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The listing originated in case-management orders made by a Court of Appeal Registrar on 4 August 2025. The Registrar had fixed the leave application and appeal for concurrent hearing, with a one-day estimate (para 2). AIAC’s motion sought to vary those orders. It relied on s 66 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and potentially s 46(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Price AJA explained that the application had not been argued as a review of a registrar’s decision under s 121(3) of the Supreme Court Act and rr 49.19(1) and 51.59 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). He therefore did not treat it as an application under those review provisions (para 4).

The appeal arose from personal injury proceedings. Zheng claimed damages for injuries suffered in an aircraft accident around September 2017, alleging negligence by AIAC. He commenced the proceedings in 2021, which by the time of this motion had been on foot for more than four years. The judgment noted that the appeal itself would add further delay before the underlying claim could be determined (para 6). Canaan Lawyers Pty Ltd, the second respondent, had filed a submitting appearance and did not actively participate (para 7).

AIAC’s stated reason for seeking postponement was a mediation scheduled for 28 October 2025. The date had been chosen because the solicitors for AIAC and Canaan Lawyers were unavailable during September. AIAC’s solicitor acknowledged that the Registrar had not been told about the planned mediation at the 4 August directions hearing (para 8).

AIAC argued that the mediation might settle the dispute and that postponing the appeal hearing would accord with the Civil Procedure Act’s purposes (para 9). Zheng opposed the motion. His position was that the appeal might produce a judgment before mediation and help narrow the issues. His solicitor had also identified potential mediators and dates before 25 September 2025 (para 10). Price AJA dismissed the motion and ordered AIAC to pay Zheng’s costs (para 18).

Why the court decided this way

The Court treated the application as a case-management question, not simply as a matter of accommodating the parties’ preferred mediation date. Price AJA referred to the established principles concerning ss 56–58 of the Civil Procedure Act, citing authorities including Aon Risk Services, Halpin, Richards and Bi v Mourad (para 11). He did not repeat those authorities’ principles in detail. Instead, he highlighted the balance between timely resolution, avoiding delay, reducing costs and properly considering the issues.

The judgment emphasised that parties do not control the management or speed of their own cases, and that timely disposition is central to the provision of justice (para 12). This was important to the motion because postponing the appeal would have delayed a determination in proceedings that had already been on foot for more than four years.

The first consideration specific to the proposed mediation was whether an appeal before mediation would harm the prospect of settlement. Price AJA was “not persuaded” that it would (para 13). He reasoned that the appeal could clarify whether the AIAC report and other expert evidence were admissible, and that this clarification was likely to increase the prospects of resolution (para 13). This was a case-specific assessment: the judgment does not state that appeal hearings generally assist mediations, only that this hearing could resolve an issue relevant to these parties’ discussions.

The Court also considered whether mediation could happen before the appeal hearing. Zheng had identified several respected mediators and dates available before 17 September 2025. AIAC’s solicitor was apparently unavailable from that date onwards, but the identified options were earlier than that unavailability (paras 14–15). The Court therefore had a practical alternative before it to the proposed postponement: the appeal hearing could remain listed while mediation was explored on an earlier date.

Delay and its human context also mattered. Price AJA noted that about eight years had elapsed since Zheng suffered serious injuries and stated that he was entitled to have the appeal determined without delay (para 16). The Court of Appeal was available to hear it on 25 September 2025. That date would allow the contentious issue to be dealt with “in a timely and efficient manner” (para 16).

The conclusion followed from the combined considerations, rather than from the mediation date alone. Price AJA held that the overriding purpose in s 56, case-management objects in s 57, elimination of delay in s 59 and dictates of justice in s 58 all pointed to proceeding on 25 September (para 17). The notice of motion was dismissed, with costs payable by AIAC (para 18).

Before and after state of the law

The judgment presents itself as an application of existing case-management principles, not as a decision changing or newly defining them. Price AJA said the principles applicable to ss 56–58 were “well known” and expressly declined to repeat the relevant authorities in full (para 11). He cited Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University, Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd v Cassar, Halpin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd, Bi v Mourad, Richards v Cornford (No 3) and Cockburn v GIO Finance Ltd (para 11). He also referred to Nguyen v Nguyen and O’Hare v Bradfield Bentley Pty Ltd (in liq) concerning timely disposition and case management (para 12).

The principles stated in this judgment are therefore framed as established propositions: case management involves balancing speed, cost and proper consideration of the issues; delay matters; and the parties cannot dictate the pace of the litigation (paras 11–12). The decision applies those propositions to a specific request to postpone an appeal hearing because of a later mediation.

The “after” position apparent from the judgment is a practical illustration of how those principles were applied in this procedural setting. The Court treated the potential benefit of mediation as relevant but not decisive. It weighed that benefit against the possibility that the appeal could assist settlement, the availability of mediators before the hearing, and the existing delay in the personal injury proceedings (paras 13–17). It did not announce a general rule that a hearing should never be adjourned for mediation, or that mediation must always occur before an appeal.

