property (described as a 'consumer mortgage') was a home loan provided to the Suranas in 2004, with the mortgage being extended to cover a car loan. The Suranas subsequently provided personal guarantees over a business loan and overdraft facility taken out by the Applicant, with their obligations under those guarantees being secured by the mortgage.[58] The Tribunal acknowledges the Respondent's submission that the litigation with the ANZ Bank might be regarded as related, at least in part, to personal or domestic financial obligations rather than business ones. However, the Tribunal does not regard time spent by Mr Surana on the ANZ Bank litigation as activity directed towards a business or enterprise. > > (f) In relation to COVID-19 lockdowns restricting the ability of the Applicant to provide services or undertake activities, the Tribunal acknowledges that COVID-19 conditions had an impact on many businesses. However in the circumstances of the Applicant the Relevant Periods mostly occurred prior to the commencement of the pandemic restrictions.[59] The Applicant also indicated that its operations were home-based and/or online by this time.

13. In summary, although the Tribunal could accept the proposition that an enterprise might continue in existence, even where there has been a significant decrease in size or scale or a change in where or how it operates, the evidence in the present matter was not consistent with the Applicant carrying on an enterprise in the Relevant Periods. There was no evidence of provision of services or undertaking of work for 'clients' other than a few limited activities for the Suranas' Superannuation Fund which may be compliance related. There was no evidence of other activities such as the management of assets for income generating or profit-making purposes. The Tribunal does not accept that Mr Surana's engagement with multiple regulators and management of disputes, although it occupied a significant amount of his time, constituted activities in the form of a business or an adventure or concern in the nature of trade.

Was the Applicant entitled to input tax credits for the Legal Costs?

1. The Tribunal has determined that the Applicant was not carrying on an enterprise during the Relevant Periods. In such circumstances the Legal Costs could not be in relation to a 'creditable acquisition' under section 11-5 of the GST Act because the Applicant could not have acquired the subject matter of the Legal Costs for a 'creditable purpose' under section 11-15. A thing is only acquired by a person for a creditable purpose to the extent that it is acquired in the carrying on of an enterprise by the person. This is sufficient reason of itself for finding that the Applicant was not entitled to input tax credits in relation to the Legal Costs.
2. However both parties made substantial submissions relating to the statutory criteria for a credible acquisition other than the carrying on of an enterprise.[60] The Applicant also contended that obtaining tax invoice documentation from the ANZ Bank should have resolved the dispute over most of the input tax credits claimed for the Relevant Periods. Although the Tribunal does not agree with the Applicant that the question of 'carrying on an enterprise' was irrelevant or should have been excluded from consideration by the Tribunal, the Tribunal believes it is still appropriate to address the submissions made by the Applicant about the nature and characterisation for GST purposes of the Legal Costs. For the reasons set out below, the Tribunal's view is that the Legal Costs were not consideration for a supply to the Applicant of anything acquired by the Applicant.
3. The Tribunal has had particular regard to the following documents provided to the Tribunal:

(a) The Tax Invoice dated 4 October 2013 rendered by Laing & Simmons to ANZ Banking Group relating to 'Laing & Simmons Real Estate Sales Commission' and 'Auction Advertising Fees' for a property in Westmead in the amount of $13,163.15 (which was stated to include GST of $1,196.65). > > (b) Invoices dated between 31 July 2012 and 31 October 2014 rendered by Kemp Strang to ANZ Banking Group relating to 'professional fees' and 'disbursements' re RQA Accountants Group.[61] > > (c) An invoice dated 26 September 2012 rendered by Kemp Strang to ANZ Banking Group relating to 'professional fees' and 'disbursements' re RQA Accountants Pty Ltd - Local Court Proceedings.[62] > > (d) Numerous items of email correspondence between Mr Surana and staff at Laing & Simmons and ANZ relating to these invoices and their subject matter.[63] > > (e) A document entitled 'Annexure 2 - Details of Abridged Tax Invoices (2012-2014) Released by ANZ on 4 August 2022.' This document appears to have been prepared by the Applicant or Mr Surana and includes the notation 'Gross Legal Costs, Security Sale Commission, and Incidentals Passed by ANZ Bank to RQA (Excludes Fees, lnterest, and other Incidental Costs.'[64] It refers to amounts charged to an account 'Business Loan Ending 515.' > > (f) A copy of a statement for a Business Loan account held in the name of the Applicant with ANZ with an account number ending 515, for the period February to August 2013 indicating several transactions described as 'Loan Enforcement Expense' in amounts which reflect amounts charged under six of the Kemp Strang invoices as above.[65] > > (g) Copies of statements or printouts of online statements for a cheque account held in the name of the Applicant with ANZ with an account number ending 926, for periods from December 2013 to December 2014 indicating several transactions described as 'Details Advised Separately' or 'Solicitor's Fee' in amounts which reflect amounts charged under another eleven of the Kemp Strang invoices.[66] > > (h) Extracts of 'director current account transaction' records as reconstructed by the Applicant when its ASIC registration was reinstated. These records show debits for amounts described as 'Legal Trust Account Expensed following NSWSC Order of 6 March 2017' in amounts which correspond to amounts in some of the Kemp Strang invoices.[67]

