(a) 26 February 2025, > > (b) 9 July 2025 and > > (c) 11 July 2025 (save for paragraphs [89] and [91] which were not read).:

5. In allowing the Reinstatement Application I deemed it unnecessary to provide substantial reasons (ie beyond the formal decision itself) where I was satisfied that it was appropriate to exercise the discretion to reinstate the Application under s 102(9) and in circumstances where:
   • the parties had asked the Tribunal to make a decision 'on the papers';
   • the Respondent had indicated to the Tribunal, through its counsel at the hearing of an earlier interlocutory application on 10 July 2025, that it held instructions to 'not oppose' an application brought by the Applicant for reinstatement should it be made instanter; and
   • the Respondent had confirmed, after being served with copies of the Applicant's Reinstatement Application and the supporting material, that they did not oppose the Reinstatement Application (save for objections to particular material that were subsequently not relied upon).
6. In deciding not to provide reasons I was conscious that the circumstances surrounding the dismissal had been well ventilated in the earlier interlocutory application and parties, as I understood, were hopeful the question around reinstatement might be determined as expeditiously as a proper consideration of the application for reinstatement would allow. I was also aware that the parties were involved in a related winding up application in the Federal Court which was next listed on 16 July 2025 and where the 'status' of the application in the Tribunal bore some relevance.
7. In providing the decision to the parties on 15 July 2025 I asked that the Parties be advised that the Tribunal "did not propose to provide written reasons beyond the decision itself, unless either party makes a request that such reasons be provided".
8. On 21 July 2025 the Respondent's representatives wrote to the Tribunal as follows "Respondent respectfully requests the Tribunal provide written reasons for the decision dated 15 July 2025".
9. In response to that request I now provide the following reasons explaining why I was satisfied on 15 July 2025 that the application should be reinstated.
10. Under section 102 of the ART Act the Tribunal has a discretion to reinstate matters where an application has been dismissed. Where the Tribunal has dismissed an application (as is the case here) for non-compliance with the Tribunal's past directions s 102 relevantly provides:
    1. Reinstatement of application

(1) This section applies if the Tribunal dismisses an application.

Party may apply for reinstatement if application dismissed in error

(5) A party to the proceeding in relation to the application may apply to the Tribunal for reinstatement of the application on the grounds of error within 28 days after the party receives notice that the application is dismissed (or such longer period as the Tribunal, in special circumstances, allows).

(6) If a party applies under subsection (5) and the Tribunal considers that the application was dismissed in error, the Tribunal may reinstate the application and make such orders as appear to the Tribunal to be appropriate in the circumstances.

Parties can apply for reinstatement in other specified circumstances

(c) section 100 (Tribunal may dismiss application if applicant fails to comply with order etc.);

a party to the proceeding in relation to the application may apply to the Tribunal for reinstatement of the application within 28 days after the party receives notice that the application is dismissed (or such longer period as the Tribunal, in special circumstances, allows).

(8) However, the applicant cannot apply if the application is dismissed under section 95 (applicant may withdraw application).

(9) If a party applies under subsection (7) and the Tribunal considers it appropriate to reinstate the application, the Tribunal may reinstate the application and make such orders as appear to the Tribunal to be appropriate in the circumstances.

1. On 10 July 2025 the Applicant was provided with a notice confirming that:

Following the Applicant's non-compliance with the Directions we confirm that the Application stands dismissed under s100(b) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) and has done so since the date of non-compliance with Directions, being 5pm, Friday 28 March 2025.

2. The Applicant's Reinstatement Application which it lodged and served on 14 July 2025 claimed that the application should be reinstated because it was appropriate in the circumstance or, alternatively, on the grounds that the application had been dismissed in error.
3. The Applicant in its written submissions argued that it was appropriate for the application to be reinstated for the following reasons:

a) The respondent does not oppose the reinstatement application. > > b) There is a reasonable explanation for the issues that resulted in the dismissal, being effectively the same reasonable explanation that justified the making of the self-executing order, being the personal circumstances of the solicitor on record for the applicant. > > c) There is a reasonable explanation for the slips in and non-compliance with the tribunal timetable in relation to filing and serving the applicant's statement of facts, issues and contentions and any material and evidence, those reasons being outside of its control. > > d) The applicant has strong merits and prospects of success in the substantive tribunal proceeding. > > e) The applicant will suffer irreparable material prejudice if the reinstatement application is not granted and the tribunal proceeding is not reinstated. In particular, the applicant is the defendant in winding up proceedings commenced by the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, and the progress and outcome of the tribunal proceeding is material to the applicant's defence of that winding up application, such that if the reinstatement is not granted, the applicant will likely be wound up in insolvency. The winding up application court proceeding is next listed before the Federal Court of Australia on 16 July 2025. > > f) That is to say, it will be catastrophic for the applicant if the tribunal does not grant the reinstatement application. > > g) The respondent has not contended that the respondent will suffer any prejudice by the tribunal granting the reinstatement application and reinstating the tribunal proceeding. Indeed, the respondent does not oppose the reinstatement application. > > h) More, any prejudice to the respondent will be cured by case management orders by consent that the applicant anticipates the parties will submit to the tribunal, and which the respondent has indicated may be provided to the tribunal if the reinstatement is granted.

1. Other litigants are not prejudiced, or if so, are not materially prejudiced. The tribunal hearing was not listed for substantive final hearing and the case management hearings that will be vacated were not listed for weeks such that other litigants may be able to make use of that now vacated listing.

j) There are public interest considerations in favour of granting the reinstatement application, which also, along with the prospects of success and merits of the applicant's application (and prejudice if not being given the opportunity to prosecute its Part IVC review), formed the basis of the applicant's successful extension of time application to commence the tribunal proceeding application in the first place. > > k) The reinstatement does not necessitate the adjournment of a final substantive hearing, as it was not yet listed.

1. The applicant applied for reinstatement promptly, within two (2) business days of receiving notice of the dismissal on 10 July 2025.

m) The applicant lodged and served its documents in chief and the case can be progressed. That is, the compliance and progress of the application has been adequately secured. > > n) The parties will approach the tribunal with case management orders by consent, which the respondent has indicated may be provided to the tribunal if the reinstatement is granted. > > o) .... > > p) ....

4. The Applicant then argued that, "in the alternative, ...the tribunal proceeding was dismissed in error, namely that the tribunal intended the self-executing order to operate at 12:01am on 29 March 2025". I do not propose to address whether "the tribunal proceeding was dismissed in error" as I was otherwise satisfied that it was appropriate to reinstate the application.
5. As mentioned above the Applicant's application was supported by 3 affidavits of his solicitor Meena Hanna sworn 26 February 2025 (1st affidavit), 9 July 2025 (2nd affidavit) and 11 July 2025 (3rd Affidavit).
6. The first of those affidavits had been produced ahead of a case management directions hearing conducted on 27 February 2025 and was intended to be relied upon as a basis for seeking a further extension of time to file his client's material and, in doing so, ward off a foreshadowed application to be brought by the Respondent for the application to be dismissed for non-compliance. It set out a range of personal circumstances that were impactive upon the Applicant's solicitor's ability to comply with the Tribunal's timetables on behalf of the Applicant .
7. The second affidavit had been produced and lodged with the Tribunal ahead of the interlocutory application which was heard on 9 July 2025 where the Applicant unsuccessfully sought further directions. It was not read in that application for reasons I explained at paragraph 14 of my decision (see Australian Gold Dealers Pty Ltd and Commissioner of Taxation (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 989). It largely dealt with Mr Hanna's attempts to file material pursuant to the Tribunal's timetable of 27 February 2025 but also disclosed improving personal circumstances.
8. The third affidavit had been produced and lodged with the Tribunal ahead of this Reinstatement Application and primarily deals with:
   • Mr Hanna's ongoing personal challenges;
   • His heavy workloads during the periods of non-compliance;
   • The prejudice that the Applicant would suffer should reinstatement not be afforded; and
   • His opinions that the Applicant's case in the Tribunal is meritorious;
9. Whilst many of the matters deposed to across the 3 affidavits are contextual, and of somewhat limited relevance to the questions I must consider on reinstatement, I accept that they represent, in an earnest and truthful fashion, Mr Hanna's views of the challenges that have beset him to date.
10. The Tribunal's discretion to reinstate matters under section 102(9) of the ART Act has been considered in a number of recent matters (see JTBJ and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social security) [2025] ARTA 464, Djuric and Commissioner of Taxation (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 469 (Djuric) and KBHN and Commissioner of Taxation (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 970 (KBHN)). In KBHN (drawing upon the analysis of authorities undertaken in Djuric) at paragraph [60] the Tribunal itemised four key (albeit non-exhaustive) factors relevant to the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion under s 102(9), those being:

