Penalty considerations and the range of penalties
35 Under s 224(3) of the Australian Consumer Law, the pecuniary penalty is not to exceed $1.1 million for each act or omission concerning ss 29(1)(a) and 33 (both of which are contained in Part 3-1).
36 Both the Commission and RL Adams submitted that the contraventions in this case should be treated as a single course of conduct and subject to a single penalty. There is authority to support that submission as a general practice, although it is not a rule of law: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Rural Press Ltd [2001] FCA 1065; [2001] ATPR 41-833 [19] (Mansfield J); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v ABB Transmission and Distribution Ltd (No 2) [2002] FCA 559; (2002) 190 ALR 169, 179-180 [38] (Finkelstein J); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CI & Co Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1511 [27] (North J).
37 The authorities above do not require that a series of contraventions, involving different acts, be treated as a single course of conduct. Rather, the approach to be taken is based upon the principle of totality which requires that the total penalty for related offences should not exceed that which is proper for the entire contravening conduct. In the circumstances of this case, I consider that the totality principle should apply and the contraventions treated as a single instance of contravening conduct. These circumstances include that the conduct involved a series of very closely related contraventions, over approximately 9 months (which is considerably shorter than some other cases), that this was the first occurrence of these contraventions which occurred from the time that RL Adams commenced operation, and the early admission of responsibility by RL Adams coupled with its assistance to the Commission.
38 Although I have applied the totality principle in this case, and although both parties effectively submitted that it should be applied, there are some considerations pointing against application of the principle in a manner which would treat the pecuniary penalty contraventions by RL Adams as if they were a single act. Those considerations include the difference between the representations on Free Range Egg Cartons and those on the Mountain Range Egg Website, in the context of the need for general deterrence.
39 Section 224(2) of the Australian Consumer Law provides that in determining the appropriate pecuniary penalty, the court must have regard to all relevant matters including:
(a) the nature and extent of the act or omission and of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the act or omission; and
(b) the circumstances in which the act or omission took place; and
(c) whether the person has previously been found by a court in proceedings under Chapter 4 or this Part to have engaged in any similar conduct.
40 There will be very few facts that are not included within the breadth of these matters. For instance, the "circumstances" in which the act takes place includes circumstances which precede the act as well as those which are contemporaneous to it.
41 In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] FCA 761; (2011) 282 ALR 246, 250-251 [11], Perram J described a number of matters which could be taken into account under the equivalent provision to s 224. That list was referred to without demur on appeal: Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] FCAFC 20; (2012) 287 ALR 249, 258 [37] (the Court). It has also been relied upon on numerous occasions although, as senior counsel for the Commission accurately submitted, lists of factors only serve as general guidance:
(1) the size of the contravening company;
(2) the deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended;
(3) whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management of the contravener or at some lower level;
(4) whether the contravener has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the Act (or the new Australian Competition and Consumer Law) as evidenced by educational programmes and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention;
(5) whether the contravener has shown a disposition to co-operate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Act in relation to the contravention;
(6) whether the contravener has engaged in similar conduct in the past;
(7) the financial position of the contravener; and
(8) whether the contravening conduct was systematic, deliberate or covert.
42 To these factors can be added:
(9) whether the contravening company made a profit from the contraventions;
(10) the extent of the profit made by the contravening company; and
(11) whether the contravening company engaged in the conduct with an intention to profit from it.
43 Factors (9) to (11) are important for reasons of both general and specific deterrence. The need for deterrence is iterated, and reiterated, constantly in pecuniary penalty cases. This highlights the importance of deterrence in Australian case law in this area. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 54; (2013) 250 CLR 640, 659 [66], French CJ, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ in quoted from the Full Court of the Federal Court that a penalty "must be fixed with a view to ensuring that the penalty is not such as to be regarded by [the] offender or others as an acceptable cost of doing business. ... [T]hose engaged in trade and commerce must be deterred from the cynical calculation involved in weighing up the risk of penalty against the profits to be made from contravention." See also Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR 41-076, 51,152 (French J).
44 The current state of Australian law after the decision of the High Court of Australia in Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; (2014) 253 CLR 58 arises from the decision in Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCAFC 59. In that case the Full Court of the Federal Court held that the decision in Barbaro applies to civil penalty cases and that (at [239]) "[t]he impermissible expression of an opinion as to the amount of the penalty reflects a well-established limitation upon the ambit of a party's right to make submissions".
45 Unfortunately, RL Adams made a submission that it was willing to submit to a pecuniary penalty of $250,000. Senior counsel for the Commission correctly submitted that such a submission is directly inconsistent with the reasoning in CFMEU. The Commission's submission is correct. There is no foundation in the CFMEU decision for a submission to be made of the nature that was made by RL Adams.