4. Mr Surana told the Tribunal that he did not agree with the Respondent's description and characterisation of the litigation between the ANZ Bank, the Applicant and the Suranas. Mr Surana also suggested that the reported decisions of the NSW Supreme Court did not provide a complete or accurate picture of the dispute and the ultimate outcomes of the litigation. The Tribunal acknowledges that Mr Surana might not have agreed with the outcomes of the litigation in that Court, or that he believes that different outcomes might have arisen had the litigation occurred after the report of the Banking Royal Commission. However the Tribunal must place primary weight on the decisions of the Court as reported in relation to the findings, outcomes and orders in the litigation between the ANZ Bank, the Applicant and the Suranas.
5. In Australian & New Zealand Banking Group v RQA Accountants Pty Ltd & Ors[68] Adamson J provided the following summary of factual matters:

1. Mr and Mrs Surana obtained a home loan for about $310,000 from the ANZ for the purchase of the Property in 2004 (the Home Loan). It was a term of the home loan that a mortgage be granted to the ANZ as security (the Consumer Mortgage). Mr and Mrs Surana subsequently obtained a loan in October 2009 in the amount of $36,000 to buy a car (the Supplementary Loan). This loan was also secured by the Consumer Mortgage. 2. Mr and Mrs Surana are both accountants. They obtained a licence to practise as tax accountants in Australia and to this end they incorporated RQA. From early 2009, the defendants operated the business of RQA from the Property but later, in August 2010, sought to lease premises from which they could operate the business (the Premises). They approached the ANZ for finance and RQA entered into a business loan agreement dated 18 October 2010 (the Business Agreement) for working capital up to an amount of about $30,000 for RQA's business (the Business Loan) and an overdraft facility (the Overdraft Facility) up to an amount of about $20,000. The $30,000 was drawn down on 6 August 2010. Weekly repayments were required pursuant the Business Loan but not by the terms of the Overdraft Facility. Mr and Mrs Surana guaranteed the indebtedness of RQA to the ANZ under the Business Loan and the Overdraft Facility. 3. RQA was granted a lease of the Premises in about August 2010 (the Lease). It was a term of the Lease that RQA provide a bank guarantee in the amount of $15,950 to secure RQA's obligations...

6. The ANZ issued a bank guarantee on 13 August 2010 (the Bank Guarantee) and transferred funds from the overdraft account to another account 905xxxxx9 in the name of RQA, as security for the Bank Guarantee.
7. Adamson J also set out that:

(a) The Suranas defaulted under the Home Loan and Supplementary Loan in August 2011. > > (b) The Bank Guarantee was called on in November 2011, with the ANZ Bank releasing the full amount of the Bank Guarantee by debiting the account 905xxxxx9 in the name of RQA. In July 2012 the Applicant filed a statement of claim against the ANZ Bank in the Local Court, and the ANZ Bank commenced proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court for possession of the Westmead Property. > > (c) The Consumer Mortgage secured monies owing under the Home Loan, the Supplementary Loan, any other amounts owed by the Suranas to the ANZ Bank (which included amounts outstanding under the Business Loan and Overdraft Facility) and 'enforcement expenses' (as defined in the Consumer Mortgage and Business Loan).

8. The orders made by Adamson J included the following:

(a) An order for possession of the Westmead Property against the Applicant and Mr Surana. > > (b) An order that RQA and the Suranas pay the costs of the ANZ Bank's motion for summary judgment for possession of the Westmead Property, striking out of the defence of the Applicant and dismissal of the cross-claim of the Applicant and Suranas.[69]

9. In Australian & New Zealand Banking Group v RQA Accountants Pty Ltd [70] Adams J refused an application filed by Mr Surana for a stay of execution of a writ of possession which followed the decision of Adamson J. Adams J made an order for Mr Surana[71] to pay the ANZ Bank's costs of the stay application/motion.
10. In Surana v ANZ Banking Group Limited[72] the NSW Court of Appeal dismissed a summons filed by Mr Surana seeking leave to appeal from earlier orders of Adamson J and Adams J. On the day of the hearing of the summons the Suranas' advised the Court that they wished to discontinue the summons application and sought an order that they would not be liable for costs. The Court nevertheless ordered that they should pay costs.
11. On the basis of these three reported decisions and the documentary evidence set out in paragraph 89 the Tribunal concludes that:

(a) The invoices rendered by Kemp Strang to the ANZ Bank dated between 31 July 2012 and 31 October 2014 were for amounts payable by the ANZ Bank to Kemp Strang for legal services provided by Kemp Strang to the ANZ Bank in relation to the NSW Supreme Court litigation, and disbursements incurred by the ANZ Bank in that litigation. Kemp Strang was retained by, and acting for, the ANZ Bank in this litigation. > > (b) The Applicant and the Suranas were parties to that litigation but the invoices did not relate to any legal or other services provided to the Applicant or the Suranas. > > (c) The NSW Supreme Court made orders for the Applicant and/or the Suranas to pay the costs of the ANZ Bank arising from the various applications made during the litigation in that forum. > > (d) The terms of the various loan and security contractual arrangements between the ANZ Bank, the Applicant and the Suranas required the Applicant and the Suranas to meet enforcement expenses incurred by the ANZ Bank in enforcing its security. > > (e) Between February and August 2013 the ANZ Bank deducted amounts referable to the amounts of some of the Kemp Strang invoices from the Business Loan bank account (number ending in 515) held by the Applicant with the ANZ Bank. > > (f) Between December 2013 and December 2014 the ANZ Bank deducted amounts referable to the amounts of some of the Kemp Strang invoices from the cheque account (number ending in 926) held by the Applicant with the ANZ Bank. > > (g) Around April 2014 the ANZ Bank deducted further amounts from the Applicant's cheque account for stamp duty arising on a transfer of land, which appears to be the Westmead Property.

12. When the ANZ Bank deducted amounts from or charged amounts to the Applicant's business loan account for legal costs and enforcement expenses the Applicant was not 'reimbursing' the ANZ Bank for expenses or acquisitions otherwise belonging to the Applicant. The legal services provided by Kemp Strang were provided to the ANZ Bank. No legal or other services or things were acquired by the Applicant by it satisfying the costs orders of the NSW Supreme Court. The recording or labelling of amounts by the Applicant in the 'director current account' as 'legal trust account expensed' does not turn these amounts into expenditure incurred by the Applicant for legal or other services. Other entities might have provided services to the ANZ Bank when the ANZ Bank enforced its security over the Westmead Property. However, no services or rights or things were acquired by the Applicant through the ANZ Bank enforcing its security. The amounts deducted from the Applicant's bank account were not consideration for anything acquired by or supplied to the Applicant.
13. In the Objection Decision the Respondent also set out a position that based on the dates of the Kemp Strang invoices for the Legal Costs the Applicant had not claimed input tax credits within the four-year time limit provided under Division 93 of the GST Act. This matter was not pressed by either party in their respective SFICs or at the hearing.

Was the Applicant entitled to input tax credits for the Miscellaneous Costs?

1. The Tribunal has determined that the Applicant was not carrying on an enterprise during the Relevant Periods. In such circumstances the Miscellaneous Costs could not be in relation to a 'creditable acquisition' such that input tax credits arose to the Applicant under the GST Act.
2. Further, if the Tribunal had found that the Applicant had been carrying on an enterprise of a boutique accounting and tax advisory practice, the Tribunal would not have been satisfied on the basis of the very limited evidence provided by the Applicant that the Miscellaneous Costs represented amounts paid for things acquired in carrying on such an enterprise.
3. 'Tax invoices' are not required for acquisitions below a certain value, that value currently being $75 (exclusive of GST).[73] The majority of the Miscellaneous Costs are below that threshold.[74] However the Tribunal must still be satisfied that the Applicant acquired those items for a creditable purpose, that is, to some extent in carrying on an enterprise. The Applicant provided summaries[75] of the Miscellaneous Costs in relation to which it sought input tax credits, but did not provide receipts or other supporting documentation. The Tribunal accepts that some time has passed since the acquisitions were made and the need to keep receipts for small purchases such as a few dollars' worth of fuel or stationery may not have been front of mind at the time of purchase. However, it would not be unreasonable to expect documentation to exist for insurance policies and telecommunications subscriptions or purchases.
4. In many cases the descriptions provided for the items the subject of the Miscellaneous Costs are very general[76] such that it cannot be determined exactly what was acquired, and therefore whether the items acquired were for business or personal use. In other instances the subject matter of the expenditure is clearer,[77] but the Tribunal cannot determine whether the goods or services were acquired for the purpose of an accounting practice, for other business purposes or for personal use. Some of the Miscellaneous Costs are identified with references applied by the Applicant such as 'Bunnings - LRF Dispute' or 'Australia Post - RQA Reinstatement.' Such labels provided by the Applicant are not of themselves sufficient to demonstrate a nexus to an enterprise. The Tribunal acknowledges the evidence of Mr Surana that he was obliged to sell the car that had originally been purchased for the business and instead acquire a motorbike which was more cost efficient. However, this was insufficient to demonstrate any nexus between the expenditure and the carrying on of an accounting practice as contended for by the Applicant.
5. The Tribunal therefore finds that input tax credits do not arise to the Applicant in the Relevant Periods in relation to the Miscellaneous Costs.