(a) whether there was a reasonable explanation for the issue/s that resulted in the dismissal;

(b) the merits of the substantive case;

(c) any prejudice to the parties; and

(d) any relevant public interest considerations.

1. The Applicant has explained that its past non-compliance was largely attributable to challenging personal circumstances and busy and unfortunately timed workloads experienced by its legal representative. It has also explained that Mr Hanna was working towards filing its material in the period when the Guillotine Direction was scheduled to take effect, was unable to manage to do so but ultimately did in the period immediately after the guillotine fell.
2. On the whole, particularly where the application is unopposed, I accept that the matters addressed by Mr Hanna's 3 affidavits provide an understandable, albeit not entirely satisfactory explanation for the Applicant's non-compliance with both the Guillotine Direction and other directions prior to the 27 February 2025.
3. The Tribunal can be somewhat comforted, at the very least, that the applicant in the hours and days following effective dismissal of the application did proceed to lodge and serve the balance of its material.
4. There is undoubtably a threshold at which a legal practitioner must properly consider, in contemplation of their professional obligations, whether they should continue to act in a particular matter. Mr Hanna implicitly argues that such a threshold has not been reached owing to prejudice that would be suffered by his client if he withdrew having regard to his extended involvement. Again, I accept that point particularly in an unopposed application although the scales regarding that matter are, it must be said, very finely balanced.

1. Turning to an appraisal of the substantive case - as the Tribunal explained in Djuric at [13] (which draws upon an earlier Tribunal decision Clinnick and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2021] AATA 7) "the merits assessment does not need to be meaningful and is "necessarily superficial."
2. In the hours after the Guillotine Direction took effect the Applicant lodged a Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (SFIC) disclosing that the applicant was "dissatisfied with a reviewable objection decision made by the Commissioner of Taxation". That decision disallowed objections to amended assessments of net amounts of goods and services tax and consequent penalty assessments totalling almost $1.9 million which the Respondent had raised after disallowing a range of Input Tax Credits (ITCs) claimed by the applicant across tax periods in the years 2014, 2015 and 2016.
3. The Applicant claimed the ITCs in the course of operating its business as a trader of scrap gold and in its SFIC raised six issues for determination, the first four addressing the validity of a series of transactions where it bought and on-sold scrap precious metal in exchange for cash and gold bullion. On a superficial appraisal each of those issues appears triable and there has been no suggestion raised by the Respondent that the applicant's case is bound to fail.
4. When considered at a high level there is nothing in the Applicant's SFIC or other supporting material filed alongside it, that would lead me to conclude that the Applicant's substantive application was manifestly hopeless in a way that would weigh against reinstatement.

Prejudice, Public Interest & Other Considerations

1. In the context of an unopposed application I would not propose to labour the extent to which there might be prejudice to the Respondent's position. One would imagine that if there was significant prejudice to his position then the Commissioner would have drawn those to the Tribunal's attention as part of this application.
2. I accept and its somewhat self-evident that the Applicant would be prejudiced if not allowed to further prosecute its case.
3. I will note however that the Applicant's non-compliance is likely to have caused the Respondent and the Tribunal to expend additional resources not least through the conduct of what seems to be two somewhat unnecessary interlocutory applications. In all the circumstances I would likely have granted what would have been a very short extension of time to comply with the obligations that caused the dismissal had such a request been made. None of this, however, would convince me that reinstatement was not appropriate.
4. Finally, per paragraph [5] above, for the reasons contained herein I was satisfied when I made my decision on 15 July 2025 that it was appropriate to exercise the discretion to reinstate the Application under s 102(9) of the ART Act.