46 Counsel for RL Adams sought to draw support from [241] of the CFMEU decision. He submitted that this paragraph permitted RL Adams to make submissions about a "significant" penalty. In that paragraph the Full Court said:
As to an agreed penalty, we have previously indicated that any admission of liability may be a relevant consideration in sentencing or imposing a pecuniary penalty. Willingness to submit to the imposition of a substantial penalty may also be relevant in that way. However, even if the offender nominates a substantial figure as the penalty to which it will submit, the Court must still fix the appropriate penalty, taking into account such contrition as well as all other relevant considerations. As we have said, any such agreement is no more than an expression of a shared opinion, and therefore inadmissible. As we have also said, the amount of the agreed penalty may simply reflect the point at which each party considers that it is in its interest to agree. In either case, the agreed amount offers no assistance in fixing the amount of the appropriate penalty. (Italics in original, bold emphasis added).
47 Two points should be made about this paragraph.
48 First, the word "significant" is not used. The Full Court refers to a "substantial" penalty. This is a penalty which has more than an insubstantial effect.
49 Secondly, there is a difference between accepting the imposition of a substantial penalty and undertaking to pay it, which is evidence of contrition, and the nomination of the amount of that penalty. Nothing in the decision in CFMEU, nor the passage quoted above (which includes the qualification "Even if") suggests that a respondent can legitimately nominate the amount of a penalty to which it would be prepared to submit. The submission by RL Adams about the amount of the penalty to which it was prepared to submit should not have been made.
50 However, the Full Court in CFMEU did accept, at [252], that "the development of a consistent approach to the fixing of pecuniary penalties necessitates reference to prior decisions". In a criminal sentencing approach this reference to prior decisions is sometimes described as identification of a "range" of sentences. Counsel for both parties properly made reference to a number of cases, including some of the cases discussed in the introduction to these reasons.
51 With contraventions of the nature of those in this case, the breadth and variety of the many factors involved in an assessment of pecuniary penalties has the effect that any range of penalties derived from previous cases can only ever be stated in very broad terms. Indeed, the well-established term "range" can sometimes be misleading. It might be more accurate to say that an assessment of the general run of cases, including the cases mentioned in the introduction to these reasons, has so far revealed that penalties for contraventions by corporations have varied from $100,000 to $400,000.
52 Two points should be made about this general run of cases.
53 First, the penalties in the general run of cases can be of limited utility when descending to the particular circumstances of a case in a context such as this where the facts can differ greatly and where there is not yet a significant volume of cases to establish a general run. For instance, in one case involving a significant penalty, the respondents (in Turi Foods (No 5)) were Australia's largest chicken meat producers and made no admission of responsibility. In another, the conduct (in Pepe's Ducks Ltd) occurred over a period of 8 years by a company that supplied 40% of the Australian market, selling 80,000 ducks a week. If the view were reached that the penalties in these cases were now inadequate to establish general deterrence then the penalties in the general run of cases could shift substantially.
54 There may be a basis for a future submission that the penalties in Turi Foods (No 5) and Pepe's Ducks Ltd (which was an agreed penalty) are no longer adequate as guides for general deterrence. There does appear, at first blush, to be a disproportionately large number of penalty decisions concerning "free range" representations in recent years particularly in circumstances in which, as senior counsel for the Commission submitted, contraventions of this nature are not easily investigated. However, counsel for RL Adams submitted, and I accept, that any such conclusion would depend upon some degree of analysis, and possibly statistical analysis, of past contravening. No such submissions were made in this case.
55 On my assessment of the published decisions concerning "free range" type representations, although I consider that there may be doubt that the penalties imposed in those cases remain an adequate general deterrent, on the information before me and in the absence of any evidence or submissions on this point I will not treat those cases, and the general run of cases to date, as revealing any inadequacy for general deterrence such that it might now be manifestly inadequate for penalties to be imposed such as those awarded in some of the previous cases I have mentioned: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chopra [2015] FCA 539 [52]-[53].
56 The suggestion that particular submissions concerning general deterrence might be made is not to suggest, contrary to CFMEU, that parties should make submissions concerning any particular amount of penalty or any range of penalties. General deterrence is, on the authorities, an extremely relevant concern. It is appropriate that submissions be made about factors with which the Court is concerned. Senior counsel for the Commission made careful and helpful submissions about general deterrence generally.
57 Secondly, some of the cases from which the general run of penalties can be assessed involved orders about the amount of the penalty which reflect those proposed by agreement of the parties. In CFMEU, the Full Court said at [238] that "where a penalty has been fixed in that way, the decision may not be treated as helpful in future cases, save to the extent that it indicates a position adopted by a regulator to which it should be held in later cases".
58 I turn then to my reasoning concerning several of the central considerations in relation to penalty.