1. Based on its finding that the Applicant was not carrying on an enterprise in the Relevant Periods, and in the alternative that the Legal Costs did not represent consideration for a taxable supply to the Applicant, it is not necessary to consider the question of whether the Legal Costs related to an input taxed supply.
2. In relation to the Applicant's submission that the Legal Costs might be regarded as blackhole expenditure or treated in a manner similar to blackhole expenditure:

(a) The Objection Decision under review in this proceeding relates to amended assessments of net amounts of GST, and whether input tax credits arise under the GST Act. Blackhole expenditure was not raised by the Applicant as a ground of objection. Neither the Objection Decision nor those amended assessments relate to income tax. > > (b) The Applicant's submissions did not provide any intelligible basis for adopting principles relating to blackhole expenditure in an analysis of the GST provisions.

1. The Applicant stated the following in its SFIC:[78]

On 7th May 2025, the respondent filed a 66-paragraph advance SFIC as opposed to the common procedure of the applicant filing a SFIC first under standing practice direction under ART Act 2024. The applicant's SFIC scheduled to be filed on 16 April 2025 had to be postponed due to delays in approval of ART summons as suggested by on duty Registrar [Name]. This was clearly communicated to the respondent who simply proceeded with filing of advance SFIC despite being aware of delays in summons. ... > > The respondents prematurely timed advance SFIC of 7-May-2025 prepared before expiry of 11-June-2025 ART issued summons deadline to [Bank] aims to oppose the applicant's claim for ITC relief.

2. The Applicant then complained that the Respondent's SFIC repeated matters that had been raised during the audit process, namely the questions of whether the Applicant had been carrying on an enterprise, whether amounts constituted consideration for a supply and whether there was an input taxed supply. The Applicant stated that the Respondent had not followed model litigant principles.
3. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make decisions or offer a remedy relating to 'model litigant' matters but believes it is appropriate to make the following observations as they relate to Tribunal directions and processes:

(a) Pursuant to Tribunal directions of 18 February 2025 the Respondent was directed to file its SFIC and material and evidence by 7 May 2025. This direction was not varied by the Tribunal until further directions were made on 18 May 2025. It may be that there was delay on the part of the Tribunal in making varied directions. However, if the Respondent had not filed an SFIC by 7 May 2025 it would have been in breach of existing Tribunal directions. The Respondent explained this to the Applicant in an email dated 6 May 2025.[79] > > (b) There is no requirement under the ART Act for an applicant to file its SFIC first. It is a matter for the Tribunal to determine dates for filing based on the circumstances of the case. The applicant usually files its SFIC first as it is the party that has made the application to the Tribunal. However, in some matters involving a self-represented applicant the Tribunal may ask the respondent to file its materials first to assist the applicant in preparing their case.[80] > > (c) Following the making of further directions on 18 May 2025, the Applicant was given the opportunity to file its SFIC by 9 July 2025 with the Respondent to file by 29 July 2025. > > (d) The Tribunal does not believe that the Applicant suffered any disadvantage or procedural unfairness as a consequence of the Respondent filing an SFIC on 7 May 2025. If anything, it gave the Applicant greater detail and understanding of the Respondent's case prior to the Applicant being required to file its own SFIC. > > (e) There is nothing untoward in the Respondent's SFIC reflecting matters that were in dispute at audit and objection. The Tribunal would have a greater concern if the Respondent sought to raise entirely new matters after objection and prior to the hearing. Further, in this case the Tribunal believes that the three issues relating to entitlement to input tax credits are the relevant issues in dispute in this proceeding.

1. As discussed above, prior to the hearing the Tribunal had made directions for the filing of key documents and evidence by the parties including:

(a) On 18 May 2025 directions were made for the Applicant to lodge with the Tribunal and serve on the Respondent its SFIC and any material and evidence upon which it intended to rely by 8 July 2025, with the Respondent to file its SFIC and any further material and evidence by 29 July 2025. > > (b) On 8 August 2025 directions were made for the Applicant to lodge with the Tribunal any written submissions it wished the Tribunal to consider four weeks prior to the hearing date, with the Respondent to file any written submissions two weeks prior.

