Heinz's state of mind
21 Heinz's state of mind in relation to the contraventions is very relevant to the assessment of the culpability of its conduct. The Full Court in Reckitt Benckiser stated the position:
[131] If a contravention does not involve any state of mind then it is for the party asserting any particular state of mind (be it a deliberate flouting of the law, recklessness, wilful blindness, "courting the risk", negligence, or innocence or any other characterisation of state of mind) to prove its assertion. If, in the event, neither party discharges its onus to establish any particular state of mind in relation to the contraventions, the Court determines penalty on no more than the fact of the proscribed nature of the conduct … However, if any degree of awareness of the actual or potential unlawfulness of the conduct is proved then, all other things being equal, the contravention is necessarily more serious. Such awareness may be able to be inferred from the very nature of the conduct or representations constituting the conduct. …
22 The ACCC's Statement of Claim contained allegations that Heinz knew or ought to have known that, by reason of the statements and images depicted on the packaging of each Product, it had made (relevantly) the Healthy Food Representations. The Statement of Claim alleged further that Heinz had known or ought to have known that each representation was false or misleading. At the request of the parties, the Court ordered that those allegations be determined as part of the liability hearing. In the Liability Judgment, I found that the ACCC had not established either limb of its claims of actual knowledge, at [291]. I was, however, satisfied that Heinz ought to have known that it was making each of the Healthy Food Representations and that each was false - see [292] and [312] of the Liability Judgment.
23 At the penalty hearing, Heinz submitted that the conduct of Heinz involved wilful blindness or recklessness. This submission came as something of a surprise for two reasons. First, because the ACCC had sought that the state of Heinz's knowledge be part of the case to be determined in the liability trial and it had not raised any allegation of recklessness or wilful blindness as part of that case. Secondly, the submission concerning recklessness or wilful blindness was made for the first time in the oral submissions at the penalty hearing, not having been foreshadowed at all in the ACCC's written submissions on relief filed and served pursuant to the Court's order of 10 April 2018. That being so, I accept the submission of counsel for Heinz that the ACCC submission on this topic involves some unfairness to it.
24 Counsel for the ACCC did not elaborate the notion of recklessness for which the ACCC contended. One well understood meaning of the word describes the state of mind in which persons appreciate the possibility or probability that their conduct will cause some harmful consequence, but decide to proceed with an indifference to, or disregard of, those consequences or of the risk that they may be realised. For reasons which I will elaborate below, that is not a reasonable characterisation of Heinz's state of mind with respect to its supply of the Shredz Products.
25 There is a notion of objective recklessness. It describes the state of mind in which persons engage in conduct causing harm without appreciating that their conduct involves an obvious risk of that harm being caused. Objective recklessness has been described as the practical equivalent of a high level of negligence: Couch v The Attorney-General [2010] NZSC 27; [2010] 3 NZLR 149 at [100]. The ACCC's submissions did not refer to this form of recklessness and, in any event, for the reasons to be elaborated below, I do not consider that it is a proper characterisation of Heinz's state of mind.
26 Counsel for the ACCC did not elaborate the sense in which he used the term "wilful blindness". Commonly, it is understood as referring to the state of mind in which persons shut their eyes to the obvious. Again, for the reasons to be given below, I do not consider that that is an appropriate characterisation of Heinz's state of mind.
27 In the liability trial, Heinz led evidence from five of its employees who had been involved in the development of the Products and in the development of their packaging. For present purposes, it is sufficient to refer to the evidence of three, Ms Tatt, Ms Rigas and Ms Russell. At [54] of the Liability Judgment, I indicated my satisfaction that Ms Tatt and Ms Rigas, and for the most part, Ms Russell, were honest and reliable witnesses who had gone about their tasks within Heinz in a conscientious manner.
28 Both Ms Tatt and Ms Rigas were members of the Heinz Scientific and Regulatory Affairs (SARA) team. Ms Rigas filled in for Ms Tatt while she was on maternity leave from June 2014 to June 2015 and so was involved in the development of the packaging for the Fruit and Chia Product. She was not involved in the development of the packaging for the Berries and Peach Products. Both Ms Tatt and Ms Rigas have tertiary degrees in Food Science and Nutrition.
29 Ms Tatt said that the SARA team was responsible "for reviewing all Heinz products across Australia and New Zealand for compliance with the Australian New Zealand Food Standards Code (Food Standards Code), which includes various food standards, including the Nutrition, Health and Related Claims, Standard 1.2.7 (the Standard) and to assess and approve technical information". Ms Tatt also identified her responsibilities in 2012 and 2013 as including:
(a) providing regulatory guidance regarding food law compliance for Heinz products to other teams, including the Legal, Marketing and Product Development teams, in response to queries about a proposed product and the requirements of the Food Standards Code;
(b) assessing the ingredient list and packaging of Heinz products for compliance with the Food Standards Code, including the various standards, with the most relevant standards for infant products being the Standard and the Infant Standard;
(c) assessing and advising on proposed marketing material, product launches, campaigns, social media and websites; and
(d) attending weekly SARA team meetings.
30 Both Ms Tatt and Ms Rigas described the system within Heinz for the development of new products and the packaging for them. The system involves a number of stages: ideation, product development, on packet information (OPI) review (which is essentially concerned with the identification of the ingredient list and other technical information), and review of the packaging and artwork developed by the Heinz Marketing team. As members of the SARA team, Ms Tatt and Ms Rigas assessed the artwork and packaging for accuracy against the OPI list of ingredients. For this purpose, they used an internal Heinz form known as the Packaging Artwork Approval Form (PAAF). Copies of the PAAF with respect to each of the three Products were in evidence. They indicate that the proposed packaging was reviewed and approved by a number of persons within Heinz, including members of the marketing team, the product development team, the SARA team, the legal team and the packaging team. Each person was required to indicate his or her approval of the packaging proposed for each Product. The evidence indicates that this course was followed in relation to each of the Products. In [313] of the Liability Judgment, I expressed my satisfaction that each of the Heinz witnesses had endeavoured to carry out their roles in the development of the Products and of their packaging in a conscientious and diligent way and that those with responsibility for the development of the packaging had endeavoured to avoid the making of any statements, express or implied which may be misleading or deceptive.
31 With one exception, Heinz did not lead any evidence from a member of its marketing or legal teams. The exception is Ms Fox, its General Counsel, but it does not appear that Ms Fox had any involvement in the development of the packaging for the Products. The ACCC did not submit that any adverse inference should be drawn against Heinz by reason of the absence of evidence from a member of either its marketing or legal teams.
32 On my assessment, the evidence of Ms Tatt, Ms Rigas and Ms Russell is inconsistent with Heinz having engaged in a form of advertent or subjective recklessness or with wilful blindness. Nor does it support a conclusion that Heinz acted with the high degree of carelessness associated with the notion of objective recklessness.
33 I consider that the penalties should be assessed on the basis of the findings concerning Heinz's knowledge set out in the Liability Judgment. That is that Heinz ought to have been aware that it was making the Healthy Food Representation in relation to each Product. Just as ordinary reasonable consumers would have understood Heinz to be making that representation, so should Heinz itself. I am also satisfied that Heinz ought to have known that the Healthy Food Representation was false or misleading. Had Heinz adverted to the fact that it was making the Healthy Food Representation, it would have appreciated that the representation was not true insofar as it represented that consumption of the Products was beneficial to the health of toddlers.
34 It follows that I do not accept the ACCC's submission that Heinz had deliberately engaged in conduct contravening s 29(1)(g) of the ACL.