The judgment also draws a procedural boundary around its own analysis. Although AIAC invoked several sources of power, the motion was not argued as a review of the Registrar’s decision under the identified provisions of the Supreme Court Act and the UCPR. Price AJA accordingly did not decide it on that basis (para 4). The text does not establish how a properly argued registrar-review application would have been determined.

Key passages with plain-English translation

At [12], the Court said that “the parties cannot determine the management of their own cases in their own way and at their own speed”. In context, this expresses the case-management principle that a court’s responsibility to manage proceedings is not displaced by the parties’ preferences about timing. The judgment links that proposition to the timely disposition of litigation.

At [13], Price AJA said he was not persuaded that hearing the appeal before mediation would jeopardise a successful outcome. He considered that the appeal could clarify whether the AIAC report and other expert reports were admissible. In plain English, the Court saw the appeal as potentially supplying information that could make settlement discussions more focused, rather than necessarily undermining them.

At [14]–[15], the Court considered the available mediation arrangements. The first respondent had identified mediators willing and available before 25 September, and the material indicated that the applicant’s solicitor was unavailable from 17 September. These details mattered because they showed that a mediation before the hearing was not merely theoretical on the material before the Court. The reasons do not record that an earlier mediation was ultimately held.

At [16], the Court referred to the eight years since Zheng’s serious injuries and stated that he was entitled to have the appeal determined without delay. The passage explains why the history of the underlying dispute was relevant to the listing question. The Court considered the effect of another postponement on the progress of proceedings, rather than treating the requested two-month relisting as an isolated scheduling preference.

At [17], the Court summarised its conclusion by identifying ss 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the Civil Procedure Act. In plain English, it considered that the statutory purposes and case-management objectives, taken together, favoured keeping the 25 September date. The Court then dismissed the motion and made a costs order against AIAC (para 18).

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

The decision is most directly relevant to procedural applications seeking to vacate or postpone a listed appeal hearing because a mediation is scheduled later. Its significance is especially close where the requested adjournment would add to delay in underlying proceedings, the appeal may clarify an issue relevant to settlement discussions, or evidence shows that mediation could be arranged before the hearing.

The judgment also illustrates the relevance of the parties’ practical scheduling evidence. AIAC explained why the October mediation date had been chosen, including the September unavailability of its solicitors and those of the second respondent. The first respondent, however, identified mediators and potential dates before the appeal hearing (paras 8, 14–15). The Court considered those competing circumstances rather than treating the existence of a booked mediation as determinative.

The decision is a procedural ruling on its facts. It does not establish that a scheduled mediation is never a sufficient reason to seek an adjournment, nor that a court must always proceed with a listed hearing when mediation is possible beforehand. The reasons depend on the particular record: the length of the existing delay, the likely utility of determining an evidence issue, the availability of mediators and the circumstances put forward for the requested postponement (paras 6, 8–10, 13–17).

The judgment may also be relevant where a party seeks a listing change after a registrar has made case-management orders. However, its treatment of the source of power is limited. The motion was not argued as a review under the provisions identified in paragraph 4, and Price AJA did not determine it on that basis. Any comparison with a registrar-review application therefore requires attention to that procedural difference.

How later courts have treated it

The supplied judgment contains no decisions of later courts discussing or applying Australian International Aviation College Pty Ltd v Zheng. It was delivered on 18 August 2025, and the material provided gives no subsequent case history. Accordingly, no conclusion about its later treatment can be drawn from this source.

The judgment itself relies on earlier authorities. It cites Aon Risk Services, Hans Pet Constructions, Halpin, Bi v Mourad, Richards, Cockburn, Nguyen and O’Hare as sources for the case-management principles it applies (paras 11–12). It also refers to Tomko v Palasty (No 2) and Charlton v National Australia Bank Ltd when explaining why the motion was not treated as a registrar-review application (para 4). Those are relationships between this judgment and earlier authorities, not evidence of how later courts have treated the 2025 decision.

For research purposes, the distinction matters: the reasons show how Price AJA applied established procedural principles to this motion, but they do not establish whether subsequent courts have followed, distinguished or qualified that application.

Still-open questions

The judgment leaves open how a similar application would be resolved where there is no practical opportunity to mediate before the listed hearing. Here, potential mediators and dates before 25 September were identified (paras 14–15). The reasons do not determine the weight a court would give to a mediation that could not occur until after the hearing.

It also leaves open how the balance might change if the appeal were unlikely to clarify an issue relevant to settlement. The Court considered that this appeal could determine whether the AIAC report and other expert evidence were admissible (para 13). The reasons do not address a case in which an appeal hearing would have no comparable connection to the issues under discussion at mediation.

The judgment does not set out a general test or a checklist for applications to vacate hearing dates. It refers to the established principles and applies them to the circumstances before it (paras 11–17). Nor does it determine the substantive merits of AIAC’s appeal, the admissibility of the reports, or the underlying negligence claim. Those matters are not decided in this motion.

Finally, the decision does not resolve the outcome of a registrar-review application under s 121(3) of the Supreme Court Act and rr 49.19(1) and 51.59 of the UCPR. The motion was not argued on that basis (para 4). That distinction should be kept in view when using this decision to analyse a challenge to a registrar’s case-management order.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.