2. In its hearing certificate dated 8 August 2025 the Applicant indicated that it wished to call Mrs Surana as an 'Expert Witness - BAS Agent.' Persons who appear as expert witnesses before the Tribunal are required to comply with the Administrative Review Tribunal (Expert Evidence) Practice Direction 2024. Such a witness must provide impartial assistance to the Tribunal on matters relevant to their area of knowledge or experience and is not an advocate for a party. The Tribunal appreciates that the Applicant may not have understood the difference between a lay and expert witness.
3. The substantive hearing of this matter was listed for 12 November 2025. As the Applicant had not filed any opening submissions as of 15 October 2025, the Tribunal contacted the Applicant who confirmed that it had nothing further to file. The Respondent also elected not to file written opening submissions.[81]
4. On 11 November 2025 the Tribunal received from the Applicant a document described as a 'witness statement' of Mrs Surana.[82] Attached to this statement was a copy of a listing notice from the Tribunal sent to the Applicant in relation to an ADR event that took place in November 2019 in relation to the Previous AAT Proceeding. Mrs Surana's witness statement addressed matters that were apparently discussed at that ADR event, which she had attended with Mr Surana on behalf of the Applicant. In her statement she expressed her view that because certain issues raised during ADR had since been addressed it was unfair for further input tax credits to be denied to the Applicant.
5. The Tribunal had not given leave to the Applicant to file further evidence or submissions. Filing an additional witness statement the day before the hearing was also unfair to the Respondent.
6. On the basis of the Applicant's hearing certificate the Tribunal had made arrangements for Mrs Surana to participate in the hearing and be contacted on the mobile phone number provided in the hearing certificate. The Tribunal was advised at the beginning of the hearing that Mrs Surana was present in the same room as Mr Surana and would participate via his video link. The Tribunal could see Mrs Surana at various times during the hearing seated beside Mr Surana and they appeared to speak to each other on occasion. As it had been indicated in the hearing certificate that Mrs Surana might give evidence, the Tribunal asked her to make an affirmation at the beginning of the hearing.
7. The hearing proceeded and the Applicant did not call Mrs Surana to give evidence.
8. The Tribunal reserved its decision at the conclusion of the hearing on 12 November 2025.
9. On 14 November 2025 the Tribunal was copied by Mr Surana into an email he sent to the Respondent's representatives, which attached an email chain between the parties. That email chain indicated that at some point after the hearing Mr Surana had contacted the Respondent's representatives in relation to scheduling a further hearing for the purpose of Mrs Surana giving evidence. The Respondent's representatives had indicated to Mr Surana that they would not oppose a further hearing if it was only for the purpose of hearing evidence that Mrs Surana had intended to give at the original hearing.
10. Mr Surana's email also claimed that Mrs Surana had been prevented from giving evidence by the Respondent's representative and that the Applicant had objected to the Respondent being given 'extensive' time to address the issue of whether the Applicant had been carrying on an enterprise. Mr Surana repeated a number of claims relating to the TPB Proceeding and his engagement with the TPB, as well as repeating matters relating to the Banking Royal Commission and his litigation with the ANZ Bank. Mr Surana said that Mrs Surana should be allowed to make an 'oral presentation' to the Tribunal on the basis that she was a witness to these matters, her investment in the Applicant's business and that she had 'benefitted from Mr Surana's guidance from time to time over the several decades to shape her accounting career and service Australian workplaces.'
11. The Tribunal appreciates the Respondent's openness to scheduling a further hearing however the Tribunal would not have given leave to reopen or resume the hearing of this matter for the following reasons:

(a) Substantive hearings are expected to be final and it would be highly unusual for a hearing to be reopened. The Tribunal's resources are limited and hearing time must be available for the range of parties who have matters before the Tribunal. Reopening hearings would not be consistent with the Tribunal's objective as set out in section 9 of the ART Act to ensure that applications are resolved quickly and with as little cost as appropriate. > > (b) The Tribunal does not agree that Mrs Surana was stopped from giving evidence. The Tribunal believes that Mr Surana is referring to an instance where he was being cross-examined by the Respondent's representative and sought to ask Mrs Surana to assist with the response. It was appropriate for the Respondent's representative to request that Mr Surana answer the question that was put to him during cross-examination. > > (c) Although the Tribunal could have simply refused to receive Mrs Surana's statement as received on 11 November 2025 on the basis that the Applicant had not been given leave to file additional material, the Tribunal did not do so. However, the Tribunal's view of Mrs Surana's statement is that it is not relevant to this proceeding on the basis that it essentially addresses matters that were canvassed during an ADR event in a different proceeding, being the Previous Tribunal Proceeding. In addition to the issue of relevance, Tribunal led ADR events are held on the basis that matters discussed between the parties are confidential and must not be relied upon in any subsequent hearing (except in limited circumstances where the Tribunal has given leave to do so). > > (d) The Tribunal made arrangements for Mrs Surana to attend the hearing and for her to make her affirmation as to the truth of any evidence she would give. The Applicant either chose not to call Mrs Surana or forgot to do so at the hearing. Towards the end of the hearing the Member explained to the parties that the next step would be for the Member to consider the materials that had been filed and the submissions and evidence put to the Tribunal during the hearing for the purposes of providing a final decision to the parties. The Member specifically asked the parties whether there were any further matters the parties wished to raise before the Member concluded the hearing. The matter of Mrs Surana giving evidence was not raised.

12. Mr Surana sent a further letter to the Tribunal on 20 November 2025 in which he said that the Applicant would 'decline second hearing request by the respondent which will add no further value.' He again set out a number of matters relating to the Applicant's dispute with the ANZ Bank and referring to an ADR process involving the TPB.
13. The Tribunal does not believe that the Applicant would have suffered any procedural unfairness had the Tribunal refused to allow Mrs Surana to return at a later date to give oral evidence. Noting that Mrs Surana was present during the hearing, there may have been potential unfairness to the Respondent if the Applicant had been given leave to reopen its evidence after the scheduled hearing had concluded. In addition to the extensive written submissions and correspondence filed by the Applicant, the Tribunal agreed to have regard to Mrs Surana's written witness statement.
14. The issue of the time allowed to the parties to make oral submissions during the hearing is not relevant to Mrs Surana's witness statement but the Tribunal wishes to address Mr Surana's concerns. There is no formula or rule for the time to be allowed to a party to make submissions, although the Tribunal is able to make directions or orders limiting the facts, issues and evidence it considers.[83] The procedure of the Tribunal is within the discretion of the Tribunal,[84] however the Tribunal must ensure that a party is given a 'reasonable opportunity' to present their case, make submissions and adduce evidence.[85] The Tribunal believes that Mr Surana was given an appropriate amount of time during the hearing to present the Applicant's case in relation to the Objection Decision. Again, his oral submissions were in addition to the extensive written materials filed by the Applicant.
15. To the extent that Mr Surana wished to discuss matters relating to his personal engagement with the TPB or other litigation in which the Applicant has been involved, the Tribunal has indicated above the limited extent to which it believes such matters are relevant to its review of the Objection Decision. The Tribunal repeats its prior statement that the purpose of this proceeding is to conduct a review of the Objection Decision, which requires a determination of whether the Applicant was entitled to input tax credits in the Relevant Periods. The hearing of this application is not a forum for agitating matters relating to Mr Surana's engagement with the TPB or the outcomes of the Banking Royal Commission. The Tribunal has had regard to particular documentary evidence arising from the litigation between the Applicant and the ANZ Bank to the extent that this was relevant to the characterisation of amounts in respect of which input tax credits were claimed in the Relevant Periods.

1. The length of these reasons reflects the fact that this proceeding was made unnecessarily complicated by submissions on matters that were not relevant to the issues of the entitlement of the Applicant to input tax credits in the Relevant Periods and the refund of tax that would have been generated by those credits.
2. For the reasons given above the Applicant has not satisfied the Tribunal that it was carrying on an enterprise during the Relevant Periods, even if it had carried on an enterprise in the past or intended to do so in the future should circumstances permit. On that basis the Applicant is not entitled to input tax credits in the Relevant Periods.
3. The Tribunal has also found that even where the Applicant had been carrying on an enterprise of an accounting practice during the Relevant Periods, the Tribunal would not have been satisfied that the Legal Costs and Miscellaneous Costs gave rise to input tax credits for the Applicant.
4. The Objection Decision under review is therefore affirmed.

[1] TB2-005. References to 'TB' in this decision are to pages of the Tender Bundle filed by the Respondent dated 7 May 2025.

[2] Mrs Savita Surana was a director of the Applicant from its incorporation until August 2011.

[3] Australian & New Zealand Banking Group v RQA Accountants Pty Ltd & Ors [2013] NSWSC 165, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited v RQA Accountants Pty Limited [2013] NSWSC 985.

[4] For the quarterly tax periods from 1 July 2016 to 30 September 2018.

[5] For the quarterly tax periods from 1 October 2018 to 31 March 2020.

[6] For the quarterly tax period ended 30 June 2020.

[7] The Applicant requested an extension of time to lodge its Objection which was granted by the Respondent.

[8] T8, 241 to 246, dated 14 June 2024. A reference to 'T Documents' in this decision is to the documents filed by the Respondent with the Tribunal under section 23 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) as modified by section 14ZZF of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth).

[9] A separate ABN was issued to that business.

[10] The business had originally been home based when it commenced in 2009, before relocating to commercially leased premises in 2010 to 2011. The litigation with the Bank led to the Applicant returning to home-based activities.

[11] Mr Surana told the Tribunal that he had disposed of an existing larger motor vehicle and replaced it with a motorbike to save costs, including fuel and other running costs.

[12] See an email dated 17 January 2024, copied to Mr Surana, from the barrister to a solicitor described as an expert in 'ex gratia tax refund applications' indicating that the Applicant might make an application: T8, p 259.

[13] See paragraphs 46 to 55 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[14] The Applicant had originally been directed to file its SFIC by 16 April 2025 but had not done so.

[15] A copy of this invoice had already been sent by the Applicant to the Tribunal on 6 May 2025.

[16] The Applicant filed a 41-page document titled "Annexures to Applicant SFIC 7JUL25" which was said to be cross-referenced to the Applicant's SFIC. The Annexure references in the Applicant's SFIC do not appear to correspond to the document references in the "Annexures" document.

[17] Emails included in this correspondence contained text in capital letters and bold font making allegations about the Respondent or its staff, and statements about Tribunal processes. While appreciating that legal disputes can be stressful for those involved, personal or inappropriate remarks about individuals in submissions do not assist the Tribunal in its decision-making process.

[18] Mr Surana provided the case reference details for that proceeding and a copy of the AAT's decision. As the hearing of that proceeding was not conducted in public and the Applicant was not to be identified within section 14ZZJ of the TAA 1953, the Tribunal will not provide in this decision details which may identify the Applicant as being involved in the prior proceeding.

[19] See section 105-55, Schedule 1 to the TAA 1953 for the tax periods between 1 July 2011 and 30 June 2012 and Division 93 of the GST Act for the tax periods from 1 July 2012 to 30 September 2024.

[20] See letter from Mr Surana to the Deputy Registrar Botros dated 7 July 2025 which accompanied the Applicant's SFIC and paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[21] Penalties were also not an issue before the Tribunal in the Previous Tribunal Proceeding.

[22] Paragraph 66 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[23] Paragraphs 43 and 44 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[24] Paragraph 14 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[25] Paragraph 7 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[27] T8-259. This email was sent after the Applicant had obtained the invoices from the Bank. The Tribunal also notes that the email names two other clients of the barrister who apparently had similar circumstances. Those clients do not appear to be related to Mr Surana or the Applicant. The Tribunal has not set out the email in full and obviously will not identify those other taxpayers.

[28] Such as the High Court decision in Spriggs, discussed further below.

[29] Paragraph 63 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[30] See paragraphs 28 and 29 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[31] Paragraph 62 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[32] Paragraph 8 of covering letter dated 7 July 2025 sent with the Applicant's SFIC.

[33] Paragraph 64 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[34] The Respondent also refers to legislation and case law relating to VAT and GST regimes of other jurisdictions, such as the UK, New Zealand and Canada in its Practice Statement GSTR2001/4.

[35] The Applicant did not provide the Tribunal with a copy or full citation of the decision it relied upon so the Tribunal is unable to confirm precisely the details of the case. However there was a case with the same name as that set out in the Applicant's SFIC decided in June 2025, which was subsequently overturned on appeal by the High Court of Sikkim in September 2025.

[36] Paragraphs 28 and 29 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[37] Such as Nerang, Swansea Services and Toyoma discussed below.

[38] Paragraph 19 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[39] HP Mercantile Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2005] FCAFC 126, at [13] per Hill J. In the same paragraph Hill J referred to 'certain conditions' needing to be satisfied under the GST Act before input tax credits were available.

[40] Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55 at [39]

[41] The Applicant cited the CCH Australian Master Tax Guide but did not provide specific page or paragraph references.

[42] The definition of an enterprise extends to certain activities relating to leases, trusts, superannuation funds, charities and public entities not relevant for present purposes.

[43] Spriggs v Commissioner of Taxation; Riddell v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] HCA 22 (Spriggs).

[44] Commissioner of Taxation v Swansea Services Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 402 (Swansea Services) at [65], [66] and [68] per McKerracher J, referring to observations of White J in Toyama Pty Ltd v Landmark Building Developments Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 83 (Toyama). See also Nerang Subdivision Pty Ltd & Ors v Hutson & Anor [2023] QSC 268 (Nerang) at [47] per Cooper J and his Honour's summary of relevant case law at [44] to [49].

[45] Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50 at [54].

[46] The Respondent took the Tribunal to three amended BAS lodged by the Applicant in June 2020 relating to quarterly tax periods ending 31 December 2018, 31 March 2019 and 30 June 2019 which disclosed only minimal total sales and GST on sales.

[47] A statement of account prepared by the Applicant for the period 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2020 indicated receivables of almost $4,000, with all of those amounts being received from the Superannuation Fund in June 2020: T8, page 212. Mr Surana identified these amounts as being referable to compliance work undertaken by the Applicant for the Superannuation Fund.

[48] Paragraph 40 of the Respondent's SFIC.

[49] The Applicant provided a document 'Detailed Time' recording approximately 16 hours spent by Mr Surana between 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2024 on matters relating to a tax objection, including engagement with the Respondent, attending the Previous Tribunal Proceeding and seeking documents from the Bank: T8, page 256.

[50] Mr Surana said that the Applicant provided services to this client for 3 to 5 months, before it went into liquidation.

[51] Taxation Ruling TR2019/1 'When does a company carry on a business?' at paragraph 40.

[52] In Swansea Services McKerracher J at [68 suggested that caution be exercised in applying income tax cases relating to the carrying on of a business when considering whether an enterprise was being carried on for GST purposes].

[53] Toyama at [71] per White J, adopted by McKerracher J in Swansea Services at [64].

[56] Accounts prepared by the Applicant and described as 'STG Freedom 2020 208 Transactions', 'Director Current Account Transactions' and 'GST8 Transactions' for the period July 2016 to June 2020 at T8-212 to 228 indicate three invoices dated 29 June 2020 for a total of approximately $4000, together with five other 'receivables' for amounts of $0.44, $10.80 and $337.76. Other amounts received appear to be small loans from Mr Surana to the Applicant, insurance receipts or manual transactions recognising amounts relating to the ANZ Bank litigation.

[57] Paragraph 4 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[58] The Suranas' home loan was for approximately $310,000 and the car loan for $36,000. The Applicant's business loan was for about $30,000 and the overdraft facility for $20,000.

[59] Fourteen of the sixteen quarterly periods relate to months prior to the commencement of pandemic restrictions.

[60] It is acknowledged that the Respondent contended that it was only necessary to consider the other statutory criteria where the Tribunal found that the Applicant had been carrying on an enterprise.

[61] T8-182, T8-184 to 201, T9-272 to 273.

[63] Including emails in Annexures to the Applicant's SFIC.

[65] T8-202. The six invoices are dated between September 2012 and February 2013.

[68] Australian & New Zealand Banking Group v RQA Accountants Pty Ltd & Ors [2013] NSWSC 165.

[69] RQA and the Suranas were also ordered to pay costs relating to motions filed in relation to an insurance company involved in the litigation.

[70] Australian & New Zealand Banking Group v RQA Accountants Pty Ltd & Ors [2013] NSWSC 985.

[71] Mr Surana was described as the First Applicant in this stay application and Adams J refers to 'he' in his reasons for the costs order.

[72] Surana v ANZ Banking Group Limited [2014] NSWCA 10.

[73] Subsection 29-80(1) of the GST Act and Regulation 29.80.01 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Regulations 2019.

[74] Some items of Miscellaneous Costs, such as 'Costco - tyres', 'Foxtel NBN' and 'Budget Direct - comprehensive insurance' are above the threshold.

[75] This included extracts from the accounts of the Applicant as reconstructed when its ASIC registration was reinstated, see T8-215 to 240. Some of these extracts related to periods after the Relevant Periods.

[76] Examples include 'Bunnings,' 'Australia Post,' 'Masters Home Improvement,' 'KJ Pest Management,' 'Foxtel NBN', 'TPG,' 'GoDaddy US.'

[77] For example, 'fuel expenses', vehicle insurance and registration, 'Costco - tyres', car mechanic expenses.

[78] Paragraphs 12 to 13 of the Applicant's SFIC.

[79] This email was then filed by the Applicant with the Tribunal.

[80] In the hearing of this matter Mr Surana requested that the Respondent make its opening submissions and outline of case first, with the Applicant to then respond.

[81] At the hearing the Tribunal confirmed with the Applicant that it had not wished to file submissions. The Respondent also confirmed that it had not filed submissions on the basis that none had been filed by the Applicant.

[82] This document was dated 19 November 2025 which was incorrect as the document was clearly sent to the Tribunal some days earlier. The parties refer to the document as being dated 10 November 2025.